Kiev strategic defensive operation

By mid-July 1941, the German command (OKW) made a strategic decision on the further development of the operation to seize the territory of the USSR . In OKV directive No. 33 of July 19, Hitler ordered the main objectives of the offensive to be changed so as to occupy the Donbass and Crimea in the south, and Leningrad in the north, connecting with the Finns . ^[3] Directive No. 33 read ^[3] :

1. ... Active actions and freedom of maneuver of the northern flank of Army Group "South" are constrained by the fortifications of Kiev and actions in our rear of the troops of the 5th Soviet Army .
2. The purpose of further operations should be to prevent the large parts of the enemy from moving deep into their territory and destroy them. To do this, prepare in the following areas:

a) Southeastern section of the Eastern Front. The most important task is to destroy the 12th and 6th army of the enemy with a concentric offensive west of the Dnieper, not allowing them to leave the river.
...

OKV Directive No. 34 was issued on July 30 , which effectively repealed Directive No. 33 and its supplement. ^[4] Directive No. 34, in particular, instructed Army Group Center to go on the defensive, and Army Group South to continue operations with the aim of destroying large forces of Soviet troops west of the Dnieper and by creating bridgeheads on the Dnieper to create conditions for the subsequent crossing 1 1st tank group on the eastern bank of the Dnieper. ^[four]

It was carried out by the troops of the Southwestern Front and part of the forces of the Pinsk military flotilla. During the fighting, the 21st Army of the Central Front, the 6th and 12th Armies of the Southern Front, the 37th, 38th and 40th Armies, newly created as part of the South-Western Front, were additionally introduced. Only 28 divisions and 4 brigades. Within the framework of this operation, the following were carried out: Korosten frontal defensive operation, defensive operation on the approaches to Kiev, Uman and Kiev-Pryluk frontal defensive operations. Duration - within 82 days. The width of the battle front is 300 km. The depth of retreat of Soviet troops is 600 km ^[5] .

Given the complexity of the situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on June 30 ordered the commander of the Southwestern Front to withdraw troops to the line of fortified areas along the former state border of 1939, and, based on them, to organize a solid defense. Fulfilling the order, the 5th army retreated to Korostensky UR , and the 6th army - to the area of Berdichev and to the south, with the task of taking up defense in Novograd-Volyn UR .

At this time, units of the 3rd Motorized Corps (Eberhard von Mackensen) from the 1st Panzer Group of Colonel General von Kleist managed to break through the 60-km gap between these armies.

On July 9, the enemy occupied the city of Zhytomyr and rapidly developed an offensive along the Zhytomyr highway to the city of Kiev with the help of two tank divisions. On July 11, tank reconnaissance of the 13th Panzer Division of the Germans entered into combat contact with the fortifications of the Kiev UR on the river. Irpin .

In this dangerous situation, the 5th Army of General M.I. Potapov launched a counterattack against the formations of the 6th Army and the 1st Panzer Group of the Germans in the area of ​​Novograd-Volynsky by forces of the strike group (31 sk, 9, 19 and 22 mk). This forced the command of Army Group South to northward 9 divisions. Thus, the active operations of the troops of the 8th, 15th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps operating in the Dubno-Lutsk region, and, first of all, of the field units of the 5th and 6th armies of the SWF during the period of July 9-14, held down the main forces of the army group "South" aimed at the Kiev direction. They played a decisive role in repelling the first attempt by the Germans to seize the capital of Ukraine. ^[6]

After repelling Soviet attacks, the 3rd Motorized Corps was drawn into positional battles for two weeks near Kiev, awaiting the approach of the 6th Army's lagging infantry. At the same time, the 48th motorized corps of the 1st Panzer Group continued to advance in a southeastern direction. The 14th motorized corps advanced between the 3rd and 48th motorized corps. In fact, after the breakthrough of the “Stalin line”, the mobile formations of the Germans fanned out, losing to some extent operational communication with each other. ^[7]

On the 20th of July, the 5th Soviet Army (M.I. Potapov) fought with 6A infantry divisions near Korosten and Malin. The 26th Army (F. Ya. Kostenko) at that time led a counter-offensive against the 14th motorized corps of the Germans, with the task of capturing the city of Fastov .

In mid-July, German 17A launched an active offensive in the direction of Vinnitsa . The Soviet 12th Army under the command of P. G. Ponedelin was forced to leave the city. In addition, between the 26th and 6th armies a wide front gap was formed in the area of ​​the city of Bila Tserkva. These factors forced the Soviet command to withdraw the 6th and 12th armies to the Uman area. But by the end of the month, German tank units were able to catch the retreating and, together with the infantry of the German 17th Army, form a Uman boiler ^[7] .

On July 30, the enemy dealt a strong blow by the forces of three infantry divisions on the 64th sk 26th army at the junction of the 165th and 175th SD on the narrow front of Pinchuki - Vinnytsia Stavy. It was here, along the highway Bila Tserkva - Kiev, that the enemy sought to break into the city of Kiev from the south.

Separated parts of the 165th SD by the morning of July 31 were pushed to the north-east. The 175th SD and combined detachment of Major General F.N. Matykin (tank, motorized rifle battalions, artillery regiment) retreated to the southern sector of KiUR, and the 165th SD - beyond the Dnieper, occupying a section from the village of Bortnichi to Voronkov. ^[6]

Reflection of the assault KiUR . On the night of August 7, the 5th airborne brigade of Colonel A. I. Rodimtsev was transferred to the direction of the main attack of the German forces advancing on Kiev. The counterattack carried out by the brigade allowed for some time to stabilize the situation. But all these were only half measures. The paratroopers did not have combat experience and heavy weapons, and they could oppose the German infantry only with high fighting spirit. The catastrophic development of the situation near Kiev, the Soviet command was only able to avoid the introduction of freshly formed divisions into battle. The 284th Rifle Division of Colonel G.P. Pankov and the 295th Rifle Division of Colonel I.D. Andryukov were transferred to the 37th Army. Already on the evening of August 8, the day the brigade of A.I. Rodimtsev entered the battle, two echelons of the 284th Infantry Division were unloaded. The arrival of the 284th division allowed an effective counterattack in the area of ​​Mousetrap on 11 August. On August 12-14, Tarasovka, Novosyolki, Chabany and Pirogovo were liberated. At the same time, KiUR bunkers were released, which for almost a week fought surrounded. By August 16, the situation was fully restored, and the situation near Kiev stabilized.

- Isaev A.V. Boilers of the 41st. The history of the Second World War, which we did not know. ^[eight]

By mid-August 1941, the forces of the German Army Group “South” reached the Dnieper along the entire course from Kherson to Kiev . Army Group Center , advancing north of the Pripyat swamps , advanced to Smolensk (see map June – August 1941 ).

August 20 advanced units of the 1st Tank Army crossed the Dnieper at Zaporozhye. After stubborn battles, the pontoon ferry in Dnepropetrovsk was also captured. At the same time, the 17th Wehrmacht army managed to force the Dnieper near Kremenchug and create a bridgehead on the left bank of the river to Cherkassy . The 6th Army came close to Kiev.

On the same day he receives an order to leave the river. Dnieper 5th Army of the Major General of Tank Troops M.I. Potapov , covering Kiev from the north in the Chernobyl - Ivankov area .

Thus, the forces of the Soviet Southwestern Front , located in the bend of the Dnieper, were threatened by encirclement. Five Soviet armies were concentrated here (from north to south): 21st (commander - Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov ), 5th (commander - Major General M.I. Potapov ), 37th (commander - Major General A. A. Vlasov ), 26th (commander - Lieutenant General F. Ya. Kostenko ), 38th (commander - Lieutenant General D.I. Ryabyshev ).

Germany

On August 18, Franz Halder , Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, presented to Adolf Hitler a plan to strike at Moscow with the help of Army Group Center . ^{[4] [9]} However, on August 20, Hitler sharply rejected this proposal and on August 21 signed a directive according to which part of the forces of Army Group Center should turn south in order to encircle and defeat South-West together with Army Group South front of the Soviet troops. ^{[4] [9] [10] [11] The} Directive determined that “the most important task before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of Crimea, industrial and coal regions on the Donets River and blocking the route for Russian oil to transport from the Caucasus” ^{[10] [11]} . On August 23, Halder personally delivered this directive to the headquarters of Army Group Center, where it was met with disapproval, especially the commander of the 2nd Panzer Group, Heinz Guderian . ^[9] On the same day, Guderian flew to Hitler’s headquarters , where he tried to convince him of the need to attack Moscow, ^[9] however, Guderian did not succeed. On August 24, Guderian arrived at his command post to lead the offensive to the south. ^[9]

USSR

Fearing for Moscow, IV Stalin was more worried about strengthening the western direction, since he was sure that German troops would soon resume offensive operations on Moscow. ^[9] This opinion was supported by data from Soviet intelligence. ^[9] In the first half of August 1941, Moscow received a message from the Soviet intelligence resident in Switzerland, Sandor Rado , which stated that the German command was going to strike Moscow through Bryansk ^[9] . This message really corresponded to the intentions of the German command of the ground forces at that time ^[9] . Stalin, however, was not aware that on the 20th of August Hitler made the final decision to turn part of the forces of Army Group Center south. ^[9]

The Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov later wrote in his memoirs that even before the start of the battle he had reported to Stalin about the need to withdraw troops from the bend of the Dnieper, but had been removed from his post and had been replaced by the Chief of the General Staff B. M. Shaposhnikov . This statement is doubtful, since in the Stalin’s office (where, according to Zhukov , this happened), Zhukov’s presence was not registered on the date or close date indicated. ^[12]

Meanwhile, having changed the initial task, the German command began preparations for the transfer of the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian and the 2nd Army of Weichs from the Army Group Center from the western (Moscow) direction south to Kiev to destroy the South-Western Front . The headquarters of the High Command discovered the turn of the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian to the south and on August 19 allowed Kirponos to withdraw troops beyond the Dnieper, organizing a defense along its left bank, and on the right bank it was ordered to keep only Kiev. (With a proposal to withdraw the right flank of the front beyond the Dnieper, thereby freeing up two or three rifle divisions to reserve, Marshal S. M. Budyonny came forward on August 16). To counter the breakthrough of the enemy in the rear of the front from the north along the river. Desna deployed a new 40th army (consisting of three divisions).

In the evening, on August 23, due to a successful operation, taking advantage of the confusion during the retreat and weak military guards, part of the 11th Armored Division of the Wehrmacht captured a wooden bridge near the village of Okuninovo, several tens of kilometers north of Kiev. This created an additional threat to the capital of Ukraine and took over a significant part of the reserves of the South-Western Front. In unsuccessful attempts to drop the Germans into the Dnieper until the middle of September, up to a dozen Soviet divisions and the Dnieper military flotilla took part . However, the enemy not only managed to hold the bridge over the Dnieper, but also to capture the bridge over the Desna in the Ostra region, which was later repelled by the Red Army units back.

On August 24, the 2nd Panzer Group launched an offensive against the front forces in the direction of Konotop . A few days later, from the Kremenchug region , the 1st tank group of Kleist began to meet her, at the same time delivering an additional strike to Poltava , but soon deployed to the north-east with all its might. By the end of August, parts of Guderian managed to capture two bridgeheads on the river. Desna - at Korop and Novgorod-Seversky , threatening to go into the deep rear of the troops of the South-Western Front . In the early days of September, fierce battles broke out with the troops of the Bryansk Front, which during the Roslavl-Novozybkov operation attempted to defeat the enemy with a counterattack and reach the Krichev - Propoisk line . Due to uncoordinated actions and insufficient preparation of the offensive, it was not possible to defeat Guderian’s troops under the command of Colonel General A. I. Eremenko .

On August 28, the 2nd von Weichs army launched an offensive from the Gomel region to Chernigov , crowding the 5th army of M.I. Potapov to the south. At the same time, the left flank of the 2nd Army as part of the 35th Army Corps squeezed the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front in a vice, between its units and units of the 2nd Guderian Tank Group , which advanced eastward towards Konotop .

On September 7, the 2nd Panzer Group reached Konotop. On the same day, Marshal S. M. Budyonny turned to the Headquarters with a request to withdraw the 5th Army and was again refused. On September 9, the Germans occupied Chernigov. By September 10, with continuing to cover the South-Western Front , the 2nd Panzer Group defeated the 40th Army of Podlas with part of the forces penetrating the Romen region. The enemy crossed the Desna in the areas east of Chernigov and the Dnieper - near Kremenchug and southeast. By this time, the reserve of the Southwestern Front was completely exhausted. Two and a half rifle divisions were transferred from the Kiev fortified area to the Chernihiv direction. On the night of September 11, two divisions of the 26th Army were transferred to the Konotop direction.

Tupikov , Vasilevsky and Budyonny insisted on the immediate withdrawal of troops from Kiev, Shaposhnikov was against the immediate withdrawal of troops. The headquarters proposed conducting desperate attacks on the Konotop group of the enemy in cooperation with the Bryansk Front, organizing a defensive line on the Psel River, and only then begin the evacuation of Kiev. Only in this way, according to Stalin, was it possible to withdraw troops without the risk of encirclement and destruction. Kirponos assured Stalin that the front had not thought about withdrawing troops until he received an offer to give thoughts on the withdrawal of troops, that the front troops were able to continue the resistance and asked to strengthen the front with reserves. In this turn of events, the Headquarters was put in a difficult position. The proposal for the withdrawal of troops came from Budenny, who referred to the request of the Military Council of the front. Kiev was ordered not to leave, bridges not to be blown up until the special order of the Headquarters. On September 12, Marshal S. M. Budyonny was removed from the post of commander in chief of the Southern direction.

By September 13, the 3rd Panzer Division of the Model from the 2nd Panzer Group approached Lokhvice from the north. There was still a 40-kilometer corridor between the 3rd and 16th tank divisions , which the Soviet troops could no longer use to move east. September 13, S.K. Timoshenko , who arrived at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front to replace Budenny , assured Stalin that Kiev would be detained. On September 14, parts of Model and Hube captured Lokhvitsa and Lubny, but because of the strong resistance of the Soviet troops they could not move further towards each other. The fighting continued on the next day, but at that time the 9th Panzer Division from the 1st Panzer Group and September 15, 1941 a giant ring around the 5th , 21st , 26th and Lokhvitsa approached Lokhvitsa The 37th Soviet Army closed. The South-Western Front was also surrounded.

On September 16, Tymoshenko verbally through the chief of the operational management of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front I.Kh. Baghramyan handed over to M.P. Psel. Kirponos , remembering Stalin’s instructions not to leave Kiev for anything and without a written directive, at 5 a.m. on September 17 asked Moscow to confirm the decision of the commander in chief , since he had no connection with the headquarters of Tymoshenko . Time was wasted. On the night of September 18, B. M. Shaposhnikov finally announced that the Headquarters allowed the troops of the 37th Army to leave Kiev, but did not report anything about the withdrawal of front troops. However, in the evening of September 17, just a few minutes before the final loss of contact with the army headquarters, Kirponos managed to pass an order to the 5th , 21st , 26th and 37th armies for an eastward breakthrough. The 38th and 40th armies located outside the boiler were to support the withdrawal of front troops from the encirclement by attacking Romny and Lubny.

However, the systematic conclusion did not take place. Pressured from all sides by the enemy, dismembered and left without control, having suffered heavy losses in previous battles, acted separately and randomly, and often in small groups. The 37th Army found itself in two regions: one — 40-50 km southeast, the other 10-15 km northeast of Kiev. She was able to hold out until September 21-23. The Piryatinsky group of troops of the 5th and 21st armies held out until September 25th. In the area of ​​Orzhitsa the longest - until September 26 the remains of the 26th Army fought. Part of the forces and control of the 5th Army were forced to join the front headquarters column and moved with it to Piryatin. The rest, divided into small groups, tried to break out on their own.

On the night of September 19, Soviet troops left Kiev.

On September 20, a consolidated convoy of headquarters of the Southwestern Front and the 5th Army approached the Dryukovschina farm, 15 km southwest of Lokhvitsy. There she was attacked by the main forces of the German 3rd Panzer Division . Having lost several guns and armored vehicles , the remains of the column retreated to the Shumeikovo grove. The group left no more than a thousand people, of which about 800 commanders. The group failed to break out of the environment. Died: front commander Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos , members of the Military Council M.A. Burmistenko , E.P. Rykov , chief of staff Major General V.I. Tupikov , generals of the front control Danilov, Panyukhov , members of the Military Council of the 5th Army Nikishev, Kalchenko, chief of staff of the 5th Army, Major General Pisarevsky. The commander of the 5th army, Major General M.I. Potapov, was seriously wounded and captured.

On September 24, the 5th Cavalry Division of the 2nd Cavalry Corps went on the offensive south in the direction of Lokhvitsy , but there she met with the advance guard of the 9th German Panzer Division and was forced to stop.

September 26, the Kiev strategic defensive operation of the Soviet troops was completed.

The defeat near Kiev was a heavy blow to the Red Army . As of September 1 , there were 752-760 thousand people, 3923 guns and mortars, 114 tanks and 167 combat aircraft in the South-Western Front , without front reserves, spare parts and rear. By the time of encirclement, 452.7 thousand people, 2642 guns, 1225 mortars, 64 tanks were in the boiler. According to German data ^[13] near Kiev by September 24, 665 thousand people were captured. According to data published in 1993 by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation , Soviet losses amounted to over 700 thousand people, of which 627.8 thousand were irrevocable. These figures include casualties during the defense of the city of Kiev itself along the border of the Kiev fortified area. They amounted to about 48,000 people total losses for the Red Army and about 14,000 people total losses for the Wehrmacht ^[14] .

Strategic Impacts

The defeat of the South-Western Front opened the way for the enemy to Eastern Ukraine, to the Donbass ( see map ). The forces of the Southern Front of the Red Army fell into a difficult position:

• On October 8, the 18th Army of the Southern Front was surrounded and perished in the Sea of ​​Azov;
• On October 16, the Odessa defensive region was left to the enemy;
• October 17, busy Donbass (fell Taganrog );
• October 25, captured Kharkov ;
• November 2 - Crimea is occupied and Sevastopol is blocked ;
• November 30 - the forces of Army Group South consolidated at the turn of the Mius Front .

On the other hand, the distraction of the 2nd Wehrmacht tank group from the central direction to the south slowed the advance of Army Group Center and allowed the Soviet command to prepare for the defense of Moscow .

As Heinz Guderian wrote in his memoirs, “ Memoirs of a Soldier ”:

The fighting for Kiev undoubtedly meant a major tactical success. However, the question of whether this tactical success was also of great strategic importance remains in doubt. Now it all depended on whether the Germans succeeded in achieving decisive results even before the onset of winter, perhaps even before the onset of the autumn season. True, the planned offensive in order to squeeze Leningrad into a closer ring was already suspended ... However, the reinforced Army Group Center was supposed to deliver the main blow in the direction of Moscow. Is there enough time left for this?

• In the Kiev direction (film directed by V.T. Denisenko , 1968)
• Fortress on wheels (film directed by Oleg Lentsius, 1960)
• The Battle of Moscow (epic)
• Great War. 2 Series. Kiev 1941. StarMedia. Babich-design
• Westbound War (TV series)
• According to the laws of wartime (television series 2015)

• Defense of the Kiev fortified area (1941)
• Battle of the Dnieper (1943)
• The Liberation of Kiev (1943)
• Medal "For the Defense of Kiev"

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