The 1979 Herat Rebellion

Herat - an ancient city located on the Great Silk Road , was one of the main centers of the historical Khorasan region, most of its territory included in the borders of modern Iran . Located in close proximity to the administrative border with Iran, Herat was always closely connected: cultural, historical and religious ties with its western neighbor.
The ethnic composition of the inhabitants of Herat is quite diverse: Tajiks , Farsivans (Persians - Parsi), Pashtuns , Hazaras , Charaimaks , Turkmens , Uzbeks , Afshars , Kyzylbashi , Kurds and others.

After the five-year reign of Serdar ( Afghan prince, prince ) Mohammad Daoud (1973-1978), a major military leader and former Prime Minister (1953-1963), who came to power in Kabul in 1973 by overthrowing his cousin King Zahir Shah (the last representative of the Afghan monarchy ), which suppressed a number of anti-government conspiracies and brought the country to dictatorship, the leaders of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin came to power in Kabul ^{[4] [5]} .

The victory of April - the "Saur" revolution under the leadership of the PDPA , which took place in April 1978, contributed to the rapprochement of the industrially backward DRA with its northern neighbor, the Soviet Union . PDPA Secretary General N.M. Taraki announced his commitment to the ideas of socialism and embarked on the path of socialist transformation.

In Moscow, he greeted his words with enthusiasm and began to regard Afghanistan as a friendly, socialist-oriented state. A historical example was: Mongolia and the republics of the Soviet republics of Central Asia .
At the interstate level, good neighborly relations were consolidated by signing on December 5, 1978 in Moscow, the “Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborhood and Cooperation between the USSR and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA)” ^[5] .

The primary measures in state administration, the leadership of the Central Committee of the PDPA in the person of N.M. Taraki determined the implementation of fundamental socio-economic reforms, which came into conflict with the fundamental socio-religious traditions and foundations of Afghan society, caused widespread discontent among various segments of the population and led to a sharp intensification of armed resistance, which soon outgrew the Civil War ^[5] .

In the summer of 1978, among the military units and formations of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, stationed in Kabul, Western intelligence agencies carried out anti-government campaigning and propaganda - leaflets were distributed with an appeal: "to embark on the warpath to cleanse Afghanistan from the Communists and Russians . "
As a result, in the first months of the “April Revolution” of 1978, part of the military who deserted the Pakistani border and entered the armed detachments of anti-government forces formed on neighboring territory deserted from the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
At the end of June 1978, a large conspiracy was discovered in the troops under the leadership of a former regiment commander who had previously been dismissed from the military service of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The number of military leaders and command personnel of the DRA Armed Forces was reactionary against the official authorities ^[6] .

By 1979, the domestic political situation in Afghanistan had become even more tense. In large cities of various provinces, one after another, riots erupted, growing into various scale armed rebellions.
In January 1979, armed forces were resisted by government forces in the central provinces, in particular in Khazarajat (where Kabul's influence was traditionally weak), and anti-government protests took place in Nuristan ^[7] .

Islamic opposition organizations that have grown into independent parties from the Muslim Youth Party - the Islamic Party of Afghanistan and the Islamic Society of Afghanistan have deployed a network of military training centers (training bases) in Pakistan on the border with Afghanistan, where future military specialists ( saboteurs ) were trained to conduct terrorist shares against the legitimate authority of the DRA ^[6] .

Arriving in the country, trained at foreign training centers - groups of Islamic radicals, organized on the territory of the DRA the recruitment of opposition groups among the local population. Also, anti-government propaganda sharply increased among military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which aimed at creating new opposition armed groups ^[6] .

With the formation of anti-government Afghan Islamic parties in states neighboring with the DRA and in the communities of Afghan refugees, active recruitment to centers for training members of armed groups began. Subsequently, the network of these centers was expanded. Foreign military instructors were involved in the preparation. Poor peasants and refugees, who were in dire need of financial resources, were recruited into the detachments. However, there were many ideological oppositionists ^[6] .

Starting from the end of 1978, the return sending of combat units and groups trained abroad was begun in Afghanistan. The scale of armed resistance to the DRA government grew. In a number of provinces, sabotage and terrorist acts of opposition groups, cases of blocking roads and highways, the destruction of power lines and communications, the prosecution and liquidation of civilians loyal to the government, have become more frequent ^[6] .

According to these measures, the spiritual leaders of the IPA and IOA , destabilized the political situation, brought about a split in society, and opposed the legitimate authorities. The opposition’s anti-government activities aimed at keeping the government and society in constant tension and fear, thus bringing the legitimate authority to the crisis and seizing it in their hands ^[6] .

The consequences of agrarian reform in Herat were not as critical as in other regions, since large landowners lived mainly in the city and did not touch rural farmers ^[8] . A number of factors led to the highest escalation of the conflict in Herat: the persecution by the authorities of the clerical clergy, Islamic theologians and traditional elites ( sheikhs, feasts, ulama ); public policies to combat illiteracy; propaganda of socialist (communist) ideas, as well as the formation of mixed (heterogeneous) classes in madrassas ^{[8] [9]} .

On the eve of the rebellion in the city of Herat, there were already outbreaks of popular unrest, but they took on the most mass character on March 15, 1979. In many areas of Herat, and its environs, local residents dissatisfied with the authorities began to gather at mosques and, after sermons and calls of clergymen, marched on the streets of the city ^{[7] [10] [11]} .

A large mass of citizens joined the protesters. A crowd marching through the streets of Herat chanted “Allahu Akbar,” various provocations began in the city: attacks on government facilities, government buildings and structures; hunting for civil servants; teachers of educational institutions, schools; in Sarluchi - people of “not pious” ( according to Muslim etiquette ) with their heads uncovered, armed raids on retail outlets, shops and bazaars ^{[7] [10] [11]} .

The city, plunged into anarchy and chaos, looters were operating on the streets of the city. Citizens associated with public service were destroyed on the spot. Three Soviet citizens were killed, other dead from among foreigners were not recorded. According to a number of sources, the bodies of the torn Soviet advisers and other dead, rebels defiantly carried along the streets of the city, other sources deny this fact ^{[7] [10] [11]} .

The personnel of the 17th infantry division of the Armed Forces of the DRA, which was entrusted with the task of ensuring security in the city and, if necessary, suppressing the rebellion, himself joined the rebels armed with weapons and ammunition taken from the depots. The rebels held the city for a week.

With the beginning of the rebellion in Herat, the leadership of Afghanistan, once again appealed to the Soviet Government with a request for military assistance.
In a telephone conversation, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. Kosygin and the President of Afghanistan N.M. Taraki March 18, the head of the Afghan state stated that the situation in the country is tense and continues to deteriorate ^[5] .

Over the past month and a half, about 4 thousand soldiers of the Islamic Republic of Iran in civilian clothes were thrown from the Iranian side into Afghanistan, who penetrated the city of Herat and the military units of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. That at the moment the entire 17th Infantry Division has passed into their hands, including the artillery regiment and the anti-aircraft division, which are firing at government planes ^[5] .

It was also said that fighting continued in the city. An insignificant part of the military remained on the side of government forces, the rest went over to the side of the rebels and one should not expect active support of the local population, since it was almost entirely influenced by Shiite slogans: "Do not believe the godless, but follow us."
“We believe that tonight or tomorrow morning, Herat will fall and be completely in the hands of the enemy,” concluded N.M. Taraki

“We ask that you provide practical and technical assistance to people and weapons. Otherwise, the rebels will go towards Kandahar and further towards Kabul. They will lead half of Iran to Afghanistan under the flag of the Herat division. Afghans will return who fled to Pakistan.
Iran and Pakistan are working on the same plan against us. And so, if you really strike at Herat now, you can save the revolution ...

While you consult, Herat will fall, and there will be even greater difficulties for the Soviet Union and Afghanistan .... I suggest that you put Afghan signs on your tanks and planes and no one will know anything. Your troops could go from Kushka and from Kabul ”

- Nur Mohammed Taraki ^[5]

There are no officers. Iran sends to Afghanistan military men in civilian clothes. Pakistan also sends its people and officers in Afghan clothes. Why can the Soviet Union not send Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen in civilian clothes?
No one will recognize them .... We want Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens to be sent to us so that they can drive tanks, since all these nationalities exist in Afghanistan.

Let them put on Afghan clothes, Afghan badges, and no one will recognize them. This is a very easy job, in our opinion. The experience of Iran and Pakistan shows that this work is easy to do. They give a sample

- Nur Mohammed Taraki ^[5]

The death of Soviet citizens

The circumstances of the death of Soviet citizens on March 17, 1979 during the rebellion in Herat:
- Bizyukov Nikolay Yakovlevich - major, adviser to the deputy commander of the 17th infantry division of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on the technical side (tank specialist). He was sent to Afghanistan in 1978 as a military adviser. He became the first of the Soviet soldiers killed in the Afghan conflict: During the rebellion in Herat, he was delayed during the evacuation from the base, for some reason he returned to the house. Armed people stopped the car on the way back. The Afghan driver was not touched, but N.Yu. Bizyukov "Was stoned and torn to pieces" ^[12] .
- Bogdanov Yuri Borisovich - Soviet civilian specialist, engaged in the purchase of wool in Herat: rebels found Bogdanov Yu.B. and his pregnant wife in a villa they rented. Bogdanov Yu.B. managed to help his wife cross the fence to neighbors - the Afghans, who sheltered the woman from the angry crowd. The woman escaped with a broken leg, and “Bogdanova Yu.B. distraught rebels tore and abused his body ” ^[12] .
- Kontsov Yakov Fedorovich - specialist of the USSR Ministry of Oil Industry, oilman. In Afghanistan, he was engaged in oil exploration: during the rebellion, along with other specialists, he was evacuated to a city hotel. An angry Afghans rushed to the building, which was stopped only by a volley of artillery. When the rebels retreated, Kontsov Y.F. he went out onto the porch of the hotel to check the situation and immediately “received a machine gun in the stomach from the rebels. The wound was fatal ” ^[12] .

At the initial stage, the rebellion did not have a single leadership, the formation of the Afghan military from the 17th Infantry Division was under the command of officers Sardar Yagran and Rasul Baloch, later it included Ismail Khan and Alauddin Khan, members of the Jamiat-i-Islami party Islamic Society of Afghanistan Burhanuddin Rabbani . Ismail Khan, who later became the emir of Jamiat-i-Islami in the province of Herat and a major field commander in western Afghanistan, according to the participants in the rebellion, did not play a leading role in his administration ^[7] .

At the same time, according to the researcher of the Institute of Oriental Studies and the written heritage of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan - doctor of historical sciences K. Iskandarov, who studies regional conflicts in the Central Asian region, Mohammad Ismail Khan was one of the organizers and was one of the commanders of the armed rebellion ^[1] .
It was on the orders of Ismail Khan, just before the start of the government bombardment of the division’s location, from the military compound’s warehouses that all weapons and ammunition had been removed in advance and distributed to the rebels.
By his order, the rebel servicemen of the 17th Infantry Division opened the gates of the city prison, freeing hundreds of prisoners. After the government forces suppressed the rebellion, Ismail Khan left the country ^[13] .

Official Kabul has taken all possible measures to maintain control over the strategic - third largest city of Afghanistan. The forces of the 4th and 15th armored brigades from Pul-e-Charchi were thrown to suppress the rebellion. Given the remoteness of the deployment of loyal troops, the DRA Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin ordered Major General Sayed Mukhram, who was then in command of the garrison in the city of Kandahar, to follow to Herat and take control of a group of government troops.

On March 20th, a convoy of General Sayed Muharam from 30 tanks and 300 military men , waving green flags and Korans, arrived in Herat to make the rebels believe that the rebellion spread throughout the country. This military trick allowed government forces to penetrate the city and take possession of it. The city was subjected to aerial bombardment of IL-28, arriving from Shindand air base ^[7] .

The rebellion in Herat opened the eyes of the Soviet leadership to the actual state of affairs inside Afghanistan. The repeated requests of the President of the DRA Nur Muhammad Taraki for the participation of the Soviet troops in the suppression of the uprising did not find support in the Politburo. At a meeting with representatives of the Afghan leadership on March 17, 1979, USSR Foreign Minister A. Gromyko He expressed serious concern about the events in Herat, saying that "under no circumstances can we lose Afghanistan." At the same time, another member of the Politburo, Alexei Kosygin, in consultations with the Politburo, expressed his distrust of the DRA leadership, citing the fact that “Amin and Taraki are hiding the true state of affairs from us” ^[5] .

The next day, in a telephone conversation with A.N. Kosygin, N.M. Taraki lamented with regret that he could no longer rely on the Afghan armed forces, including those trained in the Soviet Union. Each time, requests for military assistance from the Soviet Union sounded more and more convincing. N.M. Taraki requested the introduction of armored vehicles with Soviet soldiers from the Soviet Republic of Central Asia (ethnic groups living in northern Afghanistan) dressed in Afghan military clothing. However, these appeals were unsuccessful, and for a long time the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee initially adhered to a policy of non-intervention. When visiting President DRA N.M. on an official visit Taraki of Moscow March 20, A.N. Kosygin brought to him the Soviet foreign policy of the USSR regarding Afghanistan:

“... we carefully studied all aspects of this action and came to the conclusion that if our troops are deployed, the situation in your country will not only not improve, but worsen. It cannot be denied that our troops will have to fight not only with foreign invaders, but also with a certain number of your people. And people do not forgive this ... "

- A.N. Kosygin

However, over the coming months, the USSR provided military assistance to the DRA, sending a large number of military equipment: T-62 tanks, MiG-21 fighters and Mi-24 combat helicopters , as well as special personnel for their maintenance ^[5] .

Despite significant military assistance, the political situation in the DRA continued to deteriorate: riots broke out in the cities of Jalalabad, Asmar, Ghazni, Nakhrin and other cities; in August 1979, Bala Hissar, a fortress in the center of Kabul, rebelled. Despite the fact that all the rebellions were bloodyly suppressed, it was obvious that the authorities in Kabul are living out the last months.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has set a goal in a short time to implement fundamental transformations in the field of: social sphere, economy, ideology, culture, technological progress, science and education , aimed at improving the living conditions and spiritual development of the people of Afghanistan ":
- Decree No. 6 of the DRA Revolutionary Council freed about 11 million landless and low-land peasants from the debt dependence of moneylenders;
- Decree No. 7 was aimed at educating the younger generation: workers and peasants, also established the equal rights of men and women;
- Decree No. 8 "On Land Reform": "the liberation of the Afghan peasant from the centuries-old oppression of the feudal lords" ^[14] .

“Under the leadership of the PDPA, public organizations of youth, women and trade unions were created, which were to become party aides in carrying out revolutionary tasks. Over 600 new schools and literacy courses were opened. In accordance with the new national policy, newspapers began to be published in the languages ​​of national minorities - Uzbek, Turkmen and Balochi, as well as teaching in schools and broadcasting in these languages. ”

- V.G. Korgun “History of Afghanistan” ^[2]

Land Reform

The essence of the land reform by decree No. 8 was to seize the excess land of 6 hectares from large landowners and donate them to the peasants. According to official figures, by mid-July 1979, 666 thousand hectares of land had been confiscated from 33 thousand malekov, which the state handed over to 297 thousand peasants free of charge. Thus, the interests of 272 thousand medium and large landowners were affected. Of the 22 thousand landowners of the largest landowners, there are only 7 thousand who own about 1 million hectares of the best land. According to the conservative population, this policy was perceived as an encroachment of power on private land ownership, blessed in the minds of Afghans by religion and centuries-old traditions ^{[3] [15] [16]} .
Recalling these reforms and what they led to, the President of Afghanistan Mohammad Najibullah (1986 - 1992) summarized:

“We started the agrarian reform from the wrong end, destroying the existing production relations, ignoring national customs, traditions and rights”

- Mohammad Najibullah ^[17]

Reforms in other areas

- Decree of the Revolutionary Council No. 6 of June 12, 1978 annulled the debt of peasants to usurers and landlords. Эта мера коснулась 75 % крестьян, в итоге (по оценке специалистов министерства сельского хозяйства ДРА) 11 миллионов крестьян были освобождены от уплаты долгов ростовщикам и крупным землевладельцам ^{[3] [18]} .
— В октябре 1979 года, специальным декретом правительства ДРА женщинам были предоставлены равные права с мужчинами. Был установлен минимальный возраст вступления в брак ( 18 лет для мужчины и 16 лет для женщины ), отменены принудительные браки и запрещён древний обычай, предусматривающий выкуп невесты. В школах стали создавать смешанные ( мальчиков и девочек ) классы. ^{[4] [19] [20]} Правительство Н.М. Тараки поставило цель обучить грамоте в текущие пять лет — 8 млн мужчин, женщин и внешкольной молодёжи в возрасте от 8 до 50 лет. Для решения этих задач в государственный учреждениях, ВС, кишлаках, на предприятиях, стали функционировать курсы ликбеза. Однако консервативное сельское население не приняло и даже воспротивилось этим новшествам:

«Именно на данной почве имели место первые случаи вооружённой конфронтации между властями и сельскими жителями»

— Слинкин М.Ф. ^[21]

С точки зрения иностранных военных аналитиков, занятых изучением событий Афганской войны (1979-1989), официальный Кабул стремился преподнести руководству СССР картину, что мятеж в Герате был организован Ираном, связывая события месячной давности и победы Исламской революции в сопредельном государстве.
Отношения между Исламской республикой Иран Аятоллы Хомейни и социалистически ориентированной ДРА были напряженными. Руководство НДПА предполагало наличие сговора между иранскими аятоллами и шиитскими общинами Герата, составляющими половину населения города. Иностранные аналитики считают, что возвращение 4 000 афганских рабочих из Ирана в Афганистан было использовано властью в Кабуле в пропагандистских целях, заявившим, что в Герат проникли иранцы, переодетые в афганскую одежду.

Анализ деятельности различных антиправительственных сил в Афганистане в 1979 году и их роль Гератском мятеже, некоторыми военно-политическими аналитиками представляется, как восстание анти-пуштунского движения, назревшее в представляющей существенную долю населения города — персидской общине Герата, против местных пуштунских племён.
По убеждению других, восстание Герата было примером организованного мятежа, в отличие от спонтанных антиправительственных восстаний, которые произошли в других частях страны.
Бытует также мнение, что мятеж в Герате стал визитной карточкой Бурхануддина Раббани, духовного лидера исламской партии ИОА и разработанной им стратегии распространения военного переворота в военную среду, при поддержки народных масс. Указывается на связь агентов ИОА с военнослужащими 17-й пехотной дивизии (командирами Исмаил-ханом и Алауддин-ханом) и их отношения с духовенством, кто читал проповеди мятежникам накануне мятежа.
По данным одного из аналитиков, установлено, что за несколько недель до мятежа, штаб-квартира ИОА в Мешхеде установила связь с офицерами 17-й пехотной дивизии. Есть логические выводы третьих аналитиков, которые считают, что отсутствие координации между военными и гражданскими повстанцами, а также хаотический и непредсказуемый характер восстания указывают, на то, что мятеж был спонтанным, а не плановым.

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• Провинция Герат
• Исмаил-хан
• Афганская война (1979-1989)
• Операция «Западня»
• Восстание в Герате 1979 года (Англо—Википедия) «1979 Herat uprising» (English Wikipedia)