Siege of Kheshani

The Kheshan base was built in 1962 as a camp of the civil defense forces of South Vietnam in the village of the same name in the mountainous region of South Vietnam , not far from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and the Lao border. At the end of 1966, the US Army Special Forces moved to a new camp (Langway) southwest of Kheshan, and the base was occupied by US Marine Corps . It was the westernmost point of the McNamara Line , the construction of which was unfolding at that time in order to stop the penetration of North Vietnamese units through the DMZ. Kheshan was used as a training base for anti-communist Thiong tribes and as a starting point for special forces engaged in reconnaissance on the Ho Chi Minh Trail .

The commander of the US forces in South Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, considered Kheshan a strategic point and the most important base if he received permission from the US political leadership to conduct an operation against the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos (which did not happen) ^{[~ 2]} . However, the command of the Marine Corps, which was responsible for conducting military operations in the northern provinces of the country, was skeptical of both the base itself, considering it to have no military significance, and the “McNamara Line” under construction. To protect the base, it was forced to constantly keep a battalion on it, which thereby was distracted from conducting offensive operations in other places.

Until 1967, almost no hostilities were fought in the Kheshan region, and the base practically did not play a role in the ongoing war. In this regard, the command decided to leave only one company in Kheshan. As it turned out, it was at this moment north of the base that large North Vietnamese forces concentrated, preparing to seize it. The enemy was accidentally discovered on April 24 by a small patrol. In the next two weeks, fierce battles took place on the heights dominating the base, through which ultimately two marines battalions marched. The North Vietnamese suffered heavy losses and retreated - the first attempt to take Kheshan failed. Until the end of the year, the situation in the base area remained calm, although by the beginning of winter intelligence reports on the concentration of enemy forces here became more frequent. The center of hostilities in the DMZ area has moved to Kontkhen .

By the end of 1967, the United States Marine Corps in the province of Kuangchi occupied mainly defensive positions along the DMZ. The US command had too few troops to simultaneously continue the offensive operations and ensure the safety of the construction of the McNamara Line. The North Vietnamese army stepped up action on the eve of the upcoming Tet offensive . As early as August 1967, it became clear that any supply convoy that traveled along the only land route to Kheshan (road No. 9) was in danger of being ambushed. From that moment, the base was supplied only by air. In September, the base of Contienne was besieged, withstood many days of artillery and rocket fire with the participation of guns up to 152 mm. In December, U.S. intelligence received information that two divisions of the North Vietnamese army were advancing in the direction of Kheshan.

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  Kheshan Military Base Plan

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  Kuangchi Province and Kheshan Base in its Western Part

In January 1968, it was already obvious to the US command that the enemy was going to take large-scale action near Kheshan. Westmoreland decided to organize permanent air support for the garrison base involving tactical and strategic ( B-52 bombers ) aviation - this plan was codenamed Niagara. In addition, additional forces were transferred to the base, and by the end of January Kheshan defended a reinforced regiment (the 26th regiment of the 3rd Marine Division, consisting of four American battalions and a South Vietnamese ranger battalion), whose units occupied not only the base itself, but also heights northeast of it, for which battles were fought last year. These forces were commanded by Colonel David Lownds.

On January 20, the North Vietnamese junior officer voluntarily surrendered to the sentry on the perimeter of the base, reporting that the base would be attacked in the coming hours. On the morning of January 21, Kheshan was subjected to heavy artillery shelling, during which the main ammunition depot was destroyed. At the same time, a Marine Corps post at an altitude of 861 and a Kheshan village a few kilometers from the base itself were attacked by land. The Marines repelled the attack at a height, but the village was lost. On the same day, the main phase of Operation Niagara began.

Directly in the base area were two full divisions of the North Vietnamese army — the 304th and 325C ^{[~ 3]} - as well as at least two regiments from other divisions. As North Vietnamese defense minister Vo Nguyen Zyap claimed, the purpose of the siege of Kheshan was to divert the attention and strength of the enemy on the eve of the Tet offensive planned for late January. Some American authors question this assertion, believing that the true purpose of the North Vietnamese was to seize the base, which would be a serious defeat for the United States. There is also some confusion as to whether Zyap personally supervised the hostilities from the field headquarters near the base. In his scandalous interview with the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, Zyap emphasized that Kheshan was not and could not be a repetition of Dienbyenfu . But the top American leadership took the concentration of large enemy forces around the base precisely as an attempt by the Vietnamese to repeat the success of Dienbienfu - the battle of 1954, in which the Vietnamese army after a two-month siege captured a well-fortified French fortress. It is believed that it was the defeat at Dienbienf that finally forced France to sign the Geneva agreements and abandon their colonies in Indochina . It was this parallel that was drawn by the American media, and this seriously bothered President Lyndon Johnson . He constantly monitored the events in Kheshan (for which a special model of the base was created in the White House ) and ordered that the support of the besieged garrison be given priority over all other operations in Vietnam.

One of the key factors determining the outcome of the battle was American firepower. Every day, the entire area adjacent to the base was subjected to intense air raids and artillery shelling. At peak times, every 90 minutes, three B-52 bombers raided, each carrying 27 tons of bombs. North Vietnamese troops carefully masked their positions, and a large role in their detection was played by acoustic sensors scattered by American aircraft. These sensors made it possible to timely detect the movement of a large group of people. The effectiveness of such guidance was so high that the North Vietnamese troops were unable to concentrate a sufficient number of units for a successful ground attack, without exposing them to the risk of large losses even before the offensive. A typical example of this was the events of February 29 - March 1, when the base was attacked three times by the forces of the regiment, but each time the units that went on the attack fell under the strongest fire force of aviation and artillery, which made it possible for the South Vietnamese rangers to defend the sector to easily repel the attack. In fact, during the entire siege of Kheshan, the forces of the People’s Army of Vietnam organized only a few attacks of the battalion or regimental level, having achieved success twice: they managed to take the village of Kheshan and the Langvey special forces camp. Not one of the American outposts at the heights around the base was taken, nor was any sector of the base itself. After March 1, ground attacks ceased altogether.

Langway Camp was taken on the night of February 7, 1968 . He defended himself with several hundred militias from local tribes led by the Green Berets and the remnants of the Lao Army battalion, who had to cross the border after the start of the North Vietnamese offensive in southern Laos. The enemy attacked the camp at night, which is why air support for Langway defenders was extremely limited. In addition, during the assault, the North Vietnamese troops successfully used PT-76 tanks - this was the second case of communist forces using tanks in South Vietnam ^{[~ 4]} .

The main method of conducting a siege was regular artillery and mortar shelling. Hundreds of shells and mines were issued daily at the base (the maximum number in one day is 1307). Passive defense and constant shelling negatively affected the morale of the defenders of Kheshan. The living conditions in the siege were quite difficult, water scarcity was especially acute; according to the recollection of a marine who served at an outpost in the mountains, he had half a flask a day for all needs. The base depended entirely on the “air bridge”, and every plane landing in Kheshan met heavy anti-aircraft fire. Unlike Dienbenfu, the losses of transport aircraft in supplying the besieged garrison were very small, but flights to the Kheshan region were still very unsafe. After the Vietnamese managed to bring down the transport C-130 on February 10, the American command banned the landing of this type of aircraft at the airfield of the besieged base. Delivery of cargoes by landing method was continued by not so large (and, accordingly, less vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire) aircraft C-7 and C-123 . This restriction seriously complicated the supply of the garrison, the daily requirements of which were estimated at 235 tons of cargo, since the C-130 was the most spacious of the available aircraft. Then, parachuting cargo began to be practiced. It was most difficult to supply outposts in the mountains; For this, a technique called Super Gaggle was used - the cargo was delivered by a large group of helicopters , which were covered by the same group of A-4 attack aircraft, which suppressed the enemy firing points.

The siege of Kheshani was seen by the American command as an opportunity to fully use the huge firepower of US forces against large enemy forces. As a rule, during the Vietnam War this was not possible, since the NFLJF and the North Vietnamese army preferred to conduct a guerrilla warfare, and the geographical conditions of South Vietnam made it possible to successfully avoid detection even of entire battalions. However, even firepower did not guarantee the retention of the base. The American media paid a great deal of attention to the siege, and it was obvious that the fall of Kheshan would be a very big success for the communist forces, if not military, then propaganda. Daily reports on the situation around the base and the ongoing Tet offensive made a strong impression on American society. At the end of February, one of the most famous TV presenters, Walter Cronkite, predicted that Kheshan was doomed to fall. It was at this time that something inexplicable happened: the North Vietnamese troops began to retreat.

As early as the first half of February, several battalions of North Vietnamese troops located near Kheshan were transferred to Hue . The city of Hue, one of the three largest cities in South Vietnam and the former residence of the emperor, was almost completely captured at the very beginning of the Tet offensive and liberated by the joint efforts of the American and South Vietnamese forces only after two and a half weeks of extremely stubborn battles . Researchers interpret the fact of the transfer of troops from one battle to another in different ways, but from that moment, most likely, the North Vietnamese command abandoned the idea of ​​capturing the base (if any). By mid-March, there were clear signs that the enemy was retreating from the base; according to military historian Philip Davidson , at the beginning of the month the siege actually ended. On March 30, the besieged US troops launched an offensive against the enemy’s positions for the first time since January, although the resistance turned out to be significant. By the end of the month, a general improvement in the situation after the Tet offensive and the transition of the Allies to a counterattack throughout South Vietnam led to the creation of favorable conditions for the release of the base. The main role in this was to play the 1st Cavalry (airmobile) division with the support of the Marine Corps.

Operation Pegasus ( Pegasus ) began on April 1. The Marines advanced west along Route 9, while the units of the 1st Cavalry Division made a series of "jumps" in the same direction using helicopters. At the same time, the Kheshani garrison began to conduct more aggressive patrols over extended distances. Skirmishes with the opponent were sporadic. On April 8, the first unit of releasing forces entered the base, formally putting an end to the 11-week siege. On April 15, Operation Pegasus ended.

The 26th Marine Regiment was withdrawn from Kheshan and awarded presidential thanks (an official award given to distinguished units). The outcome of the battle was seen as a significant victory, since the base remained in the hands of the Marine Corps, and the enemy suffered very heavy losses. But the general state of affairs on the Vietnamese issue did not contribute to much celebration. America entered the fourth year of its war in Vietnam, anti-war protests widened. The Tet offensive convinced most ordinary Americans that the enemy was not exhausted, as President Johnson and General Westmoreland claimed, but that he was capable of carrying out large-scale and spectacular operations. Intelligence reported that North Vietnamese troops regrouped and could return to the Kheshan area in the second half of the year. Новая осада могла усилить антивоенные настроения в США. О возможности вторжения в Лаос уже не шло и речи. Кроме того, отразив Тетское наступление, силы союзников перешли к активным наступательным действиям, преследуя уже ослабленного огромными февральскими потерями противника. Оборонительная «линия Макнамары» была заброшена, и её строительство более не возобновлялось. Таким образом, к середине 1968 года военная база Кхешань внезапно лишилась всего, что ранее делало её удержание целесообразным. В июне покинул свой пост и главный сторонник стратегического значения Кхешани — Уильям Уэстморленд. Ему на смену пришёл Крейтон Абрамс , одним из первых распоряжений которого было оставление базы. Все оборонительные сооружения были полностью уничтожены, и к 6 июля последний американский солдат покинул бывшую базу, которая напоследок подверглась разрушительному налёту B-52. Развалины почти сразу же были заняты северовьетнамскими солдатами. Впрочем, и они не стали пытаться удерживать место, не имеющее никакой ценности. В 1971 году в рамках подготовки вторжения в Лаос база Кхешань была без боя занята и восстановлена войсками США. Она сыграла большую роль в этой операции как тыловой перевалочный пункт и место базирования вертолётов.

В 1972 году Кхешань, переданная южновьетнамским войскам, была вновь занята северовьетнамскими силами во время Пасхального наступления — на этот раз до конца войны.

Сражение за Кхешань характеризовалось интенсивным использованием американской стороной своей огневой мощи. За два с половиной месяца авиация ВВС , ВМС и Корпуса морской пехоты совершила более 24 тыс. ударных вылетов в район базы и сбросила почти 100 тыс. тонн бомб . Артиллерия выпустила около 160 тыс. снарядов .

И США, и Вьетнам рассматривают сражение за Кхешань как свою победу. Согласно американской версии, сражение продолжалось с января по апрель и завершилось деблокированием базы, которая осталась в руках морской пехоты. По мнению вьетнамской стороны, осада завершилась лишь в июле — взятием Кхешани. Интересно, что хотя генерал Зяп отрицал намерение взять базу и сравнение её с битвой при Дьенбьенфу, именно её взятие позволяет современным вьетнамским историкам говорить о победе, а надпись на монументе, установленном на месте боевых действий, проводит прямую параллель между Кхешанью и Дьенбьенфу. Это ещё больше затрудняет определение истинных целей Северного Вьетнама в ходе осады.

Американский историк и участник сражения Питер Браш даёт следующую оценку осаде Кхешани:

Если осада Кхешани была лишь уловкой коммунистов, то она была успешной уловкой. Большие американские силы были направлены в этот изолированный район Южного Вьетнама. Тем не менее, в сугубо военном смысле этот отвлекающий манёвр мало повлиял на исход боевых действий во время Тета-1968 <…>. Если Кхешань должна была стать новым Дьенбьенфу, то она была стратегической неудачей коммунистической стороны. В общем и целом, Кхешань мало отразилась на исходе Вьетнамской войны. Рассматриваемая в этом контексте, и с учётом намерений участников [сражения] вначале, Кхешань была полной неудачей для обеих сторон ^[≡] .

Потери США

Согласно официальным публикациям Корпуса морской пехоты США, в ходе осады Кхешани погибли 205 американцев . Эта цифра очень широко распространена, хотя не отражает реальных потерь защитников базы. На самом деле 205 погибших — это потери 26-го полка морской пехоты за время операции «Шотландия» ( англ. Scotland , кодовое обозначение его пребывания в Кхешани), то есть с ноября 1967 по март 1968 года, и включает погибших накануне осады; изучение журналов боевых действий и отчётов подразделений, участвовавших в обороне, показывает, что даже эта цифра неточна. В то же время все американцы, погибшие при проведении операции «Пегас», в лагере Лангвей, в сбитых самолётах и вертолётах в районе Кхешани, попадали в статистику потерь соответствующих подразделений, но не в статистику потерь операции «Шотландия». По наиболее достоверной (но не абсолютно точной) оценке, в ходе осады Кхешани погибло около 730 американцев ^[4] .

Потери Северного Вьетнама

По официальным данным морской пехоты, за время осады Кхешани подтверждено уничтожение примерно 1600 военнослужащих противника. Точные данные недоступны, так как оценить потери северовьетнамской армии от авианалётов и артиллерийских обстрелов невозможно. Тем не менее, неофициальная оценка определяла потери северовьетнамцев в 10—15 тыс. погибшими.

Официальная вьетнамская история сражения, переведённая на английский язык, сообщает, что с января по июль 1968 года Народная армия Вьетнама потеряла в районе Кхешани около 2500 человек погибшими.

Comments

Sources

• Дэвидсон Ф. Б. Война во Вьетнаме. 1946—1975 = Vietnam at War: The History 1946–1975. — М. : Изографус, Эксмо, 2004. — С. 816. — ISBN 5-94661-047-3 .

• Brush, Peter. The Battle of Khe Sanh, 1968 // The Tet Offensive / Gilbert, Marc Jason; Head, William. — Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. ^{[^]}
• Brush, Peter. Battle of Khe Sanh: Recounting the Battle's Casualties (неопр.) . HISTORYnet.com (27 июня 2007). Дата обращения 31 октября 2012.
• The Siege at Khe Sanh (неопр.) . PBS.org. Дата обращения 31 октября 2012. Архивировано 5 ноября 2012 года.