Searle, John Rogers

Born in 1932 in Denver (pc. Colorado ) in the family of the manager of the company AT & T.

During the Second World War, the family lived in various cities of the East Coast , where John Rogers changed several high schools, including some time he studied at the experimental school at Columbia University . Such schools functioned according to the well-known “Laboratory School” by D. Dewey in Chicago . According to D. Dewey , the school should become a “miniature society”, in which there is no separation of students into social and economic groups, and students should live, share thoughts and work together to solve common problems. This idea was expressed to them at the end of the 19th century, and after that experimental schools around this world started to appear around this world.

In 1949-1952 he studied at the University of Wisconsin , then, after receiving the Rodsova scholarship , in Christ Church College, Oxford University from J. Austin . For some time, John Searle’s scientific work was aimed at clarifying and further developing the theory of speech acts of his teacher, John Austin . Often, speaking of this period of his scientific activity, he is called the "successor" of Austin's ideas.

In the 0s of the 20th century, Searle's interests shifted to the area of ​​the philosophy of mind and thinking, he became, along with D. Dennett and H. Putnam , a leading expert on the philosophical aspects of artificial intelligence.

After receiving his master's degree (1955), he taught philosophy and worked on a dissertation; received his doctorate at Oxford in 1959. From 1959 to the present, he has been working at the University of California, Berkeley, professor since 1967; in 1973–1975 he headed the department of philosophy. As a guest professor, he lectured at universities in many countries around the world. Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences since 1976; honorary doctor of a number of universities.

The early period of D.Sherl's scientific activity was connected with the theory of speech acts , advanced by his teacher, J. Austin .

In 1969, Searle’s first and most famous work in this field is published - “ What is a speech act?” ( What is a Speech Act?, 1969, trans. 1986). In it, he often refers to his teacher and clarifies the very definition of a speech act. According to the scientist, the main root of all problems is the problem of everyday language. That it is the central problem of his work. First of all, an illocutionary act - the production (speech act) of a specific sentence in certain conditions, is called the Sirlem minimal unit of language communication. D. Sörl says that performing an illocution speech act refers to those forms of behavior that are governed by rules, and therefore when formulating conditions and rules for at least one such act, the model for analyzing other types of acts and the possibility of explication of the notion of speech act will become available. at all.

The scientist divides all kinds of rules into two groups - regulatory and constitutive. The former are in the form of an imperative or have an imperative rephrase; an example of their etiquette is: "Using a knife while eating, hold it in your right hand." Constitutive rules take a completely different form. Such rules, as it were, determine what the tautology refers to and contains, thus determining what they are talking about. And it is precisely such a tautology that is such a feature by which a rule can be attributed to a constitutive mind. In some cases, the rules of this type can act as rules, and in others, as an analytical truth. D. Searl says that one of the goals of his work is to formulate a set of constitutive rules for one type of speech acts, thus trying to prove the hypothesis that the rules of a constitutive type are the basis of speech acts. Ultimately, he comes to the conclusion that the semantics of language is a system of constitutive rules, and illocutionary acts are accomplished by means of constitutive rules.

D. Searl singles out two compound sentences: 1) a propositional indicator (judgment indicator), which predetermines the presence of a minimum content (object - action) 2) an indicator of illuctive function (indicator of function), to which questions concern how to perceive judgment, the power of utterance, word order, stress, punctuation, etc. At the same time, it is worth remembering that the judgment, unlike the statement, is not an act, but is part of the commission of certain illocutionary acts. The statement, in turn, is an illocutionary act, being simultaneously an illocutionary act and its propositional content. Here it is important for a scientist to distinguish between the “illocutive” and “propositional” content of speech acts. If the propositional content of some statement — for example, the statement “it is raining” —is a judgment that it is raining, then its illocutionary content consists in the (implicit) obligation of the speaker to present things as they are. If the propositional content of the order is in the nature of the action that someone must perform, then its illocutionary content is an attempt to induce to this action.

It is interesting that when analyzing the promises in this article, the scientist comes to the conclusion that the promises themselves imply the possible failure to fulfill the promises.

According to Searle, speech acts do not exist by themselves - it is thanks to the connection with consciousness that they are able to represent (“represent”) things in the world. The theory of representative language content should be based on the corresponding theory of consciousness. Searle uses the concept of intentionality in this connection, i.e. orientation of consciousness on objects. As opposed to traditional theories, he considers as carriers of intentionality not beliefs and desires, but perceptions and actions. During the debate caused by his theory, Searle advanced the thesis that there is a moment of self-reflection in the intentional content of perceptions: if, for example, a person sees a tree, the very content of this visual perception presupposes the existence of a tree. In addition, the philosopher believes that intentional content can only be understood on a non-intellectual basis of practical skills and abilities.

After 1980, the interests of the scientist shifted towards the philosophy of consciousness. Particularly interesting for him was the problem of artificial consciousness. The most famous and caused a lot of controversy work D. Searle in this area is called " Mind of the brain - a computer program?" . In it, the scientist raises the question of the possibility of creating and operating an artificial consciousness that is completely similar to human consciousness. But first you need to determine what is Strong AI and Weak AI . A strong AI is the one that passed the Turing test , which means it has a mind on a par with a person. Reason in relation to man in this case is the equivalent of a program in relation to computer hardware. Weak AI, in the understanding of the scientist - these are computer models that can be used as useful tools for studying the human mind.

Axiom 1

Computer program - the manipulation of formal (syntactic) objects.

Axiom 2

The human mind operates with semantic (semantic) content. → A computer program has syntax (characters), but does not have semantics (semantic content).

Axiom 3

The syntax itself does not constitute semantics and is not sufficient for the existence of semantics.

Conclusion 1

Programs are not the essence of the mind and their presence is not enough for the presence of the mind. → Strong AI statement is false.

Axiom 4

The brain begets the mind.

Conclusion 2

Any other system capable of spawning the mind must have causal properties equivalent to those of the brain.

Conclusion 3

Any artifact that generates mental phenomena, any artificial brain must have the ability to reproduce the specific causal properties of the brain, and the presence of these properties cannot be achieved only through the implementation of a formal program.

Conclusion 4

The way in which the human brain produces mental phenomena cannot be reduced only to the execution of a computer program.

It is in this work that the scientist resorts to the argument of the “ Chinese Room ” in order to prove the falsity of the statement of the Strong AI .

Based on his views on intentionality , Searle, in his book The Re-Opening of Consciousness (1992), describes his view of consciousness. He believes that since behaviorism , a significant part of modern philosophy is trying to deny the existence of consciousness.

Searle believes that philosophy is in the position of a false dichotomy : on the one hand, the world consists only of objective particles, on the other - consciousness has a subjective experience from the first person. Searle says that both positions are correct: consciousness is a real subjective experience caused by physical processes in the brain. This position he proposes to call ^[3] .

The consequence of biological naturalism is that if we want to create a conscious being, then we need to recreate the physical processes that cause consciousness. Searle's position, therefore, contradicts the views on the " strong AI ", which is that as soon as we have a certain program on the computer, we can create consciousness.

Searl rejects both materialism and dualism ^[4] . Along with the Nobel Prize in Physiology and Medicine, Roger Sperry, he is one of the most famous supporters of emergent interactionism - the theory that consciousness is a product of brain activity, but it has the opposite effect on brain activity ^{[4] [5]} . This approach convinces few people, since the developed descriptions of such reverse mechanisms, apart from assertions about their presence, are not present among supporters - including in the writings of Searle, and without them similar views fall into the trap of an epiphenomenal approach to consciousness ^[4] .

Searle is famous for its directness. There are cases when he tried to tear off reports he didn’t like at conferences, climbing the stage or criticizing the speaker from the spot. In the print controversy, Searle shows even more sharpness. In particular, he accused Daniel Dennett of mental inferiority (Dennett responded to these accusations in the same way), and called the book by David Chalmers a collection of absurdities. At the same time, Searle is just as critical of himself. He admits his incompetence in the history of philosophy, in particular, his complete unfamiliarity with the works of Kant, Leibniz and Spinoza and a very poor acquaintance with the works of Plato and Aristotle. At the same time, Searle argues that his own ignorance helps him in his professional activities, since, according to him, famous philosophers often did not solve complex problems so much as they created them ^[1] .

• Speech Acts (Speech Acts, 1969)
• Expression and Meaning (Expression and Meaning, 1979)
• Consciousness, brain and programs (Minds, Brains, and Programs, 1980).
• Intentionality: An Essay on the Philosophy of Consciousness (Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, 1983)
• Rediscovery of consciousness (The Rediscovery of Mind, 1992).

In Russian

• Searle J. R., Vanderveken D. Basic concepts of the calculus of speech acts // New in foreign linguistics . Issue XVIII. M., 1986
• Searle, JR. What is a speech act? ; Indirect speech acts; Classification of speech acts // New in foreign linguistics. Issue XVII. M., 1986
• Searle JR The Nature of Intentional States // Philosophy, Logic, Language. M., 1987
• Searle, J. Is the Mind of the Brain a Computer Program? // In the world of science. (Scientific American. Edition in Russian). 1990. № 3.
• Searle, JR Metaphor // The Theory of Metaphor. M., 1990.
• John Searl New Discovery of Consciousness (1992)
• Searle, J. R. Consciousness, Brain and Science // Path, 1993, No. 4.
• Searle, J. R. Consciousness, Brain and Programs // Analytical Philosophy: Formation and Development. M., 1998.
• Searle J. Rationality in action / Trans. from English A. Kolody, E. Rumyantseva. - M .: Progress-Tradition, 2004. - 336 p. ISBN 5-89826-210-5 - text

in Russian

• V. Vasilyev. Chapter 2. Searle: simple! // The difficult problem of consciousness . - Moscow: Progress-Tradition, 2009. - p. 54-105. - 272 s. - 1000 copies - ISBN 978-5-89826-316-0 .
• Levin S. M. Searl in Moscow: fragments of the event // Bulletin of the Leningrad State University named after A. Pushkin . - 2011. - № 2. - Volume 2. Philosophy - p. 246-251.
• Levin S. M. Metaphysics and the General Theory of Social Reality by J. Searl // Herald of the Pushkin Leningrad State University . - 2011. - № 3. - Volume 2. Philosophy - С.161-170.
• Pospelov O.V. John Searle's Fundamental Ontology and the Minimum Conditions of the Political // Herald of Pushkin Leningrad State University . - 2010. - № 1. - Volume 2. Philosophy. - p. 193-203.
• Pospelova O.V. Political Action and the Problem of Free Will in the Practical Philosophy of J. Serl // Izvestiya PSPU . The Humanities. № 23.-2011.
• A. Sychev “The Guillotine of Hume” in the context of the institutional approach of J. R. R. Searle // Ethical Thought. 2012. No. 12. P. 143-156.

in other languages

• John Searle and his Critics, Ernest Lepore and Robert van Gulick (eds), Oxford / Cambridge, Mass .: Blackwell , 1991.
• Nick Fotion, John Searle, Princeton / Oxford: Princeton University Press , 2000
• Fabrice Clément et Laurence Kaufmann, Le monde selon John Searle, éd. du Cerf, 2005
• Prado G., Searle and Foucault on Truth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 2006.
• Searle's Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy, Constructive Engagement, Bo Mou (ed.). Leiden, Boston: Brill , 2008.
• Raoul Moati, Derrida / Searle: Déconstruction et langage ordinaire, éd. PUF, 2009

• "Rediscovery of Consciousness" D. Searl. Archived from the original 16.09.2012.
• Interview: J. Frankl Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 2008 Archived from the original source 16.09.2012.
• Searle, John Rogers // Encyclopedia " Krugosvet ".
• Alexander Gryaznov. John Searle and his analysis of subjectivity. Archived from the original 16.09.2012.
• Shmerlina I. A. “The Naturalistic Approach” by J. Searle to the problem of institutional reality.
• Short biography. Archived from the original 16.09.2012.
• Video interview with John Searle Moscow Center for the Study of consciousness , 2011-06-13.
• Speech by John Searle at St. Petersburg State University, 2013