The Madman Theory

Despite the fact that the “theory of the madman” is associated primarily with the name of Richard Nixon, the underlying ideas were formulated by Machiavelli in the 15th century. The Italian thinker noted that in politics “it is sometimes useful to pretend to be crazy” ^[2] .

In the 1950s of the 20th century, American scholars Thomas Schelling and Hermann Kahn introduced the concept of “rationality of irrationality,” according to which state leaders can effectively achieve their goals if they convince opponents that they are so irrational that they can start wars that do not have no sense in terms of reasonable national interests ^[3] . In 1962, G. Kahn wrote that you can effectively intimidate the enemy if you pretend to be “a little crazy” ^[4] .

In American foreign policy practice, Dwight Eisenhower used a similar strategy. At the start of his presidency, the Korean War was at an impasse. Eisenhower decided to put an end to this, making it clear to the Chinese that he would drop an atomic bomb on North Korea if a ceasefire was not immediately struck. Just a few weeks later, the Chinese agreed to a ceasefire, and the Korean War ended. ^[5]

Richard Nixon , following the example of his predecessor, used the "madman theory" to put pressure on the Soviet Union and the communist regime it supported in North Vietnam to end the war on conditions favorable to the United States. After the failure of the negotiations in Paris in 1969, Nixon decided to threaten the Soviet Union with a massive nuclear strike and make its leaders think that he was crazy enough to take this step. According to his calculation, Moscow should have faced the North Vietnamese with a choice: to sit down at the negotiating table with the Americans or lose military and diplomatic support from the USSR.

As Nixon’s chief of staff G. Holdeman recalls in his memoirs, the president formulated the “madman theory” as follows:

As a result, neither Hanoi, nor Moscow really could accurately indicate what the next steps of the American president would be.

Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, during the Vietnam War took a number of steps that fit into the logic of the "madman theory." The most vivid example was Operation Giant Spear , during which October 10, 1969 an order was given to the Strategic Command of the US Air Force to begin preparations for a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union. During the operation, 18 B-52 bombers armed with nuclear weapons were put on alert, which took off on October 27 and approached the borders of the USSR through the North Pole . Three days later, they also suddenly returned to their bases in the United States.

Also, from October 13 to 30, 1969, various naval operations were carried out within the framework of US measures to frighten the enemy: from the movements of aircraft carriers and submarines with ballistic missiles to the blocking of Soviet merchant ships bound for Haiphong ^[7] .

However, as was later noted by the CIA, this activity did not entail any reciprocal diplomatic steps either from the USSR or from China, and was not mentioned either in the Soviet or in any other media ^[8] . Thus, the “madman theory” in its application to the end of the Vietnam War is not considered effective ^[9] .

The Madman Theory is often criticized as an ineffective strategy of foreign policy behavior. In particular, it is noted that it can be considered Russian roulette in international relations, which increases unpredictability and does not always stimulate its addressee to the desired behavior.

It is also noted that if a leader only pretends to be crazy (for example, implying, but not explicitly threatening to use nuclear weapons), opponents realize that they are dealing with manipulation and ignore any irrational threats that are not believed. So, Mao Zedong believed that nuclear weapons limit the United States more than its opponents, since the likelihood of its use is extremely low ^[10] . The opposite situation is also possible: for some opponents, such behavior can be a signal to manifest their own fanaticism, which will no longer be a ruse, but will increase the escalation of the conflict, which can lead to a fatal result . Thus, the costs due to the increased risks of open armed conflict become higher than the possible positive effect ^[11] .

In modern American journalism ^{[12] [13]} and analytical materials ^[14], one can find opinions that the unpredictability of US President Donald Trump suggests that he also uses the “madman theory” to achieve foreign policy goals. Trump's pressure on North Korean authorities is usually cited as an example. The harsh behavior of the American president (in particular, offensive statements about the North Korean leader on Twitter ) was intended to cause Kim Jong-un to fear that if he could not find a way to convince Trump that the country was “denuclearized,” Trump could actually start a war that risks becoming nuclear .

However, the press often notes that if Nixon “pretended” to be crazy, then Trump may actually be such, and his irrational actions in the foreign policy arena may not have a strategic basis, but only cause confusion and disorder ^[15] .

• Edge Balancing
• Big stick

• Burr W., Kimball J. Nixon's Nuclear Specter. The Secret Alert of 1969, Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War // Modern War Studies, 2015
• Sechser TS, Fuhrmann M. The Madman and the Bomb. Nuclear Blackmail in the Trump Era // Virginia Policy Review, 2017
• Scott DK The "Madman" Rhetoric of Richard Nixon: An Alternative Means to Establish Geopolitical Ethos. Tahlequah, 2005
• Ellsberg D. Doomsday Machine. Revelations of the developer of a nuclear war plan. M .: Alpina Digital, 2018