Lehman, Willie

Willy Lehman was born in Saxony in the family of a school teacher - a purebred German ^[5] . He studied at the carpenter, at the age of 17 he joined the Navy as a volunteer, where he served 12 years. From the side of a German ship he watched the battle of the Russian cruiser Varyag and Japanese ships in the battle at Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Under the influence of the battle spectacle, Lehman aroused admiration for self-sacrifice and sympathy for the Russian sailors, which later became a likely motive for cooperation with Soviet intelligence ^[12] .

In 1911, he was demobilized and came to Berlin, where he soon met an old friend Ernst Kuhr, who by that time worked in the Berlin police presidium. Due to his patronage, Lehman was hired by the Organized Crime Unit (criminal police), later transferred to the political police (which later became the Gestapo), and two years later (in 1913) he was hired by the police department anti-espionage, which then led.

After the Plenipotentiary Representation of the RSFSR was opened in Berlin in May 1918, its staff was monitored by the Lehmann counterintelligence department. After the coup on November 4, 1918, Willy Lehman became chairman of the general meeting of Berlin police officials.

In 1920, the Weimar Republic authorities recreated the secret political police, which returned Lehman and Chur. Lehman had to undergo a recertification to further promotion, but due to a fit of diabetes, the exam was postponed. Soon he was appointed acting head of the office of the department, which was engaged in surveillance of foreign diplomatic missions, that is, in fact, he led the counterintelligence department of the police presidium of Berlin. In 1927, an experienced intelligence officer was appointed to the position of chief, and Lehman’s chances of further promotion fell significantly. He chose a place for work in the file cabinet of the department, in which all information was concentrated on employees of foreign embassies. "Uncle Willie," as his young employees called him, was also responsible for the correspondence of the department, which allowed Lehman to be a very informed official ^[5] .

Over the years of service, Lehman managed to give up on the politics of the country's authorities. He decided to offer his services to Soviet foreign intelligence. In March 1929, at his suggestion, Ernst Chur, a bosom friend of Lehman, a former policeman fired for embezzlement , who by that time was unemployed, but made an impression of a competent man, visited the Soviet embassy. After a conversation with him, the OGPU employees in Soviet intelligence came to the conclusion that it would be advisable to recruit Kura on a material basis. It was planned to use agent A-70 to collect information about persons of interest to Soviet intelligence, for which he was entitled to a monthly fee depending on the quality of the information provided ^[5] .

However, to complete the USSR mission, Chur had to turn to Lehman, who was not very happy with this state of affairs. In addition, Chur unreasonably spent money received from Soviet intelligence, dropping it at noisy parties in Berlin restaurants. Fearing that this would attract the attention of the Berlin police, and then bring him to himself, Lehman decided to establish direct contact with the Soviet residency. The first representative of the Soviet intelligence who met with Lehman was the consular officer Pavel Cornel. During the first meeting in a cafe, Leman talked about his capabilities, about his interest in world events and explained that he was interested in money. Lehman, whose knowledge of the affairs of the political police was not in doubt, was offered at his request an amount within the monthly salary of a mid-ranking Berlin police officer ^[5] .

By the time he began cooperation with Soviet intelligence, Lehman was 45 years old, he had an unremarkable appearance, lived in a small two-room apartment in the center of Berlin together with his wife Margaret, and there were no children in the family. Leman did not speak Russian. In the service of the secret police of Berlin, Lehman was characterized as a solid man, without outstanding talents, but with zeal, a strong professional, pedantic, accurate and conscientious, not a bribe-taker and not a smoker, but who appreciates wealth and knows the value of money. His expenses were increased by two special factors: Lehman was treated for progressing diabetes and had a long-standing passion - his mistress , dressmaker Florentina Leversky, which became known to Soviet intelligence. Those helped him financially and with food cards , which were then in use in Germany; opinions on how decisive the role played by material incentives in collaboration with Lehman diverge ^[13] .

According to one version, Lehman agreed to cooperate with the USSR due to the fact that he was a staunch anti-fascist, according to another - for money ^[14] . A number of German-speaking sources adhere to the version of Lehmann's cooperation out of selfish motives ^[15] . This is indirectly confirmed by the fact that in the GDR the name of Lehman, who continued to be considered the Gestapo, was almost forgotten, while the names of other fighters of German resistance and agents with immeasurably lesser merits called the streets and used them in every way for propaganda purposes. Soviet intelligence officers Alexander Korotkov and Boris Zhuravlev, who personally knew Lehman, were sure that they were driven mainly by ideological motives ^[13] . Concern for the fate of Germany, interest in events in the East, a desire to live better and receive a reward for his extensive knowledge of the service was called by the German scientist, doctor of historical sciences Hans Koppi, as the motive of Lehmann ^[5] .

After recruitment, Lehman was assigned the operational index A-201. On September 7, 1929, the head of Soviet foreign intelligence, M. A. Trilisser, sent a telegram to the Berlin residency: “Your new source A-201 was of great interest to us. Our only fear is that you climbed into one of the most dangerous places where the slightest negligence on the part of the A-201 or A-70 can lead to numerous troubles. We consider it necessary to study the issue of special conditions for communication with the A-201 ” ^[5] .

Since 1930, Lehmann's responsibilities in the secret police of Berlin included the development of personnel of the USSR Embassy and the fight against Soviet economic intelligence in the country. The information transmitted to them by Soviet intelligence allowed the OGPU residency to keep abreast of German counterintelligence plans, to know about upcoming raids on Soviet agents, and made it possible to avoid failures. During this period, Lehman supplied Soviet intelligence with information about the underlying political struggle in Germany, the rapid change in the situation in the country, and the advance of Nazis to power led by Hitler ^[5] .

To increase conspiracy in working with a particularly important agent, Soviet intelligence in early 1931 attracted an experienced illegal intelligence officer, Carl Silli. Given Ernst Kur’s unreliable communication, especially his marginal habits, a tendency to drink and a drunken tongue, Kura was suspended from business, and later transferred to Switzerland , where he kept a store, which was used to communicate scouts, using Soviet intelligence tools ^[5] .

After the elections to the Reichstag as a result of the March 1933 elections, Hitler’s party, Lehman was transferred to the Gestapo on the recommendation of Hermann Goering . By that time, Lehman was well acquainted with many prominent figures of the NSDAP ; he had excellent prospects. In May 1934, with the approval of a curator from Moscow, Lehman joined the SS , was enlisted in the 44th Berlin SS assault squad. On June 30, 1934, Lehman, while in Goering’s suburban villa, took part or watched a secret operation to pacify the stormtrooper leaders “ Night of the Long Knives ”. Information about the events of the bloody night received by scouts from Lehman was reported directly to Stalin ^[5] .

During the purge of the political police from the old, and in the opinion of the Nazis, unreliable cadres, Lehman also fell under suspicion, however, he did not hold leadership positions in the police, worked for many years against Soviet institutions in Germany (which favorably characterized him in the eyes of the Nazis), had many positive characteristics and was highly respected by colleagues for experience and calm disposition - after all the permutations, he continued to work in the third Gestapo. Soon, the Lemans moved to a new apartment near the Berlin Hippodrome , horse racing was one of Willy's favorite hobbies ^[5] .

In the summer of 1933, the illegal residency involved in intelligence relations with Lehman was headed by an employee of the Soviet embassy, ​​illegal intelligence officer Erich Takke . In December 1933, Lehman was handed over to a scout with experience in the United States and France, Vasily Zarubin , who specially from Paris came to Germany as a representative of one of the American film companies and was convinced that the situation in Germany had changed radically. It was Zarubin who gave Lehman a new operational pseudonym for Breitenbach . On March 16, 1935, Hitler signed the law on the introduction of universal military service and the formation of the Wehrmacht , which meant Germany's actual unilateral withdrawal from the restrictions established by the Treaty of Versailles . Rapid military construction began in Germany with an eye to external expansion, because, according to Nazi ideology, the German people, free from internal contradictions, needed new territories for prosperity. In these circumstances, Soviet intelligence began to demand from Lehman not only oral information, but also documents, in particular, daily Gestapo summaries ^[5] .

In 1936, Lehman was transferred to the Gestapo department, which dealt with counterintelligence support for the defense industry and military construction. In Germany, tanks, guns, combat aircraft and ships began to be manufactured. Around the same time, the first tests of ballistic missile prototypes began (they were not even mentioned in the Treaty of Versailles), Moscow was also informed of the first test results. And at the end of 1935, after Lehman was present at the test of the first V-1 missile, he drew up a detailed report about them and gave her description to the Soviet intelligence. Based on these data, on December 17, 1935, Soviet intelligence submitted a report to Stalin and Voroshilov , who was then the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR , on the state of rocket science in Germany.

Among other information transmitted by Lehman, there were data on the construction of submarines, on armored vehicles, information on the release of new gas masks and the production of synthetic gasoline. Information was also transmitted on the development and strengthening of the Nazi regime, on preparations for the establishment of world domination, on building up military potential and the latest technical developments, on the structure of the German special services, their personnel, and methods of work. Also, all this time Lehman continued to inform the Soviet residency of the Gestapo counter-intelligence activities, which allowed the Soviet intelligence to avoid failures ^[5] .

According to the memoirs of Pavel Sudoplatov , Lehman conveyed to the Soviet side important information about the introduction of Gestapo agents into the communist underground and into Russian white emigre circles ^[16] .

The exceptional importance of the information received from Lehman forced OGPU to constantly strengthen measures of his conspiracy and security in connection with him. For him and his wife, passports in the name of someone else were prepared, a detailed scheme for leaving Germany in the event of failure was developed. After the deteriorating state of health, Lehman Zarubin was instructed to transfer to him a large amount of money for treatment from the best German professors in the Charite clinic. Lehman's hobby for running allowed him to create a convincing legend of winning a substantial amount of money sufficient for treatment, which prevented the further development of kidney disease and diabetes .

However, in 1936, Lehman was summoned for questioning by the Gestapo, where he was interested in his connections at the Soviet trade mission. It turned out that we were talking about the namesake, another Wilhelm Lehman, whom the mistress slander like a Soviet spy because of jealousy. After her arrest and interrogation, the suspicions from the real Soviet agent were removed. For the new year 1937, among the four best Gestapo workers, Willy Lehman received a portrait of Adolf Hitler autographed in a silver frame (orders in Germany then did not exist under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles ) ^{[17] [18]} . In the spring of 1937, Lehman joined the Nazi party of the Nazi Party ^[5] .

In 1936, Lehman was appointed head of the counterintelligence department at German military-industrial enterprises. Together with groups of officers, he began to regularly visit secret military factories. Soon, information about laying more than 70 submarines at shipyards, about putting all-metal fighters on the conveyor, about building a new plant for the production of military nerve agents , was transmitted to the Soviet residency, and a copy of the secret instruction on 14 types of the latest German weapons was transmitted. Of particular value to Moscow was a copy of the top secret report “On the Organization of the National Defense of Germany”. Leman transmitted descriptions of the new types of self-propelled artillery guns , armored vehicles, flamethrower tanks, mortars, including long-range guns, as well as armor-piercing bullets , special grenades and solid-fuel rockets for gas attacks that were on display. Lehman was the first to warn Moscow about the start of work on the creation of long - range liquid missiles under the leadership of Werner von Braun , and informed about the exact location of five secret training grounds where new weapons were tested ^[5] .

Despite the importance of the information transmitted by Lehman, which allowed the Soviet leadership to adequately assess the military power of the Wehrmacht , in 1937 Zarubin’s cooperation with the agent was complicated. Having been closely monitored in Germany, Zarubin was forced to limit contacts with Lehman, and soon, by order of Moscow, he left for the United States , from where he brought to Berlin an assistant, a young American journalist of anti-fascist views, Lucy Jane Booker, to communicate with Breitenbach. Her ability to use the most modern photographic technique at that time helped Lehman in making photocopies of secret documents. During this period, Lehman was able to get the originals of several unencrypted Gestapo messages and their own encrypted text, which enabled Moscow, by comparing the documents, to receive the Gestapo decryption key . Lehman handed over to Moscow the key to the Gestapo ciphers used in telegraph (Fernshpruh) and radio communications (Funkshpruh) to communicate with their territorial and transordinate employees ^{[2] [5]} .

In 1937, large-scale repressions began in the USSR, during which two-thirds of foreign intelligence officers were destroyed. Zarubin was called to Moscow, and although he managed to escape repression, he never returned to Berlin. Communication with Lehman continued to be maintained by the Soviet intelligence officer Alexander Agayants, who was urgently transferred to Berlin from Paris in the spring of 1937. To work with a huge stream of information coming from Lehman, Agayants attracted illegal Alexander Korotkov . During this period, messages from Lehmann were transmitted to Lucy Booker, who then seemed to accidentally intersect with the wife of Korotkov, Maria Vilkovyskaya, in the city, and from her, through Korotkov himself, information was sent to Moscow. At that time, Lehman sent detailed information to Moscow about the structure and personnel of the Fourth Directorate of the RSHA (the Main Directorate of Imperial Security), its operations, the activities of the Gestapo and the Abwehr (military intelligence), plans and intentions of Hitler in relation to neighboring countries ^[5] .

Left without an experienced curator Zarubin, Lehman acted largely at his own peril and risk, extracting information that, in his opinion, could be of interest to Soviet intelligence. In one of the messages to the Center, he wrote:

I have no cause for concern. I am sure that friends know that everything is done in good faith, everything that can be done. While on arrival to me there is no particular urgency. If necessary, I will let you know.

At that time, Hitler was preparing the Anschluss of Austria , the “ Munich Conspiracy ” soon followed, Lehman had top secret information, but did not receive due support and help from the USSR. In December 1938, the last meeting between Agayants and Lehman took place, shortly after her, the Soviet intelligence was hospitalized in Berlin and died during the operation. In early 1939, due to the deterioration of relations between Germany and the United States, Lucy Booker returned to her homeland. In the very last cipher before leaving for the ocean, Lehman informed Moscow about Germany’s intensified preparations for an attack on Poland , which was reported in Moscow to the drug addict Beria , who was in charge of foreign intelligence, on April 19, 1939, 5 months before the Soviet-German non-aggression pact . Before the upcoming military campaign, Germany conducted a sweep of foreign spies. Fearing arrest, he was forced to leave Berlin and Korotkov was illegal, after which Breitenbach was left without communication. At that time, Germany had already captured Poland, confidently turning the Wehrmacht into the most powerful army in the world, and a lot of important information passed through the hands of Lehman ^[5] .

By that time, Lehman’s cooperation with the USSR was already in many ways ideological, since he was financially secure: his wife inherited a hotel that brought good income, and access to classified information made it possible to see preparations for a world war, which did not suit Lehman at all. He did not know about the situation in the USSR, did not know about the repressions , and, apparently, decided that the USSR authorities believed in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact . This led to the fact that in June 1940 Lehman decided on an unprecedented and extremely dangerous step: he dropped a letter addressed to the military attache or his deputy in the mailbox of the Soviet embassy. In a letter, Lehman proposed immediately reestablishing operational communications with him.

I am in the same position, which is well known at the Center, and I think that I am able to work again so that my bosses will be pleased with me ... If I do not get any answer, I will assume that I now have no value and they don’t use me at work. My further work in the Gestapo will also lose all meaning then ...

The letter was sent by the embassy to Moscow, where Pavel Sudoplatov , deputy head of the 5th department (back-line reconnaissance intelligence) of the NKVD, got acquainted with it, and Vasily Zarubin, who miraculously survived the reprisals in the central office, confirmed the author's identity. However, there was no connection until September 1940, when Alexander Korotkov, deputy resident of the NKVD, again sent to Berlin under the guise of electrical engineer of the Soviet exhibition pavilion met with Lehman in warring Germany. A new stage began in Lehmann’s intelligence, which at that time, through the Gestapo, worked closely daily with the head of counterintelligence in the 4th Directorate of the RSHA Schellenberg ^[5] .

By this time, the position and responsibilities of Lehman in the Gestapo were so extensive that he did not even need other tasks to obtain information. On September 9, 1940, the Berlin residency received an instruction personally from the people's commissar Beria :

No special assignments should be given to Breitenbach. It is necessary to take for now everything that is in his immediate capabilities, and, in addition, everything that he will know about the work of various intelligence services against the USSR, in the form of documents and personal reports of the source

Among the materials obtained by Lehman after the restoration of communication, there were a large number of documents indicating that Germany had begun preparations for the war against the USSR. During this period, Breitenbach transmitted to Moscow information on the positional areas of the construction of fortifications along the border with the USSR, on the actions of the Abwehr units in the Soviet direction, information on the contingent and the activities of schools to prepare scouts for casting in the USSR. April 5, 1941 Breitenbach announced the planned invasion of German troops in Yugoslavia . Prepared due to timely information received in Belgrade , the resistance in the Balkans postponed the timing of the German attack on the Soviet Union ^[5] .

The new agent of Breitenbach during this period was Boris Nikolayevich Zhuravlev, a young employee of the Foreign Department of the NKVD, who had recently graduated from the NKVD Special Purpose School . The venue was usually a pub . Often, Lehman sewed up secret documents in the lining of his hat , came to the pub, where the liaison officer expected him in a similar hat, after which there was an exchange of hats ^[10] . Having received the materials from Lehman, Zhuravlev photographed them and returned them to Lehman the next day before leaving Lehman. At a meeting on May 28, 1941, the agent informed Zhuravlev that he was ordered to urgently draw up a schedule of round-the-clock duty on the staff of his unit in the Gestapo, which meant the onset of emergency ^{[13] [5]} .

On June 17, 1941, in Moscow, Stalin was informed of the summary that “the war can begin any minute”, received from Berlin from two other high-level sources operating separately from Lehman — Harro Schulze-Boysen and Arvid Harnak . On the report, Stalin imposed a resolution: “To Comrade Merkulov . You can send your “source” from the headquarters of German aviation to the fucking mother. This is not a “source”, but a disinfectant. I. St. ” ^{[19] [20]} .

The last meeting of the associate B.N. Zhuravlev with Lehman took place on the evening of June 19, 1941 in a pub near the Berlin radio tower . According to B.N. Zhuravlev's documentary video interview recorded in 1988 at the KGB of the USSR , at the meeting, Breitenbach looked extremely excited and an alarm was written on his face. Lehman immediately informed the agent that the Gestapo received the text of Hitler’s secret order to German troops stationed along the Soviet border. It ordered the start of hostilities against the USSR after 3 a.m. on June 22. Встреча связника с Леманом оказалась короткой, поскольку дальше обсуждать было нечего, и Журавлёв прямиком направился в советское посольство, откуда немедленно в Центр ушла шифротелеграмма. Вскоре из Москвы поступил ответ, по словам Журавлёва, в нём было написано: «Не собирайте бабушкины сказки!» ^[21] . В 2009—2010 годах Служба внешней разведки РФ официально подтвердила подлинность описываемых связником событий ^{[3] [2]} .

После начала войны связь советских спецслужб с Леманом была потеряна окончательно.

Помимо Лемана у советской разведки перед войной было ещё несколько менее значимых агентов в Берлине. В ходе войны связь ни с кем из них не была восстановлена, и Центр не располагал информацией, что с ними вообще произошло. Мощные рации, которые последний оперативник резидентуры Александр Коротков оставил берлинским агентам, всё же не позволяли им связаться непосредственно с Москвой, а были рассчитаны на промежуточную станцию в Минске , однако белорусская столица была оккупирована германскими войсками до июля 1944 года ^[5] .

По словам вдовы Лемана Маргарет, однажды декабрьским утром 1942 года Вилли, как обычно, ушёл на работу и домой больше не вернулся. Никаких объяснений исчезновению на службе мужа тогда ей получить не удалось ^[8] . Однако позже один из сослуживцев сообщил ей, что Леман был расстрелян гестаповцами. Обо всём этом Маргарет в июле 1945 года рассказала резиденту советской разведки в Берлине Александру Короткову , навестившему её дома по Пренцлауераллее, 137 ^[13] .

Сразу после Победы в НКВД стали выяснять судьбу предвоенных источников и агентов. В руинах штаб-квартиры гестапо на Принц-Альбрехтштрассе, 8 были обнаружены документы, где говорилось, что Вилли Леман был арестован гестапо в декабре 1942 года. Причины ареста указаны не были. В Москве установили, что казнённый сотрудник гестапо Вилли Леман был агентом НКВД Брайтенбахом. Время событий совпадает с казнью 22 декабря 1942 года руководителей антифашистского подполья в Берлине Харро Шульце-Бойзена , его жены Либертас и Арвида Харнака ^[22] .

Позднее советским спецслужбам удалось восстановить причину провала Лемана. Она заключалась в неудачной попытке возобновить контакт с ним по ходу войны и провале радиста ^[13] .

В мае 1942 года в партизанский отряд в лесах между Брянском и Гомелем вместе с товарищем был заброшен агент советской разведки Бек (немецкий коммунист Роберт Барт, добровольно сдавшийся в советский плен). Цель состояла в том, чтобы установить связь с агентами, разрозненными группами сопротивления фашизму и подпольщиками в Германии. Через Минск оба перешли линию фронта и прибыли в Берлин под видом возвратившихся с передовой немецких солдат. Однако гестапо в конце августа удалось арестовать обоих. Не выдержав допроса, Бек согласился участвовать в радиоигре с Москвой, вследствие чего 11 декабря 1942 года из Центра обманным путём были получены пароль и условия явки ^[10] . Лемана удалось выманить на подстроенную «встречу», где он ожидал увидеть советского агента, чем и разоблачил себя. Операцию по его захвату и ликвидации проводили в строгом секрете Гиммлер , Мюллер и Кальтенбруннер . Они не стали докладывать Гитлеру о том, что в гестапо уже долгие годы работал советский агент ^[13] .

После войны из показаний американским следователям сотрудника гестапо, гауптштурмфюрера СС Хорста Копкова выяснилось, что Лемана доставили не во внутреннюю тюрьму гестапо, поскольку там он был хорошо известен, а в общую тюрьму Плётцензее , где допрашивали около двух недель. Протоколы допроса Лемана так и не были обнаружены. Вероятно, из-за опасений огласки крупнейшего провала гестапо даже формального судебного процесса над Леманом не проводилось. Гестаповец Хорст Копков на допросе американцам признался, что присутствовал при кремации тела Лемана в концлагере Заксенхаузен , из чего писатель Теодор Гладков сделал вывод, что он лично, по всей видимости, и расстрелял Лемана. Точная дата смерти Лемана и место его захоронения неизвестны ^{[13] [7]} .

В январе 1943 года в служебном вестнике гестапо было опубликовано извещение: «Криминальный инспектор Вилли Леман в декабре 1942 года отдал свою жизнь за Фюрера и Рейх» ^[13] .

После окончания войны Роберт Барт вновь добровольно сдался представителям Красной Армии и настаивал, что в ходе радиоигры передал сигнал о работе под контролем и дезинформации в сообщениях. Однако то ли он этого не делал, то ли ошибся кто-то из техников при приёме радиограммы на советской стороне, но сигнал о дезинформации не был понят, что и погубило Лемана. В СССР Барт был обвинён в предательстве, осуждён и в 1945 году расстрелян ^[13] .

В трудное послевоенное время вдову Лемана Маргарет КГБ СССР поддерживал материально. В декабре 1969 года, когда в СССР по инициативе КГБ приступили к съёмкам телесериала « Семнадцать мгновений весны » о советском разведчике-нелегале Исаеве-Штирлице , ряд немецких антифашистов (в том числе и посмертно) были награждены советскими орденами, однако Лемана по настоянию властей ГДР вычеркнули из наградного списка как гестаповца. Тем не менее представители внешней разведки СССР вручили его вдове в Берлине наручные золотые часы с надписью «На память от советских друзей», тогда Маргарет и узнала, кем в действительности был её муж ^{[13] [5]} .

О том, что в центральном аппарате гестапо в Берлине работал советский шпион «дядюшка Вилли», впервые рассказал в своих мемуарах «Лабиринт», написанных в 1950—1952 годах и опубликованных в 1956 году, начальник внешней разведки службы безопасности рейха Вальтер Шелленберг , который, однако, не знал о подлинных масштабах и деталях деятельности Лемана ^{[5] [23]} . Официальная информация о советском агенте Брайтенбахе, 12 лет передававшем важнейшую информацию из центра немецкой контрразведки, оставалась засекреченной долгие годы. В 1998 году о Лемане, как прототипе Штирлица , было рассказано писателем и историком спецслужб Теодором Гладковым в документальном фильме « Новейшая история. Семнадцать мгновений весны 25 лет спустя » ^[8] . В 1999 году были рассекречены 12 томов дела Лемана ^[24] . В 2009 году рассекречены новые архивные материалы, всего в архивах СВР находится 28 томов документов по делу Брайтенбаха ^{[3] [2]} . В том же году в журнале « Шпигель » была опубликована статья «Stalins Mann in der Gestapo» («Человек Сталина в гестапо»), основанная на рассекреченных в России сведениях и публикациях близкого к КГБ СССР и Службе внешней разведки РФ Теодора Гладкова ^[13] . В 2010 году о том, что сведения о деятельности Лемана стали для Юлиана Семёнова наиболее ценными при создании образа Штирлица, свидетельствовал в своих мемуарах писатель, друг и собеседник Ю. С. Семёнова Борис Эскин ^[11] . В 2011 году на телеканале Россия 1 был показан документальный исторический фильм о Лемане «Агент А/201. Наш человек в гестапо» с участием историков, писателей, ветеранов разведки и ведущего Юрия Соломина . В аннотации фильма на сайте телеканала утверждается: «У Штирлица , героя Юлиана Семенова , был реальный прототип: гауптштурмфюрер СС Вилли Леман, шеф реферата общей контрразведки гестапо» ^[5] .

• Теодор Гладков. Его Величество Агент. — Печатные традиции, 2010. — 280 с. - 3000 copies. — ISBN 978-5-91591-047-6 .
• David E. Murphy. What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa. — Yale University Press, 2005. — С. 208. — 347 с. — ISBN 0-300-10780-3 .
• Матвей Сотников. Наш человек в гестапо. Жизнь и борьба Вилли Лемана. Журнал «Разведчик», 30 июня 2016 .

Video

• НТВ, 23 июня 2009. Настоящий Штирлиц
• Звезда, 23 июня 2009. Рассекречен прототип Штирлица

• Сергей Петрович Владимиров. Наш человек в гестапо, или кто был прообразом Штирлица // Независимое военное обозрение. — 2010-05-28.
• Екатерина Забродина. Подвиг разведчика Лемана // Известия. — 2010-04-15. Архивировано 17 апреля 2013 года.
• «Агент „А—201“ — наш человек в гестапо» — фильм, созданный при содействии Пресс-бюро Службы Внешней разведки России.