British campaign

Geography

New Britain is a crescent-shaped island located northeast of mainland New Guinea , the largest island of the Bismarck archipelago . On the island there are volcanoes up to 1800 meters high ^[2] , and its coast is indented by a large number of bays ^[3] .

The climate is tropical . During World War II, the mountains were covered in forest . The presence of mountains, swamps and the jungle greatly complicated the movement of military units in New Britain. The number of places suitable for amphibious landing was also limited by coral reefs , which occupied most of the coastline of the island ^[3] .

The population of the island in 1940 was estimated at 106,000 people, of which Europeans and Asians were slightly more than 4,500 ^[4] . Rabaul , located on the northeastern coast of New Britain, was the largest and most populous city both on the island and throughout the archipelago as a whole ^[3] . The city also served as the capital of the Australian territory of New Guinea , since Australian troops captured the region as early as 1914 ^[5] .

Japanese occupation

Japanese troops captured New Britain in January 1942 ^[6] , quickly destroying the small Australian garrison during the Battle of Rabaul ^[7] . The Japanese feared that the Allies might use Rabaul to attack the Japanese base on the Truk islands in the central Pacific Ocean , and Rabaul was considered by the Japanese as a promising base that could be used to support a further offensive in the region ^[8] . Hundreds of Australian soldiers and pilots managed to evacuate in February-May, but about 900 people were captured by the Japanese. 500 European citizens captured by the Japanese were interned ^[5] . On July 1, 1942, 849 prisoners of war and 208 civilians captured earlier in New Britain were killed after the Japanese heard that the Japanese ship Montevideo Maru was torpedoed by an American submarine en route to Japan ^[5] . Almost all of the surviving Europeans were transported to the Solomon Islands , where they died due to poor conditions ^[9] .

Many small towns were forced to show loyalty to the Japanese troops in order to survive ^[5] . Few dissenters were killed. European women and children were evacuated to Australia before the war, while the Asian population failed to leave the island. The Chinese population of the island was afraid that it would be killed by Japanese troops, as happened periodically in the Pacific, but this did not happen. However, the Japanese used forced labor, and women were subjected to violence, "comfort stations" were organized on the island ^[5] .

After the invasion, the Japanese founded a large military base in Rabaul. Objects located near the city, from the beginning of 1942, were attacked by allied air units, but these operations, as a rule, were unsuccessful. By mid-1943, a network of four airfields was built in Rabaul, which accommodated a total of 265 fighters and 166 bombers. Additionally, the aircraft were placed in unguarded parking lots ^[10] . Airplanes from these airfields acted against the Allied forces in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands ^[11] . Rabaul was also a major port. Both in the open air and in the premises, large reserves of provisions were stored ^[12] . The largest airfield was built under the village of Gasamata on the south coast. The Japanese kept a small coast guard group ^[9] .

During 1943, small Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB ) units, consisting of Australians and New Guineans, landed in New Britain. These units collected data on Japanese military installations, rescued allied pilots shot down over the island. The Japanese tried to track them down and killed the locals who helped them. AIB also conducted operations against the population of villages, which they convicted of collaboration ^[9] .

Warring Forces

By 1943, there were more than 100,000 Japanese troops and civilians in New Britain and a small neighboring island, New Ireland . Here was located the headquarters of the 8th Front under the command of General Hitoshi Imamura : 17th Division (11,429 by the end of the war); 38th division (13 108); 39th brigade (5073); 65th brigade (2729); 14th regiment (2444); 34th Regiment (1879) and 35th Regiment (1967). Together, these forces were equivalent to four divisions. From the naval forces it was possible to make up another, additional division ^[13] . By the end of the war, Japanese troops were surrounded in Rabaul, another part was blocked on the Gazelle Peninsula ^[6] . Over time, these forces became scarce ^[14] , divisions became increasingly isolated, and ultimately were completely cut off from the metropolis, which meant that the garrison was virtually abandoned to its fate ^[15] . The connection between Rabaul and Japan was lost in February 1943, and was not restored until the end of the war ^[16] .

Unlike Japan, the forces of the United States, Australia and New Guinea were assisted by local residents, and their number never exceeded 15,000. At different times, the 112th cavalry regiment ^[17] , the 1st Marine Division , the 40th Rifle Division, and the 5th Australian Division ^[6] operated on the island. The small number of allies on the island was explained by their goals: the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition at a later stage did not seek to drive the Japanese out of Rabaul, but only kept suitable places on the island for the construction of air bases, and later fettered superior Japanese forces by blocking ^[6] .

Since mid-1942, the Allied plans in the Pacific region have been built to capture or neutralize the significance of Rabaul. In July 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OKNSh) ordered the preparation of a double offensive. The forces assigned to the southern part of the Pacific Ocean were aimed at capturing the Solomon Islands, starting from Guadalcanal . At the same time, detachments assigned to the southwestern part of the Pacific Ocean and under the command of General Douglas MacArthur , were to capture Lae and Salamaua - cities on the northern coast of New Guinea. As soon as these operations were completed, the Allies, they believed, would have bridgeheads for the development of an attack on Rabaul. This plan was too premature because MacArthur lacked the strength necessary to implement it. The Japanese offensive in the direction of Port Moresby , which was stopped by the Allies after several months of heavy fighting for Kokonda , the Gulf of Milne and at Buna Gona , also confused the maps to the Allies, but the Japanese only likely delayed the enemy’s attack ^[18] .

The Allies returned to this plan in early 1943. After a major conference, on March 28, the OKNSh issued a new plan to neutralize the significance of Rabaul, which was called Operation Cartwheel . According to this plan, MacArthur’s forces were to build airfields on two islands near the coast of New Guinea, capture the Hewon Peninsula and the western part of New Britain. The forces assigned to the southern part of the Pacific Ocean were to continue the offensive through the Solomon Islands in the direction of Rabaul, and the operation was supposed to end with the landing on Bougainville Island ^[18] . The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that the original plan for Operation Cartwell, which consisted of the capture of Rabaul by MacArthur in June 1943, was insufficient, since Japanese bases, in their opinion, could be neutralized by military blockade and aerial bombardment. MacArthur initially opposed these changes, but they were approved by the NSC during the Quebec Conference in August ^[19] .

The Fifth US Air Force launched a campaign against Rabaul in October 1943. The goal of the campaign was to prevent the Japanese from using Rabaul as an air or naval base, and to provide support for the planned landing on Bougainville , scheduled for November 1, and in western New Britain, scheduled for December ^[20] . The first raid took place on October 12 with the participation of 349 aircraft. Further raids were carried out during October and early November, when weather conditions allowed it ^[21] . On November 5, American aircraft made another raid on Rabaul and its harbor. It is noteworthy that after this attack, the Imperial Fleet of Japan stopped using the city as a fleet base ^[22] . The campaign against Rabaul intensified in November, when part of the Solomon Islands was captured ^[23] .

Views of the parties

September 22, 1943 the General Staff of MacArthur ordered the invasion of New Britain, the operation was called "Dexterity" ( Eng. Operation Dexterity ). It was planned to land the sixth US Army (Alamo) at Cape Gloucester (in the west of New Britain) and in Gasmat in order to create an imaginary line of the Gasmat-Talasea and take control, first of all, of this territory ^[23] . Lieutenant General George Churchill Kenny opposed this operation because he believed that the construction of airfields at Cape Gloucester would have taken an unacceptably long time and, moreover, in his opinion, they would have been useless, since the existing ones were quite enough to support the attack on Rabaul . Nevertheless, Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, commander of the Sixth Army, and MacArthur naval commanders believed that invading New Britain was necessary in order to gain control of the strategically important Vityaz Strait . However, the planned landing in Gasmat in November was canceled, because the leadership considered it dangerous to land in too swampy areas and in the immediate vicinity of the fortified Japanese district and airfields in Rabaul. Instead, on November 21, it was decided to capture Arava on the southwestern coast of New Britain in order to create a base for torpedo boats and, possibly, divert the attention of the Japanese from their main target - Cape Gloucester ^[24] . The landing in Arava was scheduled for December 15, at Cape Gloucester - on the 26th of the same month ^[25] .

Alamo Headquarters was responsible for the development of Dexterity’s operational plans and began work in this field in August 1943. Information about the enemy was obtained from sea and scout patrols, which were landed in New Britain from September to December, as well as from aerial photography ^[26] . The main unit, which was supposed to participate in the landing at Cape Gloucester, was the 1st Division of the US Marine Corps ^[27] . For the landing in Arava, the 112th cavalry regiment was created ^[28] .

The Imperial Headquarters assessed the strategic position in the southwestern Pacific at the end of September 1943 and came to the conclusion that the Allies would try to break through the northern Solomon Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago in the coming months. Accordingly, reinforcements were aimed at strategically important positions in an attempt to slow down the hypothetical advancement of the Allied forces. A large force group was retained in Rabaul, as it was believed that the Allies would try to take over the city. At the same time, Japanese positions in Western New Britain were limited to airfields at Cape Gloucester at the western tip of the island and to several small stations that served as shelter from Allied attacks for small boats traveling between Rabaul and New Guinea ^[29] . New Britain lay east of the "absolute national defense zone", the position of which was adopted by the Japanese army on September 15. Thus, the Japanese wanted to delay the advance of the allies in the area in order to gain time and increase the defenses of more strategically important areas ^[30] .

In October, the commander of the eighth army of Imamur came to the conclusion that the next step of the allies would probably be an invasion of Western New Britain. He decided to transfer additional forces to this area in order to strengthen the garrison ^[31] ; the 17th division was chosen for this purpose; the main part of the division arrived in Rabaul from China on October 4 and 5, losing 1,400 people on the way to New Britain. The commander of the 17th Division, Lieutenant General Yasushi Sakai, was appointed the new commander of Japanese forces in Western New Britain, but parts of the divisions were scattered throughout the region ^[32] .

Arave

The main American forces under the command of Julian Cunningham ^[28] were concentrated on the island of Gudenaf , where they were preparing for the landing until December 13, 1943. A few weeks before the operation, the allied aviation carried out massive attacks throughout New Britain, but the landing area was not specially touched so as not to alert the Japanese ^[33] . The ships carrying American forces arrived at the Arava Peninsula in the area of ​​Cape Merkus, at about 03:00 a.m. on December 15. Two small groups set off almost immediately under cover of night with an order to destroy the radio transmitter on the island of Pilelo in the southeast and block the route leading to the peninsula near the village of Umtingalu. The landing of reinforcements at Umtingalu was met with fierce resistance, and subsequently completely repelled. The landing on Pilelo turned out to be more successful, the superior forces of the Allies without much difficulty suppressed the Japanese resistance ^[34] .

После некоторого замешательства главная группа войск заняла корабли десанта, основной штурм начался после 06:25, при поддержке мощной морской и воздушной бомбардировки ^[35] . На берегу японцев практически не было, хотя первая волна встретила пулеметный огонь, который, однако, был быстро подавлен. Боевыми воздушными патрулями американцы обеспечили себе превосходство в воздухе. Дальнейшее замешательство привело к задержке второй волны и получилось так, что вторая и третья волны высадки войск прошли в одно время. Тем не менее кавалеристы быстро обеспечили себе плацдарм и к полудню создали сильную оборонительную позицию. В последующие дни прибыло японское подкрепление, и они перешли в контратаку, но американцы к тому времени тоже подвели подкрепление, включая танки, и контратака была отбита. В результате японцы отошли вглубь, в сторону ближайшего аэродрома, а бои вокруг Араве закончились ^[36] .

Мыс Глостер

Высадка на мысе Глостер состоялась 26 декабря, уже после высадки в Араве ^[37] и действий у мыса Судест несколькими днями ранее ^[38] . Для нападения была выбрана 1-я дивизия морской пехоты под командованием генерал-майора Уильяма Х. Рупертуса ^[39] . В качестве места высадки были выбраны два пляжа к востоку от аэродромов на мысе Глостер, который и был главной целью операции. Ещё одним местом вспомогательной высадки войск стал пляж к западу от аэродромов, на противоположной стороне мыса. 7-я дивизия морской пехоты вышла из залива Оро. В сопровождении американских и австралийских военных кораблей, она была усилена 1-й дивизией морской пехоты и артиллерией от 11-ой. ^[40] . На протяжении нескольких недель до высадки гарнизон при мысе подвергался бомбардировке, таким образом, были разрушены многие укрепления. Продолжительная тяжёлая бомбардировка повлияла и на боевой дух солдат ^[41] . Последняя бомбардировка произошла 26 декабря, накануне штурма, и густой дым заволок место высадки ^[40] . Американская высадка прошла успешно, контратака японских сил 26 декабря потерпела неудачу. На следующий день 1-й полк морской пехоты двинулся на запад, в сторону аэродромов. Японцы ослабили свои позиции, но наступление было остановлено, американцы высадили подкрепление. Наступление возобновилось 29 декабря с захваченных аэродромов ^[42] . В течение первых двух недель января 1944 года морские пехотинцы продвинулись на юг в поисках японских сил, которые, как им казалось, должны были быть там. Это опрометчивое решение привело к тяжёлым боям с японским 141-м пехотным полком, который пытался отстоять более выгодные позиции ^[43] . Морские пехотинцы взяли контроль над этими высотами только к 16 января ^[44] .

После удачной высадки союзники фактически получили частичный контроль над Новогвинейским морем и взяли под контроль пролив Витязь , поскольку ранее захватили Финшхафен. В январе 1944 года союзники стремились развить наступление, начав ещё одну операцию «Декстерити» с высадкой в Сайдоре в рамках кампании Хюон. В ответ на эти действия японское верховное командование решило, что нужно отозвать войска с полуострова Хюон в обход Сайдора ^[45] .

В середине января Сакаи запросил вывод своей группы из Западной Новой Британии, а 21 числа Имамура эту просьбу удовлетворил. Японские силы затем попытались уйти от американцев и двигались в сторону Таласеа ^[46] . Японцев преследовали морские патрули, и в центре, и вдоль северного побережья велись частые, но непродолжительные бои ^[47] .

Таласеа

В течение нескольких месяцев после операции союзники стремились, прежде всего, закрепить за собой Араве и мыс Глостер, потому в этот период происходят лишь локальные столкновения. Японские войска также предпочитали избегать открытых боёв и продолжили отвод войск в направлении Рабаула. Вооруженные силы США взяли под контроль остров Рук в феврале 1944 года, но вскоре гарнизон с острова был выведен ^[43] . В следующем месяце была произведена ещё одна высадка — в Таласеа. Это была попытка отрезать от Рабаула отступающие японские части ^[48] , в операции принимал участие, в основном, 5-й полк морской пехоты . После успешной высадки полк направился к аварийной взлётно-посадочной полосе в Таласеа, что на противоположном берегу. Небольшая группа японцев атаковала американские войска и мешала им продвигаться достаточно быстро, чтобы перекрыть отход главных японских сил из мыса Глостер ^{[49] [50]} .

Союзные воздушные атаки на Рабаул ещё усилились, когда в течение января 1944 года были сооружёны аэродромы в Бугенвиле. Город был разрушен, вышло из строя множество кораблей и самолётов. Из-за потери городского флота, с февраля японцы перестали посылать в Рабаул какие-либо надводные суда ^[51] . Японские авиачасти, дислоцированные в Рабауле, сделали последнюю попытку перехватить союзный налёт 19 февраля, который также закончился неудачей. После этого воздушные налёты, которые продолжались до конца войны, встречались только зенитной канонадой ^[52]. As a result of prolonged bombing, the city ceased to be a place from which the Japanese could offer serious resistance. Nevertheless, he was still very well defended by a garrison of 98,000 people; in Rabaul there were hundreds of artillery and anti-aircraft mounts . Around the Gazelle Peninsula, fortress walls were built, rugged terrain also played into the hands of the defenders ^[53] . On March 14, 1944, the Imperial Headquarters ordered the eighth army to "keep the area around Rabaul as long as possible" in order to distract the allies from other regions ^[54] .

In April 1944, after landing in Arava and at Cape Gloucester, the 40th US Rifle Division, commanded by General Rapp Brash, arrived on the island ^[55] to pick up the infantry and cavalry who landed here in December 1943. After this, a period of relative inactivity followed, the American and Japanese troops occupied the opposite ends of the island, sabotage was carried out in the center of the island by the Australians ^[6] . AIB reconnaissance patrols subsequently successfully pushed the Japanese post of Ulamon closer to the north coast, and Kamandan to the south ^{[56] [57]} . In mid-1944, the headquarters of the Eighth Army decided to reassess allied intentions in New Britain. Indeed, until that time it was believed that the Allies planned a major attack on Rabaul, but the advance of the Allied forces in the Philippines meant that this was impossible. Now the Japanese have decided that the Allies will slowly advance throughout Rwaul throughout New Britain, and begin a full-scale offensive only when the outcome of the war is predetermined or if the contingent of Australian troops on the island is increased ^[58] .

In October 1944, it was decided to transfer the American 40th Infantry Division to the Philippines , and the responsibility for New Britain was shifted to the Australians, as the Australian government expressed a desire to use its own troops to recapture the territory of Australia, which the Japanese controlled at the start of the war ^{[ 59]} . For this operation, the 5th Division of Australia was chosen, commanded by Major General Alan Ramsey, the troops were concentrated around Madang in May 1944, after the operation on the Yuon Peninsula ^[60] .

At one time, the allied intelligence services underestimated the Japanese forces on the island, believing that there were approximately 38,000 Japanese on the island. Although they made almost half a mistake, the allies understood the Japanese’s intentions much better, believing that the Imamura’s forces were in a defensive position and were in fortified Rabaul ^{[ 61]} . In fact, the Japanese military personnel consisted of approximately 69,000 people, including 53,000 infantry and another 16,000 marines, most of which were located on the Gazelle Peninsula, north of Rabaul. Due to the growing isolation of the garrison, many soldiers began to grow rice and garden . The American enclaves of Thalasea Cape Hoskins, Aravee and Cape Gloucester maintained a secret ceasefire. The Allied bombing was carried out much less often, since almost nothing remained of the Japanese air and sea forces ^[14] .

Ramsey’s forces were ordered to restrain the enemy’s forces, that is, to keep the Japanese garrison on the Gazelle peninsula ^[6] . At the same time, Ramsey continued to put pressure on the Japanese, avoiding major clashes. It was decided that the Australians would carry out some offensive operations, with the goal of someday reaching the cut off American garrison. To achieve this, the Australian command decided to create two bases: one around Jacquinot Bay on the south coast, and the other on the north coast around Cape Hoskins ^{[6] [61]} .

In early October 1944, the 36th Infantry Battalion landed at Cape Hoskins to establish contact with the American garrison ^[62] . At the beginning of next month, the rest of the Australian 6th Infantry Brigade landed in Jacquinot. In the following weeks, the construction of roads, runway and hospital began. Work on their construction will be carried out until May 1945 ^[63] . Two Royal New Zealand Royal Air Force squadrons, consisting of Chance Vought F4U Corsair fighters , arrived a bit later to support allied operations on the island ^[64] , and American landing ships provided support until the Australian landing ship arrived in February 1945. ^{[ 65]} .

Due to the lack of ships, the transition of the 5th division was significantly delayed and was not completed until April 1945. Nevertheless, in December, the Australian offensive began in order to occupy the Gazelle Peninsula in order to develop an attack on the Japanese units located around Rabaul ^{[66] [67]} . The 36th Rifle Battalion began to advance, expanding the bridgehead around Cape Hoskins in early December. Having established that the Japanese had gone beyond the Pandi River, a new base was created around Ea-Ea, and troops were deployed on a barge. The 1st New Guinean Infantry Battalion strengthened its forces in January 1945 ^[68] , after which the Australians on the north coast resumed their advance in the direction of Open Bay, meeting with little resistance ^[69] .

Meanwhile, on the south coast in the direction of White Bay was preparing the main offensive, which began in late December ^[69] . On February 15, after a short battle, Kamandran was taken; the 1st New Guinean Infantry Battalion carried out a successful ambush ^{[68] [70]} . At that moment, the resistance of Japanese troops on the south coast began to increase, and in the final phase of the offensive, the Australians began to advance towards Henry Reid Bay, behind which was the Waitavalo Tol Zone, held by about a Japanese battalion ^[66] .

During the six weeks after this attack, the Australians carried out a series of actions aimed at weakening the main position of the Japanese troops around Mount Suji; the first in the chain of these actions was the attack of the 19th infantry battalion on March 5 ^[71] . The Japanese repulsed the attacks one after another and kept Sugi using mortars, machine guns and bunkers, and rain also did not contribute to the success of the Australian forces. This was followed by fierce clashes between the Japanese and the 14th / 32nd Bacon Hill battalion on March 18. In March-April, the Vaitavalo-Tol region was taken ^[72] . Reinforcements arrived soon: first the first part of the 13th Infantry Brigade, and then the 4th ^[73] , so the offensive part of the campaign came to an end. In the following months, Australians patrolled the Gazelle Peninsula to prevent any Japanese attempts to escape from Rabaul. Australians adhered to this tactic until the end of the war ^[67] .

During this time, there have been some changes in the command structure. In April, Major General Horace Robertson took command from Ramsey, and Major General Kenneth Isher took command in early August. ^[74]

Rabaul was assigned to the 29th / 46th Infantry Battalion, which was part of the 4th Infantry Brigade on September 6, 1945, more than 8,000 former prisoners of war were released from the Japanese camp on the island. Australian losses during the fighting in New Britain from October 1944 until the end of the war amounted to 53 killed and 140 wounded. Another 21 people died from non-combat injuries or illnesses ^[75] . The US 1st Marine Division lost 310 people dead and 1,083 wounded ^[76] . The losses of all allied units during the battle of Arava amounted to 118 people, 352 people were injured, four more were missing ^[38] . Total Japanese casualties in New Britain and other islands of the Bismarck archipelago are estimated at about 30,000. Most of them died from disease and hunger.

There is no consensus among historians whether it was worthwhile to land at Arava or even at Cape Gloucester. According to Henry Shaw and Kane Douglas, authors of the official history of the Marine Corps, landing near Arava may have made landing at Cape Gloucester easier ^[77] . American naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison argues that the landing near Arava was of "little importance", noting that it was not of strategic importance, and human resources could be used elsewhere ^[78] . Historian John Miller also concluded that landings near Arava and at Cape Gloucester “were probably not important to neutralize Rabaul or to prepare for an operation in the Philippines,” but the offensive in Western New Britain has some advantages, for example, few casualties with the overall success of the operation ^[79] .

Gavin Long, an Australian historian, wrote that Australia was not adequately resourced, especially militarily, as shown, for example, by the situation with the 5th division ^[80] . In any case, according to Long, the relatively inexperienced Australian forces, having met with almost five Japanese divisions, showed an outstanding result in the circumstances ^[66] . Laclan Grant also came to a similar conclusion, noting that the losses of the army in the framework of this campaign were less than, for example, according to the results of the Aitape-Wewak campaign ^[81] . Retired General John Cotes wrote that “in many aspects, the Australian operation in New Britain is a classic campaign to deter the enemy,” but in contrast to this, it was dangerous to conduct an active operation in the region, since all forces were directed to support the Borney operation ^{[ 82]} . Peter Charlton also called Australian operations successful. ^[83] The defensive tactics chosen by the Imamura were probably the main factor behind successful containment by much smaller Australian forces. According to the Japanese story of Tanaki Kengoro, the Imamura was ordered to keep his troops in Rabaul until the Japanese imperial fleet came to the rescue ^[84] . Eustace Keo agrees with this assessment, arguing that any offensive does not make sense if it is conducted without sufficient naval and air support, which was unavailable to the Japanese in Rabaul ^[72] .

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