A substitute is an individual specially selected to perform any operation [1] in order to hide the identity of the true beneficiary . In the legislation of most countries, the use of dummies (“ denominations ”) in the economy is permissible [1] , as long as the purpose of their use is not to avoid liability for the beneficiary . For many centuries, dummies were also used in political activities [2] .
Content
Russian Corporate Governance
As a result of “creative development” in capitalist Russia, the figurehead in corporate governance turned into a puppet, the professional suitability of such a person does not matter. A substitute who can be the sole leader of the company, the nominal owner of a controlling block of shares or a regular participant in meetings of shareholders with a power of attorney for the same block of shares creates a big risk element for the beneficiary and therefore is selected on the basis of personal loyalty [2] .
This non-legal form of corporate governance is used forcefully, mainly by officials who are formally prohibited from doing business. In addition to them, members of criminal gangs and ordinary businessmen operating in risky corners of the economy (for example, using untested practice investment methods) resort to shammers [2] .
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
In the criminal code of the Russian Federation, articles 173 1 and 173 2 , designed, inter alia, to reduce the role of one-day companies , restrict the use of dummies when registering legal entities . At the same time, the concept of nominees in these articles is significantly narrowed by comparison with the meaning of the phrase in Russian [1] : they are people who are misled when using their data for registration, as well as nominee heads of legal entities who do not have the goal of managing these organizations.
See also
- Beneficial owner
Notes
- ↑ 1 2 3 Garmash Anna Mikhailovna. The reasons for entrepreneurial crime associated with deficiencies in legislation // Business in law. 2012. No. 4.
- ↑ 1 2 3 Osipenko O. V. Analysis of the “Shadow” forms of corporate control in the context of the study of unfair competition methods in the Russian capital market // Modern Competition. 2012. No.6.