The Battle of Patras (1822)

In 1803, almost 20 years before the start of the Liberation War of Greece against the Ottoman Empire , Adamantios Korais , in his "prophetic speech" about the role of the fleet in the future, whenever it took place, the Liberation War, repeated the words he heard from the captains of Idra , in turn attributed to Themistocles ^[3] :

“We will have land and the Fatherland while we have 200 armed vessels.”

With the outbreak of the War of Independence in 1821, rebellious Greece could only set up commercial ships against the Ottoman fleet.

According to post-war documents satisfying the financial claims of shipowners of the three islands, which were the backbone of the Greek fleet, during the War of Independence, Idra Island put up 59 armed commercial vessels, Spetses Island 47, Psara 40 Island ^[3] .

They were opposed by the Ottoman fleet, which consisted of 4 three-deck battleships with 84 guns each, 13 two-deck ships with 74 guns each, 7 frigates, 5 corvettes, a large number of brigs and other sailing ships ^{[3] [4]} .

In addition to the Ottoman (sultan) fleet, the fleets of vassal sultans of Tunisia , Tripoli and Algeria , subsequently the Egyptian fleet, with its new European-built ships, including the first ships appeared in the Eastern Mediterranean ^[3] took part in the war against the rebellious Greeks.

According to Admiral K. Alexandris, by the middle of the war, the Ottoman and vassal forces totaled 150 large and small warships with 2,000 guns, while the fleet of Greek armed commercial ships totaled about 80 units with 800 small guns. The fire superiority of the Ottoman fleet was obvious for the following reasons: The radius of fire of the guns of the Ottoman battleships reached 3500 m (effective 2500-3000 m), the weight of their cores ranged between 33-44 pounds. At the same time, the range of the guns of the Greek ships did not exceed 1800 m (effective 900–1100 m), the weight of their cores ranged between 12-18 pounds ^[3] .

Under these conditions, and since May 27, 1821, when a fireman under the command of young Dimitrios Papanikolis burned a Turkish frigate in Eressos Bay on the island of Lesbos , firewalls became the main weapon of the Greek fleet in battles with a much stronger enemy. The Pantheon of the Greek Navy was replenished with several dozen captains of firewalls. Although the Greeks were not pioneers in the use of firewalls in the sailing fleet, only in the years of the Liberation War of Greece of 1821-1829, firewalls were used on such a large scale, at any time of the day and against ships at the berth, at anchor and on the go ^[3] .

The main squadron of the Ottoman fleet went to the Aegean Sea to suppress the Greek uprising in August 1821 and joined at Rhodes with 14 Egyptian ships commanded by Izmail Gibraltar ^[3] . An attempt by the Turkish-Egyptian squadron to land troops in the south of the Peloponnese on August 27 was repelled, after which the squadron delivered food to the besieged Turkish garrisons of the fortresses Metoni and Koroni ^[3] . On September 7, the Turkish-Egyptian squadron delivered reinforcements to the Patra fortress besieged by the rebels ^[3] .

On September 23, the Egyptian-Algerian squadron of Izmail of Gibraltar destroyed the coastal city of Galaxidi in Central Greece and captured its sailboats. The destruction of Galaxidi at an early stage of the war was a serious blow for the rebels and did not live up to their hopes for the role of the galaxy fleet during the war. On November 12, 1821, the Sultan awarded the commanders of the Ottoman fleets for the destruction of Galaxidi. By the end of 1821, most of the ships of the Ottoman fleet switched to wintering and repair in Constantinople.

However, the capture by the Greek rebels in October of the fortified city of Tripolitsa in the center of the Peloponnese , dictated to the Ottoman authorities the need to provide reinforcements and supplies to the coastal fortresses so that they could survive before the start of a new campaign in the summer of 1822 ^{[5] [4]} . At the same time, the modern British historian Douglas Dakin, in his work “Unification of Greece, 1770-1923”, writes that without the help of land forces “the Ottoman fleet had neither the strength nor the necessary capabilities” to save the chain of isolated coastal fortresses ^[6] .

The modern Greek historian Stefanos Papageorgiou notes that, among other things, the Greek uprising created a big problem for the Ottoman fleet with manning: the Ottoman fleet could no longer rely on experienced Greek sailors, who previously made up a significant part of its personnel ^[4] .

In particular, taking into account the remark of the historian Dimitris Fotiadis that the Turks were good gunners, but useless sailors, due to which, for working with sails and for navigation in general, the Ottoman fleet mainly used the Greeks, as well as the earlier statement of the French admiral and fleet historian Juryen de la Graviera , that “without the Greeks there would be no Ottoman fleet” ^{[3] [7]} . The Ottoman squadron sailed from Constantinople on January 27. D. Fotiadis emphasizes that the winter campaign itself was unusual for the Ottoman fleet, due to the concern of the Ottoman fate of the coastal fortresses of the Peloponnese.

Large battleships were left in Constantinople, where the fleet commander Kapudan Pasha Kara-ali (Nasuh-zade Ali Pasha) also remained. The squadron, which went on a winter hike, consisted of 7 frigates, 6 corvettes, 19 brigs and 24 vehicles, with a load of provisions and ammunition. On board the transports were also taken 4 thousand soldiers of the “Kaklamans," as the Greeks and Albanians of the Turks from Asia scornfully called, differentiating them from the Balkan Turks or the renowned compatriots. The soldiers were commanded by Kara-Mehmet Pasha ^[5] The command of the squadron was entrusted to Pepe-Ali, who, due to the weakened composition of the fleet, was called capudan-bey.

During this winter campaign, Algerian, Tunisian and Egyptian ships joined the squadron. The latter under the command of Ishmael of Gibraltar ^[5]

Bending around the Peloponnese from the south, on January 30, the Ottoman squadron attempted to take the fortress of Nyokastro (Navarin) with an unexpected attack. A. Vakalopoulos writes that this attack caused a panic in the population of Navarin and the region ^[2] . However, the Turkish landing attack was repelled by Greek rebels. A significant role in repelling the Turkish attack was played by about 40 foreign phyllin officers, led by Württemberg general K. F. Norman and who had just arrived at the Peloponnese from Marseille ^[5]

The Turkish squadron was forced to continue heading north in stormy conditions, and on February 2 it anchored at the "neutral", which was under British control of Zakynthos . The Turkish squadron remained in the "neutral" raid for 11 days. On February 13, the squadron arrived in Patras , the Ottomans continued to hold the fortress, and landed here the "kaklamans" of Mahmud Pasha ^[5]

The ships of the Greek islands made no attempt to interrupt the course of the Turkish squadron in the Aegean Sea, which passed on January 26 near the island of Psara, and on January 27 off the island of Hydra. The reason was extremely banal - the revolutionary government owed shipowners for all their previous expenses. Immediately after receiving the news of the Ottoman fleet entering the Aegean Sea, in a letter dated January 25, shipowners asked the revolutionary “Central Board” for at least participation in the payment of crew salaries.

Fortunately for the Greek Navy and the uprising, on January 14, the rebels took the fortress of Corinth along with the treasury of the garrison and the treasures of the Turkish landowner Kamil Bey ^[3] . Of this money, the Central Board sent shipowners 35 thousand Turkish pennies and, a little later, another 213 thousand debt securities.

The first was the squadron of the island of Psara. This squadron, commanded by Nikolis Apostolis , consisted of 15 armed ships and 1 fireman, whose commander was Konstantin Kanaris .

Idra's squadron (26 vessels) was delivered on February 10, under the command of the triumvirate Andreas Miaulis , Lazaros Pinocis and Yannis Vulgaris. Miaulis had the status of the first among equals, but de facto the command of the squadron of Idra passed to him. On the same day, under the command of Gikas Tsupas, the squadron of Spetsi Island (19 ships and the captain Poriotis’s fireman) made a speech.

Squadrons converged at the island of Elafonisos at the southeastern tip of the Peloponnese. The psaritites divided the squadron load of gunpowder they received from Russia from their illustrious elderly fellow countryman Ioannis Varvakis . After which, and despite the impending storm, the “Three-island fleet” (Τρινήσιος στόλος), as often called in the Greek historiography the combined squadrons of the three islands ^[4] , hastily left Elafonisos and went in search of the Ottoman squadron ^[5]

Having rounded the south of the Peloponnese in stormy weather, the squadrons of three Greek islands entered the strait between Katakolon in the northwest of the peninsula and Zakynthos Island on February 15. Miaulis convened a meeting of the “admirals” aboard his Ares . In his speech, Miaulis expressed the idea that since the Turkish squadron was weakened in numbers, but mainly due to the absence of battleships, the squadrons of the three islands were able to abandon the tactics of raids on single ships or groups of ships, and attack the Ottoman squadron. Mialis was persistent and convinced the admirals. 2 feluccas were sent to intelligence in Glarendzu. Scouts reported that the Ottoman squadron was stationed in Patras.

The Greek squadrons launched at dawn the next day, but when approaching Patras, a storm headwind forced them to anchor across from Patras, near Mesolongion

On February 18, an attempt to approach Patram by maneuvering under a gale was unsuccessful.

At a meeting on February 19, the admirals announced their firm decision to attack the Ottoman fleet in accordance with linear tactics and despite the storm. At night, the wind calmed down a little and 3 hours before dawn, Greek ships raised their sails.

The approach of the Greek squadrons during a severe storm was a complete surprise for the Turkish fleet. Ottoman frigates and corvettes chopped ends and anchor ropes in a mess, trying to leave the port and leave the raid. “ Ares ” Miaulisa overtook the outgoing Ottoman ships, wedged between two Turkish frigates and discharged its cores from two sides, carrying the mast of one of the frigates.

The ships of the captains M. Tombazis , G. Sakhturis , A. Kriyesis , G. Psevtis, G. Tsupas, I. Kutsis, A. Sotiriu, A. Lembesis, D. Leonidas, L. Kutrumbis, N. Apostolis managed to enter the battle, K. Kojias, I. Makras, A. Yannidzis. The “Agamemnon” of Captain A. Tsamados fought for 3 hours with 3 Turkish frigates. It is noteworthy that the ship of I. Kutsis, having received damage, crossed to the opposite side of the strait, where, with the help of the inhabitants of the Mesolongion, closed up the leaks and managed to return to the battlefield by its end ^[2] .

However, due to the storm, the change of winds and the departure of the Ottoman squadron, many ships of the Greek squadrons failed to take part in the battle. Fotiadis, somewhat poetically for the historian, writes that the few Greek ships that took part in the battle "looked like cocky falcons who fought with eagles superior to them in numbers."

The battle lasted 6 hours. Using a favorable change of wind for her, the Turkish squadron managed to break away from the advanced group of Greek ships and head south-west. Miaulis stopped the battle and gave the order to anchor in the Mesolongion raid ^[5]

The battered Turkish squadron did not seek a safe anchorage at Patras and headed straight for the neutral British Zakynthos. Unaware of Miaulis’s intentions, Pepe-Ali ordered his captains to enter the port regardless of the night. However, as a result of a complete mess, at the entrance of the port, 2 ships of the Ottoman squadron ran aground, and the British and Austrian warships were forced to launch several cores against the Turkish ships so that they would not fall on them ^[3] .

According to the report of the three Greek admirals and according to the information received by them from Zakynthos, 1 Turkish frigate was not repairable and was disabled, many were seriously damaged. 130 Turkish sailors were killed. At the same time, the Greek admirals claimed that they had only the wounded (“up to 20 people”) ^[2] .

On February 23, Greek ships approached Zakynthos and, seeing the Turkish squadron leaving the port, rushed to the attack. They were intercepted by 2 English frigates. The British captain told Miaulis that Zakynthos is a neutral territory and that only under force majeure circumstances are Turkish and Greek ships allowed to be in its waters. Miaulis ordered his ships to depart, but almost immediately, Pepe Ali used the thesis of force majeure and his squadron again entered the port of Zakynthos. This game continued for several weeks, while performing other tasks and again resolving their supply problems, the Greek ships did not leave the waters of Zakynthos.

After which, and with the assistance of the British, the Pepe-Ali squadron broke up into flotillas, of which the two main made transitions to Constantinople and Alexandria ^[2] , in anticipation of the start of a new summer campaign for the Ottoman fleet.

Anastasios Orlandos in his work published in 1869 wrote that "according to rumors" Ishmael of Gibraltar recognized the defeat of the Ottoman fleet in this battle ^[2] . Most Greek historians characterize the Battle of Patras as a great Greek victory ^[5] . D. Fotiadis disputes this thesis, believing that the battle ended without winners, since the Ottoman fleet managed to take refuge in Zakynthos, which was under British control ^[3] Fotiadis focuses on moral victory. He believes that the battle confirmed the audacity and naval skills of the Greek sailors, who showed these qualities in an unfamiliar linear battle ^[5]

It is noteworthy that Admiral K. Alexandris, in his work published in the 30s of the XX century, writes that after receiving news of the battle, depression reigned on Idra and the rest of Greece. The battle only confirmed the well-known and so far truth that the Greek ships could not achieve decisive results against the enemy using only their insufficient guns in numbers, calibers and range ^[3] .