North Mexican Campaign

During the Texas campaign in the spring of 1846, General Taylor’s army forced the Mexican army to retreat to Monterrey , and Taylor occupied the Mexican city of Matamoros . Here, units of volunteers began to join his army, so that by June 3, Taylor’s army numbered 8,000 men. Later, the rest of the units approached, and the army grew to 20,000, but much of it consisted of volunteers recorded for 3 and 6 months of service, and their terms of service expired on 1 August. While the troops were in the camps, their fighting spirit was fading due to inaction and boredom, the discipline suffered, and they were treated so carelessly that Lieutenant Meade later called being in the camp no less dangerous than in the thick of the battle. The level of training of officers was also low. Congressman enlisted in the army as a private, but quickly received all the ranks before a brigadier general, unable to even command a company ^{[4] [5]} .

Preparing Mexicans

Anticipating the Taylor offensive, the Mexican side began preparing for resistance. Back in July, President Paredes sent three regular brigades to Guadalajara , and on August 6 they were sent to Monterrey. Already on the way, the army overtook the news of the overthrow of Paredes on 4 August, which is why many officers and soldiers left the army and returned to Mexico City. On August 29, the first brigade (1,400 people with three 8-pounder guns) arrived in Monterrey, on September 6, the second came, and then the third. According to the official report, by September 10, the garrison of Monterrey numbered 7303 people. The arrival of the new units raised the morale of the army, strongly shaken after the defeats at Palo Alto and Resac de la Palme ^[6] .

However, the need to keep Monterrey was the subject of debate. General Santa Anna urged the Minister of War to abandon this idea, and on August 20, General Pedro de Ampudier was ordered not to try to defend Monterrey, unless he was completely sure that the city’s fortifications could withstand a siege. Three days later General Ampudier was informed that Monterrey was absolutely impossible to defend and that his forces were clearly not enough to resist, and he was ordered to retreat to Saltillo. But Ampudia knew that Santa Anna wanted to organize a large army under his command, so the defense of Monterrey was his last chance at independent command. After examining the fortifications of the city, he decided that he would be able to repel the onslaught of the Americans and even throw them over the Rio Grande . General Mejía also advocated defense: he considered it humiliating to give the city without a fight, and his officers at the military council shared his point of view. Having learned about the decision of Ampudia and having listened to his arguments, the military department finally allowed him to defend Monterrey ^[7] .

Taylor was supposed to advance on Monterrey, but the journey by land from Matamoros was too difficult, so it was decided to create an intermediate base in Camargo on Rio Grande, where it was possible to deliver supplies by steamers. The weather delayed the offensive and only on July 6 the 7th Infantry Regiment (under the command of Dixon Miles ) was sent to Camargo. He arrived at the scene on July 14, and Miles officially took command in the city. Then the rest of the regular regiments began to arrive, and on July 30 an order was given to nominate volunteers. Taylor himself arrived in Camargo on 8 August. Not expecting serious resistance north of Monterrey, he wanted to launch an offensive as early as possible, no later than September 1, with just 6,000 men, only half of whom were regular army soldiers. On August 10, Major cavalry scouted a route towards Monterrey, meeting only minor detachments of the Mexican army ^{[1] [8]} .

Taylor's army was not fully prepared for the offensive and was in dire need of vehicles, but the commander was in a hurry from Washington. Senator asked him to launch an offensive without waiting for reinforcements and transport: “The public is impatient; feet in hands and - to the palaces of Montezuma! ” ^[9] .

On August 20, Taylor issued an order to bring down all the regiments of volunteers in brigades and divisions. As a result, the volunteer part of the army took the following form ^[10] :

• The first division of Major General
  • Br-General Thomas Marshall's 1st Brigade (Kentucky regiments)
  • 2nd Brigade of br-General Thomas Haymer (regiments from Ohio)
  • 3rd brigade Joe Lane (regiments from Indiana)
• Second Division Major General Robert Patterson
  • 1st Brigade of br-General James Shields (regiments from Missouri and Illinois)
  • 2nd brigade of br-General Gideon Pillow (regiments from Tennessee)
  • 3rd Brigade of br-General John Kitman

Taylor could step on Monterrey through Caderate, where there was enough pasture for forage, but still he chose the path through Mier and Serralvo. This path was shorter — 140 miles long, it was thought (only 125), and there was more drinking water. On this road there was only one difficult crossing. On August 19, the Worth Regular Division crossed the river and headed for Serralvo, followed by brigade, Regular Division, and Butler's Voluntary Division. September 5 after the army went headquarters. The army was faced with the problem of a march in the heat of the day, and as a result, the movement began to begin at 3 am. At noon on August 25, the army arrived in Serralvo. Taylor claimed that there are so many springs in this city that New York can be supplied with drinking water. In the town and its surroundings there were abundant sheep, goats, watermelons, nuts, good pastures and a lot of forest for fires. By the morning of September 15, the entire army was concentrated with Serralvo ^[11] .

On September 12, engineering units guarded by cavalry Captain McCulloch and a squadron of dragoons marched from Serralvo to prepare the way for the advance of artillery and carts. The next three days, the troops were given 40 shots per barrel and provisions for 8 days, and three divisions marched on Monterrey, leaving the patients in Serralvo guarded by the Mississippi companies. Not encountering any serious resistance, by September 17, the Americans passed Papagallos and approached Marina. Taylor initially intended to go to Saltillo, but in Marina he realized that it was first necessary to take Monterrey. On the morning of September 19, the advance units of his army approached Monterrey. At that time, 3080 regular units and 3150 volunteers were at the disposal of Taylor, of whom 1350 were mounted troops. The general had four artillery batteries and two 24-pound howitzers , but there was only one 10-inch mortar from siege weapons. Before Taylor was now a stone city with strong fortifications, the garrison of which numerically surpassed its army ^[12] .

Monterrey Battle

Since the city of Monterrey was covered from the north by the Citadel, Fort Taneria and other fortifications, it was decided to attack it from the west, where there were weaker fortifications of La Libertad and Independence Hill. On the morning of September 20, a detachment of about 2,000 General Worth began to march around the city. The Mexican cavalry attacked the Worth convoy several times, almost once capturing it with the entire headquarters, but the artillery repulsed all the attacks. By 18:00, Worth walked 7 miles and stopped there, spending the night in a field without campfires under a gale with rain. At 06:00 the convoy continued its march and almost reached the Monterrey-Saltillo road, and here it was attacked by two hundred cavalrymen of Lieutenant Colonel Nahera. During the fierce battle, Nacher's detachment was rejected, and the infantry did not come to his aid. The Mexicans lost about 100 people, the Americans about 12. At 8:45, Worth took to the Saltilla road, the main supply line of the Mexican army in Monterrey ^[13] .

At noon, Worth decided to attack the Federated Ridge, his detachment crossed the river and stormed a redoubt on the ridge, then Fort Soldado and one more fortification. That same night, three companies of the 8th Infantry Regiment, reinforced by dispersed artillery companies and Texans, under the leadership of Lieutenant Meade, attacked Independence Hill and took the forward redoubt. It remained to take the Episcopal Palace, which was defended by 200 or 300 people. Worth transferred the 5th Infantry Regiment and the 12-pound howitzer to reinforce the attackers. The appearance of the howitzer forced the Mexican garrison to go in a counterattack, but it was repulsed and the Americans broke into the palace. By 04:00 the palace building was taken ^[14] .

Meanwhile, on September 21, Taylor noticed that the Mexicans were transferring forces to the western fortifications, and decided to divert their attention. He pushed the army to the outskirts of the city from the north: the division of Twiggs on the left flank and the division of Butler on the right. The Monterrey earthworks did not seem serious to Taylor (if he noticed them at all ^{['' i '' 2]} ), and therefore he did not use his mortar against them, but decided to take the city with a bayonet attack. On his orders, Garland (with the help of Major Mansfield ) led Twiggs' division to the assault. Passing a maze of streets on the northern outskirts, the Americans reached the main line of the Mexican fortifications and stopped there. They were transferred to the aid of the Braxton Bragg battery, but it did not save the situation, and Garland ordered to retreat. Due to a misunderstanding, three companies of the 4th infantry attack the Fort Taneria and were repulsed with heavy losses. Lieutenant Ulysses Grant participated in this attack ^[16] .

Then, the Keetman Brigade attacked Taneria Fort : the 1st Mississippi Regiment of Davis and the 1st Tennessee Regiment of Campbell. The defenders of the fort were on the verge of exhaustion, their ammunition was coming to an end, their commander escaped, so they panicked under attack and abandoned the fort. At the same time, the main fortifications were attacked again - this time by the 1st Ohio regiment, which was led personally by General Haymer. General Taylor, General Butler, and Joseph Hooker and Albert Johnston took personal part in this attack. This attack was again unsuccessful. When Kitman's regiments took Taneria, the attack was repeated once more, and again without success. At 17:00, Taylor led the army back, leaving only a garrison in Fort Taneria ^[17] .

At night, General Ampudia left the fortifications of the city and concentrated his troops around the central square of Monterrey. In the morning, Taylor began the offensive again, occupied the abandoned fortifications, and began to advance toward the center of the city, but by the end of the day the Americans began to run out of ammunition and were taken back again. On September 23, Worth, who had never received any instructions from Taylor, launched an offensive from the episcopal palace to the center and by nightfall made his way almost to the city market. By the time Ampudia had lost, according to his report, 29 officers and 338 privates, he had sufficient supplies of food and ammunition, and his position near the central square was strong. But the soldiers were disappointed with the passivity of Ampudia, and many officers offered surrender. On the morning of September 24, Ampudia offered Taylor to surrender the city if he would be allowed to retreat, keeping his weapon. Taylor responded by demanding unconditional surrender. The special commission began negotiations, and as a result, an agreement on surrender was signed. Under the terms of the agreement, the Citadel surrendered immediately, and the army was given a week to leave the city with weapons and six field implements and retreat beyond the Rinconada-Pass-Linares-San Fernando de Presas line. The Americans promised not to cross this line for eight weeks ^[18] .

The Polk Administration decided that Taylor had exceeded his authority by agreeing to such agreements, but the commander and his supporters claimed that he had no choice. His army was reduced to 5,000, and the volunteer unit was so demoralized by the war that, according to Mead , it was impossible to rely on it. Senator argued that in Taylor's position it was too risky to storm the center of Monterrey, a retreat in case of failure could lead to the death of the army, so in this situation, Taylor’s decision to negotiate was reasonable ^[19] .

Offensive on Saltillo

After the capture of Monterrey, Taylor faced some difficulties: his army was reduced due to illness and desertion, and also because the Texan militiamen returned home. Soon there was no one to replenish the army, and on October 15, Taylor had only 12,000 people at his disposal. At the same time, the general’s relationship with the presidential administration became complicated. Many officers were unhappy with Taylor and offered to replace him with someone from the brigadier generals of his army. Winfield Scott stood up for the commander and was able to prevent his resignation. At the same time, the government wanted to put pressure on the Mexicans to force them to peace, and for this purpose on September 22, they proposed to send Patterson's detachment to occupy some of the settlements in northern Mexico. This interfered with Taylor's plans, and he did everything to thwart this expedition. The administration was also unhappy with the truce that Taylor had concluded, and on October 13 the general was ordered to stop it and continue the war more decisively in order to bring peace closer. On November 5, Taylor notified Santa Anna that the truce was not confirmed by the administration and the fighting could be resumed from November 15 ^[2] .

Termination of the truce enabled Taylor to occupy the town of Saltillo, the capital of the state of Coahuila . It was a strategically important settlement with 18,000 inhabitants, having large food reserves, located in the passage of the Sierra Madre mountains and completely unprotected: after the fall of Monterrey, the entire Mexican army left for San Luis de Potosi . On November 8, General Worth received an order to speak on November 12 on Saltillo with a detachment of 1,000 men (the 5th and 8th infantry regiments, a battery of Duncan, and several other infantry companies). Taylor decided to accompany the detachment, taking with him two squadrons of the 2nd Dragoon Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel May. Worth's squad began to march along the left bank of the Santa Catarina River, past the village of the same name, then through the Rinconada Gorge and to the farm of Los Muertos, where the Mexicans once started building fortifications, but then abandoned them. Meanwhile, on November 15, a new state governor was elected in Saltillo, who formally protested Taylor on November 16. He did not answer, and on the same day his army entered Saltillo. After exploring the surrounding area, Taylor returned to Monterrey on November 21, leaving Worth to control Saltillo. ^[20]

The campaign of General Voula

One of the units that was supposed to invade Mexico was General John Voula ’s Central Division in San Antonio . It consisted of two dragoon regular squadrons, artillery regular battery, three companies of the 6th Infantry Regiment and two Illinois regiments of and Bissell and in total numbered 3,400 people. At the headquarters of Voula there was a detachment of military engineers, among whom were Robert Lee and William Franklin . The adjutant at Voula was Lt. Irwin McDowell . On September 28, a detachment of 1954 men marched from San Antonio. According to the campaign plan, Vul was to be subordinate to General Taylor and to attack a parallel course on Chihuahua . The offensive plan was made hastily after a declaration of war and was poorly developed. The nature of the terrain was unknown; it was not clear whether Vul would be able to reach Chihuahua and whether there was a practical sense in it, and also whether he could advance to the south after taking Chihuahua. Washington was expecting a plan of attack from Vul, and he was waiting for specific orders from Washington ^{[21] [22]} .

Having traveled 164 miles (182 according to Wilcox) in 11 days, the detachment went to the Rio Grande River, which in this place was 270 meters wide with a strong current. Engineers began to build a bridge, and Vul at this time made a proclamation to Mexican citizens, where he promised to treat civilians humanely and not to violate their rights. On October 12, the bridge was completed and provided with bridge fortifications, and the detachment moved to the right bank of the river. Here, the Mexican parliamentarian came to Vulu, who reported on the battle of Monterrey, the retreat of the Mexican army and that a truce for 6 weeks was signed on September 24. Vul, however, decided that his march did not contradict the terms of the truce, and informed the parliamentarians that he intended to continue. Intelligence has shown that there is no direct route to Chihuahua, and the only road leads south to . Having gone to this side, the detachment arrived in San Juan de Bautista, from there to San Juan de Nava, and on October 24 came to Santa Rosa. On November 3, the detachment arrived in Monclova. Vul believed that Monklova is the last point where he can attack without breaking the truce, so he stopped in the city, waiting for the end of the terms of this truce ^{[21] [23]} .

In Monclove, Wool realized that the route to Chihuahua was too long, and the city itself was not of great value, so he decided to cancel this campaign and join the Taylor army. He also requested permission from Taylor to interrupt communications with San Antonio and establish new ones with the Camargo. On November 19, the Monterrey truce expired, so on the eve of Vul sent the vanguard, and at night received permission from Taylor to interrupt communications and attack Parras, where he could go to Monterrey, Saltillo or Chihuahua. On November 25, Vul left 250 men in Monclove to protect the warehouses, and with the rest of the forces he set off for Parras, where he arrived on December 5. By this time, the detachment has already passed 587 kilometers of hostile territory, without encountering resistance ^{[21] [24]} .

Vul stood in Parras for two weeks, and on December 17 an alarming message came from General Worth: he reported that the Mexican army was advancing on Monterrey and Saltillo and Vul should urgently join the Worth division. If the Mexicans first take a crossroads in Encantada, then Vul will be cut off from Worth, so you must move as quickly as possible. Vul moved in an accelerated march, having covered 160 kilometers in 4 days, almost without stopping. On December 21, the detachment came to Agua Nueva, which was located 27 kilometers from Saltillo. It turned out that the report of the Mexican offensive was false. The detachment of Voula joined the division of the Worth ^[21] .

Trekking on Chihuahua

On August 18, 1846, General Philip Carney’s detachment occupied the Mexican city of Santa Fe , after which Carney decided that he had extra forces at his disposal. Therefore, on August 22, he wrote to Vul that he would go to California, and a detachment of Colonel Alexander Doniphan would send Vula to Chihuahua. Donifan had to be distracted by the pacification of the Indians, and it was not until December 12 that he gathered in Valverde a detachment of 856 men to march south through undiscovered terrain. Donifan asked to join him 6 guns Clark battery, but did not wait for the arrival of the battery, and made three troops on December 14, 16 and 18. The detachment passed about 90 miles through the cold, waterless desert to the village of Dona Ana, from where, on December 23, began the march to El Paso ^[25] .

In El Paso, there were about 400 Mexican military who were extremely reluctant to agree to fight in this area. The regiment commander and his deputy resigned their command under the pretext of illness, and as a result, Lieutenant Colonel Ponce de Leon gathered about 500 people with two guns and led them towards Donifan. December 25 Donifan went to the town of El Brasito, where he met a squad of Ponce de Leon. A shootout ensued, but after 30 minutes the Mexican infantry could not stand it and fled. Donifan lost 7 people easily wounded, the Mexicans lost a howitzer and about 100 people killed and wounded. This shootout went down in history as the battle of El Brasito ^[26] .

After 2 days, Donifan occupied El Paso, whose citizens assured him that they had fought with him at El Brasito only under duress. Here Donifan learned that Vul did not go to Chihuahua, that Chihuahua was preparing for defense and that riots broke out in the rear. He needed artillery to continue the march, so until February 5 he waited for the Clark battery to arrive. On February 8, Donifan marched on Chiahua with a detachment of 924 men and three hundred merchants and drovers, who were consolidated into a unit under the command of Major Owens. The core of Donifan's detachment was the 1st Missouri Infantry Regiment. Donifan had four 6-pounder guns and two 12-pound howitzers. On February 27, a detachment came to Asiendo El Sauz, where he learned that the Mexicans had built fortifications on the Sacramento River 15 miles from there ^[27] .

Despite the plight of the region, the Chihuahua authorities managed to gather about 4,000 people. They were placed on the heights between the Sacramento River and the lowland of Aroyo Seco, blocking the road to Chihuahua. Donifan's squad began to march at dawn on February 28 and at about 1:30 pm went out to Mexican positions. The battle on the Sacramento River began : having studied the position of the enemy, Donifan decided to bypass her left flank, turned the column to the right, crossed the lowland of Arroyo Seco and climbed the plateau to the west of the Mexican positions. At around 3:00 pm here, the Mexican cavalry Ponce de Leon tried to attack her, but was repelled by the fire of Clarke’s artillery. Donifan's detachment went on the offensive and captured two southern forts. The Mexicans threw cavalry into the counterattack, but the attack was again repulsed. By 5:00 pm, the Mexicans had moved from position to the height of Sacramento Hill across the river, but by the night they had been knocked out from there. In Donifan’s detachment, only Major Owens was killed and 8 ^[28] or 5 people were injured. The Mexicans lost about 300 people killed and 300 wounded. 40 people were captured ^{[29] [28]} .

February 29, the city of Chihuahua was busy without resistance. Donifan could not stay long in the city, so he began negotiations with local authorities, seeking the promise of their neutrality during the war. But the Mexican authorities did not promise neutrality, and negotiations broke down. On April 23, news arrived from General Voula, who was standing in Saltillo, and Donifan decided to leave Chihuahua. On May 21, having overcome the insignificant resistance of the Indians, he joined Wool. His unit had expired service, so he was sent to New Orleans and from there to Missouri ^[30] .

Decision to suspend campaign

During the North Mexican campaign, the American army managed to take control of large areas, but the calculation of the American government for a short war was not justified. Despite the defeat, Mexico did not negotiate, President Santa Anna and the Mexican press were determined to continue the war. The United States faced the prospect of waging war of indefinite duration and tension. Discontent gradually grew in the USA. The British ambassador, Richard Pakenham, reported to London that disappointment with the course of the war was growing noticeably every day. It became clear that big expenses and human casualties were coming, and many doubted that the country would have enough economic and human resources for such a war. In this situation, Zachary Taylor suggested simply holding the occupied territory without concluding peace, especially since, in his opinion, in Mexico, there was no stable government with which to negotiate. This opinion was shared by John Calhoun and Secretary of State James Buchanan . President Polk himself was also inclined towards such a strategy ^[31] .

At the same time, such a strategy was beneficial to Mexico and unprofitable to the United States. The American army would have to keep a long front line at great expense, and the Mexican army could deliver concentrated blows. Contributions would be impossible, some minor defeats would affect public opinion, and European states could monopolize trade with Mexico, and, moreover, the United States would become an occupier that holds the territory without formal rights to it. President Polk understood the negative aspects of this strategy, but also a decisive attack on Mexico to force it to peace seemed too dangerous to him ^[32] .

Both the government and the press were aware of the need for a decisive offensive, but it was obvious that an offensive from the north, from the Rio Grande River to Mexico City, after 800 miles of steppes and deserts is not possible. At a rather early stage, the idea of ​​landing with Veracruz . On July 4, 1846, Senator Benton proposed to land outside the range of Fort Ulua, take the city by storm from land, and from there attack on Mexico City. Some suggested that instead of Veracruz, seize Tampico . By the end of August, President Polk decided to attack Veracruz. For two weeks, the presidential administration was developing plans, and as a result, on October 22, General Taylor was ordered to suspend operations in northern Mexico ^[33] .

The operation to capture Veracruz was assigned to Winfield Scott, who was ready to begin the siege of Veracruz with 8 or even 5 thousand people. Part of the troops was supposed to be taken from Taylor, so on November 25, Scott wrote him a letter to explain the situation and avoid a possible conflict: “I have to take most of your troops,” Scott wrote, “your victories, however, put you in such a position that you you can act defensively for some time, and even before spring, I believe, you will be able to resume fighting ” ^[34] . He promised to meet with Taylor for talks in the Camargo, on November 30 he sailed from New York to New Orleans, from there he left for Brazos, where he arrived on December 27. Taylor, meanwhile, received his letter, but did not immediately respond to him and did not go to the Camargo, but marched on Victoria to be as far as possible from Scott. On December 29, Scott went to Camargo, but did not find Taylor there, and therefore, on January 3, 1847, he ordered General Butler to collect the necessary troops at the mouth of the Rio Grande. Despite Scott’s tactful letters, Taylor was infuriated by his decisions. He decided that by intrigue Scott achieved the post of commander in chief, promising the Regiment to deprive Taylor of the chance to win the presidential election. He said that he was betrayed, left to die in Mexico, and blamed Scott and the president all over. Scott, meanwhile, returned to the island of Brazos and began to prepare for the expedition. Soon, General Worth brought the first regular units, and on February 11, transports arrived from New Orleans. On February 19, Scott arrived in Tampico, where parts of Patterson and Kitman arrived ^[35] .

Meanwhile, General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, in the summer of 1846, returned from exile to Mexico, took command of the army, and went to northern Mexico. Already leaving Mexico, he learned about the fall of Monterrey. On October 14, he arrived at San Luis de Potosí, removed General Ampoudue from command, and began to recruit an army ^[36] . In mid-January 1846, Scott’s letter to General Taylor on January 3 fell into his hands, from which Santa Anna learned that the bulk of Taylor’s army was leaving for Veracruz and only a small detachment of volunteers remained. Taylor was far from the reserves, among a hostile population, with an army scattered across individual positions, and Santa Anna decided that he had a good chance to risk a dangerous march through the desert ^[37] .

On January 28, the Mexican army, numbering about 20,000 people, launched an offensive: the first began the march of the wagon train, then the 1st division came out on January 29, then the 2nd division on January 30, and the 3rd division began on January 31. February 2 San Luis left the army headquarters. On December 24, the Mexican Congress declared him interim president of Mexico, and the opposition began to accuse him of slowness and inaction, so Santa Anne began the march even before the army was fully prepared ^[38] .

Mexican offensive

On February 2, Taylor moved his headquarters from Monterrey to Saltillo, and on February 5 moved it further south, to Agua Nueva. Scott advised him to leave Saltillo, but Taylor believed that it was more profitable to take the fight with the Mexicans here. In case of victory, the enemy would have to retreat 300 miles across the desert. If we take the fight from the city of Monterrey, then the Mexicans will be able to retreat to Saltillo and from there continue to threaten the American positions ^[39] .

Meanwhile, on February 17, the advanced division of the Mexican army (General Pacheco) approached and occupied Encarnacion. February 18 came the division of Lambardini, February 19 - the division of Ortega. 20 and 21 came the cavalry brigade of Torrehon and Hoover. The march from St. Louis to Encarnacion greatly weakened the Mexican army. It rained from time to time, a cold wind blew for several days in a row that many soldiers died from hypothermia. Desertion grew in the army, and in general, Santa Ana lost 4,000 people during the march. At an inspection in Encarnacion, it turned out that out of 18,000 people who actually came out of San Luis, only 14,000 reached Encarnacion. The American command had already learned about the concentration of the Mexican army and had sent a group of intelligence officers to gather additional information. During one such raid, Lieutenant Samuel Sturgis was captured ^[40] .

General Taylor discovered that his position at Agua Nueva could easily be outflanked, so at noon on February 21 he retreated 11 miles back to Buena Vista. Taylor entrusted General Wul with command of the army at the position of Buena Vista, while he himself, with an escort from the squadron of May and the Mississippi Regiment of Davis, set off to strengthen Saltillo. The Arkansas cavalry regiment of Colonel Yella was left in Agua Nueva to guard the exported property, and later Marshall and Stin squadrons were sent to help him. Taylor's retreat later caused a lot of questions and criticism - if the position was so bad, then why did the army initially be on it? The retreat tired the soldiers and lowered their morale. In addition, Taylor left a well-studied position and forced the army to take the fight to another, completely unfamiliar to her. In Agua Nueva, he could take the fight, forcing the Mexicans to fight on the very edge of the desert, but now he was losing this advantage ^[41] .

On February 21 at 11:00, the Mexican army left Encarnacion, hoping to catch Americans by surprise at Agua Nueva. Ahead went the Ampudia Light Corps, then the sapper battalion, followed by a battery of three 16-pound guns, then the Pacheco division, then a battery of five 12-pound guns, the division, a battery of five 8-pound guns, the Ortega division, then carts and cavalry. Santa Anna was at the forefront. Arriving on the morning of February 22 in Agua Nueva, the Mexicans found there burned carts and plenty of destroyed food. Everything said that the enemy hastily retreated. News of the appearance of Mexicans in Agua Nueva reached General Voula at 08:00, and he decided to take the fight to the Agostura Gorge, immediately sending two guns of Washington's battery there. At 09:00 he sent all the rest of his army there ^[42] .

Battle of Buena Vista

Santa Anna decided not to waste time, so he took with him a detachment of cavalry of 2500 men and rushed to pursue the retreating enemy. He soon discovered that the Americans had taken a position in the gorge of Angostur, across the road to Saltillo. They occupied it quite recently and have not yet prepared for defense. Justin Smith wrote that if Santa Anna immediately rushed to the attack, he would have every chance of achieving a quick victory. But the position seemed to him too serious, and after reconnaissance he decided to wait for the infantry. To gain time, at 11:00 he sent Taylor a parliamentary with a proposal for surrender. Taylor refused ^[43] .

At 3:00 pm, General Ampoudia’s light infantry reached the dominant heights behind the left flank of the American army. A small exchange of fire followed, after which the heights remained behind the Mexicans. Shooting stopped after sunset. On the morning of February 23, the infantry launched an offensive from the front, directly at the American guns that were standing on the Saltil road. This attack was repelled by artillery fire. At the same time, Pacheco’s infantry division attacked the left flank of the Americans and put the 2nd Indian regiment to flight. This retreat opened the flanks of the other regiments, and the Americans retreated, leaving two guns. The entire left flank of Taylor’s army collapsed, and the Mexican cavalry broke through to the rear of the Americans. The situation was critical. General Vul told Taylor that the battle was lost ^{[44] [45]} .

The Mexican army took the enemy in a half ring, and if Santa Anna launched a simultaneous attack, he would have a chance to win. But he attacked in separate directions, allowing Taylor to move parts from place to place. General Ampoudi’s infantry was stopped by the Jefferson Davis Mississippi Regiment. Torrejon's cavalry, which had broken through to the rear, was driven back by units of Yella and Marshall. The cavalry attack on the position of the Davis regiment was also repulsed. At 4:00 pm, the Mexicans went on the last attack: they threw away three American regiments, which suffered heavy losses, and after their departure, only one artillery battery remained in the path of the Mexican army. At this critical moment of the battle, a Braxton Bragg battery appeared on the position and opened fire on the Mexicans almost point-blank. Davies’s Mississippi came to the rescue of Bragg, and the Mexican offensive was stopped. At 17:00, the Mexican army retreated across the front ^{[46] [47]} .

Guerrilla warfare

Separate clashes with irregular Mexican units occurred throughout the campaign, but only after the battle of Buena Vista did the guerrilla warfare become more organized. Even before the battle, Santa Anna sent a cavalry detachment of General Urrea to attack the wagons on the Monterrey-Camargo road. Urrea linked up with the partisans of General Canales and on February 22 he attacked a wagon train of 110 wagons and 300 mules near the town of Ramos. During the short skirmish, Urrea captured almost the entire wagon train and killed about 50 drovers. After that, he attacked the American garrison in the town of Marin, but two companies of the 2nd Ohio Regiment (about 100 people under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Irwin) held back the Mexicans until February 25 and lasted until reinforcements arrived. With their arrival, Irwin went to Monterrey, and a detachment of Colonel Morgan came to Marin. Irwin and Morgan eventually united and repelled the attacks of Urrea, but the road still remained blocked by the Mexicans ^[48] .

Realizing the scale of the problem, Taylor organized a detachment of 250 men under the command of Major Giddings and sent him to Camargo with a wagon train of 150 wagons. The detachment left Monterrey on March 5, and on March 7 the Mexicans attacked him at Serralvo. They managed to destroy about 40 wagons and kill 17 Americans, but the rest of the train was able to get to Camargo. Then Taylor sent the 1st Kentucky Cavalry Regiment to the north, Colonel Marshall, who discovered the partisan Urrea near Marina. Then Taylor sent the same cavalry brigade, battery Bragg and Mississippi regiment Davis and personally led the troops in Marin. They were unable to break Urrea, but the Mexicans were still unable to attack the carts. Urrea left the road alone and withdrew with his cavalry in Saint-Louis-de-Potosí. Taylor decided to continue to carefully guard the transports and deployed strong garrisons along the entire road ^[49] .

On April 4, Antonio Canales called on all Mexicans to raise weapons against the Americans, promising to treat all those who refuse as traitors. Guerrilla attacks became frequent and lasted throughout the summer and fall of 1847. In early January, the partisans changed tactics. It became unprofitable to attack the guarded transports, and they switched to separate groups of the military in the countryside. As a result, General Vul, appointed military governor of Saltillo, took a number of measures to normalize the situation. He removed the American garrisons from the settlements and forbade them to loot on pain of disbanding the entire unit. Taylor also blamed the attacks on the local Mexican authorities and began to demand compensation from them for the damage caused. In addition, a special police force was formed from Mexicans, although it did not seriously affect the course of the guerrilla war ^[50] .

In the same November, Taylor resigned as commander, returned to the United States, and General Vul led the army. Guerrilla warfare by that time had almost ended. Vul in his report called it a consequence of the responsibility of local authorities, their financial responsibility for the damage and the actions of the local police ^[51] .

The war with the United States led Mexico to a financial crisis, and the government of Gomez Farias decided to save the situation by confiscating church property. Supporters of the law on confiscation argued that if the Americans won, Mexico would not have any religion or church property. The law has been discussed in Congress since the beginning of January and was finally adopted on January 11. This led to riots on January 11 and February 4, and on February 27, four battalions rebelled in Mexico City. They declared that Farias and Congress had lost confidence, and demanded the repeal of the law of 11 January. About nine days in Mexico City were shooting. The population did not support the rebels, and the situation became deadlocked. Both sides of the conflict asked Santa Anna to intervene. He demanded that both parties stop the violence, he personally arrived at Guadalupe Hidalgo on March 22 and triumphantly entered Mexico City on March 23 ^[52] .

The situation is extremely beneficial for Santa Anna. He was defeated in Northern Mexico and almost died with the whole army, but now he had a chance to become the savior of the nation and regain his popularity and fame. He repealed the law of January 11, but the day before the government had time to confiscate church property for $ 20 million ^[53] .

Meanwhile, on February 15, 1847, the Americans completed preparations for the seizure of Veracruz, and General Winfield Scott departed from a base on the Brazos River in Tampico, where 6,000 soldiers were loaded onto transports. From there, on February 20, Scott went to Lobos Island, where he arrived the next day. February 22, on the day of the battle of Buena Vista, was the birthday of George Washington, and on February 25, they landed soldiers and sailors on the island. March 3, the army and navy were finally ready, and Scott went to Veracruz. The Scott Mexican campaign began , which diverted Santa Anna’s attention from events in the north. ^[54]

Ratings

The successful Taylor offensive and the fall of Monterrey gave the American government hope for a profitable peace, but these hopes were not justified. The Taylor campaign was militarily successful, but yielded no political results, and this forced the Polk administration to agree to an offensive through Veracruz, which ultimately led to the end of the war ^[55] . When the offensive was planned through Veracruz, Taylor was an obvious candidate for the expedition commanders (after Patterson ), but in the Polk administration they came to the conclusion that he was not professional enough and was not suitable for his personal qualities. Taylor proved to be a charismatic leader and a great fighter, but did not demonstrate any talents of the commander. He did not trust the presidential administration, did not share his plans and intentions, strongly protested against the decision to suspend the campaign in northern Mexico. Justin Smith wrote that Taylor had lost all his former good nature and sanity, became incredulous and suspicious. As a result, Winfield Scott was appointed to command the attack on Mexico City via Veracruz ^[56] .

Campaign in photo history

In the 1840s, the first daguerreotypes (photographs) and the first photo studios began to appear in America. During the Taylor campaign with the army, photographers first appeared, then still unofficial, who took the first ever photos of the army under combat conditions. These were photographs of soldiers and officers in Saltillo and, in particular, a photograph of General Voula with headquarters. A photograph of Voula recognized by some as the first military photograph in history ^{[57] [58]} . In the private letters of the military there are many references to portrait photography in Saltillo in 1847. On July 25, 1847, Captain wrote to his wife that he had made three of his portraits ( Likeness ). On the same day, Major John Reynolds wrote to his wife that he had made his “daguerreotype” in Saltillo ^[59] .

Comments

References to sources

• Bauer, KJ The Mexican War, 1846-1848. - New York: Macmillan, 1974. - ISBN 0803261071 .
• Eisenhower, J. So Far from God: The US War with Mexico, 1846-1848. - University of Oklahoma Press, 1989. - 436 p. - ISBN 0806132795 .
• The Mexican-American War, Vol. I. - ABC-CLIO, 2013. - 1084 p. - ISBN 1851098534 .
• Palmquist, Peter E., Kailbourn, Thomas R. Pioneer Photographers from the Mississippi to the Continental Divide. - Washington, DC: Stanford University Press, 2005. - 742 p. - ISBN 9780804740579 .
• Smith, Justin H. The War With Mexico Volume I. - BiblioLife, 2009. - 572 p. - ISBN 978-1117281698 .
• Smith, Justin H. The War With Mexico Volume II. - BiblioLife, 2009. - 636 p. - ISBN 978-1117281698 .
• Wilcox, Cadmus M. History of the Mexican war. - Washington, DC: Church news publishing co., 1892. - 828 p.
• The Occupation of Mexico May 1846 - July 1848 . - Washington: US. Army Center of Military History. - 47 p. - ISBN 0-16-075744-4 .

• Chapter XIII. A Campaign Without a Cannon Shot