NSC Memorandum 68

By 1950, events dictated the need to study US national security policy: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( NATO ) was operational; military assistance to European allies began; The Soviet Union detonated an atomic bomb , the Communists established their control over China . In addition, the British pound crisis in the summer of 1949 made American officials understand that the Marshall Plan would not be enough to cure Western European economic problems by the end of the year by 1952, with the prospect that Western Europe would have no choice but to seek autarchy as it was in the 1930s, with all the difficulties that will accompany the world economy in general, and the US economy in particular ^{[to clarify ]} . ^[2] Similar problems plagued Japan. ^[3] As these threats to the United States and its allies intensified, on January 31, 1950, President Truman instructed the State Department and the Department of Defense to “re-examine our peace and war objectives and the impact of these goals on our strategic plans.” The State Defense Policy Analysis Group was created under the chairmanship of Paul Nitz of the Department of State. ^[four]

Representatives of the Department of Defense on the committee initially resisted proposals that would exceed the current defense spending ceiling of $ 12.5 billion.

The report, designated SNB-68, was presented to President Truman on April 7, 1950, which he submitted to the SNB for further consideration on April 12, 1950.

SNB Research Group:

• Paul Nitz, Chair
• John P. Davis
• Robert Tufts
• Robert Hooker
• Dean Acheson
• Charles E. Bohlen
• Major General Truman Landon, Joint Representative
• Samuel S. Bhutano
• Robert Lovett, Under Secretary of Defense

Initially, President Truman did not support SNB-68 when he was introduced to him in 1950. He believed that the document did not propose specific programs that should be affected or amended, and also did not comply with its previous limits on defense spending. Truman sent him back for further consideration, until he finally approved in 1951. ^[five]

The document outlined the actual national security strategy of the United States at that time (although it was not the official NSS in the form that we know today) and analyzed the capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States of America from a military, economic, political and psychological point of view.

SNB-68 described the problems facing the United States in disastrous terms. “The issues before us are of great importance,” the document says, and are related to the implementation or destruction of not only this republic, but also civilization itself. ” ^[6]

The SNB - 68 viewed the goals and objectives of the United States as reliable, but poorly implemented, calling it "current programs and plans ... dangerously inadequate." ^[7] Although the containment theory of George F. Kennan formulated a multifaceted approach to US foreign policy in response to the alleged Soviet threat, the report recommended a policy that focused on military rather than diplomatic actions. Kennan's influential article “X” of 1947 defended a policy of containment in relation to the Soviet Union. She described containment as “a policy of prudent and gradual coercion” and called for significant military spending in peacetime, in which the United States possessed “superior full power”, “in a reliable combination with other, like-minded countries.” In particular, he demanded that the armed forces be capable of:

• protecting the western hemisphere and the most important union territories with a view to developing their military potential;
• ensuring and protecting the mobilization base during the formation of the offensive forces necessary for victory;
• conducting offensive operations to destroy the vital elements of Soviet military potential and to keep the enemy from balance until all the offensive force of the United States and its allies is deployed;
• protection and maintenance of communication lines and baseline areas necessary to perform the above tasks;
• providing such assistance to the allies. which is necessary to fulfill their role in solving the above problems.

SNB 68 itself did not contain any specific cost estimates; in fact, the United States allocated between six and seven percent of its GNP for defense. It was obvious that the restrictions the president had previously set for defense spending were too low. The report called for tripling defense spending to $ 40-50 billion a year, compared with the original 13 billion in 1950. ^[8] He defined tax cuts and “cuts in federal spending for purposes other than defense and foreign aid, if necessary by delaying certain desirable programs,” as a means for such funding. However, several officials involved in the preparation of the study, including the future chairman of the Presidential Council on Economic Relations, Leon Keyserling, suggested that a massive increase in military spending could be achieved by deliberately adopting a state budget deficit that would have the additional benefit of revitalization and stimulation of parts of the American economy, as it was after 1930. Indeed, the document notes that achieving a high gross national product “can be enhanced by building up the economic and military power of the United States ...”, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett also suggested that the US economy “can benefit from the kind of building that we offer.” ^[9]

The argument is made that if the Soviet sphere of influence continues to grow, it can become such a powerful force that no coalition of nations can unite and defeat it. It was understood that militarization was necessary for the self-preservation of America. In other words, the aggressive nature of Soviet expansion required a decisive US reaction to prevent the destruction of America. This, of course, was formulated in the context of military efforts (bearing in mind the military victory in the First and Second World Wars), and therefore the need for military expansion was emphasized.

Also important in understanding this document is language. Indeed, the primary sources must be read carefully in order to recognize topics or motives. The adjectives provide a valuable insight into the motives of the authors of this document and what impression he made on the intended audience. An example is the description of the international situation provoked by the Soviet Union as endemic. Using this language, it becomes clear that the authors wanted to portray the Soviet Union as a disease, and the United States as a medicine. This message was received loudly and clearly and dominated many foreign policy decisions throughout the Cold War.

The SNB - 68 caused some criticism from senior government officials who believed that the Cold War was escalating unnecessarily. When the report was sent to senior officials in the Truman administration for consideration, before it was officially delivered to the President, many of them laughed at these arguments. Willard Thorpe cast doubt on the claim that the USSR is steadily closing the gap between its total economic power and that of the United States. Thorpe claimed: “I don’t feel that this position is being demonstrated, but rather the other way around ... The actual gap is widening in our favor.” He noted that in 1949 the US economy doubled compared to the economy of the Soviet Union. Steel production in the United States ahead of the Soviet Union by 2 million tons; stocks of goods and oil significantly exceeded Soviet volumes. Regarding Soviet military investments, Thorpe was skeptical that the USSR allocated so much of its GDP : “I suspect that most of the Soviet investments went into housing.” William Schaub of the Budget Bureau was particularly harsh, believing that “in every arena” the air force, the army, the navy, the stockpiling of atomic bombs, and the US economy far exceeded the Soviet Union. Kennan, although he was the “father” of the containment policy, also disagreed with this document, especially with his call for mass rearmament (FRUS, 1950, Vol. I).

Truman's position

President Harry S. Truman, even after the Soviets became a nuclear power, sought to curb military spending. In the next two months, little progress was made on the report. By June, Nitz practically abandoned him. But on June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel of northern latitude. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the SNB - 68 acquired a new meaning. As Acheson later remarked: "Korea ... created an incentive that made it work." ^[ten]

Public Opinion

The Truman administration launched a nationwide public relations campaign to convince Congress and public opinion makers of the need for strategic rearmament and containment of Soviet communism. This was supposed to overcome the opinion of isolationists, including Senator Robert A. Taft, who wanted less global participation, as well as intense anti-communists such as James Burnham, who proposed an alternative pullback strategy that would eliminate communism, or perhaps even a preventive war. The State Department and the White House used the North Korean attack in June 1950 and the battle during the first few months of the Korean War to direct Congress and public opinion on the path of rearmament between the two poles of preventive war and isolationism.

The SNB - 68 is the cause of many historical debates, as is the escalation of the Cold War. Ken Young, a Cold War historian, said: “The report has undergone ongoing analysis and commentary ... Despite the fact that SNB-68 appeared in the mid-twentieth century, it remains of exceptional importance in the 21st.”

This was an important part of the overall transition of US foreign policy to a comprehensive deterrence strategy, which was confirmed by successive administrations. In 1962, scientist Paul J. Hammond presented the first detailed, modern, interview-based report on the formation of NSC 68.

This document is critical to understanding the Cold War, with its impact on similar statements about national security, such as President George W. Bush made on the War on Terrorism in September 2001 and the 2002 National Security Strategy Document. It is not only linked to documents such as the National Security Strategy of March 2005, but also provides insight into current US foreign policy. The implementation of the SNB - 68 shows the extent to which this marked a "shift" in US policy - not only in relation to the USSR, but to all communist governments. By signing the document, Truman introduced a clearly defined and consistent US policy that had not existed before. In addition, it can be argued that the SNB-68, as suggested by the council, solves the problem of Truman, who was attacked on the right after the “ red panic ” and the case of Alger Hiss . Despite the fact that the SNB - 68 was not made public, it manifested itself in a subsequent increase in America's conventional and nuclear potential, thereby increasing the country's financial burden. Although the SNB-68 did not make any specific recommendations regarding the proposed increase in defense spending, the Truman administration almost tripled defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product from 1950 to 1953 (from 5 to 14.2 percent). ^[eleven]

• Directive SNB-68. (Acheson Memorandum)