Submarine Incident S-363 (1981)

At the beginning of October 1981 from Paldiski , the diesel-electric submarine S-363 of project 613 went to the Baltic Sea to carry out combat duty, which was supposed to last about a month and end on November 5, 1981 . Formally, the captain of the 3rd rank Anatoly Mikhailovich Gushchin was the commander of the submarine, but the chief of staff of the Paldisk Submarine Brigade, captain of the 2nd rank Joseph Avrukevich, to whom Gushchin obeyed, went on this boat trip. It was an ordinary military campaign, the submarine was supposed to be on alert in the square east of the Danish island of Bornholm . In mid-October, S-363 entered the Polish base Swinoujscie for a short rest, and from there on October 17th again left for the Baltic. A day later, the submarine team heard a rattle of metal. As it turned out later, the upper hull of the boat was hooked by a fishing trawl, as a result of which the direction - finding antenna frame was damaged. This was significant damage, as the direction finder provided both the detection of the forces of the likely enemy and assisted in navigation. This issue was reported to the fleet headquarters. In fact, this meant the cessation of the S-363 military campaign and its return for repair, but from the headquarters, Gushchin and Avrukevich were ordered to continue the campaign using backup equipment.

In addition to disruption in the operation of the direction finder, the navigator A. Korostov was rather professionally weak on the submarine. Thus, the crew of the submarine did not know exactly where he was and where he was going. Eight days after the trawl incident, S-363 was 53 nautical miles from the proposed location. Walking at night in the surface, the submarine walked along the secret channel of the Swedish Navy, the width of which was only 12 meters. At 21:57 minutes on October 27, a metal rattle rolled across the hull of the submarine and the boat at a speed of 7 knots jumped out onto the stones of the coastal shallow of the coast of Sweden. The S-363 crew tried to take the boat aground on their own, but failed to do so.

The former political officer of the ship at that time, Captain-Lieutenant Vasily Besedin subsequently said:

“... I immediately went downstairs and - through the compartments, to the people. On a boat, the worst thing in an emergency is the lack of information. And here we also need to take into account the moment: until the end of the military service - a week and a half. As they say - a nose to the house. In other words, the “plateau of tranquility”, that is, the peak of fatigue, both physical and psychological. The decline in vigilance, efficiency, and all that. Here, to panic, to a nervous breakdown, it’s not that a step is a half step. And the unknown in this matter is the most powerful catalyst.

Blow, rattle, roll in the boat - of course, heard and felt everything. But the guys did well. However, in the eyes of everyone there is a dumb question: what happened? I speak as it is: we ran aground, where and why - we don’t know yet. We will understand, try to do it on our own. The crew calmed down somewhat, the tension gradually began to subside ... "

Then again, attempts began to take off the shallows. Until 6 a.m. they tried everything conceivable and inconceivable, but since it was not possible to correctly assess the situation in complete darkness, they only managed to lie still denser on the stones - from the nose to the wheelhouse. Later, in the database, it was discovered that in the broken fairing of the sonar lay a stone from this same shallow. The only Swedish souvenir ...

When the dawn came, an opportunity appeared to look around, but at the same time complete bewilderment grew with visual clarity. Around the submarine - the earth, only in front and behind a narrow strip of water. Directly on the course - the tower of the coastal radar .

Around this time, the navigator gave a voice. He finally managed to determine the place. One can imagine the reaction of the crew when Korostov finally squeezed out that the boat was sitting on the rocks ... off the southeastern coast of Sweden next to the Karlskrona naval base. According to Besedin, many “warm” words were addressed to Anatoly himself, his near and distant relatives, and the commander who issued SUCH navigator.

Once again, the word to the politician: "... Honestly, at that moment I did not so much react to the stunning news as I was afraid for the commander and navigator. Both were extremely depressed. There is only one way to get them out of it - to distract them to work. Well, the commander and her it was enough, and I told the navigator: "Look, Tolya, where, how and when the error appeared. It is necessary that you yourself, and not someone else find it."

Understanding that, apparently, it would inevitably have to come into contact with the Swedes, the flag of the USSR Navy was hoisted on the cabin of the submarine. The submarine was noticed by a Swedish fisherman and called the police, who did not immediately believe the words of the fisherman, but after the second call she transmitted a message to the chief of staff of the naval base in Karlskrona, located nearby, to commander Karl Andersson. A Swedish boat was sent to the place with Andersson, who stepped on a submarine for further negotiations. At the same time, the USSR Embassy in Sweden, as well as the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were notified of the incident. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mikhail Yakovlev, extraordinary and plenipotentiary after the USSR in Sweden, was called. The appearance of a Soviet submarine off the Swedish coast near the naval base of Karlskrona, where it is forbidden to be outsiders, caused a shock to the military and political environment of official Stockholm . At the same time, the Minister of Defense of the USSR Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov was informed about the incident.

The negotiations between Andersson and Gushchin did not lead to anything. Gushchin refused to leave the submarine. However, the situation around the boat began to deteriorate. The Baltic Fleet squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Kalinin , led by the large Obraztsovy anti-submarine ship, was sent to help S-363. The Swedish press and the public received this news extremely negatively. The possible entry of the Soviet squadron into Swedish territorial waters is a world scandal. The Swedish Navy commander was ordered to open fire from coastal artillery batteries if the Soviet squadron entered the Swedish waters. The incident threatened to result in armed conflict. But even more fuel was added to the fire by information about the possible presence of nuclear weapons (torpedoes) on the S-363.

October 30, the Swedish authorities seriously considered the possibility of assaulting the submarine. Swedish border guards on duty were replaced by special forces of the Navy. All dismissals for the Swedish military were canceled, and charges for military reservists were also announced. The C-363 crew received an order to destroy the submarine in the event of an assault.

On November 1, a final decision was made during the Soviet-Swedish summit talks. The Swedes were ready to remove the S-363 from the shallows under the following conditions:

• 1) The USSR must apologize to Sweden for the incident
• 2) Payment for all expenses for saving the submarine fell entirely on the Soviet side
• 3) Only a Swedish ship will be shooting aground
• 4) Commander Gushchin and boat officers should be interrogated by the Swedish side

To meet with the Swedish commission to investigate the incident, commander Gushchin and the submarine commander Besedin went. For almost six hours, in the presence of two representatives of the Soviet embassy, ​​the Swedish military interrogated the Soviet sailors. The next day, the Swedish authorities gave a big press conference to summarize. At the conference it was said that the Soviet submarine entered the territorial waters of Sweden due to a malfunction of navigation equipment and crew errors in determining the location, as a result of which, without knowing the terrain, it sat on a stone shallow.

On November 6, the Swedes stranded the boat, towed into neutral waters, where they transferred control to the crew. At the same time, the TASS Message “On the incident with a Soviet submarine” was published in the Soviet press:

On the night of October 27-28 of this year, the Soviet diesel submarine No. 137, making the usual training voyage in the Baltic Sea, as a result of the failure of navigation instruments and the occurrence of errors in determining the location, lost its visibility and landed on stranded at the southeastern tip of Sweden.
The submarine is currently stranded by Swedish rescue vessels and is anchored in a safe place. Negotiations are underway with the Swedish authorities to withdraw the submarine from the territorial waters of Sweden.

November 8, S-363 returned to Liepaja.

Submarine officers were sent to the headquarters of the fleet for questioning by the Soviet special commission to investigate the incident. Sailors and warrant officers were interviewed right on board. As a result, the commander of the S-363 captain of the 3rd rank Gushchin, the captain of the 2nd rank Avrukevich and the submarine commander of the submarine Besedin were charged with the incident. As a result, Avrukevich was dismissed from the armed forces. Gushchin was removed from his post and sent to serve on the coast, and Besedin was found not guilty. The rest of the S-363 crew did not suffer any punishment. Witters from among Soviet sailors gave the boat a caustic nickname: "The Swedish Komsomolets."

The incident with S-363, (or with U-137, how to get it in the Western press, on board number), became a rather loud scandal in Sweden itself. The appearance of foreign submarines off the Swedish coast was recorded earlier, but a similar incident was the first time. The Swedish press, like the public, questioned the fighting efficiency of the local armed forces. As a result, Commander Andersson was removed from his post as head of the base in Karlskrona, but continued to serve in the navy. In addition, this episode negatively affected Soviet-Swedish relations, which until then were among the most friendly and constructive in Soviet and Swedish diplomacy, since Sweden was a neutral state and did not belong to any military-political blocs. According to some Swedish people and the press, the appearance of a Soviet submarine off the Swedish coast and most importantly at the military base of Karlskrona, where the latest torpedoes were tested at that time, was not accidental. In addition, amid the confrontation in the Cold War and recent large-scale exercises, including in the Baltic Sea " West-81 ", many doubted that the submarine was able to pass by such a narrow (12 meters wide) secret channel that only the Swedish naval forces knew about. The USSR reimbursed Sweden for the rescue of S-363 in the amount of 5 million Swedish kronor.

However, this incident was the reason for the operation of the Swedish Navy exactly one year later, in October 1982 in Harsfjord, because according to the Swedes, a foreign submarine was again found in this place. During this period, 44 depth charges were dropped, and 4 anchor mines detonated. Subsequently, it turned out that the bombing was unsuccessful: either the boat escaped them, or she left the territorial waters of Sweden at the very beginning of the military action. The events caused an emergency meeting in the parliamentary commission of Sweden, which accused the Soviet Union of invasion, which caused political tensions in relations between the USSR and Sweden. Subsequent studies showed that civilian ship noise could be mistaken for the noise of submarine propellers.

• S-363
• Foreign submarines in the territorial waters of Sweden
• Submarine incident off the coast of Sweden (2014)

• Whiskey on the Rocks - A Window on the 1981 Cold War Era .
• S-363. Submarine on the stones. Documentary. TV Center. 2012.

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