K-429

Previous Events

In May 1983, the K-429 nuclear submarine came from military service in the Indian Ocean. The crew was sent on vacation, the nuclear submarine was put on inter-naval repairs. The crew was supposed to be taken over by the crew of Captain 1st Rank Nikolai Suvorov. It was planned that in the fall the nuclear submarine would go to sea to conduct training torpedo firing and to develop measures to counteract the torpedo attack of the enemy.

However, it turned out that torpedo firing should not take place in the fall, but in June. The crew began preparations for the upcoming exercises. Since many crew members were on vacation, they had to urgently seek a replacement in their place. At the same time, it was necessary to transfer the boat from the old crew to the new. At the same time, the inter-passage repair was not completed ^[1] .

On June 24, 1983, K-429 received and received nuclear submarines and prepared for launching at sea. The crew had to check the tight hull of the boat for leaks. However, the submarines were charged with batteries, and it was forbidden to carry out pressurization during charging, and it was impossible to check ^[2] .

The chief of staff of the 10th division, Captain 1st Rank Alexei Gusev, and the commander of the submarine, Captain 1st Rank Nikolai Suvorov, objected to going to sea, but their opinion was not taken into account. Hero of the Soviet Union, 1st-rank captain Gusev recalled: “I declared my disagreement with the launch of the K-429 with the crew of N. M. Suvorov. However, in the evening of the same day he learned that the plan was signed, that is, approved by Rear Admiral O. E. Erofeev, the chief of staff of the flotilla. I arrived at Erofeev and tried to persuade him to cancel the decision, but I received the answer: “Are you, Hero, chickened?” ".

On the same day, June 24, 1983, the boat left the Krasheninnikov Bay for trim. On board, instead of the full-time 87 people, 120 went to sea ^[1] .

Crash

In the bay of Saranna the crew of the boat proceeded to dive. Suddenly, overboard water began to flow into the fourth (reactor) compartment of the submarine through the ventilation system at high speed. The boat began to sink. The commander gave the command to blow through the tanks of the main ballast (TsGB). However, the locks of the ventilation valves of the Central City Hospital were opened due to a mistake by the commander of the BC-5 Boris Likhovozov ^[3] (according to another version - due to a failure of the hydraulic system pump due to a short circuit) ^[4] , so the VVD turned out to displace water just bent overboard ^[5] .

At 23 hours 30 minutes (or 23 hours 40 minutes) ^{[6] the} K-429 lay on the ground at a depth of 37 meters (along the depth gauge of the second compartment) with a small trim and a roll to the left side. The fourth compartment was flooded, 14 submariners in it were killed, not allowing themselves to leave the compartment. Outboard water began to flow into the 1st, 2nd and 3rd compartments. To stop the flow of water, it was necessary to close the flaps of the ship's ventilation, but it was impossible to do this with the help of an electric manipulator due to the lack of power supply. The assistant commander A. P. Rozborskiy was the first to orientate; he managed to close the bulkhead flaps using the hydraulic manipulator in the third compartment ^[7] .

Salvation

The situation was difficult: the fourth compartment was completely flooded, the first by 75%, the second a little less. The fifth compartment was gradually flooded through the pressure equalization valve between the 4 and 5 compartments. In 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 compartments there were 106 people. There were no lamps, there were no food in emergency tanks ^[5] . Many breathing apparatuses were malfunctioning, out of a hundred sets only ten contained oxygen in cans, some masks were torn ^[1] . A pop-up rescue device (APU) was welded to the hull and the APU winch was disassembled. Emergency buoys could not be released due to malfunctioning release mechanisms. Thus, the crew was not able to notify the command of the accident ^{[2] [4]} . Later, the situation worsened due to a battery fire in the first and third compartments and the gas contamination that arose.

To report the accident, on June 25, midshipman Nikolai Merzlikin (at 4 hours 20 minutes) and midshipman Mikhail Lestnik were sent to the surface via a torpedo tube ^{[approx. 1]} (at 5 hours 30 minutes). Around 8 in the morning, a border ship picked them up. An emergency alert was announced in the fleet ^[7] .

An emergency rescue vessel "SS-38" of project 532 arrived at the time of the accident in inter-passage repair. Rescuers failed to dock the rescue bell to coaming sites. It was decided to leave the boat independently ^[1] . Since the boat was divided by flooded 4 and 5 compartments, one part of the crew had to leave through the emergency rescue hatch of the seventh compartment, the other through torpedo tubes (TA) of the first compartment. Rescuers adjusted the ventilation of the compartments and passed on the missing IDAs , some of them turned out to be faulty, but there were enough serviceable ones to exit.

The first compartment, the sailors left through TA for 4 people. However, due to the tightness in the TA, the sailor N.P. Sinyukov received severe lung barotrauma and died. After this, the exit continued for three people ^[7] . The last to come was Captain 1st Rank A. A. Gusev.

In the seventh compartment there were 23 people. Despite the presence of senior in rank and position, the exit was actually led by a 23-year-old midshipman V.P.Baev, who had the experience of a diver instructor. He checked and helped put on an IDA, instructed other sailors, determined the order of exit (went in pairs: more experienced with less experienced). Due to a malfunction of the carbine at a depth of 15 meters ^{[approx. 2] the} sailor R. M. Zakirov got stuck and died. Midshipman Bayev, with the risk to life, was the last to leave, while he lifted up the hatch behind him and prevented the flooding of the compartment, which later helped to raise the boat. For his feat, Vasily Baev was awarded the Order of the Red Star ^[5] .

Accident circumstances

Haste

Vice Admiral Ryazantsev expresses the opinion that the launch of the torpedo fire at sea was not planned in advance, but was added to the action plan at the last moment (when developing a weekly plan). Firstly, neither the submarine commander, nor the headquarters of the flotilla, nor the headquarters of the division would have allowed the departure of most of the crew on leave before a crucial event. Secondly, the submarine commander filed an application for the preparation of practical torpedoes 10 days before the shooting, although with the correct preparation and execution of the monthly combat training plan, the issuance order was to be signed back in May ^[2] .

Oleg Aleksandrovich Erofeev , at that moment the chief of staff of the 2nd flotilla, believes that the rush was not the result of a planning error, but an element of study: the K-429 crew worked out the emergency preparation of the ship for battle, campaign and immersion. In this case, the means of movement, control, course guidance, observation and communication are prepared, the rest of the preparation is carried out at the transition to the dive point ^[8] . In response, Ryazantsev indicates that:

1. The emergency preparation of the ship for battle, hike and immersion differs from the usual one only in the accelerated heating of the reactor coolant and the accelerated inclusion of the navigation complex. All other training activities should be carried out.
2. After emergency training, the ship should proceed to the dispersal area, where to complete the preparation activities, and only then go to sea, to the dive point. An unprepared ship entering the sea is prohibited ^[2] .

Crew Readiness

The result of the rush was the inability to assemble the crew accepting the boat (379th) from the holidays. The places of the departed had to be replaced by the sailors of the surrender (228th) and other crews. The accident investigation commission noted that "... in accordance with the order of the commander of the 10th division of June 24, 1983 No. 484, 106 people were to leave. Of these, only 48 people were in the 379 crew, and 58 were seconded from 228 and 2 other crews ” ^[6] . The 379th crew was manned by 55% of the staff. According to the guidelines, when changing more than 30% of the crew, the crew is declared non-linear (not suitable for any tasks other than restoring linearity). However, the command allowed such a crew access to the sea.

According to O. A. Erofeev, this is not a violation, since members of the other crews were on the boat not to fill vacant posts, but to “control the actions of personnel who are fulfilling tasks” ^[8] .

Technical condition

Another consequence of the rush was the exit of the boat without checking the rugged hull for leaks. There is a version that the ventilation system was previously deliberately transferred by the 228 (surrendering) crew to an abnormal mode of operation to prevent the accumulation of hydrogen released during battery charging. Given the lack of time and lack of coordination of the receiving crew, this fact was not communicated to all crew members, in particular, in the fourth compartment. As a result, the shift sailor of the 4th compartment moved the hydroelectric manipulators flap exhaust ventilation from the "Closed" position to the "Neutral" position. Due to the abnormal mode of operation of the ventilation system, this action opened the way for sea water ^[4] .

Most of the rescue equipment was out of order. Rechargeable batteries worked out two prescribed service life, hydrogen evolution from them exceeded the norm ^[7] . A logic block (including ventilation system control) was deleted from the repair list. In general, after a five-month trip the nuclear submarines did not receive the required repairs and re-equipment ^[1] .

Organization

The command of the flotilla and division is also criticized for the untimely reaction to the incident. K-429 was supposed to get in touch before 3 a.m. on June 25, and when this did not happen, it should be recognized as emergency and start the search. However, the operational duty of the 2nd submarine flotilla announced an alarm at 9.30 am, only after the midshipmen Merzlikin and Lestnik were discovered ^[2] .

A. Gusev says the following about the execution of the documents necessary for going to sea: “Under the diving suit, the commander of the 1st rank captain Suvorov brought up a trim book. Before Suvorov changed his clothes, they slipped a pen and a “Log of the ship’s readiness for going to sea”. “Nikolai Mikhailovich, sign, we’re burning, for your own benefit,” said division commander Alkaev. Then they slipped pieces of paper again, again and again ... Helping out the bosses, the commander signed everything. Unaware that he was a ready-made hostage. ”

Court

In 1983, the court sentenced Nikolai Suvorov to ten years of imprisonment, the commander of the BS-5 of the 379th crew, Boris Likhovozov, to eight. Nikolai Mikhailovich Suvorov sought a review of the decision until his death in 1998. Later, his widow Zinaida Vasilievna Suvorova was engaged in this ^[1] .

Submariners killed on K-429

1. Captain-Lieutenant Kasprovich I. Yu., born in 1953, graduated with honors from SVVMIU in 1975.
2. captain-lieutenant Kurochkin V.M.
3. Senior Lieutenant Petrov A.I.
4. Lieutenant Tulasov V.G.
5. midshipman Zharikov I.M.
6. midshipman Kolesnikov N.N.
7. Midshipman Kuzmin A.I.
8. Midshipman Leshchuk V.A.
9. warrant officer Portnov V.N.
10. Midshipman Cheremushin A. E
11. foreman of the 2nd article Sultanov F.A.
12. foreman of the 2nd article Yashkin L. I.
13. foreman of the 1st article A. Konrinsky
14. sailor Zakirov R.M.
15. Sailor Sinyukov N.P.
16. sailor Shvedov A. D.

The commander-in-chief of the Navy reported to the Minister of Defense of the USSR about what had happened not as a disaster with the loss of a boat, but as an accident with the subsequent return of K-429 to service ^[2] . In 1984, the boat was lifted and put into repair, allocating 320 million rubles.

On September 13, 1985, the boat sank again at the factory pier in Krasheninnikov Bay. After that, the repair work was stopped, and the ship excluded from the fleet was converted into a training vessel. In 1987, it was withdrawn to the reserve, and later disposed of.

In the village of Rybachy there is a monument dedicated to the dead submariners. On one of the memorial stones, the names of the dead crew members of K-429 are embossed ^[5] .

1. ↑ Perhaps the Forester .
2. ↑ According to other sources, at a depth of two meters, the leg became entangled in the buirep.