Convoy PQ-17

Lend Lease and Arctic convoys

At the Moscow Conference on September 29 - October 1, 1941, the USSR, Great Britain and the USA reached an agreement on mutual deliveries ^[1] . The shortest supply routes to the USSR through the Black and Baltic Seas were blocked by the enemy. There were only three ways left: the northern, Pacific and Iranian. Only the Pacific Ocean was relatively safe, but crossing it took 18-20 days, after which goods by rail had to be transported across the entire territory of the USSR. In addition, after Japan entered the war, the delivery of goods along this route could only be carried out by Soviet ships, which, despite the neutrality of the USSR, were attacked by the Japanese. The route through Iran was even longer: ships from New York through the Cape of Good Hope lasted 75 days, then cargo had to be transported through Iran and through the south of the USSR. The shortest available route was from Great Britain around Norway occupied by Germans, which amounted to 1800-2000 miles , which took 10-14 days to overcome ^[1] .

Under the agreement, about 500 thousand tons of goods were to be transported per month. Of these, the Soviet Union could carry only 1/5. In addition, the Northern Fleet of the USSR , which consisted of 51 ships at the beginning of the war, including 8 destroyers and 15 submarines ^{[approx. 1]} , had limited ability to protect these ships ^[2] . Responsibility for the organization of the convoys and their direct protection throughout the route from Iceland to the USSR and vice versa lay with the British Admiralty . Responsibility zones were divided between the British and Soviet Northern Fleets, the border of which passed in the Barents Sea along the meridian of 20 ° east longitude. In its area of ​​responsibility, the USSR fleet was supposed to conduct reconnaissance of the edge of Arctic ice, to block the exit of surface ships by its submarines, reconnaissance of airfields, search and destruction of enemy submarines, and ensure the meeting of the convoy ^[3] .

The front line ran 40 km from the ice-free port in Murmansk , and the city itself was subjected to constant bombing and port equipment was evacuated. Therefore, the first deliveries went to the port of Arkhangelsk . On August 31, the first Dervish convoy arrived (he later received the PQ-0 index) from six transports. The possibilities of the Arkhangelsk port were limited, and since October 1941 large-scale dredging works and the construction of new moorings, railway tracks and the installation of cranes were carried out ^[4] . On October 11, the first caravan PQ-1 arrived in Arkhangelsk ^[3] . By the winter of 1941, it became clear that the freezing Arkhangelsk would not be able to take convoys, and in November 1941, the restoration of the port in Murmansk and work on lengthening moorings and piers ^{[5] began} . On January 11, 1942, the first allied convoy PQ-7 arrived in Murmansk ^[6] .

Until the end of 1941, 154,000 tons of cargo from the total amount of 360,778 tons were delivered to the USSR via the northern route, which amounted to more than 40% ^[7] . At first, the route was relatively safe. From September to December 1941, 53 vessels ^[8] were delivered as part of 7 PQ convoys without a single loss, delivering 750 tanks, 800 aircraft, 2,300 vehicles and more than 100,000 tons of other cargo ^[9] . The first convoy to be attacked by submarines was the PQ-7A. On January 2, 1942, the U-134 submarine sank the British transport Waziristan ^[10] . All subsequent Arctic convoys were attacked by German submarines and aircraft. By February 1942, 93 vessels were carried out in 12 convoys and one was lost ^[9] . The first losses in the Arctic were suffered by the British Navy. On January 17, 1942, during the escort of the PQ-8 convoy as a result of the attack of the U-454 submarine, the destroyer HMS Matabele was sunk ^[11] .

The increased activity of the British fleet in the north did not go unnoticed in Germany. The sabotage raids of British ships to the Norwegian coast on December 26 and 27 also added fuel to the fire. Fearing a possible Allied landing in Norway, Hitler said:

The German fleet must therefore use all its forces for the defense of Norway.

- Wolfram Wette, Wilhelm Deist, Manfred Messerschmidt. Germany and the Second World War: Volume I The Build-Up of German Aggression . - New York: Oxford University Press, 1991 .-- P. 444. - 832 p. - ISBN 019822866X .

For this purpose, heavy German ships were also transferred to Norway, which, moreover, could be used to attack the northern convoys ^[12] . January 16, 1942 in Trondheim anchored the battleship “ Tirpitz ”, the same type with the famous “ Bismarck ” ^[13] . On February 21–23, the “pocket battleship” “ Admiral Scheer ” and the heavy cruiser “ Prince Eugen ” ^[14] , transferred from the Baltic, arrived in Trondheim. The presence of these ships in Norway required the Admiralty to cover the convoys with heavy ships - battleships and aircraft carriers. Because of the threat from German aviation, heavy ships could only be distantly guarded on the Iceland - Jan Mayen Island line . At the suggestion of the English admiral John Tovey , it was decided to combine the time for escorting the convoy to the USSR with the return convoy of empty vessels, in order to provide cover for them with heavy ships and strengthen direct escort. The first convoys carried out according to this scheme were PQ-12 and QP-8 ^[15] .

Convoy PQ-12 went to sea on March 1, 1942. The long-range cover forces included the battleships King George V , Duke of York , the battlecruiser Rinaun , and the aircraft carrier Viktories ^[16] . On March 6, Tirpitz went out to intercept the convoy. Visibility was poor, so German ships could not find the convoy. And on March 9, 12 torpedo bombers from the Victories launched an attack on the discovered Tirpitz ^[15] . The attack was inconclusive, but seriously scared the Germans. Everyone has learned lessons from the Bismarck hunt. Just as the British feared the might of the Tirpitz, the Germans also feared the attacks of the British carrier-based aircraft.

The increasing polar day provided more opportunities for the Germans to attack by aircraft. Convoys, forced to bypass the ice, passed dangerously close to German air bases in Norway. Losses increased, and the Admiralty repeatedly suggested stopping the convoys, but these proposals were rejected for political reasons. The convoy PQ-13 and QP-9 damaged the Trinidad light cruiser. In early May, during the escort of convoys PQ-15 and QP-11, the Edinburgh light cruiser was lost with a cargo of Soviet gold sent to pay for deliveries not included in the Lend-Lease and as a “reverse Lend-Lease”. The small repair capabilities of the Soviet northern shipyards forced Trinidad to be sent to the UK for repairs. On the way back, the cruiser was sunk by German aircraft in the Barents Sea ^[15] .

Operation Rösselsprung

In late spring 1942, the German Navy began planning the operation "Rösselsprung" ( Russian: Horseback Riding ), the purpose of which was to destroy one of the PQ convoys. It was planned to deliver a concentrated attack on the convoy by forces of surface ships, submarines and aviation. On June 15, Admiral Raeder reported to Hitler about the plan of operation. The condition for the operation was the absence of a risk of meeting with superior forces of the English fleet and the provision of the Luftwaffe air cover “Tirpitsu” ^[17] . The German admiral Schnyvind , commander of the German surface forces in the North, planned to attack the convoy east of Bear Island , between 20 and 30 degrees east longitude ^[18] .

The control scheme was quite complicated. The tactical leadership of the formation of surface ships was entrusted to Otto Schnywind, who held the flag on the Tirpitz. The submarine forces were commanded by Admiral Hubert Schmundt , who was in Narvik aboard the Tanga command post ship. Operational leadership was entrusted to Admiral General Karls, who was to control the surface and submarine forces from the headquarters of the Navy of the North group, located in Kiel . The German Air Force was ordered to conduct reconnaissance in the interests of the Navy. The Air Force was tasked with detecting a convoy and heavy cover ships. After detection, the aircraft had to monitor their movements, reporting them to the Navy. The Air Force also had to carry out a fighter cover of the linear forces of the German fleet and their withdrawal to the escort ships. Heavy surface ships were assigned the task of destroying the escort guard. The main task of the destroyers was to shield their linear forces from torpedo attacks of enemy destroyers. After neutralizing the guarding of the convoy, aviation and submarines were to deal with the destruction of transports ^[19] .

The German Navy deployed two groups of heavy ships in Norway. The Tirpitz battleship and the Admiral Hipper heavy cruiser were anchored in Trondheim . Their protection should have been five destroyers and two destroyers. Less speedy “pocket battleships” “ Lutts ” and “Admiral Scheer” were supposed to leave Narvik, accompanied by five destroyers. After receiving the order to start the operation, the first group was to leave Trondheimsfjord to Westfjord . The second group from Narvik was supposed to go to the Alta Fjord . After refueling with tankers, the destroyers and the rest of the ships were to wait for orders from Kiel. Having received data on the whereabouts of the convoy, the ships should meet hundreds of miles northwest of Cape Nordkap and move to intercept the convoy east of Bear Island ^{[20] [21]} .

By mid-June, U-657 , U-88 , U-355 , U-334 went to sea. On June 18 U-457 left Trondheim, and on June 23 U-255 from Narvik and U-456 from Bergen. By mid-June, the number of boats in the Arctic “ wolf pack ” was brought to ten ^[22] .

The situation on the eve and the wiring plan of the convoy PQ-17

By the spring of 1942, the rate of dispatch of Arctic convoys had decreased. The upcoming polar summer allowed the forces of the 5th Luftwaffe Air Force to strike ships around the clock. Analyzing the difficulties of escorting convoys in March and April, Admiral Tovy handed over to the Admiralty: “If convoys must be followed for political reasons, very heavy losses must be expected.” His opinion was supported by the first sea lord Dudley Pound ^[23] . By the end of April, 107 vessels with cargo awaiting departure were in ports in the United States and Great Britain. However, the supply protocol clearly stipulated what should be delivered and when. Stalin demanded that Churchill “take all necessary measures to ensure the arrival of these goods in the USSR during May, since this is extremely important for our front” ^[23] . He was echoed by US President Roosevelt , who wrote to Churchill in his message on April 27, 1942: “The United States has made such a great effort to provide Russia with supplies of materials that, in his opinion, blocking these materials would be a serious mistake if this is not justified insurmountable obstacles ” ^[24] . In this situation, the British Prime Minister decided to continue the posting of Arctic convoys. In his address to the Admiralty, he wrote:

Not only Prime Minister Stalin, but President Roosevelt will be very disappointed if we stop sending convoys now. The Russians are fighting hard and expect that we will take the risk and, if necessary, we will suffer losses in accordance with our obligations. US ships are waiting in line for departure. Aware of the great and real danger, I personally believe that the convoy (PQ-16) should go to sea on May 18. The operation will be justified if at least half of the ships reach their destination ^[25] .

On March 21, the 95th Fighter Aviation Regiment (IAP) was included in the Northern Fleet Air Force, which was armed with 2 squadrons of Pe-3 long-range fighters. His main task was to cover the convoys at a distance of up to 200 km from the entrance to the Kola Bay ^[6] .

Convoy PQ-16 left Reykjavik on May 21 as part of 35 ships, becoming the largest ship sent to the USSR until that time. The return convoy QP-12 consisted of 15 vessels. To strengthen the close cover, four cruisers were allocated ^[26] . Given the sad experience of the “Edinburgh” and “Trinidad”, the cruiser, before carrying out air defense of the convoy, according to the instructions of the Admiralty left it 250 miles southwest ( WSW ) of Bear Island ^[27] . Despite the ongoing massive air attacks with the simultaneous use of torpedo bombers and dive bombers, the convoy reached Murmansk and Arkhangelsk , losing only 7 ships, which was recognized as a success. The return convoy passed without losses ^[26] .

In accordance with Churchill's promises to Roosevelt about an interval between convoys of 3 weeks, the next one was to go to sea on June 11. But the Admiralty was faced with a shortage of escort ships. Due to the need to escort the convoy to Malta , the PQ-17 exit was first moved to June 17, and then to 27 ^[28] . This led to the fact that the PQ-17 was the target of the German operation "Horseback Riding". In general, the wiring plan for this convoy was the same as for the PQ-16. It was not possible to select an escort aircraft carrier. The close cover was to be carried out by escort forces under the command of Commander Brum . The cruiser, consisting of four cruisers, was supposed to cover the convoy from enemy surface forces west of Medvezhy Island, up to 25 ° C. e. In any case, he was forbidden to engage in battle with the formation, which will include Tirpitz. The task of neutralizing the Tirpitz was to be solved by a long-range cover group consisting of an aircraft carrier and two battleships. To the east of Bear Island, only submarines could provide protection from surface ships. Two of them were supposed to go with the convoy, and the remaining eleven were previously deployed in the path of the possible movement of German ships ^[29] .

With the aim of disorienting the enemy, a false convoy was planned to enter the sea - compound “X” ( Eng. Force X, Operation ES ^[30] ). It was supposed to include several transports under the protection of destroyers and cruisers. The convoy was supposed to simulate a subversive compound intended for landing in southern Norway. The PQ-17 convoy's long-range cover force course was chosen so that the Germans had the impression that the battleships and aircraft carrier were covering up the sabotage unit. It was assumed that information about the false convoy would force the Germans to use heavy ships for the defense of Norway and distract them from the convoy PQ-17 ^[31] .

In the spring and summer of 1942, the confrontation between the Luftwaffe and Soviet aviation over the Kola Peninsula resumed. Germany was increasing its aviation group. During the spring of 1942, the number of combat aircraft almost doubled ^[32] . In May - June 1942, the Luftwaffe actually seized air supremacy and subjected Murmansk to constant raids, as a result of which the city, in which there were many wooden buildings, burned down, and the port was destroyed and actually could not receive ships ^[33] .

The forces of the parties

Allies

Convoy composition

The convoy consisted of 35 transports, including 22 American, 8 British, 2 Panamanian, 1 Dutch and 2 Soviet (tankers Donbass and Azerbaijan). Three British rescue ships (converted passenger ships) Zafaran, Zamalek, Ratlin and a squadron tanker for refueling escort ships (originally it was the RFA Gray Ranger , but because of its damage, was replaced by a convoy RFA “Aldersdale” from Compound “Q”). Some sources mention that the 36th West Gotomsk transport was planned to be escorted by the convoy, but it didn’t leave Reykjavik, apparently because of problems with the engine.

Together with PQ-17, the “Q” connection left Iceland, which was supposed to disconnect in the area of ​​Jan Mayen Island and wait for the return convoy QP-13. It included the destroyer HMS "Douglas" (D 90) and the tank destroyer RFA "Aldersdale" ^[30] .

The convoy cargo included 297 aircraft, 594 tanks, 4,246 trucks, as well as aviation gasoline and other materials weighing 156,492 tons. The cost of the cargo was about $ 700 million in 1942 prices. This cargo could be enough to provide an army of 55,000 people.

One of the vessels (Empire Tide) was equipped with a catapult with a Sea Hurricane IA fighter ( eng. CAM ship - Atapult Aircraft Merchantman ). The catapult allowed the fighter to be launched to intercept the enemy, but after completing the mission the pilot could not land on the transport due to the absence of the last flight deck. The plane was actually a one-time one, and the pilot could count on salvation only if he successfully landed on water near one of his ships ^[34] .

All convoy vessels were equipped with barrage balloons . Anti-aircraft guns were installed on the decks of ships for the maintenance of which special military teams were engaged. In total, 33 guns with a caliber from 40 to 102 mm, 33 20 mm Oerlikon assault rifles and more than 207 different machine guns were installed on ships ^[35] .

Состав эскорта

Непосредственное охранение конвоя осуществляла первая группа сопровождения (EG1) ВМС Великобритании под командованием Джона Брума, включавшая в себя 6 эсминцев, 4 противолодочных траулера, 4 сторожевых корабля, 3 тральщика, 2 корабля ПВО, 2 подлодки, три спасательных судна и танкер.

Дальнее прикрытие осуществлялось крейсерским соединением ( англ. First Cruiser Squadron — CS1 ) под командованием британского адмирала Луиса Гамильтона . Оно состояло из двух британских крейсеров «Лондон» (флагманский корабль) и «Норфолк», двух американских крейсеров « Тускалуза » и «Уичита» и трёх эсминцев (из них два американских).

Тяжёлое прикрытие осуществлялось эскадрой под командованием адмирала Джона Тови. В её состав входили линкоры « Дюк оф Йорк » и « Вашингтон », авианосец « Викториес », крейсера «Камберленд» и «Нигерия», а также двенадцать эсминцев ^[39] .

Для блокирования выхода в море германских надводных кораблей вдоль побережья Северной Норвегии были развёрнуты две завесы из подводных лодок. Ближе к берегу у выходов из фиордов располагались позиции четырёх советских подводных лодок ^{[прим. 2]} , чуть мористее располагались ещё девять подводных лодок — восемь британских и одна французская. 5 июля к ним присоединились британские подлодки P-614 и P-615 из состава конвоя PQ-17, а 6 июля советская Щ-422 ^{[прим. 3] [30] [39] [40] [41]} .

Немецкие силы

В зоне прохождения конвоя PQ-17 действовала «волчья стая» подводных лодок под кодовым названием «Eisteufel» («Ледяной чёрт»). С 7 по 29 июня в Арктике были развёрнуты 11 субмарин ^{[18] [22]} .

Проводка конвоя

События 27 июня — 3 июля

27 июня из Мурманска вышел обратный конвой QP-13 в составе 25 судов ^[53] . Суда конвоя PQ-17 начали выход из Хвальфьорда в 16:00 GMT ^{[прим. 4]} 27 июня 1942 года ^[54] . Конвой на этот момент состоял из 35 торговых, 3 спасательных судов и 1 эскадренного танкера, в сопровождении временных сил охранения — 3 ^{[30] [54] [прим. 5]} тральщиков и 4 вооружённых траулеров ^[55] . Одно из судов («Эмпайр Тайд») было оборудовано катапультой с самолётом «Харрикейн», который мог использоваться только однократно ^[34] . Танкером был «Грэй Рейнджер», который должен был сопровождать конвой до конечного пункта, и с которого должны были осуществлять заправку в море корабли охранения ^{[55] [56]} . С конвоем вышло и соединение «Q» в составе ещё одного танкера «Олдерсдейл» и устаревшего эсминца «Дуглас» ( англ. HMS Douglas (D 90) ) ^[30] , которое 2 июля должно было отделиться от конвоя и ждать в районе острова Ян-Майен обратный конвой QP-13.

Суда выстроились в две кильватерные колонны и, в условиях плохой видимости, направились вокруг Исландии на север ^[55] . Вскоре после выхода один из транспортов, «Ричард Бленд», в густом тумане не удержал строй и наскочил на подводную скалу, получив большую пробоину. В 21:00 из Рейкьявика был выслан буксир, с помощью которого транспорт вернулся в Рейкьявик ^[55] . Миновав мыс Стромнесс, суда были построены в походный ордер — девять колонн по четыре судна в каждой. Конвой направился в сторону острова Ян-Майен , на встречу с основными силами охранения, которым командовал коммандер Брум. Встреча была запланирована на 30 июня ^[57] .

В 05:00 29 июня конвой, находясь в густом тумане (видимость до 50 метров), вошёл в зону тяжёлых плавающих льдов. Четыре судна получили повреждения. Американский транспорт «Эксфорд», сообщив о повреждении, получил разрешение вернуться. Танкер «Грэй Рейнджер» получил большую пробоину в носовой части и не мог развить ход больше 8 узлов. Было принято решение заменить «Грэй Рейнджер» танкером «Олдерсдейл» так, чтобы «Грэй Рейнджер» занял место «Олдерсдейла» в составе соединения «Q», ожидавшего у острова Ян-Майен конвой QP-13 ^[55] . В 08:00 того же дня две английские подводные лодки Р-614 и Р-615 ^{[прим. 6] [30]} вышли из Исландии в сопровождении корвета HMS Dianella (K07) ^[58] , а в 13:30, заправившись с танкера в Сейдис-фьорде , в море вышли корабли ближнего охранения Брума ^[59] .

После выхода в море сил охранения состоялся телефонный разговор между адмиралом Тови и первым морским лордом Паундом . По воспоминаниям Тови, именно в этом разговоре Паунд впервые упомянул о возможности рассредоточения конвоя в случае атаки «Тирпица» ^[60] . Подобная тактика применялась британским флотом ранее, например, 5 ноября 1940 года во время атаки немецким рейдером « Адмирал Шеер » атлантического конвоя HX-84 . Тогда ценой собственной гибели вспомогательный крейсер « Джервис Бей » позволил спастись 32 из 37 рассредоточившихся судов конвоя ^[61] .

В 17:00, после телефонного разговора с Паундом, соединение Тови вышло из Скапа-Флоу на Оркнейских островах . В состав соединения входили линейные корабли «Дюк оф Йорк» и «Вашингтон», авианосец «Викториес», два крейсера и восемь эскадренных миноносцев. Маршрут кораблей был подобран таким образом, чтобы они могли осуществлять как охранение PQ-17, так и имитировать силы прикрытия ложного конвоя ^[39] . 29 июня из Скапа-Флоу вышел и сам конвой-приманка — соединение «X» — в составе 5 минных заградителей и 4 угольщиков ^[31] в сопровождении крейсеров «Сириус» и «Кюрасо», 5 эсминцев и 4 вооружённых траулеров ^[30] .

Во второй половине дня 30 июня силы охранения под командой Брума догнали PQ-17 и к 15:45 заняли свои места в ордере ^[30] . Конвой, не замеченный противником, продолжал движение на восток. В тот же день была получена радиограмма главы английской военно-морской миссии в Мурманске. Он сообщал, что конвой QP-13 обнаружен немецким самолётом-разведчиком на следующий день после выхода. Следовательно, немцы должны были предполагать и наличие конвоя PQ-17 ^[62] .

1 июля в 02:00 из Сейдис-фьорда в море вышло крейсерское соединение ( англ. First Cruiser Squadron — CS1 ) под командой Гамильтона. В его состав входили британские крейсера «Лондон» и «Норфолк», американские крейсера «Тускалуза» и «Уичита», а также эсминцы «Уэйнрайт», «Сомали» и «Роуэн» ^[63] . Конвой-приманка достиг 1° восточной долготы ^[39] . В условиях плохой видимости он так и не был обнаружен противником. Операция была прервана, и соединение «X» вернулось в Скапа-Флоу ^[39] .

1 июля было получено и сообщение из Мурманска. Из-за непрекращающихся авиационных бомбардировок глава английской военно-морской миссии считал, что корабли и суда конвоя не должны идти в Мурманск. Адмиралтейство решило, что все суда PQ-17, которым позволяет осадка, должны идти в Архангельск ^{[64] [17] [65]} .

В полдень 1 июля конвой был обнаружен противником. Над судами появился самолёт-разведчик Fw-200 «Кондор» ^[65] . С этого момента конвой находился под практически непрерывным наблюдением самолётов, а в дальнейшем и подводных лодок, первая из которых заметила суда ближе к вечеру ^[66] . Она была отогнана глубинными бомбами с кораблей охранения, но позже дала радиограмму о местоположении конвоя. Эта радиограмма первой дошла до штаба ВМС в Киле (сообщение с самолёта-разведчика было получено с задержкой на 10 часов) ^[62] . Теперь радиомолчание можно было нарушить, и Брум провёл сеанс связи с Адмиралтейством ^[67] . Погода и корабли охранения мешали лодкам атаковать, поэтому им приходилось следить за конвоем в ожидании лучшей возможности ^[68] .

Во второй половине 1 июля немецкий самолёт-разведчик Fw-200 «Кондор» обнаружил линейные силы Тови ^{[69] [70]} . Эта информация позволила 2 июля немецкому командованию сделать вывод о том, что англичане придерживаются стандартной тактики — проводка прямого и обратного конвоя одновременно с дальним прикрытием из тяжёлых кораблей. Так как всё шло согласно плану, было принято решение о начале первого этапа операции «Ход конём» ^[71] .

2 июля погода не способствовала воздушным атакам. Туман вынудил немцев поберечь основные силы 5-го воздушного флота и применить поплавковые гидросамолёты-торпедоносцы Heinkel He-115 ^[72] . Семь самолётов эскадрильи 1./406 атаковали конвой вечером 2 июля ^[44] . Однако сильный зенитный огонь рассеял самолёты эскадрильи. Самолёт командира эскадрильи капитана Ватера был сбит, но экипаж был спасён самолётом фельдфебеля Арабина, который под обстрелом кораблей эскорта смог сесть на воду и взлететь со своим командиром ^[44] .

Вечером 2 июля немцы начали выдвижение надводных сил на передовые базы в Вестфьорде и Альта-фьорде. Первая боевая группа, состоявшая из линкора «Тирпиц» и тяжёлого крейсера « Адмирал Хиппер » в сопровождении эсминцев « Hans Lody », «Karl Galster», « Theodor Riedel » и миноносцев T7 и T15, вышла в Альта-фьорд. Позже к ним присоединился эсминец « Рихард Байтцен ». Однако в сильном тумане « Ганс Лоди », «Karl Galster» и « Theodor Riedel » наскочили на мель и вынуждены были вернуться обратно. Вторая боевая группа вышла из Нарвика в составе тяжёлых крейсеров « Лютцов » и « Адмирал Шеер » в сопровождении эсминцев Z24, Z27, Z28, Z29, Z30 и судна снабжения «Dithmarschen». Вскоре после выхода, ночью 3 июля , «Лютцов» наскочил на подводную скалу и, получив пробоину, прервал своё участие в операции ^[21] .

3 июля прошло в относительном спокойствии. Крейсерская группа Гамильтона шла в 20 ^[73] —30 милях севернее конвоя ^[74] . Почти весь день конвой и крейсерская группа шли в густом тумане. Несмотря на то, что над конвоем постоянно висели разведчики Bv-138 , атак авиации не было. Подводные лодки периодически пытались выйти в атаку, но их успешно отгоняли корабли охранения ^[75] . Поскольку ледовая обстановка позволяла, конвой прошёл приблизительно в 50 милях к северу от острова Медвежий, став первым конвоем PQ, прошедшим севернее него ^[64] .

В этот день пришла и тревожная новость. После нескольких дней безуспешных попыток разведки немецких баз британский самолёт-разведчик сообщил о том, что гавань Тронхейма пуста ^[76] . Но, зная по разведданным, что выход немецких кораблей из гавани планировался приблизительно за 36 часов до атаки ^[77] , Адмиралтейство считало, что пока непосредственной угрозы атаки конвоя немецкими надводными кораблями нет ^[78] .

События 4 июля

4 июля американцы отмечали День независимости и с началом нового дня стали получать поздравления с других кораблей и судов конвоя ^[79] . К утру туман начал рассеиваться. В 04:52 GMT+2 (02:52 по Гринвичу) сквозь разрыв в облаках проскочил одиночный He-115 и торпедировал американский транспорт «Кристофер Ньюпорт» ^[80] . Судно потеряло ход, и 47 человек его команды были сняты «Замалеком», а Брум приказал подводной лодке Р-614 добить судно. Торпеда Р-614 не причинила особого вреда транспорту, попытки «Дианеллы» затопить его тоже не увенчались успехом. Судно было брошено в дрейф и, позже, в 08:23, потоплено немецкой подлодкой U-457 ^{[81] [82]} .

Вскоре туман окончательно рассеялся ^[80] . Крейсерское соединение приблизилось к конвою и следовало в нескольких милях впереди. За кормой конвоя висела пара Bv-138. Постепенно к ним стали присоединяться бомбардировщики Ju-88 , кружившиеся над конвоем в ожидании удобного момента для атаки ^[83] . К полудню конвой подобрался к 25-му меридиану восточной долготы — месту, где его должно было покинуть крейсерское соединение. В 12:30 Гамильтон получил от Адмиралтейства разрешение следовать с конвоем дальше на восток и уходить, когда тот сочтёт нужным. Гамильтон, несмотря на возражения адмирала Тови, радировал, что будет с конвоем до прояснения ситуации, но не позднее чем до 14:00 5 июля ^[80] .

После полудня конвой подвергся методической бомбардировке с Ju-88. Атаки были немногочисленными, но держали зенитчиков в постоянном напряжении ^[84] . Незадолго до 17:00 в атаку на конвой попытались выйти гидросамолёты He-115 406-й эскадрильи ^[35] . Но их попытки приблизиться к конвою на дистанцию сброса торпед успешно пресекались зенитным огнём кораблей охранения ^[44] . В 20:22 GMT+2 ^[85] началась атака 25 торпедоносцев He-111 26-й эскадрильи. Они заходили в атаку с двух направлений — правых кормового и носового углов, перпендикулярно друг другу ^[35] . Атака с носовых углов была встречена сильным зенитным огнём заправлявшегося в этот момент с «Олдерсдейла» американского эсминца «Уэйнрайт». Эсминец развернулся и на полном ходу направился в сторону самолётов, ведя огонь из всех орудий. По воспоминаниям очевидцев, «Уэйнрайт» превратился в огнедышащий вулкан ^[86] , а его эффективный огонь заставил торпедоносцы преждевременно сбросить торпеды и рассеяться ^[87] . Эсминцем был сбит самолёт лидера этой атаки, лейтенанта Георга Каумейера ^{[88] [89]} .

Атака с кормовых углов оказалась для «хейнкелей» более успешной. Несмотря на плотный зенитный огонь, лидер атаки лейтенант Хеннеман ^[89] не свернул с курса и был сбит, успев сбросить свои торпеды, попавшие в «Нэйварино» ^[35] . Другими самолётами его группы были повреждены «Азербайджан» и «Уильям Хупер». Спасательные суда сняли экипажи с «Нэйварино» и «Уильяма Хупера» ^[90] . Танкер «Азербайджан» смог восстановить ход и через час после начала атаки догнал конвой ^[91] . Несмотря на потерю ещё двух кораблей, конвой отбил массированную атаку торпедоносцев и сохранил строй. Оптимизм моряков конвоя хорошо иллюстрирует фраза, записанная в своём дневнике командиром эскорта Брумом:

Моё впечатление от решительности, проявленной конвоем и эскортом, таково, что если не кончатся боеприпасы, PQ-17 может пройти куда угодно.

— ^[92]

В 21:00 крейсерская группа находилась в 5 милях впереди конвоя ^[93] . А в течение следующего получаса из Адмиралтейства пришли три радиограммы, решившие судьбу конвоя ^[94] .

• 21:11 Крейсерскому соединению отойти на запад полным ходом.
• 21:23 Ввиду угрозы надводных кораблей конвою рассредоточиться и следовать в русские порты.
• 21:36 Согласно моей от 21:23 конвою рассеяться.

Отправке этих радиограмм предшествовало заседание в Адмиралтействе под председательством первого морского лорда Дадли Паунда ^[95] . Ранним вечером были получены разведданные о том, что тяжёлые немецкие корабли сосредоточены в Альта-фьорде . Адмиралтейство решило, что нападение «Тирпица» на конвой запланировано приблизительно на 02:00 5 июля ^[95] . Было очевидно, что крейсерское соединение должно быть отозвано ввиду неспособности оказать сопротивление немецкому линкору. На совещании были рассмотрены три варианта действий: 1) отзыв крейсерской группы и продолжение движения конвоя, 2) разворот конвоя навстречу эскадре Тови и попытка перехватить немцев, 3) рассредоточение конвоя. Первые два были признаны неэффективными ^[96] . Несмотря на отсутствие информации о выходе немецких кораблей из Альта-фьорда, лордом Паундом было принято практически единоличное решение (его поддержал только заместитель начальника морского штаба адмирал Мур) о рассеивании конвоя ^[96] .

Были отправлены радиограммы об отзыве крейсерской группы и рассеивании судов конвоя. Однако во второй отправленной радиограмме была применена формулировка «рассредоточиться», а это, согласно инструкциям, подразумевало, что суда покидают строй конвоя и самостоятельно на полной скорости добираются до портов назначения. Это могло привести к тому, что суда бы шли плотным строем. Поэтому была отправлена уточняющая радиограмма с формулировкой «рассеяться». И теперь суда конвоя должны были разойтись в разные стороны веерообразно и поодиночке двигаться в порт следования ^[97] .

Передача радиограмм в такой последовательности и с такими формулировками привела к тому, что Гамильтон и Брум пришли к выводу, что немецкие корабли на подходе к конвою. Поэтому, когда Брум предложил Гамильтону присоединить эсминцы эскорта к крейсерскому соединению, тот согласился ^{[98] [99]} . Брум лично передал приказание Адмиралтейства о рассредоточении конвоя изумлённому коммодору конвоя Даудингу, следовавшему на «Ривер Афтоне» ^[100] . А затем выдал приказ остающимся кораблям и судам:

Конвою рассеяться и следовать в русские порты. Эскортным кораблям, кроме эсминцев, самостоятельно следовать в Архангельск.

— ^[101]

Submarines received orders to act independently. After Broome left, the Pozariki commander, 1st rank captain Jack Jonesy, became the senior security officer. The cruisers and destroyers turned and walked along the convoy vessels to the west at full speed. This action had a demoralizing effect on the crews of the remaining vessels. The sailors of the transports felt left to their own devices ^{[99] [103]} . In addition, the Norfolk had to abandon the Valrus , which had just flown up for reconnaissance, because it could not be recalled. Later this plane returned from reconnaissance, got into the water and was towed by the Palomares ^[104] .

In his memoirs, Broome mentions that in those days the order “to act independently” meant “to act separately from Keppel” ^[102] . However, the remaining guard ships literally complied with the order and left the guarded ships at the highest possible speed. At 11:00 p.m., Jonesy, who remained a senior officer, signaled to the security ships: "Scatter and follow on their own." Attaching the minesweepers Britomart and Helsion to themselves for the purpose of anti-submarine protection, Pozarika went east ^{[105] [106]} . Another Palomares air defense ship requested permission to form a small convoy of seven vessels sailing north and five security ships. But, having received a refusal from the senior officer, he attached the Lotus and La Malone corvettes to himself and went north-east to the edge of the pack ice ^[107] . Closer to the morning of July 5, they were joined by the rescue ship Ratlin ^[108] .

The captain of the Ayrshire trawler considered the way to Arkhangelsk too dangerous, so having joined the Ironclad and Trubedue transports to himself, he moved northwest to the island of Nadezhda. On the morning of July 5, the American vessel Silver Sod ^{[108] [109] [110]} joined this group. Ships and ships diverged in different directions — north, east, and south, traveling both individually and in groups of several ships ^[111] .

July 5th Events

On July 5, German submarines and aircraft began searching for and destroying the unprotected ships of the PQ-17 convoy. The first victim was Empire Byron. He was underwater pursued by U-703 captain-lieutenant Bayfeld. At 07:15 GMT + 1, Bailfeld chose the position for the attack and fired two torpedoes on the English transport that did not hit the target. Two more torpedoes launched a little later also did not reach the target. Only the fifth torpedo launched at 08:27 hit Empire Byron. Two people were able to escape on two boats, 18 were killed ^[112] . Coming a little south of U-88, Captain Lieutenant Behmann caught up with the Carlton. At 10:15 GMT + 2, two torpedoes hit the ship. The sailors were able to escape on the only surviving boat and life rafts ^[113] .

At 09:00 a four-hour readiness for departure was announced for German ships in the Alta Fjord. The 1st and 2nd battle groups anchored around 11:00 ^[114] . The German headquarters saved their ships, so Schnyvind received an order from Karls to act with extreme caution:

Short-term fleeting actions with partial success are more important than total victory achieved over a long time. Report immediately if ships are detected by enemy aircraft. If the situation is doubtful - do not hesitate to stop the operation. In no case do not allow the success of the enemy in operations against our ships.

- ^[115]

By 15:00, German ships left the skerries of narrow skerries in the open sea ^[116] . By this time, bombers of the 30th bombing squadron had joined the attacks against the dispersed PQ-17 vessels. The first half of the day at the airfields was fog. By lunchtime, it had dissipated, and for the rest of the day the bombers were hunting for convoy ships ^[117] . Submarines sometimes simultaneously tried to attack the same target. Around 14:30 GMT + 2 ^[118] U-456 fired two torpedoes and sank the Honoma. Surfaced for interrogation of sailors who escaped in boats, the boat found that U-334 and U-88, also hunting for an American ship, surfaced next to it ^[119] .

Fairfield City and Daniel Morgan, who were traveling together, tried to hide in a fog strip at about 2 p.m., but a few minutes before entering it they were discovered by the German Bv-138 seaplane ^[111] . When the ships got out of the fog at about 3 p.m., they were attacked by Ju-88. Three aircraft quickly dealt with the "Fairfield City", having achieved several hits ^[117] . "Daniel Morgan", armed with a 76 mm anti-aircraft gun, successfully repulsed the attack for several hours. However, towards evening, the Ju-88 managed to damage the ship. Using the U-88 submarine, which was observing the American vessel, seized it by firing it at 22:52 GMT + 2 with two torpedoes ^{[117] [120]} . Fortunately for the sailors, they were soon picked up by the Soviet tanker Donbass ^[121] .

The nervous tension of the crews was so great that some crews left their ships at the slightest danger. So, seeing the submarine on the horizon, the team left the Samuel Chase in boats. An empty ship drifted for two hours before the crew ventured to board again ^[122] . A similar story happened with the Alcoa Ranger, which was abandoned by the team when the reconnaissance Focke-Wulf hovered over the ship. The team returned to transport only after the scout flew away ^[122] .

The Peter Kerr, which was on its way alone, was attacked by the He-115 torpedo bomber of the 1st squadron of the 906th squadron ^[117] , but was able to evade all torpedoes. Two hours later, the southbound transport was attacked by three Ju-88s. Peter Kerr received several hits and was left by the crew ^[117] . After 5 p.m. several more ships were sunk or damaged by aviation. The bombers attacked an eastbound group consisting of the Salamander minesweeper, the Aldersdale tanker, Ocean Freedom transport ^[121] and the rescue Zafaran ^[123] . The ships went within sight of each other, and "Zamalek" went to the southeast of them ^[124] . Around 17:30, Aldersdale was damaged by bombs ^[124] . The Salamander remained with him in order to remove the crew. Around the same time, Zafaran was damaged by bombs. Not far from this place was the Palomares group. Britomart, which separated from her and came to the rescue of Zamalek, removed people from the sinking Zafaran ^[125] . A small convoy consisting of Zamalek and Ocean Fridoma, guarded by Palomares, Britomart and Halcyon, continued their journey east. And later they were joined by the Salamander, who removed the crew from the Aldersdale ^{[105] [106]} .

A group of three transports, Bolton Castle, Washington, and Paulus Potter, after dispersing the convoy, headed north. Having reached the edge of the pack ice , they turned east and walked along it to the New Earth . By the evening of July 5, they were found by bombers. The first victim was Washington. The ship did not receive direct hits, but as a result of numerous close gaps, it lost control and began to take water. The crew left the ship in boats ^[117] . The next was the Bolton Castle. One of the bombs fell into the hold with the cordite being transported. The ship turned into a burning candle. Fortunately for the crew, gunpowder did not detonate , but burned out. A hole melted in the hold, and the ship began to quickly gather water. The crew left the ship in boats ^[117] . “Paulus Potter” as a result of several hits also lost control and was abandoned by the crew. All this happened within a few minutes, while none of the sailors were injured ^[126] . “Washington” was burning, “Bolton Castle” quickly went down, and the “Paulus Potter” looked unscathed ^[117] . Not wanting to be on board again the attacked ship, some sailors refused to board the other ships trying to help them. Also heading north, but due to lower speed, lagging behind the trio of Olopana, she approached sinking ships. But the sailors of all ships refused to board her. They preferred to stay on boats and continue sailing on them, believing that it would be safer. Having supplied them with food, Olopana left ^[127] . The boats from the Bolton Castle went to the Soviet coast, 400 miles southeast. The boats from Washington and Paulus Potter were not afraid of the low temperatures of the adjoining waters and went east to the closer Novaya Zemlya ^[128] .

Around 5 p.m., the Ju-88 group attacked the Pankraft walking in the ice crumb. The vessel caught fire and was abandoned by the crew, as in one of its holds was a load of explosives . The ship burned the next day and took off on the morning of July 7 ^[117] . Another unit of bombers attacked a single Earlston and deprived him of his move with several hits ^[117] . This took advantage of the pursuing U-334. By 5:47 p.m., the Earlston sank, receiving from it two of the three fired torpedoes ^{[129] [130] [131]} . A little later, U-334 was mistakenly attacked by a German aircraft. The damaged boat was forced to interrupt the operation in the evening of July 5 and, accompanied by U-456, returned to Norway ^[132] .

The distress signal from Pankraft was received on the ships of the Pozariki group. Shortly before this, a message was received from the Admiralty that German ships were discovered and were going to intercept the convoy. The captain of the Pozariki considered the delay in the ships for the rescue operation to be too risky. The captain of the Lotus, who considered that the task of his ship was to protect the ships of the convoy, and not the well-armed air defense ship, turned around and went to the rescue ^[133] . Corvette found boats from the Pankraft at around 8 p.m. and, having removed all the people from them, went to join the Pozariki group in the area of ​​the Matochkin Shar Strait on Novaya Zemlya ^[134] .

The River Aft Commodore's ship, the Commodore of Dowding, was sailing northeast until it reached the ice edge. And then moved east, towards the New Earth. He failed to reach her. From 21:02 to 22:22 GMT + 1 U-703 fired three torpedoes on the River Afton, sending it to the bottom ^[135] .

Around 16:00 GMT + 2 ^{[approx. 7]} on the horizon a group of German ships was discovered by K-21 captain of the 2nd rank Lunin . The German squadron went directly to K-21. But at 16:30 the ships changed course, and K-21 had to use fodder machines. At 17:01 GMT + 2, the boat reached the attack position and fired 4 torpedoes along the Tirpitz, after which it began to take off from the squadron at a depth of 30 meters. At 17:04 GMT + 2 submariners heard two explosions. After surfacing, no ships were found. Lunin transmitted a message about the discovery of a German squadron and two hits in the Tirpitz ^{[136] [approx. 8]} . At 19:16, a German squadron was discovered by the Soviet DB-3F reconnaissance aircraft ^[137] . And finally, around 20:30 they were discovered by an English submarine ^[138] . Messages about the detection of the exit of the German squadron were intercepted by the German radio interception service. According to the results of reports of submarines and aircraft, it became clear that the dispersal of the convoy had already occurred. Due to the early detection of the Tirpitz exit, further pursuit of the convoy vessels by the German command was considered too risky, since it was possible to begin hunting for the Tirpitz squadron with the use of English carrier-based aircraft and the subsequent attraction of linear forces. At 21:30, after receiving the order to terminate the operation, the German ships turned back and headed for their bases in Norway ^{[116] [138]} .

July 5, 1942 from the Kola Bay to strengthen the protection of convoy ships came destroyers "Thundering", "Terrible" and "Crushing". The Soviet command at that time had no information about the dissolution of the convoy, so on July 7 the destroyers consumed fuel and, having not found the convoy ships, returned to the base ^[40] .

Events After July 5th

A group of vessels consisting of Silver Soda, Trubdue, and Ironclad, escorted by Ayrshire, reached the pack ice, and by the evening of July 5 found that it was impossible to reach the island of Hope. The captain of the trawler said that he intends to stay in the ice. The ships moved slowly through the ice throughout the night and the next day, until they found themselves among dense ice, about 20 miles from free water. The ships stopped, and their decks and sides , facing south, were painted white. The disguise was so successful that ships were never detected by flying aircraft ^{[139] [140]} .

At 11:00 a group of ships, consisting of the Palomares, the minesweepers Britomart, Helsion, Salamander and the rescue vessel Zamalek, saw the shore of Novaya Zemlya ^[141] . A short distance behind this group was Ocean Freedom ^[142] . By 2:30 p.m. this group entered the Strait of Matochkin Shar and anchored . With the help of the Valrusa , which was selected two days ago, they carried out reconnaissance and established that the exit to the Kara Sea was closed by ice. Therefore, there was only one way left - to the south along the Barents Sea ^{[105] [106]} . By 18:00, the Pozarika, La Malone and Poppy entered the bay ^[142] . At 19:00, La Malone was sent to the sea to search for convoy ships. By 10 p.m., accompanied by him, they entered the strait and anchored the transports “Khuzier”, “El Capitan”, “Samuel Chase” and “Benjamin Harrison” ^[142] . Towards the end of the day, the Nofern Gem, Lord Austin and Lord Middleton trawlers entered Matochkin Shar, followed by the Lotus with the crews of the Pancraft and River Afton on board ^[142] .

Stretching out from the north, seven ships were sailing one at a time - John Whiterspoon, Alcoa Ranger, Empire Tyde, Bellingham, Hartlebury, Olopana and Winston-Salem ^[142] . At about 12:30 pm, John Whiterspoon, who lagged behind the Palomares group, decided to change course south and go not to New Earth, but to try to break through to the throat of the White Sea . But at 16:40 he was overtaken by U-255. The submarine fired three torpedoes at it. The ship lost speed and began to sink. The crew switched to boats. After the U-255 fired a fourth torpedo through it, the vehicle quickly broke in half and sank ^[143] . Around 18:20, a single Ju-88 dived into the south-facing Pan Atlantic. The ship received two hits, one of them in the hold with cordite. There was an explosion, and the nose was torn off the ship. The transport went to the bottom within a few minutes, and with it 26 people from its crew. All this happened to the great displeasure of the captains U-88 and U-703, who had been chasing the ship all day trying to launch an attack ^{[144] [145]} .

U-255 was heading north along Novaya Zemlya when it discovered the Bellingham. The submarine fired two torpedoes at the Bellingham, but, to the chagrin of Reinhart Rehe, one of the torpedoes passed by, and the second hit the side, but did not explode. The ship hid behind the horizon ^[146] . A little later, around 09:30 U-255 found the Alcoa Ranger. One torpedo was enough to stop the ship. Rehe had only three torpedoes left, so he decided to save them and finished off the transport with artillery fire ^[146] . Far to the north, the Empire Tide, emerging from the fog, saw the death of the Alcoa Ranger and therefore turned around and went to Moller Bay, where it anchored and decided to wait for the arrival of convoy vessels ^[147] .

Around 15:30 U-457 found the Aldersdale crew abandoned by the crew and finished it off ^[147] . At approximately 2:50 p.m., the U-355 was pursued by the Hartlebury, which was attempting to travel south along New Earth. Around 19:40 , Lieutenant Commander Gunter La Bom went to the attack position and fired four torpedoes through the transport, two of which hit the target ^[148] . After about 10 minutes, the U-355 fired a fifth torpedo at Hartlebury. The ship broke in half and quickly sank ^[148] . Only two life rafts and a half-sunken boat remained on the water. Many sailors drowned or later froze in ice water. Only 20 crew members managed to reach the coast ^[149] .

The Northern Fleet Air Force tried to cover the convoy vessels with the Pe-3 long-range fighter of the 95th Fighter Regiment (IAP). In early July, the regiment was relocated to the field site. On July 6, Captain N.F. Kirikov’s car did not return from the first weather reconnaissance flight. The next three days, the Pe-3 flights were prevented by bad weather and they could only provide assistance to the convoy vessels on the morning of July 10 ^[144] .

At 7:00 p.m. on July 7, a convoy of 17 ships left Matochkin Shar — five transports and a rescue ship, guarded by two air defense ships, three corvettes, three minesweepers and three trawlers. They headed south in the direction of Kanin Nos , planning, then, upon reaching him, to turn to the entrance to the White Sea. Towards evening, a thick fog rose in which the Benjamin Harrison got lost and returned back to the Matochkin Shar Strait ^[150] .

On the morning of July 7, the corvette Dianella arrived in Arkhangelsk. After replenishing fuel supplies, he went back to sea on July 8 to search for lifeboats from sunken ships ^{[39] [151]} .

Back in the second half of July 7, after the loss of the Empire Tide, the U-255 discovered another vehicle heading south and began to pursue. By the night of July 8, she caught up with the ship, which turned out to be "Olopana". The only torpedo launched hit it around 01:05 ^[148] . Then the submarine surfaced and finished off the transport with artillery fire ^[152] . In conditions of poor visibility, Winston-Salem ran aground southeast of Cape North Goose Nose ^[153] .

On July 8, at 02:30, the Fw-200 reconnaissance discovered Bellingham and Ratlin going south about 160 kilometers from Kanin Nose. Then a rather extraordinary event occurred. Разведчик, вместо того, чтобы вызвать бомбардировщики, снизился и на бреющем полёте стал обстреливать «Беллингем». Зенитным огнём самолёт был сбит ^{[прим. 9]} и упал в море. С «Рэтлина» спустили на воду катер, но самолёт затонул до того, как из него смог выбраться хотя бы кто-то из экипажа ^[144] . На входе в Северную Двину «Беллингем» и «Рэтлин» нашли ожидающий лоцмана советский танкер «Донбасс». Три судна вошли в порт Архангельска 9 июля, став первыми судами PQ-17, добравшимися до точки назначения ^[154] .

Конвой, вышедший из Маточкина Шара, двигался на юг вдоль Новой Земли. По пути следования им встречались шлюпки с потопленных ранее судов. Были подобраны моряки с «Джона Уайтерспуна» и «Пан-Атлантика». Вечером 8 июля конвой из 16 кораблей попал у южной оконечности Новой Земли в тяжёлые льды. В тумане корабли потеряли друг друга. Им пришлось разворачиваться и идти на запад вдоль кромки льдов. К утру 9 июля корабли оказались разбиты на две группы. В первую вошли «Хузиер», «Эль-Капитан» и «Замалек» под охранением кораблей ПВО «Позарика» и «Паломарес», сторожевиков «Ла-Малоне», «Поппи», «Лотос» и траулера «Лорд Остин». Отставшая от них приблизительно на 40 миль группа состояла из «Оушен Фридома» и «Сэмюэля Чейза» под охранением трёх тральщиков и траулеров «Лорд Миддлтон» и «Ноферн Гем» ^{[105] [106]} .

В атаку на эти две группы кораблей пытались выйти подводные лодки U-376, U-408 и U-703, но их своевременно обнаруживали и отгоняли глубинными бомбами суда охранения ^[155] . Вечером 9 июля первая группа вышла из тумана. В 20:15 она была обнаружена Bv-138, который навёл на неё бомбардировщики 30-й эскадры ^[156] . В 22:00 конвой находился в 60 милях от материка ^[157] . Атаки Ju-88 второй и третьей групп 30-й эскадры начались незадолго до полуночи. Атаки шли волна за волной с разных направлений ^[144] . Первой жертвой стал «Хузиер». Корабль лишился хода, и Даудинг приказал «Поппи» и «Ла-Малоне» снять экипаж и затопить судно. «Ла-Малоне» ^{[прим. 10]} поджёг транспорт 102-мм снарядами, но не смог его потопить. Позже его добила U-376 ^{[158] [159]} . В 03:00 10 июля в результате повреждений хода лишился «Замалек», но, к его счастью, атаки самолётов прекратились. Конвой ушёл вперёд, но вскоре механикам судна удалось устранить все поломки и продолжить путь ^[160] . В 05:45 пришёл черёд «Эль-Капитана». Бомбы, сброшенные одиночным «юнкерсом», разорвались в нескольких метрах от левого борта, и этого оказалось достаточно, чтобы судно потеряло ход. Экипаж был подобран «Лордом Остином», а брошенное судно через несколько часов добито U-251 ^[161] . Атаки самолётов прекратились. Чуть позже конвой догнал «Замалек». Во время атак коммодор конвоя Даудинг пытался вызвать для прикрытия советские истребители, но безуспешно ^[156] . Корабли расстреляли практически весь боезапас и остались без защиты ^[144] .

В 11:00 начались атаки шестнадцати «юнкерсов» 1-й группы и учебно-боевой эскадрильи 30-й эскадры на вторую группу конвоя. Первым был повреждён «Сэмюэль Чейз». Однако берег был близко, поэтому было предпринято всё для его спасения. Группа разделилась. Один из тральщиков взял судно на буксир и потащил к Йоканьге . «Оушен Фридом» в сопровождении «Бритомарта» и «Ноферн Гема» ушёл вперёд ^[144] . Во второй половине дня наконец-то появились истребители прикрытия — Пе-3 и «Харрикейны». Они отогнали подходившую группу немецких бомбардировщиков. В Йоканьге две группы конвоя соединились. К ним присоединились несколько советских эсминцев и тральщиков, и под прикрытием истребителей остатки конвоя около 16:00 11 июля прибыли в Архангельск ^[39] . Здесь их уже ожидали пришедшие ранее «Донбасс», «Беллингем» и спасатель «Рэтлин».

8 июля на помощь конвою PQ-17 командованием Северного флота из Ваенги были посланы эскадренные миноносцы « Гремящий », « Грозный », « Куйбышев » и « Сокрушительный ». В ночь на 10 июля группа советских кораблей, осуществлявшая поиски одиночных транспортов, попала в зону плавучего 4-бального льда и была вынуждена снизить скорость до малого (6 узлов). В это время она была атакована четырьмя немецкими бомбардировщиками Ju-88 , которые сбросили на эсминцы шестнадцать бомб, но все бомбы прошли мимо цели; только эсминцы «Гремящий» и «Сокрушительный» получили лёгкие повреждения и деформацию корпуса. Транспортов из состава PQ-17 кораблям обнаружить не удалось и вечером 10 июля они возвратились в Ваенгу. Пополнив топливо, эсминцы «Грозный», «Куйбышев» и « Урицкий » вышли к Новой Земле для поиска судов конвоя ^{[40] [162]} .

11 июля немецкие подводные лодки начали возвращаться на свои базы. 13 июля при возвращении на базу U-255 обнаружила дрейфующий «Паулюс Поттер». Обследовав его, Рехе выпустил по нему последнюю торпеду, и через две минуты судно затонуло. Это был последний затонувший транспорт из состава PQ-17. 15 июля на базу вернулись U-251, U-255, U-376 и U-703. Последней 16 июля на базу вернулась U-457. Ещё 12 июля самолёты-разведчики обследовали зону поиска конвоя PQ-17, не обнаружив ни одного самолёта. Немецким командованием было заявлено о полном уничтожении конвоя ^[144] .

Но операция союзников по спасению PQ-17 продолжалась. 9 июля в пролив Маточкин Шар на Новой Земле вошли траулер «Айршир» и транспорты «Айронклэд», «Трубэдуэ» и «Сильвер Сод» ^[164] . Здесь они присоединились к «Бенджамину Харрисону» и стали ожидать прихода кораблей эскорта, чтобы двигаться в Архангельск ^[165] . Связь между Маточкиным Шаром, «Эмпайр Тайдом» и находившимся в заливе Моллера и сидевшим на мели «Уинстоном Сэйлемом» поддерживалась с помощью « Каталины » полковника И. П. Мазурука. К берегам Новой Земли приставали шлюпки с потопленных судов. «Айршир» подобрал недалеко от входа в Маточкин Шар три шлюпки с «Фэйрфилд Сити». К «Уинстону Сэйлему» вышли шлюпки с «Олопаны» и «Хартлбери» ^[166] . Советское гидрографическое судно « Мурманец » доставило на «Эмпайр Тайд» подобранных на берегу Новой Земли моряков с «Вашингтона» и «Паулюс Поттера». Последним в Маточкин Шар в сопровождении минзага «Мурман» пришёл укрывавшийся с 7 июля в бухте Советская Гавань танкер «Азербайджан» ^[167] .

16 июля в Архангельск из поиска возвратилась «Дианелла» с 61 моряком с «Эмпайр Байрона» на борту ^[168] . В ночь с 16 на 17 июля командор конвоя вышел на борту «Поппи» в сопровождении «Лотоса» и «Ла-Малоне» ^[169] . Они прибыли в Маточкин Шар 20 июля ^[170] . Около 02:00 21 июля три корвета вместе с «Айрширом» и советским траулером вывели из пролива «Айронклэд», «Трубэдуэ», «Сильвер Сод» и «Бенджамин Харрисон». Впереди конвоя шёл советский ледокол «Мурман», на который перешёл Даудинг ^{[171] [170]} . Забрав по дороге «Эмпайр Тайд», они двинулись к Архангельску ^[170] . С «Уинстоном Сэйлемом» остались два советских буксира , которые пытались стащить его с отмели ^[170] .

22 июля ^[144] к конвою Даудинга присоединились «Позарика», «Паломарес», «Дианелла», тральщики «Леда» и «Хазард» ^[39] и советские эсминцы «Урицкий» и «Валериан Куйбышев» ^[144] . Но эти предосторожности уже были излишними. Вечером 24 июля, не встретив сопротивления немцев, конвой Даудинга пришёл в Архангельск. 28 июля в Архангельск прибыло последнее судно конвоя — снятый с мели «Уинстон-Сэйлем» ^{[153] [172]} .

Потери союзников

Из 35 транспортов до Архангельска добрались только 11. 2 судна вернулись в Исландию. 22 транспорта общим тоннажем более 142 тысяч тонн были потоплены немецкими подводными лодками и авиацией. На дно ушли 210 самолётов, 430 танков, 3350 автомобилей и 99 316 тонн других генеральных грузов . Кроме того, танкер «Азербайджан», повреждённый торпедой, потерял через пробоину часть ^{[173] [174]} груза льняного масла, а большая часть груза «Уинстона Сэйлема» была выброшена за борт на Новой Земле ^[36] .

In addition to the transports, the Zafaran rescue vessel and the Aldersdale squadron tanker were also sunk. Thus, the total loss of PQ-17 was 24 vessels. Losses of crews amounted to 153 people. Of these, only 7 died before the convoy was dissolved ^[36] .

Losses of Germany

During the operation against the convoy PQ-17, the kriegsmarine did not suffer losses among surface ships and submarines. From July 2 to 10, 72 torpedoes were consumed by submarines, of which 27 were hit by the target ^[179] . In total, 16 convoy vessels were sunk by submarines, some of which had already been damaged by aircraft.

For PQ-17 convoy attacks, Luftwaffe aircraft carried out 202 sorties : He-115 torpedo bombers made 29 sorties, He-111 torpedo bombers completed 43 sorties and 130 Ju-88 bombers . Torpedo bombers dropped 61 torpedoes and damaged four ships ^[144] . In total, 8 ships were sunk by planes, another 8 were damaged, and then finished off by submarines. Three more damaged vessels were able to reach Arkhangelsk. During this time, in operations, one way or another connected with the PQ-17, the Luftwaffe lost 11 aircraft (shot down or crashed during landing and decommissioned). The attribution of these losses to the PQ-17 account in different sources is considered differently, therefore the number of lost Luftwaffe machines varies from five ^[180] to eleven ^[144] .

Reasons

The wiring of the PQ-17 caravan became one of the most tragic stories of World War II ^[182] . For all the time of the escort operations, none of the convoys suffered such great losses in transport ships. Therefore, the epithets used in the descriptions of his story become clear - defeat, catastrophe ^[183] , tragedy, “ill-fated convoy” ^[184] , “doomed convoy” ^{[approx. 12]} , “a convoy to Hell” ^{[approx. 13]} . Despite the unity of views on the scale of the catastrophe, its causes, called by historians, vary greatly.

Versions

"Stone on the neck"

In 1942, the first naval lord Dudley Pound wrote to the US Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral King that "convoys become a stone on the neck of the Allies," since they are a constant source of cruiser and destroyer casualties. Britain has repeatedly tried to convince the United States and the USSR that escorting convoys through the Arctic is too risky. Mentioning these complaints and the break in sending convoys that followed the PQ-17 rout, some historians (for example, Sergeev in the book German Submarines in the Arctic 1941-1942 ^[185] ) believe that the PQ-17 convoy was doomed to destruction. This rout was to serve as the basis for stopping the sending of convoys ^[185] .

However, this version is not confirmed by further events. Despite the break in sending convoys, deliveries to the USSR only increased. So, in June 1942, 155 thousand tons of cargo were delivered to the USSR, in July 195 thousand tons, and in August 216 thousand tons ^{[approx. 14] [186]} . The complete cessation of supply was disadvantageous for Great Britain, since the USSR occupied a leading role in its “indirect impact strategy”. According to this strategy , the Axis countries were to be surrounded by the “encircling ring” of the Allied armies. And the economic dominance of the United States and Britain in the ensuing depletion of war will allow victory. And the main task for Great Britain was to keep the USSR in the war, for which Lend-Lease supplies were also used ^[187] . At the same time, it is worth noting that the increase in deliveries through Iran following the defeat of PQ-17 was beneficial to Great Britain, since, firstly, it increased its presence in Iran, and secondly, it could improve the supply of its armies in North Africa ^{[186 ]} .

"Bait for Tirpitz"

According to one version, the convoy PQ-17 was a bait for the battleship Tirpitz . It is believed that the convoy was supposed to lure the German battleship out of the fjords, and then heavy English ships were to begin the destruction of the Tirpitz . This version was adhered to by Admiral A. G. Golovko ^[188] , who in 1942 was commander of the Northern Fleet of the USSR.

Despite the fact that the possibility of hunting Tirpitz in the area west of Medvezhy Island was not excluded, in the area east of Medvezhy Island the Admiralty did not have the strength to carry out such an operation. And according to John Tovey’s plan, for the convoy to bring the Tirpitz to the British linear forces, the convoy should not disperse, but turn around and go west towards the English squadron ^[189] .

Affected Factors

To some extent, all these versions are justified, since there were many factors that turned the PQ-17 convoy wiring into a rout. German aviation dominated the air of the Arctic, and German submarines hosted the Barents Sea. The Soviet Northern Fleet and the air units attached to it were too weak to independently provide reliable cover for the convoys east of the 20th meridian, as the British wanted. Under these conditions, both the Allies and the USSR understood that when convoys were posted in the Arctic, losses in ships and guards were inevitable. This situation was not extraordinary. The British faced similar problems in the Mediterranean when escorting convoys to Malta . In the summer of 1942, like the Arctic convoys, they suffered heavy losses. At the same time, escort ships also suffered heavy losses:

Additional factors that influenced the fate of the PQ-17 were the Allies' inability to neutralize heavy German surface ships, and, in particular, Tirpitz . To the east of the island, the Bear Admiralty could only hope for submarines deployed on the way of its advancement. An additional headache for the Admiralty was concern for the fate of the cruising group. Together with an attempt to control the actions of the fleet from the headquarters located 2000 miles from the scene, this led to the issuance by Lord Pound of a hasty order to disperse the convoy ^[194] . The fallacy of this decision has made the carrying out of a difficult operation a disaster. Both the untimely issuance of this order (half a day before the actual launch of the Tirpitz into the sea) and the dubious effectiveness of this decision were noted. Metropolitan Fleet Commander John Tovey reasonably assumed that German surface ships would not attack the compound if they included destroyers ^[195] .

Additional aggravating factors were the actions of Hamilton and Broome to receive controversial radiograms from the Admiralty. Mistakenly deciding that the cruisers were going into battle with the approaching Tirpitz, Broome suggested that Hamilton join his destroyers to the cruiser formation. Hamilton, realizing that they would be of help in a future battle, did this. If Hamilton, as it was prescribed to him, was 30 miles from the convoy, this would most likely not have happened. The protection of the Brum destroyers would not be out of place for the remaining convoy ships ^[196] .

All these errors led to the fact that defenseless ships became easy prey for German aircraft and submarines. After analyzing all this, the Admiralty decided to change tactics during the next convoy.