Grain procurement in the USSR

During the period of civil war and war communism , the organization of grain procurements was based on the grain monopoly and the surplus , inherited from the last months of the Tsar and Provisional Government: on November 29, 1916, the head of the Ministry of Agriculture Rittikh signed a decree on bread distribution, and on December 7 the norms were defined Provincial deliveries with the subsequent calculation of the surplus in districts and volosts. The surplus in Russia came into force in January 1917. On February 17, 1917, Rittikh spoke at the State Duma with a detailed justification of the surplus as an effective means of solving food problems. Rittih pointed out that as a result of political bargaining, fixed prices for the purchase of products by the state in September 1916 were somewhat lower than market prices, which immediately significantly reduced the supply of grain to the transportation and grinding centers. He also pointed out the need for voluntary deed.

I have to say that where there were already cases of refusal or where there were underperformance, now I was asked from the places how to proceed further: should I do what the law requires, which indicates a certain way out when rural or volost societies they do not decide the sentence that is required of them for the performance of one or another of the duties or layouts - whether they should do this, or perhaps they should resort to requisition, also provided for by the Resolution of the Special Meeting, but I always and everywhere I echal that there ought to wait with this, it is necessary to wait: perhaps vanishing mood changes; it is necessary to assemble him again, to tell him that purpose for the sake of which this development is intended that it is precisely what the country and homeland needs for defense, and depending on the mood of the meeting, I thought that these decrees would change. In this direction, voluntary, I recognized the need to exhaust all means.

Report Rittih in the Duma on February 14, 1917. (inaccessible link)

March 25, 1917, the Minister of Agriculture of the Provisional Government, the cadet A. I. Shingarev conducted a law on grain monopoly. “This is an inevitable, bitter, sad measure,” he said, “to take in the hands of the state the distribution of grain stocks. Without this measure can not do. Having confiscated office and specific lands, Shingaryov postponed the question of the fate of landlord estates until the Constituent Assembly.

In May 1917 the Provisional Government was organized by the Ministry of Food, which was headed by the publicist A.V. Peshekhonov . He sought to implement the grain monopoly. But his policy provoked resistance from both entrepreneurs and peasants themselves. For May-August 1917, the practical fruits of Peshekhonov’s activities as minister were insignificant. His miscalculations are also characteristic of his successor, the well-known economic theorist S. N. Prokopovich , the former Minister of Food during the month before the October Revolution. Prokopovich also failed to fulfill his food program, which was based on active state intervention in the economy: the establishment of fixed prices, the distribution of products, the regulation of production. He demanded the introduction of labor service, the creation of a national economic management center, a unified plan for the supply of all its branches. Neither the forces nor the will of the Provisional Government was enough for this. Instead of the planned 650 million poods for harvesting, about

In the first composition of the Council of People's Commissars of People's Commissar for Food, a hereditary nobleman, a professional revolutionary Ivan-Bronislav Adolfovich Teodorovich, became. But by the middle of December, when he finally left the post of Commissar, the results of his activities in the Commissariat were zero. Deputy People's Commissar Sovnarkom appointed a professional revolutionary, a physician by education A. G. Schlichter, a supporter of rigid administrative methods of work. He very quickly managed to rebuild both new and old food keepers against himself, and this could not but worry Lenin. On November 28, 1917 Tsyurup was appointed Comrade of the People's Commissar of Food, and on February 25, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars approved him as the People's Commissar of Food.

In March 1918, in a report to the Council of People's Commissars, Zyurup wrote:

Tsyurupa offered stocks of manufactured goods, agricultural machinery and basic necessities in the amount of 1,162 million rubles. send to the grain regions. March 25, 1918 SNK approved the report of Tsyurupa. The food authorities, the People's Commissariat and the Tsyurup personally received extraordinary powers to supply the country with bread and other products. The decree adopted in April 1918, by which the Narkomrod was authorized to acquire consumer goods in order to issue them in exchange for peasant grain, was not fully implemented. Attempts to establish food standards and firm prices in cities have collapsed due to lack of food and poor management. The decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee dated May 9, 1918 confirming the state monopoly of the grain trade and prohibiting private trade in bread.

In May 1918, a decree on the food dictatorship in the country was adopted (Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of May 13, 1918 on the Food Dictatorship of the People's Commissariat of Education). Local organs of the People's Commissariat are being reorganized. Provincial and district prodkoms are created. Both in the center and in the provinces, with the sales in the provinces, a network of courses of foodstuff agitators has been created. “The News of the People's Commissariat of Education”, “The Bulletin of the Commissariat of Education”, “Prodrabotnik's Handbook” are regularly published. "Memorable book of the food technician" and a number of other agitation and reference publications.

In the summer and autumn of 1918, the focus of Tsyurupy was on harvesting and preparing food. With the help of trade unions, factory committees and local Soviets, the People's Commissariat of Education created working detachments that organized on-site harvesting, grain transportation and grain procurement. The poor committees (commanders) created by the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of June 11, 1918, which until the liquidation in December 1918-1919, controlled the procurement and supply activities of the village cooperation and directly managed the harvesting and sowing company of the autumn of 1918, played a large role in grain procurement. The civil war forced extraordinary measures. Tsyurup explained: “Now, when we do not have ... goods, when our stocks are not replenished and we live by the inheritance we receive, we cannot conduct commodity exchange on a large scale. Now, when the civil war has taken away our vast grain territories, fuel, etc., the forms of the future are not available to us. We must, resorting to surrogates, according to the clothing and stretching the legs ... In conditions of fire we must not allow experiments. We must get bread. ”Strengthening foreign military intervention and the need to urgently get bread to fully meet the needs of the Red Army and at least the minimum needs of industrial centers forced the government to switch from February 1919 (on January 11, 1919, the decree“ On the development of bread and fodder ”was promulgated. ) to the overdevelopment of the already existing from the second half of 1918 in a number of provinces (Tula, Vyatka, Kaluga, Vitebsk, etc.). For the first 9 months of the Soviet regime - 5 million centners; for 1 year of the surplus (1 / VIII 1918-1 / VIII 1919) - 18 million centners; 2nd year (1 / VIII 1919-1 / VIII 1920) - 35 million centners. 3rd year (1 / VIII 1920-1 / VIII 1921) - 46.7 million centners. Weather data about grain procurements for this period: 1918/1919 −1767780 tons; 1919/1920 −3480200 tons; 1920/1921 - 6011730 tons

The transition from war communism to the NEP demanded completely different forms of the organization of grain procurements. The grain procurement system based on the surplus was replaced by a food tax (introduced by a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of March 21, 1921), which precisely determined the amount of bread to be delivered to the state; its amount should be published before spring sowing. The natural food tax was less than surplus. All that remained after the tax was handed over was at the complete disposal of the peasant, who was granted the freedom to trade these surpluses. On May 10, 1923, the food tax was replaced by a single agricultural tax, which was calculated in grain (rye) units, although it could be partially paid in money. The agricultural tax of 1924/25, due to the completion of monetary reform, was fully levied in cash. In parallel with the tax in exchange, the bread was harvested by direct exchange of goods and through the purchase of bread that was traded on the market. The correlation between the bread, which came in the way of the food tax and the bread purchased on the market, already in 1923/24 changed dramatically in favor of the latter.

In the transition from war communism to the NEP , new bread trading organizations were created. To cover the market turnover of bread (the concentration of the bulk of marketable grain and the subordination of the price of bread to state regulation), in May 1922 a special organization, Khleboprodukt, and a number of other organizations were created. Cooperation was also involved in the production of marketable grain. All of them, along with the planned procurers, tried to cover the commodity surplus of grain that rotated on the market. Already in 1923/1924, 16 basic planned suppliers and a large number of unscheduled ones appeared on the procurement market: field and wheelchair cooperation, factory plants, mutual aid committees, etc. The multiplicity of suppliers generated unhealthy competition. In 1925, this was one of the factors behind the sharp jump in grain prices, when, in attempts of the first to execute a fairly high procurement plan, the state buyers created an excessive demand. At the same time, individual areas of the country were not sufficiently covered by the planned procurement. The regulation of the grain market was carried out through specially authorized service stations - the Executive Committee of the Service stations (1922/23), a special interdepartmental commission, through Komvnutorg at the stations 1923/24, in 1924/25 the People's Commissariat of Trade was created and transformed in 1925/26 into the People's Commissariat of Trade. In 1924/25, the state’s regulatory measures were reduced to streamlining the bread market by eliminating competition at the expense of: reducing the number of major suppliers to 10, their more rational distribution across regions, linking individual work of individual state organizations in contact with the bread market, and, in particular, setting limit prices . At the beginning of NEP, private and unscheduled procurers occupy a large place in the grain turnover: they harvested bread and oilseeds: in 1922-23 −26%, and in 1924/25 - 43% of the total volume of blanks. The development of state regulation, the strengthening of state-planned blanks and the systematic struggle with private owners further led to the growth of the socialized sector (1925/26 - 65%, 1926 / 27-67% of the total mass of market bread), taking into account unplanned state-owned ones. and cooperative collectors. Since 1925/26, the state has denied private traders with public services on lending, providing railway services. and water transport for grain transportations (economic regulation on transport). In 1926/27, private milling was reduced. The state prohibits state. and cooperative organizations to enter into transactions with private traders. All these activities have greatly strengthened the position of the state. and cooperative suppliers left in the bread market. In 1927/28 state. and 84% of marketable grain was procured by cooperative procurers. The remaining 16% fell on unscheduled turnover, including both private capital and direct purchases of the population. The role of private capital in inter-district grain production is reduced to 3%. The sizes of cooperation blanks are rapidly growing, their share in planned grain procurements.

In 1927/28, with the holding of measures against private owners, the price is set at a level acceptable to the national x-va and the discrepancy between the highest and lowest levels of state procurement prices is significantly reduced.

In 1926/27 the gap between autumn and spring procurement prices also sharply decreased, which was significant in 1923 / 24-1924 / 25:

The blanks for this period amounted to

By the autumn of 1927, the state set firm prices for bread. The rapid growth of industrial centers, an increase in the urban population caused a huge increase in the demand for bread. Low marketability of grain farming, crop failure in some regions of the USSR (mainly in Ukraine and the North Caucasus), the wait-and-see attitude of suppliers and sellers, the international situation around the USSR resulting in what is called the “military alarm of 1927,” and a number of reasons listed below led to events called the "bread strike". Despite a slight decrease in yield (1926/27 - 78393 thousand tons 1927/28 - 76696 thousand tons) in the period from July 1, 1927 to January 1, 1928, the state procured 2,000 thousand tons less than in the same period before of the year. The Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of July 10, 1928 "The policy of grain procurement in connection with the general economic situation among the specific reasons for the appearance of" difficulties on the grain front "indicated:

A) disruption of the market equilibrium and aggravation of this disruption due to a more rapid growth in demand from the peasants in comparison with the supply of manufactured goods, caused by an increase in the profitability of the village, especially its well-to-do and kulak strata
b) an unfavorable price ratio for bread in comparison with prices for other agricultural products, which weakened the incentive to sell grain surpluses and which, however, the party could not change in the second half of the year without conflicting with the low-powered strata of the village.
c) mistakes of the planned management, mainly along the line of timely delivery of goods and taxation (low tax for the propertied strata of the village)
d) lack of procurement and party-Soviet organizations (lack of a united front, lack of activity, reliance on gravity)
e) the use of all these minuses by the capitalist elements of the city and village (kulaks, speculators) to undermine the grain procurements.
As a result of these drawbacks, by January 1928, the state faced a shortage of 128 million pounds of grain in comparison with the previous year, which created the threat of a crisis for the entire national economy.
Thanks to timely measures taken, the party and the Soviet authorities, in a certain part of which were of an extraordinary nature, managed to prevent this threat and catch up in the first half of the harvesting year and bring bread harvest to last year’s size by April 1, which would ensure the needs of the domestic market to continue new crop.

However, as a result of the death of winter crops in the south of Ukraine and partly in the North Caucasus, which are the main suppliers of bread, Ukraine is full, and the North Caucasus partially fell out as supply areas, which not only reduced the procurement capacity of the state to a new crop of millions by 25, but also required seed помощи для пересева, поставив государство перед необходимостью довести яровую семенную помощь по всему СССР до 30 млн пудов. Эти обстоятельства плюс перерасход в снабжении хлебом сверх плана для удовлетворения широкого круга потребителей вынудили заготовительные организации усилить заготовки и других хлебных районах и задеть страховые запасы крестьянства.“
Всё это создало почву для повторного применения чрезвычайных мер и для административного произвола в заготовительных районах, нарушения революционной законности частичного применения методов продразвёрстки (обход дворов, закрытие базаров, незаконные обыски и т. д.), а в районах потребляющих в связи с резким сокращением планового снабжения привело в ряде мест к частичному введению карточек на хлеб.
Эти обстоятельства вызвали недовольство среди некоторых слоёв крестьянства выразившееся в выступлении протеста против административного произвола в ряде районов…»

Среди мероприятий которые планировалось для не допущения подобного в будущем планировалось:

1. немедленная ликвидация практики обхода дворов, незаконных обысков и всякого рода нарушений революционной законности.
2. Немедленная ликвидация всех и всяких рецидивов продразвёрстки и уничтожение каких бы то ни было попыток закрытия базаров с обеспечением максимально гибких форм регулирования торговли со стороны хозяйственных органов.
3. Известное повышение цен на хлеб с варьированием по районам и зерновым культурам.
4. Не допускать повторения ошибок в деле распределения товаров и обеспечить своевременный завоз пром.товаров и обеспечить своевременный завоз промтоваров в хлебозаготовительные районы.
5. Сочетать политику возврата кредитов и сбора единого сельскохозяйственного налога с интересами хлебозаготовок, обеспечение своевременное их поступление.
6. Вести неослабную борьбу с самогоноварением.
7. Правильная организация дела снабжения хлебом, не допускающая перерасходов сверх установленных планов и возлагающая ответственность за снабжение потребителей на местный товарооборот и местных заготовителей.
8. Обязательное образование государственного хлебного (продовольственного и семенного) резерва.
Серьёзная семенная помощь, оказанная Советской властью бедноте и среднему крестьянству, обеспечила значительное расширение яровых посевных площадей. Это обстоятельство совпало с благоприятными видами на урожай, оцениваемый ЦСУ СССР, по данным на 15 июня, выше среднего. Всё это плюс рост промышленной продукции и реорганизация заготовительного аппарата, соединённое с вышеуказанными мероприятиями должно облегчить, несмотря на недостаток манёвренных запасов хлеба, достижение нормального темпа заготовок ещё до осени".

Несмотря на благоприятные прогнозы засуха на уже пострадавших Украине и Северном Кавказе привела зимой-весной 1928/29 к трудностям с продовольствием и голоду в отдельных районах страны. В виду отсутствия государственных запасов группой Бухарина было предложено «отказаться от наступления на кулачество, вернуться к свободной продаже хлеба, а недостающий хлеб купить за границей».

Это предложение было отвергнуто, и практика «нажима» была продолжена (преимущественно за счёт хлебопроизводящих районов Сибири).

Всего в 1927/28 году было заготовлено 11 тысяч тонн. Этот кризис становится отправной точкой к «коренному разрешению зерновой проблемы» выразившиеся в «развёртывании социалистического строительства в деревне, насаждая совхозы и колхозы , способные использовать тракторы и другие современные машины.»

Вся заготовка хлеба в этом периоде сосредотачивается преимущественно в системе сельскохозяйственной кооперации. На рынке был оставлен единый заготовитель хлеба, центр сельскохозяйственной кооперации, «Хлебживцентр»; «Хлебопродукт» был превращён в единого государственного держателя зерна — «Союзхлеб».

По мере увеличения размера обобществлённого сектора (количества колхозов и совхозов) его роль в поставках государству возрастала.

Всего же за период контрактации хлебозаготовки увеличивались вплоть до 1932 года.

Практика применения контрактации (механическая разверстка планов на районы, встречные планы и так далее), применение антинаучных методов ведения хозяйства (мелкая вспашка, монокультурность, и так далее и тому подобное), формальное и некомпетентное управление (отсутствие оного) сельским хозяйством со стороны Наркомзема , и сильная засуха 1931 катастрофически сказались на состоянии зернового хозяйства. Неспособность государственных и кооперативных структур полноценно поддерживать зернооборот на рынке хранения, переработки и доставки хлеба потребителю создали значительное напряжение с хлебом в стране.

Данная система вводилась с официальной целью развития товарооборота в стране. Согласно ей колхоз и единоличник мог торговать хлебом после выполнения плана хлебозаготовок и засыпки семенных и страховых фондов. Колхозник мог торговать хлебом, полученным им по трудодням , по выполнении плана хлебозаготовок и засыпки семян. Несмотря на это послабление в итоге хлебозаготовки в 1932, прошли дали значительно худший результат. Официально причиной тому было то, что «Однако многие деревенские работники и отдельные партийные организации не учли новой обстановки, не перестроили своей работы, допустили ряд серьезных ошибок и тем создали большие трудности в Xлебозаготовках 1932.» «Пока не было колхозной торговли хлебом, пока не было двух цен на хлеб, государственной и рыночной,— обстановка в деревне была одна. С объявлением колхозной торговли хлебом обстановка должна была измениться круто, ибо объявление колхозной торговли означает легализацию рыночной цены на хлеб, более высокой, чем установленная государственная цена. Нечего и доказывать, что это обстоятельство должно было создать у крестьян известную сдержанность в деле сдачи хлеба государству». И далее «…наши деревенские коммунисты, по крайней мере большинство из них, раскусили колхозную торговлю лишь с её положительной стороны, поняли и усвоили её положительную сторону, но совершенно не поняли и не усвоили отрицательных сторон колхозной торговли,—не поняли того, что отрицательные стороны колхозной торговли могут причинить большой вред государству, если они, то есть коммунисты, не начнут с первых же дней уборки хлеба подгонять во всю хлебозаготовительную кампанию» (Сталин И., О работе в деревне)

The forced grain procurements of 1932 led to a massive famine ^[1] , as a result of which several million people died in the USSR.

In the new situation created by the approval of the collective farm system and the introduction of the collective farm bread trade, the old method of procurement based on contracting turned out to be unsuitable. During the contracting period, each collective farm recognized its own grain size only after the harvest. At the same time, the work of the best collective farms was often not stimulated due to the permissible equalization when the grain was left on the collective farms after the grain-yields. This had a negative effect on the labor productivity of collective farmers and an increase in the productivity of collective farm fields.

On 19/1, 1933, to abolish the contracting system of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the law “On Mandatory Supply of Grain to the State by Collective Farms and Individual Enterprises” was adopted. The new bread harvesting system consists in the fact that the collective farm, even before spring sowing, knows for sure how much grain it is obliged to sell to the state. The size of the grain delivery per hectare of crops, according to the state plan, is set by the government. Everything that the collective farm has removed in excess of the quantity that it is obliged to hand over to the state remains at its full disposal. In addition, to eliminate the breakthrough in agriculture, the party sent the best workers to the village to work in the MTS political departments, set up commissions for determining yields from among the tested Bolsheviks, strengthened the personnel of the harvesting apparatus, sending them to the village as authorized by the Harvesting Committee of the Agricultural Industry. products with SNK USSR (KomzagSNK) almost two thousand people who have been selected by the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).

MTS political departments and the restructuring of collective farm cells and the regional party desks, the leaders raised the effectiveness of village party organizations. This was the deciding factor. Earlier, the grain procurement apparatus was reorganized. S.-H. cooperation was superfluous. The whole business of harvesting, storage and distribution of grain was concentrated in Zagotzerno. Guide X. was entrusted to the Committee on the procurement of S.-X. products at the service station (Komzag-STO), then reorganized into KomzagSNK, with district authorities KomzagSTO in the districts. The whole matter of accrual of obligations for the supply of grain to the state and for procurement is concentrated in the system of the KomzagSNK USSR. Zagotzerno has become a body for the acceptance, storage and distribution of bread.

As a result of all these measures, the VKP (b) achieved in 1933 a great victory in the consolidation of social services. with. h-va, one of the indicators of which is the production of 898 million centners of grain in the country and the successful implementation of bread deliveries to the state. In 1933 bread was harvested by 23.1% more than in 1932. The gross output of grain in the country increased in 1933 compared to 1932 by 200 million centners.

It should also be noted that wheat was harvested by 52.4% more than in 1932, the annual plan established by the SNK of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) for state farms) was fully implemented. State farms surrendered grain to the state by 11.2% more than in 1932.

The June plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) (1934) in a resolution “On the implementation of the plan for the supply of grain and meat” stated that “The results of spring sowing are a bright indicator of the growth, power and organization of the collective farm system in the village”, and indicated that he considers the combat mission of all Party and Soviet organizations successful and organized cleaning and ensuring maximum collection of bread with minimal losses. The deadlines for the fulfillment of tasks on grain deliveries in 1934 were established in the republics of Central Asia, Transcaucasia, the North Caucasus, the Azov-Black Sea and Stalingrad territories, the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian SSR, yuzh. and the Alma-Ata regions of Kazakhstan in accordance with the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) of January 19, 1933, by state farm — by November 1, 1934 (125 million pounds), by payment of MTS — by November 1, 1934, by return of loans - by October 1, 1934. In all other territories, regions and republics: a) on grain deliveries (except for the Far Eastern Branch and the eastern part of the East Siberian region) —in terms in accordance with the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) Of 19 January 1933, by the state farms for bread-making by December 1, 1934, by the payment of the MTS — by December 1, 1934, by the return of loans — by October 1, 1934. The resolution gave specific guidance on carrying out the harvest. At the same time, specific instructions were given to all party and Soviet institutions and organizations what measures should be taken to carry out this plan, how to fight anti-state tendencies, mobilize the forces and vigilance of collective farmers and state-farm workers to struggle for the full implementation of the grain delivery plan in time. on account of the payment in kind and the return of seed and food loans.

The rate of delivery of grain to the state on mandatory deliveries for the period since 1933 has been repeatedly reduced. By 1938, they barely reach half the norms of 1933.

In 1933 the system of settlements with collective farms for work done on collective farms was also changed. In order to stimulate the struggle for higher yields, in-kind payment was introduced instead of the cash payment system, and the payment rates for individual works were directly dependent on the harvest.

Mandatory grain supplies for a number of years gave the bulk of the bread harvested by the state. But due to the rapid growth of MTS and the volume of work performed by them, a significant increase in the yield of organizationally strengthened collective farms systematically increased the size of grain receipts on payment in kind. In 1937, despite a significant reduction in the rates of payment for the work of the MTS, grain receipts on payment in kind had already exceeded the grain supply for mandatory deliveries (for individual regions 1.5-2 times). In 1933/34, the obligatory deliveries, which accounted for 70% of the receipts from grain procurements in 1933/34, accounted for only 33.5% of the total receipts. The share of individual farmers in grain deliveries for this period decreased from 10 to 0.2%. Organizationally strengthened state farms became the leaders of bread supply. Systematically increasing the yield of the fields, they brought the change in 1937 to 38.7 million centners. Grain state farms surrendered an average of 8.2 centners per hectare of sowing. Public procurement occupies a significant role in procurement, to-rye on the instructions of the government are carried out by consumer cooperation in the order of collective farm trade, being strongly stimulated by the state. Since 1937, each individual collective farmer and individual farmers had the opportunity to sell grain in the order of the collective farm bread trade immediately after fulfilling his obligations to the state, without waiting for the completion of grain supplies, filling seed and insurance, funds by other collective farmers and individual farmers of the region and the region as it was in previous years. The marketability of collective farm and state farm production of grain at least reached 40% - that is, it was 1.5 times higher than the marketability of the pre-war (meaning I world) grain farm. For example, in 1938, despite the drought in the Volga region and adjacent areas, marketable bread was about 2.3 billion pounds of grain, that is, 1 billion pounds more than exceptionally productive 1913. Such high marketability of agriculture provided an opportunity to harvest grain for the period 1936 -39 at a level not lower than 1,600 million pounds, and in 1937 even prepare 1 billion 800 million pounds. If, moreover, take into account procurement on the basis of public procurement approx. 220 million pounds of grain, we obtain that the grain procurements of 1937 reached a record number of 2 billion pounds ( 318.5 million centners), while as early as 1934/35 approx. 1.5 billion pounds.

With the change in the forms and methods of grain procurements, the bread procurement apparatus was also rebuilt. The organization of the procurements was entrusted to the specially created system of the Committee for Procurement under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, transformed in 1938, according to the USSR Constitution, to the People's Commissariat of Procurement. The whole matter of reception, storage and distribution of grain is concentrated in a single state. organization Zagotzerno, later Disintegrated into 3 independent associations: Yugozagotzerno, Centrozagotzerno and Vostok-Zagotzerno, serving separate parts of the Soviet Union.

From 1940 in the policy of grain procurements, as well as in the policy of procurement of other agricultural types. products, there have been significant changes. The size of grain supplies is established from each hectare of arable land assigned to the collective farm. The new order X. should have given new powerful incentives for the development of grain crops for the development of virgin lands, the introduction of correct crop rotations, etc.

• Agricultural Encyclopedia 1 ed. 1932-1935 M. OGIZ RSFSR
• Agricultural Encyclopedia 2 ed. 1937-1940 M.-L. SELHOZOGIZ
• N. D. Kondratyev. The market of grain and its regulation during war and revolution - Moscow: Science 1991