Kornilov performance

General Kornilov

In the summer of 1917, the situation in Petrograd was turbulent. The First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies on June 3-24 (June 16 - July 7), which was dominated by Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, supported the bourgeois Provisional Government and rejected the Bolshevik demand for an end to the war and the transfer of power to the Soviets. Soon, however, in Petrograd, anti-government protests took place, caused by a military defeat at the front . The unrest that began with the spontaneous actions of the soldiers of the 1st machine gun regiment, workers of the Petrograd factories, Kronstadt sailors under the slogans of the immediate resignation of the Provisional Government , the transfer of power to the Soviets and negotiations with Germany on the conclusion of peace , was led by the Bolsheviks ^[7] , uniting the discontented under their slogans. On July 4 (17), the Provisional Government was forced to introduce martial law in the city ^[8] .

On July 24 ( August 6 ), 1917 , the second coalition government was created, which included 7 representatives of the socialist parties (Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks) against 4 Cadets, and the Socialist Revolutionary A.F. Kerensky headed the government. Instead of General A. A. Brusilov, he appointed the General from Infantry L. G. Kornilov as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief instead of General A. A. Brusilov : the Minister-Chairman was bribed by the General’s loyalty to the government, his authority among the military, and the democracy of convictions ; Considering the fact that in Petrograd the armed protest of a part of the garrison , supported by the Bolsheviks had just been suppressed, “hard power” was also required in the rear ^[7] .

B.V. Savinkov , in connection with the new appointment of the general, wrote about Kornilov ^{[7] [9]} :

General Kornilov was able to escape from Austrian captivity in 1916, was extremely popular among the troops, enjoyed authority in the military circles ^[7] , officers began to close around him, the Cossacks - generally all circles who were in opposition to the expanding revolutionary processes, which they regarded as the collapse of the country. First of all, these were right-wing circles associated with the nobility and large owners. According to V. M. Chernov , “Kornilov did not have to look for assistants. His defiant behavior became a signal for the whole of Russia. Representatives of the Union of Officers, led by Novosiltsev, appeared on their own and expressed a desire to work to save the army. Delegates from the Cossack Council and the Union of St. George Knights arrived. The republican center promised Kornilov the support of influential circles and transferred the military forces of the Petrograd organizations to his disposal. General Krymov sent a messenger to the committee of the Union of Officers of the Russian Federation with an order to find out whether it’s true that “something is being planned” and to inform him whether he should accept the 11th army proposed by Denikin or stay with the 3rd corps which he is to as he put it, "go somewhere." He was asked to stay with the 3rd building. ” The movement was financially supported by the largest Russian capitalists: Ryabushinsky, Morozovs, Tretyakov, Putilov, Vyshnegradsky and others ^[10] .

Already in April 1917, among the officers dissatisfied with the new order, the idea of ​​establishing a military dictatorship gained popularity; many military organizations were formed, among which, by mid-summer, the most influential were the Military League, the Union of St. George Knights (headquarters were in Petrograd ), and the Union of Army and Navy Officers created at Headquarters in Mogilev . The aspirations of the military were supported by several civic organizations, including the Society for the Economic Revival of Russia, headed by A.I. Guchkov and A.I. Putilov, and the Republican Center, which even created its own military department, to coordinate the actions of various officer organizations. Various candidates were nominated for the post of military dictator in spring and summer, including M.V. Alekseev, A.A. Brusilov and A.V. Kolchak , however, after the appointment of L. G. Kornilov as Supreme Commander, he naturally turned out to be the main and only candidate for dictators.

Kerensky generally agreed with Kornilov’s many views on the situation in the country and ways out of it — both believed that the monarchy was a thing of the past, sought to preserve Russia as a great power, and saw Russia's participation in the war primarily as fidelity to the allied obligations of the country and state as a member Entente. At the same time, Kerensky, a prominent representative of the radical left-liberal part of the Russian intelligentsia, from his youth was used to distrust and suspicion of the military estate, since in Tsarist Russia it was the bearer of the traditions of loyalty to autocracy, and professional military Kornilov, certainly brought up in the spirit of patriotic sacrifice, as a Russian officer who, according to the Charter, was forbidden to engage in and be interested in politics, saw a solution to the crisis of the fantastic, rapid degradation of society and, most vnoe - the army, the leading heavy war - in building the elementary discipline in the armed forces and conducting a solid policy. Kerensky, “pushing away” Kornilov and trusting the warnings about the “danger to the right”, signed the death sentence for the country, and at the same time he did not fully believe that he had done the right thing, hesitated all the time and was in a state of affectation and shock at the end of the summer.

On July 21, the English ambassador Buchanan conveyed the words spoken to him politically close to Kerensky by Foreign Minister Tereshchenko: “There is only one thing left: the introduction of martial law throughout the country, the use of military courts against railroad workers and forcing peasants to sell grain. The government should recognize General Kornilov; several members of the government should remain at headquarters for permanent communication with him. To my question about whether Kerensky shares his views, Tereshchenko answered in the affirmative, but said that the prime minister’s hands were tied ” ^[10] . At the same time, the introduction of a military dictatorship and the dispersal of the Soviet made Kerensky himself superfluous and jeopardized his political survival. Objectively, Kerensky could retain power only by tacking between the right and the Soviets; this explains the ambiguous behavior of Kerensky throughout the entire Kornilov conspiracy, reinforced by the personal antipathy that soon arose between Kerensky and Kornilov ^[11] .

At the State Conference , which was held in Moscow on August 12-15 (25-28), Kornilov vividly showed his political claims, thereby entering into conflict with Kerensky. Kerensky, who was trying to remove Kornilov from political activity, reluctantly agreed to participate in the meeting, making it a condition that Kornilov talked about purely military issues; nevertheless, Kornilov made a vivid political speech that made a great impression; and chanted in one of Marina Tsvetaeva’s poems (“Cossack’s son, Cossack ... That was how it began - Speech”). Although the soldiers present at the meeting defiantly did not stand up when Kornilov appeared, the audience enthusiastically greeted his speech, and when Kornilov exited, they threw flowers at him, and the cadets and Tekins carried him on their shoulders ^{[10] [12]} .

An important role in the future events of August related to the name of General Kornilov was played by the private meeting of members of the cadet parties and the Octobrists and former members of the State Committee held at the apartment of the Moscow city commissioner, member of the Cadet Party Central Committee N. M. Kishkin on the initiative of MV Rodzianko Dumas P. N. Milyukov, V. A. Maklakov, I. Shingarev, S. I. Shidlovsky, N. V. Savich. The headquarters spokesman, Colonel Rozhenko, reported a brewing conflict between Kornilov and Kerensky, the possible nomination of cavalry units in Petrograd "to eliminate the attempt of a Bolshevik coup," the dispersal of the Council and the Provisional Government and the transfer of power to the Duma ^[10] . Also, reports were made by representatives of the "Union of Officers" Colonels Novosiltsev and Pronin on the "Kornilov program", the speakers stated the need for "public support" of the general. According to Savich's recollections, these reports gave the impression of “unexpectedly naive and childishly thoughtless” ^[13] . "It became clear to us that everything, absolutely everything in this adventure was not thought out and prepared, there is only chatter and good intentions." Speakers from the Cadet Party, P. N. Milyukov and Prince G. N. Trubetskoy, spoke of the importance, and, at the same time, of the impossibility of a military dictatorship if it was not supported by the masses. As a result, it seemed that the cadets supported Kornilov. However, Makiltakov told Novosiltsev about the fallacy of such confidence: "I am afraid that we will provoke Kornilov." On the eve of the Meeting, public appeals of support to the Commander-in-Chief were also made by the “Union of Officers”, “Union of St. George Cavaliers”, “Union of Cossack Troops”, a congress of non-socialist organizations and others. The historian V. Zh. Tsvetkov states that all this instilled in Kornilov confidence in his sympathy not only for the generals and politicians, but also for officers and soldiers ^[7] .

Meanwhile, the situation at the front was deteriorating; August 21 ( September 3 ) 1917 German troops captured Riga ; Kornilov's barrage detachments not only did not help, but also intensified the fierceness of the soldiers against the officers ^[14] .

Contrary to the assertions of some historians, General Kornilov never, before his August speech, or during him - neither officially, nor in private conversations and conversations, set a definite “political program”. He did not have it, just as he did not (along with Kerensky) have direct social and political slogans. The document, known in history as the “Kornilov Program”, was the result of the collective work of Bykhov prisoners - persons imprisoned in Bykhov prison with General Kornilov on charges of supporting him after the failure of the Kornilov speech. According to General Denikin , co-author of this program, it was needed as a correction to the “gap of the past” - the need to announce a strictly business program to keep the country from its final collapse and fall. After compilation, the program was approved by General Kornilov and appeared in print without a date and under the guise of a program of one of his past speeches, because, in the conditions in which its authors were, it was difficult, according to General Denikin, to publish the Bykhov Program ^[15] .

“Kornilov program”:

• 1) The establishment of a government that is completely independent of all irresponsible organizations - from now on until the Constituent Assembly.
• 2) Establishment of local authorities and courts, independent of unauthorized organizations.
• 3) The war is in full unity with the allies until the conclusion of a speedy peace that ensures the wealth and vital interests of Russia.
• 4) The creation of a combat-ready army and organized rear — without politics, without the intervention of committees and commissars, and with firm discipline.
• 5) Ensuring the vital activity of the country and the army by streamlining transport and restoring the productivity of factories and plants; streamlining the food business by attracting cooperatives and a trade apparatus regulated by the government.
• 6) The resolution of the main state, national and social issues is postponed until the Constituent Assembly ^[16] .

During his appointment to the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief on July 19, 1917, General Kornilov demanded that the government recognize his responsibility "only to his own conscience and to all the people", thus establishing, according to Denikin, a kind of "original scheme of sovereign military command." The statement mainly concerned the military unit, in particular, the provision to the Commander-in-Chief of full autonomy in all military matters, such as the solution of operational tasks, the appointment and removal of command personnel. He demanded Kornilov and the introduction of the death penalty at the front.

In conversations with a number of people, General Kornilov put forward various forms of “strong power”, for example, the reformation of Kerensky’s cabinet on a national basis, the change of head of government, the introduction of the Supreme Commander into the government, the combination of the posts of Minister of the Chairman and Supreme Commander, directory, sole dictatorship. General Kornilov himself was inclined toward a single-handed dictatorship, without, however, setting it as an end in itself and attaching great importance to the fact of legitimacy and legitimate succession of power.

On July 30, at a meeting with the Ministers of Railways and Food, General Kornilov expressed the following views:

To end the war in a world worthy of a great, free Russia, we need to have three armies: an army in the trenches, directly leading the battle, an army in the rear - in workshops and factories, manufacturing everything for the front army, and a railway army bringing it to the front

Without going into the question of what measures are needed to improve the working and railway components and allowing specialists to understand this, the general nevertheless believed that “for the proper operation of these armies, they must be subordinate to the same iron discipline that is established for the front army ".

The note by General Kornilov, prepared for the report to the Provisional Government, spoke about the need for the following main events:

• the introduction throughout the territory of Russia of the rear troops and the population of the jurisdiction of military revolutionary courts, with the death penalty for a number of grave crimes, mainly military ones;
• restoration of disciplinary authority of military commanders;
• introduction of the narrow scope of the committees and the establishment of their responsibility to the law.

On August 3, General Kornilov presented a note to Kerensky in Petrograd , but the latter, having previously expressed his fundamental agreement with the measures proposed by Kornilov, persuaded the general not to submit the note to the government directly on that day, motivating this desire with the desirability of completing similar work of the War Department for mutual coordination of projects. However, the very next day, August 4, a copy of General Kornilov’s note was at the disposal of the Izvestia newspaper, which began printing extracts from the Kornilov’s note, and at the same time a broad campaign began against Kornilov.

Regarding the key agricultural issue in those circumstances, Kornilov had a program developed for him by Professor Yakovlev; it assumed a partial nationalization of the land with the endowment, however, not of all peasants, but only soldiers who returned from the front, with a number of seizures in favor of landowners ^[10] .

According to General Denikin, "the political appearance of General Kornilov remained unclear for many" and legends were built around this issue, which had their source in the environment of Lavr Georgievich, who, due to his excessive tolerance and credulity of a general who was poorly versed in people, got "small-state or completely unprincipled. " This Denikin saw the deepest tragedy of the activities of General Kornilov.

Lavr Georgievich was neither a socialist nor a monarchist : like the overwhelming majority of the officers at that time, he was alien to political passions. Denikin believed that according to the views and convictions of General Kornilov was close to the "wide layers of liberal democracy" ^[17] . As Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov had more than other military leaders of courage and courage to oppose the destruction of the army and in defense of the officers. ^[18]

Already in the days of the Moscow meeting, threatening movements of units loyal to Kornilov began: the cavalry corps of Major General A. Dolgorukov moved to Finland from Finland, and the 7th Orenburg Cossack Regiment moved to Moscow. They were stopped respectively by the commanders of the Petrograd and Moscow military districts ^[19]

After that, the most reliable units from the point of view of Kornilov were concentrated in the Nevel , Novosokolnikov and Velikiye Luki areas: the 3rd cavalry corps and the 3rd brigade of the "Wild Division" —the Ingush and Circassian regiments, under the command of the very right-wing political views general Lieutenant AM Krymov . The meaning of this concentration, absurd from a military point of view, was clear: created a bridgehead for the march on Petrograd According to the memoirs of the commander of a regiment, Prince Ukhtomsky, officers understood this perfectly:. "The general opinion has declined that we are going to Petrograd ... We knew that a coup would soon take place, which would end the power of the Petrograd Council and declare either a directory or dictatorship with the consent of Kerensky and with his participation, which under these conditions was a guarantee of the complete success of the coup ". When the chief of staff of Kornilov, General Lukomsky, still not initiated into the plot, demanded an explanation, (August 11) Kornilov informed him that he intended to protect the Provisional Government from the attack of the Bolsheviks and Soviets even against Oli government itself. He “hangs German agents and spies led by Lenin” and disperses the Soviets. Kornilov wanted to entrust this operation to Krymov, since he knew that he “did not hesitate to hang all the members of the Council of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies on the lanterns.” Perhaps at the last moment he will be able to conclude an agreement with the Provisional Government, but if the agreement of the latter fails, nothing terrible will happen: "then they themselves will thank me." There was no real threat to the Bolshevik speech at that moment (the Bolsheviks were defeated and discredited as German spies after the July days ), but the Kornilovites in every possible way exaggerated the allegations about her ^{[10] [20]} .

Meanwhile, the Germans' breakthrough near Riga, on the one hand, posed a real threat to Petrograd, and on the other, gave reason to use this threat to "restore order." The relocation of the Headquarters to the territory of the Petrograd Military District in connection with this also created an ambiguous and alarming situation for Kerensky. Kerensky, whose relations with Kornilov became aggravated after the Moscow meeting, now decided to enter into an alliance with him. The agreement was worked out thanks to Savinkov; Kerensky gave Kornilov considerable power, hoping that he would clear his environment at Headquarters from too open and warlike reactionaries. On August 20 ( September 2 ), 1917 Kerensky, according to Savinkov’s report, agreed to “declare Petrograd and its environs martial law and to arrive in Petrograd military corps for the real implementation of this provision, that is, to fight the Bolsheviks” ^[21] . On August 21 ( September 3 ) 1917, the Provisional Government approved the decision to separate the Petrograd Military District into direct submission to the Headquarters. It was assumed that both military and civilian power in the district would belong to Kornilov, but Petrograd itself would remain under the authority of the government; The 3rd Cavalry Corps, as especially reliable, will be handed over to Kerensky, but not under the command of Krymov, but another, more liberal and loyal to the government, commander. From reliable parts it was supposed to form a Special Army at the direct disposal of the government. At the same time, Savinkov was appointed Governor General of Petrograd - thus, the de facto fate of the country was in the hands of the triumvirate of Kerensky - Kornilov - Savinkov. This decision was brought to Headquarters on August 24 ( September 6 ), 1917 . After this, Kornilov, on the one hand, issued an order to the commander of the 1st Kuban Cossack Division P.N. Krasnov to take command of the 3rd cavalry corps (in fact, Krasnov took command of the corps only on August 29 ( September 11 ) 1917 ), and on the other On August 25 ( September 7 ) 1917 he advanced the 3rd Corps (still under the command of Krymov) and the Wild Division, as well as the cavalry corps of Dolgorukov to Petrograd. Thus, the movement of Kornilov’s troops to Petrograd began absolutely legally ^[7] . Kornilov formally set the task for Krymov: 1) “If, from me or directly on the spot (information) about the beginning of the Bolsheviks’s speech, immediately move with the corps to Petrograd, occupy the city, disarm the units of the Petrograd garrison that will join the Bolshevik movement, disarm the population Petrograd and disperse advice; 2) Upon completion of this task, General Krymov had to allocate one brigade with artillery to Oranienbaum and upon arrival there, demand from the Kronstadt garrison the disarmament of the fortress and the transition to the mainland ” ^[22] . To get a reason to send troops to Petrograd and a coup, it was planned to organize a provocative pseudo-Bolshevik demonstration on August 27 ( September 9 ) 1917 , and this task was assigned to the chairman of the Council of the Union of Cossack Units General Dutov ^{[19] [20]} .

On August 25–26 (September 7–8), a feeling reigned in Stavka that the coup was developing without any obstacles — even too, suspiciously smoothly. Options for power arrangements were discussed. The Directory project was put forward as part of Kornilov, Savinkov and Filonenko (Social Revolutionary, assistant and proxy to Savinkov). The project of the Kerensky-Kornilov-Savinkov directory was also put forward. Another project involved the creation of a coalition government of the so-called. "Council of People’s Defense." It was supposed to introduce Admiral A. V. Kolchak (manager of the Ministry of the Sea), G. V. Plekhanov (Minister of Labor), A. I. Putilova (Minister of Finance), S. N. Tretyakova (Minister of Trade and Industry), I. G. Tsereteli (Minister of Posts and Telegraphs), as well as Savinkova (Minister of War) and Filonenko (Minister of Foreign Affairs). Even the introduction of the “grandmother of the Russian revolution” E. K. Breshko-Breshkovskaya into the cabinet was supposed. Kornilov was supposed to become the chairman of the “Council”, and Kerensky was his deputy. The discussions at Headquarters also spoke of a directory consisting of Kerensky-Kornilov-Savinkov as the highest governing body of the country before the Constituent Assembly . At the same time, already without agreement with the government, a draft order was prepared at Headquarters on the introduction of a state of siege in Petrograd ( curfews , censorship , prohibition of rallies and demonstrations, disarmament of the garrison that resist, military courts ). At the same time, the Union of Officers, with the knowledge of Kornilov, proposed the liquidation of the Council and the arrest of the Bolsheviks in Petrograd by the forces of mobile officer-junkers, thus putting Kerensky before the fact. These deviations from the agreed plan did not hide from Kerensky, which caused him alarm and distrust ^{[7] [19]} .

On August 25 ( September 7 ), 1917 , the cadet ministers resigned - this was part of the plan that Kornilov’s had previously conceived. At the same time, the Socialist-Revolutionary Minister Chernov resigned, who, on the contrary, did not want to take part in the pro-Kornilov’s intrigue ^[10] . Meanwhile, on August 22 ( September 4 ), 1917, a deputy of the State Duma and a former member of the Provisional Government V.N. Lvov , who enjoyed a reputation as a near, naive and frivolous ^[23] , tried to act as an intermediary between Kerensky and Stavka. He told Kerensky that the Soviets were slowly but surely falling into the hands of the Bolsheviks and would no longer help Kerensky; at the same time, "anger against the Soviets is growing ... it is already breaking out and ending in a massacre." Threatening Kerensky with personal death in this “massacre” if he did not “break with the Soviets”, Lviv, on behalf of the pro-Kornilov forces, suggested that he form a right-wing government, and in the end, according to Lvov, even obtained words of consent to resign. After that, Lvov went to Headquarters to discuss with Kornilov the conditions of the latter to Kerensky.

On August 24 ( September 6 ), 1917, he had a conversation with Kornilov, in which Kornilov formulated the idea of ​​introducing martial law in Petrograd, concentrating the power of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Minister-Chairman in the same hands (“of course, all this is before the Constituent Assembly”), declaring readiness hand over the portfolio of the Minister of Justice to Kerensky, and the Minister of War to Savinkov. He also asked Lvov “to warn Kerensky and Savinkov that I’m not guaranteeing their life anywhere, and therefore let them come to Headquarters, where I will take their personal safety under my protection”. On August 26, with this message, Lvov arrived at Kerensky ^{[7] [19] [24]} .

August 26 ( September 8 ) 1917 V. Lvov met with Kerensky and handed him the conditions of Kornilov. At the same time, he also retold the moods that dominated the Headquarters and were sharply negative in relation to Kerensky, and retold in such a way that this could be mistaken for the words of Kornilov himself. As a result, Kerensky, who hesitated, was afraid of Kornilov and was in an excited and nervous state, had the impression that Kornilov ultimately required him to lay down his power and come to Headquarters, where he was preparing to kill him. From that moment on, Kerensky’s actions were aimed at “proving immediately the formal connection between Lvov and Kornilov so clearly that the Provisional Government would be able to take decisive measures that very evening.” Kerensky invited Lvov to write down his demands on paper, after which the following note was drawn up last:

General Kornilov offers:

1) Declare Petrograd martial law.
2) Transfer all power, military and civilian, to the hands of the Supreme Commander.
3) The resignation of all ministers, not excluding the minister-chairman, and the transfer of the interim management of the ministries to the ministerial comrades, until the formation of the cabinet by the Supreme Commander.

Lvov subsequently assured that what he expressed was not an ultimatum, but “different wishes in the sense of strengthening power” ^[25] .

Then came negotiations on a direct wire between the close Kerensky V.V. Vyrubov and Kerensky, on the one hand, and Kornilov, on the other, and Kerensky, who was trying to enlist new evidence of the rebellion, entered into negotiations on behalf of (absent) Lvov:

[Kerensky]. - Hello general. The telephone has Vladimir Nikolaevich Lvov and Kerensky. Please confirm that Kerensky can act in accordance with the information transmitted by Vladimir Nikolaevich.
[Kornilov]. - Hello, Alexander Fedorovich, hello, Vladimir Nikolaevich. Reaffirming the outline of the situation in which the country and the army appear to me, the outline made by me to Vladimir Nikolayevich with a request to report to you, I reiterate that the events of recent days and newly emerging imperatively require a very definite decision in the shortest possible time.
[Kerensky]. - I - Vladimir Nikolaevich - I ask you: what specific decision needs to be executed, about which you asked to inform me, Alexander Fedorovich, only completely personally? Without this confirmation, personally from you, Alexander Fedorovich hesitates to completely trust me.
[Kornilov]. - Yes, I confirm that I asked you to convey to Alexander Fedorovich my insistent request to come to Mogilev.
[Kerensky]. - I am Alexander Fedorovich. I understand your answer as a confirmation of the words conveyed to me by Vladimir Nikolaevich. Today you can’t do it and you cannot leave. Hope to leave tomorrow. Do I need Savinkov?
[Kornilov]. - I urge Boris Viktorovich to come with you. What I said to Vladimir Nikolayevich applies equally to Boris Viktorovich. I beg you not to postpone your departure later tomorrow. Please believe that only the awareness of the responsibility of the moment makes me so persistently ask you.
[Kerensky]. - Should I come only in case of speeches about which there are rumors, or in any case?
[Kornilov]. - Anyway.

Kornilov’s answers looked like a confirmation of all Kerensky’s accusations, although in fact they weren’t, since Kerensky’s questions were asked in a general form. Subsequently, Kornilov and his supporters regarded these actions of Kerensky as a provocation . In fact, according to Kornilov, he only confirmed Kerensky’s invitation to Mogilev for negotiations, but did not sign the ultimatum. According to A. I. Denikin, Kerensky was most afraid that “Kornilov’s answer on the most important question - the nature of his proposals” - would refute his interpretation of the “ultimatum”, and therefore deliberately clothed the essence of the question in “deliberately dark forms”.

After that, Kerensky hid in his office behind the curtain the police chief Bulavinsky; in the presence of this witness, Lvov in a new conversation confirmed the contents of the note. According to Bulavinsky’s memoirs, when asked “what were the reasons and motives that made General Kornilov demand that Kerensky and Savinkov come to Headquarters,” he did not answer. After that, Lviv was arrested ^{[7] [19] [26]} .

In the evening of August 26 ( September 8 ), 1917, at a government meeting, Kerensky qualified the actions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief as " rebellion ." However, the government did not side with Kerensky. During the stormy meeting that took place, Kerensky demanded "dictatorial powers" to suppress the "rebellion", but other ministers opposed this and insisted on a peaceful settlement.

Alexander Fedorovich slammed the door several times, threatened that since the ministers did not support him, he would "go to the Soviets"

- Kerensky, A.F. Russia at a historical turn .

As a result, a telegram was hastily compiled, sent to Headquarters signed by Kerensky, in which Kornilov was asked to relinquish his position to General A. S. Lukomsky and immediately leave for the capital ^[27] .

This telegram without a number received at Stavka at night on August 27 ( September 9 ) 1917 and completely unexpected for Kornilov, signed simply “Kerensky”, was at first mistaken for a fake. Kornilov had just sent a telegram to Kerensky informing him that Krymov’s corps would be in Petrograd on the 28th, and asking them to introduce martial law on the 29th ^[26] . Meanwhile, a statement by Kerensky was published in the newspapers, beginning with the words: “On August 26, General Kornilov sent me State Duma member V.N. Lvov demanding that the Provisional Government transfer all the fullness of the military and civil power so that he would draw up at his own discretion a new government to govern the country ... "

Kornilov was furious. Kornilov’s response to Kerensky’s statements was a formal declaration of war on the Provisional Government: “The telegram of the Prime Minister No. 4163, in its entire first part, is a complete lie: I didn’t send State Duma member V. Lvov to the Provisional Government, but he came to me, as the messenger of the minister-chairman. Member of the State Duma Alexey Aladyin witnesses this. Thus, a great provocation took place that puts at stake the fate of the Fatherland. Russian people! Our great homeland is dying. The hour of her death is near. Forced to speak openly - I, General Kornilov, declare that the Provisional Government, under pressure from the Bolshevik majority of the Soviets, acts in full accordance with the plans of the German General Staff and, at the same time as the forthcoming landing of enemy forces on the Riga coast, kills the army and shocks the country inside. ( ...) I, General Kornilov, the son of a Cossack peasant, declare to everyone and everyone that I personally do not need anything other than preserving Great Russia, and I swear to bring the people - by defeating the enemy - to the Constituent Assembly, on which he himself will decide his fate, and choose the way of a new state life. But to betray Russia into the hands of its original enemy, the German tribe, and to make the Russian people slaves of the Germans, I cannot do it. And I prefer to die on the field of honor and battle, so as not to see the shame and disgrace of the Russian land. Russian people, in your hands the life of your Motherland! ”

Kornilov categorically refused to give up the post of commander in chief, and General Lukomsky - to accept her. In response to a demand to stop Krymov’s movement, the latter telegraphed Kerensky: “it is impossible to stop the matter that began with your approval” ^[26] . He refused to stop the echelons and assume the post of commander in chief and commander of the Northern Front, General V.N. Klembovsky . Of the five front commanders, he was one of two who openly supported Kornilov; the second was the commander of the Southwestern Front, A. I. Denikin, who declared his support for Kornilov immediately upon receipt of a telegram from Kerensky on the resignation of the latter.

Kerensky took over command and summoned Alekseev to Petrograd to appoint him commander in chief. He also refused to carry out such an order.

August 28 ( September 10 ) 1917 was followed by a decree to the Governing Senate, formally declaring Kornilov a rebel and traitor. For his part, Kornilov said that he was taking full responsibility.

The reaction of the former Sovereign to newspaper reports about the “betrayal of Kornilov” in connection with the start of the “rebellion” is known: Nikolai Alexandrovich was very indignant and “said with bitterness:“ Is this Kornilov a traitor? ”” ^{[28] [29]} .

Taking upon himself the full power, General Kornilov promised to "save Great Russia" and "bring the people through victory to the convocation of the Constituent Assembly." On August 29 ( September 11 ), 1917, the general circulated another appeal in which he announced a conspiracy of the government, the Bolsheviks and Germany, called the bombings in Kazan their planned action, and called for disobedience to government orders ^[30] .

The speech of General Kornilov was supported by the Union of Officers, Petrograd officer organizations; "Second checker of the Empire" General A. M. Kaledin joined the rebels. The commanders of the four fronts declared their solidarity with the Supreme Commander.