Foreign Assistance to the Afghan Opposition (1979-1989)

During the Presidency of the United States, R. Reagan in 1980, efforts were intensified to create a united front of the struggle against the USSR and the DRA . Since 1980, the volume of American military assistance to the Afghan rebels went: in 1984, its volume amounted to $ 125 million, in 1985 - 250 million, and in 1986 - 470 million, in 1987 it amounted to $ 630 million. According to Mohammad Yusuf, head of the Afghan division of the Pakistan intelligence center, in 1983-1987: the amount of funds allocated to support the Afghan resistance by 1987, from the United States alone, amounted to about $ 1 million per day - 1.75 million worth of marks ^[1] .

The total amount of assistance to the Afghan opposition from the United States by 1988 reached $ 2.1 billion. The same amount of military assistance to the Afghan armed opposition was provided by Saudi Arabia . At the same time, significant financial resources came from private funds of the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf - about $ 400 million annually ^[2] .

Already in early 1981, the American magazine “Soldier of Fortune” published a series of interviews with the leaders of the Mujahideen, in which they invited “volunteers from all over the world” to join them. In these same magazines were published "private announcements" with addresses and contacts for those wishing to take part in the war.

In the initial period of the war, the United States and Britain conducted a secret operation against the USSR, code-named "Faraday," which was supervised by the ministries of defense of Great Britain and the United States. The direct executors of the tasks were employees of the British special forces SAS and the intelligence department of the US Department of Defense .

The operation pursued the following objectives: the creation of training camps (including in Pakistan and in Scotland ); sending American and British saboteurs from special forces units for reconnaissance in the areas of Kandahar - Bagram - Kabul; the organization of the supply of weapons, ammunition and explosive devices; instructing Afghan mujahideen on sabotage tactics ^[3] .
However, the largest scale of assistance to Afghan rebels is associated with the start of the US CIA Cyclone operation .

The Cyclone is a CIA operation in Afghanistan in the 1980s, one of the CIA's longest-running and costliest covert operations. The annual financing of the program, which began with an amount of $ 20-30 million, by 1987 increased to $ 630 million. The main technical tool for Operation Cyclone was ISI, Pakistan’s inter-agency intelligence.

During the period from 1978 to 1992, with the funds of Operation Cyclone, ISI trained and armed more than 100 (one hundred) thousand members of Afghan mujahideen groups, recruited volunteers (mercenaries) in Arab and Islamic countries, in the Persian Gulf states and in Uyghur Autonomy Of China. According to various estimates, ISI mobilized up to 35 (thirty-five) thousand foreign Muslims from 43 Islamic countries.

Funding for the Cyclone program increased from year to year, thanks to the active support of a number of US politicians and military leaders. To Pakistan, up to 20 billion US dollars were transferred in the form of credit tranches and economic assistance to the preparation and supply of various types of Afghan rebel forces with weapons, including Stinger man-portable air defense systems.

The CIA Director William Casey (1981-1987) made a great contribution against the Soviet Union . It was he who in 1981 convinced President R. Reagan of the weakening of the Soviet Union and the feasibility of conducting large-scale secret operations:

In 1982, with the financial assistance from the Cyclone operation in the Pakistani city of Peshawar , the CIA and ISI formed the Peshawar Seven - the “Islamic Mujahideen of Afghanistan”, consisting of seven Islamic parties of Afghan Sunni Mujahideen, six Pashtun and one Tajik. The Alliance of Seven attracted, distributed and controlled foreign financial and military assistance - the United States (as part of the CIA Cyclone covert operation), the Persian Gulf states , Western Europe , the PRC and other states, and led military operations against the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and OKSVA . By 1989, the number of armed groups of the Afghan mujahideen of the Islamic parties of the Peshawar Seven reached 200 thousand members.

According to the American newspaper The New York Times , already in December 1982, the US CIA received instructions from the US government to supply heavy weapons to the Mujahideen, including recoilless guns, mortars and anti-tank grenade launchers ^[4] . Jihad was declared against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. A large number of Arab mercenaries joined the war ^[5] . Help went through international Islamic organizations. Among them, a special place was occupied by Maktab al-Hidamat ^[6] , founded in 1984 in the city of Peshawar (Pakistan) by Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden .

In the fall of 1986, the United States began supplying mujahedin with the Stinger missile to combat Soviet helicopters and aircraft ^[7] . As early as January 5, 1987, Soviet commandos intercepted the Stinger MANPADS ^[8] . According to experts from the US Department of Defense, the US CIA delivered 1,000 Stinger missiles to the rebels, and about 350 of this amount were spent during the Afghan war. After the war ended, the US Congress allocated $ 65 million for an operation to purchase MANPADS and missiles, and some the amount was purchased, but up to 400 “stingers” remained in Afghanistan ^[9] .

In addition to the “Stingers,” the rebels received the English MANPADS Blowpipe and Soviet Strela-2 , which had previously been delivered to the Palestine Liberation Organization ^[10] .

In the years 1970-1980, Pakistan was an ally of the United States , China , Saudi Arabia and in the 1970s had significant external influence from the United States. Between Pakistan and Afghanistan (RA), there is a long-standing unresolved (in the opinion of the RA) border dispute related to the “Durand Line”, which serves as the current state border of states and separates the “tribal territory”. Instructors from ISI's Secret Inter-Agency Intelligence (SAS) not only trained “mujahideen” in Pakistani camps, but also participated in hostilities against Soviet troops ^[11] .

The Afghan opposition was provided with financial resources and weapons (including ammunition) on behalf of the CIA by the ISI. Upon the arrival of weapons in Pakistan, the responsibility of the CIA ended and fell entirely on the ISI, 7 parties and their field commanders became the last link in the supply chain in Peshawar .

When the mujahideen threw a mine into the pipe of his mortar, there was the end of the route, during which the mine was reloaded at least 15 times, breaking thousands of kilometers with a truck, ship, train, then again a truck and a pack animal

- Mohammad Yusuf, Head of the Afghanistan Department of Interagency Intelligence of Pakistan ISI from 1983-1987, the book “The Trap for the Bear”

The state security agencies of the MGB DRA reported that at the end of January 1981, a branch of Monte Franco Scandinabia Est., A Liechtenstein- registered company, was opened in Pakistan, through which at least five instructors from the United States arrived in Pakistan “privately” and Britain, directly involved in the combat training of the Mujahideen ^[12] .

Military Aid Logistics

Military cargoes for the Afghan opposition were delivered to Pakistan from various countries by sea and air. There were two supply traffic. The first from Karachi to Quetta , the second from Rawalpindi and Peshawar , both to the border with Afghanistan. From the border strip, countless supply routes led to Afghanistan.

The arms supply system consisted of three stages

- The CIA was responsible for the first stage. It delivered weapons to Pakistan , paid transport costs.
- The ISI inter-agency intelligence was responsible for the second stage. She took cargo in Pakistan, stockpiled it and transferred it to Islamic parties near Peshawar .
- For the third, final stage of supply, the Islamic parties were responsible, they were also engaged in the distribution of weapons to their field commanders in Afghanistan .

Delivery Routes

During the period of the Afghan war (1979-1989), six main routes (routes) were established for the delivery of military cargo to the Afghan opposition (1979-1989):

- The first and main route, the "northeast" from Chitral (Pakistan) - to the Panjshir Gorge and to Fayzabad , and from there to the northern provinces. It was the shortest, most reliable and less expensive. However, this route had a seasonal factor. During the period from November to May, it was impassable due to snow ^[13] .
- The second, “eastern” most active route ran from Parachinar (translated from dari “parrot's beak”) through Alicheil ( Paktia province ) to Logar province, through it passed about 40% of the total cargo volume. It was the shortest to Kabul , lasting 7 days on the road. It was also used for moving north through the mountain valleys near Mazar-e-Sharif , but it was the longest lasting, more than one month. This route was particularly problematic in terms of obstacles from the government forces of the DRA and Soviet troops ^[14] .
- The third - "southeast", stretched from Miram Shah through Jawara to the province of Logar . Columns and caravans diverged along a fork in either Gardez or Ghazni , which, if necessary, was used for supply in a northerly direction, through mountainous areas. This route was also used frequently.
- The fourth route originated in Quetta, crossed the Pakistani-Afghan border in the Chaman area and ran in the direction of the city of Kandahar , as well as in the nearest southern provinces. This route passed through open areas and required the use of high-speed vehicles. This route, as well as the delivery method, was very dangerous, since suspicious vehicles were destroyed by ground and air forces OKSVA ^[15] .
- The fifth route ran to a distance of 400 km to the west, in the southern Helmand province, to the relatively small transshipment base at the Girzi-Jungle, used to supply the provinces: Helmand , Nimruz , Farah and Herat . This route was subjected to frequent attacks. With the exception of rare cases, the convoy managed to get through without being attacked. The terrain along which the route lay represented an open territory with a low population density, on which it was difficult to request combat support. Transport, moving north from the Pakistani border, easily found itself from the air and was hit by air strikes and ambushes of OKSVA units. It took a week to deliver the goods to Herat ^[16] .
- The sixth route ran through Iran. He was reliable and simple. To deliver goods to the provinces of Farah and Herat , it was first necessary to travel a long way west - along the border of Balochistan to Iran, and then another 600 kilometers - north of the city of Zahedan in Iran, along the Iran-Afghanistan border in the direction of Herat . However, this route had its difficulties.

Each time transporting cargo along this route, it was required in advance - for 6 months to obtain permission from the Iranian side to cross the border with the specified list of cargo, since it was allowed to import exclusively handguns. The convoy was carefully inspected on the way back ^[17] .
In 1983, 10 thousand tons of weapons and ammunition passed through these supply routes. In 1987, shipments grew to 65,000 tons ^[18] .

The ISI logistics officer kept the cargo flow under full control, the arrival schedule of ships and aircraft, trains, found the necessary transport and monitored to prevent information leakage ^[19] .

The head of Pakistan’s ISI Inter-Agency Intelligence, General Akhtar, followed his unshakable strategy, according to which only ISI would decide who, how much, and what weapons it would receive.
This meant that after the formation of the union of parties, the distribution of weapons for each of them was in our area of ​​responsibility.

No one outside the ISI, even President Zia, had control or influence on the distribution of weapons, ammunition or other goods from our warehouses in Rawalpindi and Quetta

- Mohammad Yusuf, Head of the Afghanistan Division of the ISI Pakistan Inter-Agency Intelligence Center 1983-1987 ^[20]

Iran’s response to the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was the formation of the “Coalition Council of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan” in the Islamic Republic in the early 1980s, the military-political union of the Islamic resistance of Shiite Mujahideen. It was organized by the leaders of eight pro-Iranian fundamental Shiite parties and the organization is better known as the Shiite Eight. The alliance’s activities were aimed at attracting, distributing, controlling financial resources and managing the actions of the armed groups of the Afghan Shiite Mujahideen against the government of Afghanistan and the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (OKSVA) ^[21] .

Some Mujahideen groups received assistance from Iran - in particular, the “one-armed Kari” (“Kyari-Yakdasta”) detachment, operating in the area of ​​Herat, and the Turan Ismail detachment, operating in the vicinity of Mashhad ^[22] .

The military and financial assistance of the Afghan opposition (1979-1989) from Saudi Arabia is comparable to 3 billion dollars, in general, the CIA spent the same amount. Some sources claim that the financial contribution of Saudi Arabia was twice as large. Most of the financial resources of the Afghan opposition were openly transferred from the budget of the Kingdom. The other part (from individuals and communities) came from donations from Saudi princes, the kingdom's business community, and mosque fees ^{[23] [24]} .

In 1984, China became the leader in the supply of weapons. The Chinese were distinguished from others by stability and punctuality. Since 1985, the CIA began to purchase large quantities of weapons in Egypt ^[25] .

Japan indirectly played a very significant role in the struggle against the USSR. Japanese troops did not participate in the battles, but Japanese aid allowed Pakistan to become a stronghold for training the Mujahideen against Soviet troops. The dimensions of this support were enormous. Only in the period from December 1979 to August 1983, Japan provided assistance to Pakistan in the amount of more than $ 41 billion ^[26] .

The places of arms purchases were determined by the special services of the USA and Saudi Arabia. Most of the weapons were spent outside Pakistan. The United States provided Pakistan's ISI inter-agency intelligence with a list of weapons needed to purchase on its territory.
To deliver weapons and ammunition to the Afghan border, the CIA purchased hundreds of trucks. The Islamic parties of the Mujahideen needed transport, which needed fuel. Costs increased with the purchase or hiring of thousands of pack animals (mules, horses and camels) that needed to be fed and kept somewhere. Thus, the cost of delivering goods from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 1987 cost about $ 1.75 million per month ^[27] .

During the years of the Afghan war (1979-1989), a number of governments of Western European states and private medical public organizations organized activities to open hospitals both near borders on the territory adjacent to Afghanistan, in Pakistan ( Quetta and Peshawar ), and inside the country, in areas controlled by the Afghan opposition. Help came from three main sources:
1. The Government of the Kingdom of Sweden has funded a network of 10 medical clinics staffed by Afghan medical personnel.
2. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) operated two hospitals in Peshawar and Quetta - Pakistan, exclusively engaged in the treatment of wounded from Afghan rebel forces.
3. Three private Parisian medical organizations formed groups of foreign doctors, nurses and medical equipment in areas under the complete control of the armed opposition. The medical staff, consisting of medical teams consisting of French citizens with the support of the French government, carried out activities inside Afghanistan, providing medical assistance to members of resistance groups and the civilian population ^[28] .

The activities of private French medical organizations in the 1980s became widely known throughout the world. According to one source, with the outbreak of war - 800 (eight hundred) doctors from the French-Swedish teams, by the end of 1983 reduced the total number to 300 (three hundred) ^[28]

In August 1983, in Afghanistan, medical assistance was provided by about 27 - mostly French doctors and nurses, ten of whom were women. French medical teams, according to the leadership of the resistance, have proven themselves from the best side.
Between 1980 and 1983, about 250 French-speaking doctors and nurses served in war zones. Most of them stayed in Afghanistan from four to eight months, waiting for a replacement. Each medical team consisted of two to four doctors or nurses. A number of representatives of foreign medical personnel were in the country without a break.
One of the female doctors went to Afghanistan on a business trip six months. Despite the fact that most of the medical staff were citizens of France, the groups were also formed by citizens: Holland, Norway, Great Britain and Belgium ^[28] .

The French medical teams were funded by three private organizations in Paris: MSF - Doctors Without Borders Médecins sans frontières ; AIM - "International Medical Assistance" "Aide Medicale Internationale"; and MDM, Doctors of the World, Médecins du Monde ^[29] .

The most active in Afghanistan was, of course, the Doctors Without Borders Organization (MSF). She sent her first medical team to Afghanistan in May 1980. This group stated that before their arrival there were no doctors or medicines on the ground, but there were epidemics of measles and diphtheria with threatening epidemic prospects. It has also been reported that many wounded rebels require inpatient treatment. By the end of 1983, MSF had dispatched over 170 doctors and nurses to Afghanistan, and it also equipped and operated at various times 12 small hospitals in three provinces. In turn, AIM sent 40 to 50 people; and MDM 20 people.
According to the medical staff themselves, the Soviet command and the government forces of the DRA, a hunt was organized for foreign medical personnel. In a number of cases, medical teams changed their locations every few days to disrupt the plans of the Soviet troops to capture them; in a number of cases, doctors placed their facilities directly in caves ^[29] .

In December 1982, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, allocated development funds to provide emergency assistance to the Swedish private committee in Afghanistan to establish medical clinics in Afghanistan. By the end of 1983, more than 4 million kroons (500,000 US dollars) had been invested. Ten of these clinics were established in six provinces of the DRA, they were managed by Afghan SIDA doctors, hired for payment and from outside the DRA.
By mid-1984, 17 medical clinics were functioning. The accompanying Swedish committee supported not only doctors and their staff, but also supplied the clinic with medical equipment and medicines. In turn, the local rebel squads controlling the area were required to guarantee the safety of the clinic staff ^[30] .

The activities of the French teams, the opening of Swedish clinics were enthusiastically welcomed by the leadership of the rebel forces. It was reported, for example, that a Swedish clinic in the province of Kunar that in three months had provided medical care to 4,000 patients, while noting that only 40 of these patients were wounded rebels.
At the same time, Swedish clinics had a serious drawback - they were staffed exclusively by male medical personnel. When providing medical assistance to the civilian population, problems arose - Afghan religious foundations did not allow male doctors (in most cases) to examine and treat Afghan female patients ^[30] .

Based on the book of the same name by George Crail, the biographical story Charlie Wilson 's War (2007) tells of Texas Democrat Congressman Charles Wilson , who was directly responsible for funding the Cyclone program in the 1980s.

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• CIA Operation Cyclone
• The fighting of the Afghan war (1979-1989)
• The basic areas of the Afghan opposition (1979-1989)
• Transshipment bases of the Afghan opposition (1979-1989)
• Afghan Mujahideen
• Peshawar seven
• Shiite Eight
• Islamic Society of Afghanistan
• Islamic Party of Afghanistan