Lugou bridge incident

In 1931, Japan occupied Manchuria and created the puppet state of Manzhou , headed by Puy (the last emperor of the Qing Dynasty ). This state was not recognized either by the Kuomintang or the international community, but since 1931 a truce has been operating. At the end of 1932, the Japanese Kwantung Army invaded Jaehe Province, encountering resistance from the 29th Army Corps of the Kuomintang under the command of General Song Zheyuan . After the operation, known as the Defense of the Great Wall of China , in which Japan won, the territories west of Beijing fell into the sphere of influence of Japan. In 1933, Hehe Province was incorporated into Manzhou-guo under the pretext of enhancing security. On June 9, 1935, a Sino-Japanese agreement was signed, known as the He-Umezu agreement , recognizing the Japanese occupation of Hebei and Chahar provinces. In November 1935, with the support of Japan, the creation of an independent state in the eastern part of Hebei was proclaimed. By early 1937, Japan controlled all territories west, north, and east of Beijing.

In accordance with the terms of the " Final Protocol " of September 7, 1901, China guaranteed its signatories the right to hold troops at 12 points along the railway connecting Beijing with Tianjin . In accordance with an additional agreement of July 15, 1902, these troops had the right to conduct maneuvers without notifying representatives of other countries. By July 1937, Japan had from 7 to 15 thousand people, mostly located along the railways. This number of troops was several times higher than the number of troops of the European powers stationed there, as well as the limits established by the Final Protocol.

Geography

Lugou Bridge is located in the southern suburb of Beijing Fengtai , and passes over the Yongdinghe River. At the time of the event, the defense of Beijing was guaranteed by four strategic points: from the east - the city of Tongzhou , from the north-west - the city of Nankou, from the south - the city of Fengtai, and from the south-west - the Lugou bridge. A bridge passed from Beijing to Wuhan , the only transportation route connecting Beijing with the part of China controlled by the Kuomintang. Before the incident began, the Japanese army controlled the eastern, northwestern and southern points, as well as the western end of the bridge, the Kuomintang - the eastern end of the bridge ( Wanping Fortress). If the bridge came under the control of the Japanese army, Beijing would be completely cut off from China and would be immediately occupied by the Japanese.

Position of the Parties

The Chinese army in Northern China was armed mainly with sabers and obsolete guns, soldiers were recruited from peasants and criminals, and thus the Chinese army was significantly inferior to the well-trained and armed Japanese army. The only advantages of the Chinese army were numerical superiority and good knowledge of the area.

The Japanese primarily sought to seize the Chinese cities, since in the lowland countryside the Chinese troops, which practically had no military aircraft and anti-tank weapons, could no longer oppose the Japanese army.

Phase I

From the end of June 1937, several hundred Japanese troops stationed at the western end of the bridge conducted exercises, while the Kuomintang forces stationed in the Wanping fortress city watched them closely. At dawn on July 7, the Japanese army sent a telephone message to the Kuomintang forces in which it reported that the Japanese soldier was missing and allegedly taken hostage and held in Wanping. The army demanded permission to enter the city in search of a soldier. (Subsequently, the soldier was discovered, no harm was done to him). There is currently no consensus as to whether the abduction was unintentional, or whether it was a provocation inspired by the Japanese army in order to start a war. Some Japanese historians believe that the incident was inspired by the Chinese Communist Party in order to weaken both Japan and the Kuomintang ^[1] .

Colonel Ji Xinwen (219th Regiment of the 37th Division of the 29th Army), on the orders of his superior, General Qin Dechun , rejected the request. On the evening of July 7, Matsui presented Qing with an ultimatum, requiring Kuomintang admission to the city within an hour. Otherwise, shelling of the city was offered. At the time of the transfer of the ultimatum, Japanese artillery was already aimed at the city. At midnight on July 8, Japanese artillery began shelling the city, and tanks and infantry entered the bridge. Ji on the orders of Qin moved his troops, numbering about 1,000 people, with the order to protect the bridge at all costs. In the afternoon, the Japanese troops partially held the bridge, but the next day, the Kuomintang troops received reinforcements and completely established control over the bridge. The Japanese army proposed negotiations, which is the end of phase I. However, Japanese troops continued to be near the western end of the bridge.

Phase II

During a meeting of senior officers of the 29th Guomindang Army in Beijing on July 12, opinions were divided. Qin believed that the Japanese could not be trusted, and the bridge should be defended to the last without offering negotiations. Zhen spoke in favor of negotiations, and General Song sent him as representative of the Kuomintang to Tianjin to meet with General Hashimoto, the commander of all Japanese forces in the provinces near Beijing and Tianjin.

At the start of the negotiations, Hashimoto informed Zheng that, in his opinion, the incident could have been resolved peacefully. Zhen cabled Suna that the further concentration of the Kuomintang troops near Beijing could be regarded by the Japanese as unfriendly. Nevertheless, since at the same time, Song received reports of the redeployment of Japanese troops from Manchuria and Korea to Beijing, he considered the negotiations to be an extension of time from Japan and ordered the 132nd division to be relocated to the incident zone to possibly deter Japanese troops.

The 29th Guomindang Army, like other Chinese troops, was poorly equipped, in addition, Chiang Kai-shek did not provide her with proper support, since it mainly consisted of units loyal to his political opponent Feng Yuxiang .

The Japanese promised not to attack Beijing and Tianjin under the following conditions:

1. The Kuomintang must expel all anti-Japanese organizations from the cities and stop anti-Japanese actions;
2. The Kuomintang must take full responsibility for the July 7 incident;
3. Song, not some lower-ranking officer, must personally apologize.

Zhen agreed to the first condition, and the battalion commander was to be relieved of his post as consent to the second condition. However, Zhen informed Hashimoto that he could not decide for Suna, and thus could not accept the third condition. Hashimoto made it clear to Zheng that the Japanese would prefer to see him as the head of Beijing. Then Zhen returned to Beijing. Immediately after this, Japanese forces launched a large-scale attack on Beijing. Three days later, they occupied the bridge and the city of Wanping, the day after that - the city of Nanyuan. A few days later, Song resigned from all non-military posts and appointed Zheng, who also became mayor of Beijing. Then, Qin and Song led the 29th army out of the city, leaving Zheng virtually without troops. On August 8, Japanese troops entered Beijing with virtually no resistance and appointed Zheng as mayor. However, Zhen was disappointed and thought he was betrayed. He secretly left the city a week later.

After the Chinese forces left Beijing and Tianjin in late July and early August, northern China remained completely defenseless against Japanese mechanized units that had completely occupied it by the end of the year. The Chinese troops constantly retreated before they defeated Japan in the battle of Taierzhuang .

Some historians believe that Zhen and Song agreed in advance to transfer to Zheng the post of mayor of Beijing, so that Song and Qin could withdraw the 29th army from the city without loss. Others believe that the Japanese betrayed Zheng on the offensive after the Kuomintang fulfilled all the conditions of the ultimatum. The Chinese press reacted extremely negatively to the role of Zhen in the incident, some newspapers even branded him as a traitor. Arriving in Nanjing after his flight from Beijing, he publicly apologized and later died fighting against the Japanese troops.

In English literature:

• • Battle of Lugou Bridge

In China :

• • July 7 incident (七七事变 / 七七事變Pinyin : Qīqī Shìbiàn)
  • Lugou Bridge Incident (卢沟桥 事变 / 蘆溝橋 事變 Lúgōu qiáo Shìbiàn)
  • Lugou July 7 (七七 卢沟桥 / 七七 蘆溝橋 Qīqī Lúgōu qiáo)

In Japan :

• • Roco Bridge Event (盧溝橋 事件 Rokōkyō Jiken)
  • Roko Bridge Incident (盧溝橋 事 変 Rokōkyō Jihen)

• Lugoutsiao incident // Forester - Magnet. - M .: Soviet Encyclopedia, 1954. - P. 454. - ( Great Soviet Encyclopedia : [in 51 vols.] / Ch. Ed. B. A. Vvedensky ; 1949-1958, vol. 25).
• Dorn, Frank. The Sino-Japanese War, 1937–41: From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor. - MacMillan., 1974.
• Dryburgh, Marjorie. North China and Japanese Expansion 1933–1937: Regional Power and the National Interest. - RoutledgeCurzon., 2000.
• Lu, David J. From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: A Study of Japan's Entry into World War II. - Public Affairs Press., 1961.
• Furuya, Keiji. The Riddle of the Marco Polo Bridge: To Verify the First Shot. - Symposium on the History of the Republic of China, 1981.

• International Military Tribunal Proceedings
• The Marco Polo Bridge Virtual Tour and Photographs
• Bridge described
• Japanese soldiers in the Marco Polo Bridge
• Marco Polo Bridge Incident - July 7, 1937