The fighting of the Afghan war (1979-1989)

In the early months of 1980, the rebels still made attempts to counteract the Soviet and Afghan forces with sufficiently large forces. But already in the summer of that year, due to large losses in manpower, they abandoned this and switched to actions, mainly - in small groups using elements of partisan tactics. The main tactics of the armed opposition were shelling troops and settlements, assaulting posts and small garrisons, setting up ambushes, sabotage at national economic facilities, terror against party-statesmen and military personnel, and actions to interrupt transportation on the country's main communications.

Combat activities of OKSVA for the protection of national economic and military facilities and the conduct of hostilities for the transport convoys

The monthly combat plan of the 40th Army and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia, developed on the map, presented the main tasks of the Soviet and Afghan troops for the coming month
1. Areas of independent (only by Afghan troops) and joint military operations, their goals, leaders, forces involved (Afghan and Soviet), means of reinforcement for each operation, timing
2. The areas of responsibility of the formations and units in which they were supposed to operate independently by their duty forces, putting these forces
3. Areas of responsibility of formations and units for combating enemy caravans by ambushes (covering the border), the number of units allocated for this purpose
4. Cities in which it is planned to liquidate the counter-revolutionary underground, terms, forces, leaders
zones of independent actions of Soviet and Afghan aircraft to defeat enemy groups and objects

On the basis of the plan of combat activity approved in Moscow at the headquarters of the 40th Army, the headquarters of its formations and units, the following were developed monthly:
1. combat orders
2. plans for the organization and conduct of intelligence
3. action plans to ensure the upcoming hostilities
4. action plans to assist local governments in strengthening state power and stabilizing the situation ^[7]

By the nature of the tasks to be solved, operations were carried out in order to defeat large enemy groupings in areas controlled by him, to protect military and national economic facilities, to ensure the transport of convoys, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The operations to defeat large enemy groupings in the areas controlled by him were offensive by the type of actions of the troops, although defensive actions could be conducted in certain areas. In terms of organization and practical implementation, these operations were among the most complex. At the same time, the costs of manpower and resources were not always adequate to the results obtained. Nevertheless, the Soviet command, deprived of the opportunity in other ways to effectively influence the military-strategic situation in the country, was forced to conduct such operations ^{[8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]} .

Almost all the active military operations of the Soviet troops were conducted jointly with the Afghan units: the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the MGB - DRA. The exception was ambushes on the caravan routes of the opposition, since this type of combat operation requires special secrecy and secrecy, for this reason the Soviet units conducted it independently. Also, independently, Soviet units performed tasks as part of watchposts and posts while guarding roads and sensitive areas of major cities, airfields, power plants and other critical facilities. The creation of mixed Soviet-Afghan units for combat missions was extremely rare ^{[8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]} .

“The search and improvement of the forms of military activity of the army took place throughout the war. The following forms of combat activity of the 40th Army were finally formed:

• conducting operations to defeat the most dangerous groups of the armed opposition
• defense of communications, sensitive areas, important national economic objects
• ambush combat operations of units and subunits in the general system of surprise and covert attacks by army troops
• combat operations on the implementation of intelligence data on duty forces and means of the army
• combat operations on the convoy of logistics with material and technical means in particularly dangerous areas
• state border cover

An analysis of the forms of combat activity, the types of operations, the methods of their conduct and the defeat of individual enemy groupings made it possible to identify their structural and logical dependence. In connection with the creation by the armed opposition of large formations, their improvement of combat methods, the use of unexpected tactics, effective methods of combating aviation, mine warfare in the main areas of operations of the 40th Army, the adoption of automatic weapons, artillery systems, modern MANPADS and equipment communications - by the end of 1980, a qualitatively new form of combat activity of the 40th Army began to take shape - conducting army operations ^{[8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]} .

The essence of operations 40-A on the defeat of particularly dangerous rebel groups consisted of a combination of agreed and interconnected by:
The goals, objectives, the area and time of combat and reconnaissance and search operations, strikes and maneuvers of formations and units of the ground forces, aviation, missile forces and artillery, helicopter landings, bypassing, raid and assault squads, armored groups, formations, formations and units of the Afghan army carried out both simultaneously and sequentially. In scale it could be either large-scale operations or military operations in a limited area. In turn, depending on the participating forces and means of operation, it is advisable to divide as follows.

Large-scale operations were divided into: independent military operations; joint military operations with associations, formations and units of the Afghan army; support for the combat operations of associations and formations of the Afghan army.
Fighting in a limited area was divided into: private hostilities; implementation of intelligence data; ambush and search and reconnaissance operations ^{[8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]} .

In order to defeat large groups of the Afghan opposition, by the nature of the tasks to be solved, military operations can be divided into 4 types of operations:

• defensive - in the course of the protection and defense of important military and national-economic objects of the objects of the operational construction of the army and the main objects and communications centers;
• defensive - on the main road directions while ensuring the transport convoys wiring, especially during the withdrawal of troops;
• offensive - with the aim of breaking through the enemy’s defense and releasing their troops, ensuring the combat activity of the surrounded points of permanent deployment of formations and units of the 40th Army and the Armed Forces of the DRA;
• air-ground to defeat large enemy groupings and its base areas - the elimination of the rear system of the armed opposition by air-ground strike forces with the widespread use of helicopter landing ^[15] .

Operations were divided into two types - scheduled and unscheduled . A total of 426 scheduled and 47 unscheduled operations were carried out. They differed from each other in tasks, methods and levels of planning, attracted forces and means ^{[8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]} .

The scale of operations can be divided into army (as part of the army) and private (as part of a division, regiment, battalion). Depending on the forces and means involved, army operations should be considered as:

• independent operations, joint with the troops of the friendly DRA
• support for hostilities - associations and units of a friendly army

Forms and Methods

The forms and methods of warfare of the Soviet troops (1980-1984) in the DRA were joint and independent military operations:

• Independent military operations are characteristic of the first period of the war, when the Afghan army was not yet fully formed organizationally, the command and troops did not have combat experience, the personnel had low morale and fighting spirit. At this stage, the forces of the 40th A had to bear the main burden of conducting military operations, the main efforts were concentrated on the defeat of the rebel groups along the main communications, in the most threatened areas that constitute the base of the counter-revolutionary forces. The increased activity of the armed opposition formations, their better equipment, as well as the completion of the creation of the Afghan army, allowed the transition to the implementation of "joint operations" at the second stage of the war.
• Joint combat operations to defeat the largest enemy groupings in the most important areas, in order to achieve more significant goals, were carried out with formations and units: Armed Forces, MGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs - DRA. At first, military operations were carried out in a certain area, with the solution of tasks to master it, the area of ​​operation expanded.

Speaking about the joint participation in the hostilities of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the All-Russian Special Forces in the Period of the Afghan War (1979-1989), General E.G. Nikitenko in his book - “The East is a delicate matter,” writes:

“If in 1980-1983 the Afghan units and subunits for the most part conducted military operations together with the Soviet troops and only 25-30% of operations (mainly small) were carried out independently, then in 1984-1985, 60- 70% of operations ”

- General Nikitenko E.G. book "East is a delicate matter"

The 40th Army, together with the DRA Armed Forces, carried out a number of large-scale planned and unscheduled operations. The most characteristic operations of the second stage were Panjerskaya and Kunarskaya. In 1984, in connection with the decision by the opposition leadership not to reduce activity in the winter, a new approach was required to conduct joint large-scale operations ^{[8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]} .

Planned and non-scheduled operations

Planned operations in Afghanistan - the actions of troops to defeat large enemy groups were called for, provided for in the combat plans of the headquarters of the 40th Army and the apparatus of the main military adviser in the DRA for a month, in large areas, with the involvement of significant forces and means, or to solve problems, which must be performed for a long time. In addition, in a war without a front line, the enemy created large armed groups in the most important areas, the decision to destroy which must be taken in a short time in order to quickly disrupt the rebels' plans. Planned military operations (and some unplanned ones) were, as a rule, large-scale, with the involvement of significant forces and means. They covered large areas of the country and sometimes were quite long in time. Such operations were led by the head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, army commander, his deputies, and commanders of formations. If large-scale operations were carried out independently by Afghan forces, and the Soviet units only supported them, then the leader was either the Minister of Defense (sometimes his deputy) or the corps commander. At the same time, the role of Soviet advisers under the Afghan leader, who were inseparably at his command post ^{[8] [9] [11] [12] [13] [16] [17] [18],} sharply increased.

Unscheduled operations in Afghanistan are military operations to immediately destroy precisely established enemy units, the actions of which could lead to dangerous consequences. In connection with the increased activity of the enemy’s actions, the role of unscheduled operations increased, which required the availability of units and units capable of solving suddenly arising tasks. According to the special conditions of conduct - operations were divided into operations:
in mountainous areas, operations in valleys with green and intestinal zones and operations in settlements.
Unscheduled military operations in Afghanistan were carried out mainly by duty units - reinforced companies and battalions against specific units and opposition groups according to the decisions of commanders of formations, units and even separate battalions after receiving reliable intelligence information, with a report of their decision to a higher commander.

This situation was due to the fact that due to the relatively high mobility of the enemy, intelligence relating to individual units and groups quickly became obsolete. It was necessary to ensure preemptive action in order to fend off or prevent completely hostile actions against Soviet and government forces and authorities in time. In many cases, these preemptive actions were not carried out by units of the ground forces, but by air and artillery strikes if intelligence had full exact coordinates ^{[8] [9] [11] [12] [13] [14] [18] [19]} .

The duration of the operation averaged about 10 days. The number of troops involved has increased from the 40th A (up to 30 battalions) and the RA Armed Forces (up to 19 battalions). The geography of hostilities expanded, their number increased in the green zone, more hostilities took place at night. An example of the largest operations in the winter of 1984 can be operations carried out in the Paktika province in the Urgun region, in the summer in the Panjer and Andarab valleys.
Due to political changes in the general strategy of the opposition leaders in 1982. changes were made to the tactics of warfare. The main efforts of the Afghan opposition were focused on maintaining and expanding the scope of its territorial control. Actively carried out work on the reorganization of the armed forces on the basis of the introduction of a clearer organizational structure close to the army ^{[8] [9] [11] [12] [13] [18]} .

• scheduled operations and raids;
• ambush actions in the zone of responsibility and in the border zone;
• actions of duty forces on the implementation of intelligence data;
• air strikes and tactical assault landing;
• fighting to capture kyariz and caves;
• military operations of airborne assault forces;
• ambush fighting;
• raids as a way of fighting ^[20]

“The composition of forces and means for carrying out each operation was determined on the basis of its scale, position, nature of the enemy’s actions and the chosen method of defeating it, as well as terrain features. At the same time, it was taken into account that the partisan nature of the actions of the opposition’s armed formations in the mountains required the involvement of much more forces and means than to accomplish the same task in ordinary conditions. This led to participation in a number of operations involving four to five or more combined arms units and a number of units of various branches of the army and special army forces. ”

According to the deputy chief of the operational department of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan V.A. Merimsky, the main factor influencing the actions of the troops, was the limited number of contingent of Soviet troops in the DRA:

The whole burden of warfare fell on motorized rifle and parachute airborne battalions. There were 55 such battalions in the 40th Army ( fifty-five ). Of this number, 32 ( thirty-two ) battalions were involved in the defense of communications, the protection of the most important national economic facilities, permanent deployment centers, and for securing state power in counties and provincial centers. Thus, only 23 ( twenty-three ) battalions could be used to conduct hostilities, which did not ensure the maintenance of hostilities even in the main regions of the country. In addition, a number of vital units, such as bakeries, laundries, etc., were not full-time and maintained at the expense of motorized rifle battalions, which reduced the number of personnel involved in the battle.

- General V. A. Merimsky "The Mysteries of the Afghan War" ^[21]

Speaking of those involved in the hostilities in Afghanistan, during the final period of the presence of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces - forces and means, in the book of the Head of the Southern Division of the Operational Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Lieutenant General V. A. Bogdanova - “The Afghan War (1979-1989). Recollection ”, it was written:

as of July 1, 1986, the 40th Army had a total of 133 (one hundred thirty-three) battalions and battalions. Of this number, 82 (eighty-two) battalions ( or 62% ) performed security tasks - 23 battalions were guarded by communications, 14 airfields, 23 various military and business facilities, and 22 local authorities. For conducting active hostilities throughout the country, no more than the 51st battalion (division) could be involved.

- General V.A. Bogdanov “The Afghan War (1979-1989). Recollection ”Chapter 4. FEATURES OF AFGHANISTAN. CHARACTERISTIC OF THE MILITARY ACTION OF THE OPPOSITION FORCES AGAINST SOVIET AND GOVERNMENT TROOPS

To facilitate the identification (specification) of operations among OKSVA military personnel, a prefix was used indicating the name (geography) of the region, their conduct - the province, town, mountain range. So in the recollections of participants in the events reflected the following operations: Panjshirskie; Kunarsky; Herat; Kandahar Helmand; Alicheil; Urgun; Marmolsky; Tashkurgan; Surubian and others. All major army operations were carried out with the support of attack aircraft ”, were joint - ground forces and attack aircraft, in the conditions of continuous relocation. ^[22]

First Period

The first period (initial) is from January 1980 to January 1982. By the nature of military-political tasks and the characteristics of the armed struggle, the military operations of the OKSVA in Afghanistan can be conditionally divided into four periods.
The first period included the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, its deployment along garrisons, the organization of security and defense of permanent deployment points and the most important military facilities, as well as the conduct of hostilities to ensure the solution of these tasks ^{[8] [9] [11 ] ] [12] [13] [18]} .

The Winter of 1980 was especially difficult for Soviet soldiers. The calculation that the Afghan army will solve the main tasks of the armed struggle against the opposition has not justified itself. The armed forces of the DRA remained weak and not operational. Therefore, the main burden of the struggle against the armed opposition units was borne by Soviet troops. ” Anti-government forces in the 1st period acted against the Soviet forces by relatively large forces, did not evade a direct clash with them. This allowed the defeat of large counterrevolutionary groups in the areas of Fayzabad, Talikan, Tahar, Baglan, Jalalabad and other cities ^{[8] [9] [11] [12] [13] [18] [19]} .

Second Period

The 2nd period (active) - from January 1982 to January 1987 (according to other sources: from March 1982 to April 1986), until the announcement of the policy of national reconciliation (PNP) was characterized by the introduction of active large-scale hostilities, mainly - on their own, as well as in conjunction with units and parts of the Armed Forces. “The opposition, having suffered a number of major military defeats in the first period of the war, moved the main groupings of its troops to hard-to-reach mountain areas, where it became practically impossible to use modern technology ...” The opposition, using knowledge of the area, skillfully used various tactics. When meeting with superior forces of the Soviet troops, formations evaded the battle. Ways were worked out to shelter members of formations in settlements, among civilians ^{[8] [9] [11] [12] [13] [18]} .

At the same time, the enemy did not miss the opportunity to deliver a sudden blow using small forces. In the 2nd period, the armed opposition squads abandoned the positional struggle and maneuvering actions were widely used. The battles were fought only in cases when the situation forced it - during the defense of the basic regions, when the opposition forces were completely blocked and clashes could not be avoided. In such cases, “the blocked units fought in close combat, which practically excluded the use of aviation and drastically reduced the possibility of using artillery, especially from closed fire positions” ^{[8] [9] [11] [12] [13] [18] [19 ]} .

Third Period

The 3rd period (passive) from September 1986 to January 1988 is the period of execution of the policy of national reconciliation. “In the third period of their stay in Afghanistan, the troops of the 40th Army came out with the most numerous personnel. The grouping of their ground forces included four divisions, five separate brigades, four separate regiments and six separate battalions. As part of these forces, there were about 29 thousand units of military equipment, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles up to 6 thousand. To ensure the actions of troops from the air, the commander had four aviation and three helicopter regiments.

The total number of personnel of OKSVA reached 108.8 thousand people, including 73 thousand in combat units. This was the most combat-ready group for the entire period of the Soviet troops’s stay in Afghanistan, however, the views on their use have changed significantly ” ^{[8] [9] [11] [12] [13] [18] [19]} .

Fourth Period

The 4th period - from January 1988 - preparation for the withdrawal of troops and the withdrawal in February 1989. The impulse for the fourth period was laid back in September 1986 by the Extraordinary Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, which proclaimed a course towards national reconciliation. By this time, it had become clear to sensible people that there was no military solution to the Afghan problem.

The adoption of the "course of national reconciliation" reflected the current situation in the country, when it was impossible to achieve the end of the war by military means. However, the implementation of the policy of reconciliation became possible only after a whole complex of preliminary measures had been taken at the initiative of the Soviet Union, which created the necessary ground for this.

The main and decisive step was the decision of the USSR government agreed with the Afghan leadership on the start of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, subject to the termination of armed assistance to the Afghan rebels from Pakistan and other countries ” ^{[8] [9] [11] [12] [13] [18 ] ] [19]} .

The military-political situation in the DRA and around it, in accordance with the actions of the armed opposition and the nature of the operational and combat operations of the units of the border troops of the USSR, were conditionally determined by three periods ^{[8] [9] [11] [12] [13] [18] [ 20]} .

First Period

In the first or initial period (December 1979 - January 1982), the border troops ensured the entry of OKSVA into the territory of the DRA with separate raid actions, a group of special forces of the border troops was created, cleared of bandit formations and taken under protection throughout the Soviet-Afghan border to a depth of 10– 15 km the northern regions of the DRA, local authorities are strengthened, thereby ensuring the security of the southern borders of the USSR ^[20] .

Second Period

The second ( main ) period of operations of the special forces of the border troops in Afghanistan (January 1982 - January 1987) was characterized by the improvement of their organizational structure, large-scale operations in connection with the expansion of their area of ​​responsibility to 100-120 km, as well as significant stabilization of the situation in the northern regions of the DRA ;

Third Period

The third ( final ) period (from January 1987 - February 1989) coincided with the duration of the national reconciliation program announced by the leadership of Afghanistan in 1987, the signing of the Geneva Agreements, which provided for non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from there ^[20] .

In the period from 1980-1981, the units of the KSAPO border troops in the territory of the DRA conducted dozens of planned and private operations, hundreds of combat raids and ambushes, which helped to stabilize the situation and strengthen the authorities in the northern regions of Afghanistan and thereby ensure the security of the borders of the USSR ^[20] .

Thus, by the end of 1981, a group of border troops and a control system for their special forces operating in the territory of the DRA were created. In fact, this group was a kind of security belt that reliably protected the southern borders of the USSR. As a result of the operations, the plans of opposition centers to seize the entire territory of Badakhshan and establish an anti-government regime here were disrupted ^[20] .

The threat of the capture by armed groups of the opposition of the areas adjacent to the Soviet-Afghan border and the strengthening of Islamic influence in them was eliminated, large armed groups that were forced to leave the border were defeated ^[20] .

At the beginning of 1982, KSAPO had 40 helicopters, and after the reorganization in 1984 of the Dushanbe Air Squadron into the 28th Aviation Regiment, the Okrug had already had 62 helicopters and 6 aircraft. In total, by July 1986, the KSAPO border guard units in the DRA had 28 moto-maneuverable groups; 20 frontier posts were located in 55 garrisons - on Afghan territory ^[20] .

In the fighting 151 infantry fighting vehicles and 248 armored personnel carriers, more than 200 mortars and other weapons were involved.
In 1982–1986, the KSAPO border guard units in the DRA conducted more than 800 (eight hundred) operations both independently and jointly with units of the 40th Army and the Afghan Armed Forces ^[20] .

The commander of the 40th Army and the army headquarters monthly developed a combat plan, subsequently it was coordinated with the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the group of the General Staff, the headquarters of the TurkMO, the apparatus of the chief military adviser of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Afghanistan and the KGB representative at the embassy of the USSR, and signed by the commander of the TurkMO chief military adviser, representative of the KGB at the embassy of the USSR and was approved by the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. На основе утвержденного ежемесячного плана боевой деятельности 40-й Армии — на каждую армейскую операцию, командующим разрабатывалось решение.

В зависимости от условий и масштаба операции, они утверждались крупномасштабные — Министерством обороны, командующим войсками ТуркВО, руководителем оперативной группы МО, главнокомандующим войсками Южного направления, а иногда и командующим армией (небольшие операции), если руководителем операции был заместитель командующего ^[23] .

Получив разрешение от вышестоящего командования на проведение операции, командующий армией уяснял задачу по разгрому противника. Для оценки обстановки он привлекал начальника штаба, командующих авиацией и артиллерией, начальника разведки и начальника разведцентра, начальника оперативного отдела и начальника инженерных войск, В результате оценки обстановки командующий определял основы замысла на операцию. Затем под руководством командующего привлекаемые должностные лица конкретизировали замысел, вырабатывая решение на операцию.

Принятое решение последовательно детализировалась, затрагивая большой круг вопросов. Командующий армией лично согласовывал решение с главными военным советником в Афганистане и представителем КГБ при посольстве СССР. После согласования решение докладывалось в штаб ТуркВО и Генеральный Штаб Вооруженных Сил СССР. По мере приближения срока (но не позднее чем за 5-7 суток до начала операции) для разработки плана привлекались начальники роде войск.
Затем боевые задачи ставились командирам соединений и частей. В то же время для проведения крупномасштабной операций, таких, как Панджшерские 1982-1985 годы., Кунарские 1980-1985 годы . и другие, план операции отрабатывался строго ограниченным кругом лиц за месяц до их начала, затем представлялся в Генеральный штаб и только после доработки доводился до начальников отделов и служб ^[24] .

Войсковые операции с кодовыми наименованиями в период (1979-1989): «Горы-80», «Весна-80», «Осень-80», «Удар-1,2», «Залп», Смерчь, Операция «Манёвр», «Западня» , «Магистраль» , «Гранит», «Гроза» в провинции Газни, « Джавара », «Юг» (Кандагар), «Тайфун» и другие .

Воспоминания генерала армии Варенникова В. И. о проведённых войсковых операциях :

В период моего пребывания в Афганистане был проведен целый ряд интересных и сложных операций. Конечно, операция операции — рознь. Одни не оставили никаких воспоминаний. Другие же никогда не поблекнут. Для меня особо памятны операции в Кунарском ущелье , при штурме базы Джавара, на Парачинарском выступе , в районе Кундуза , западнее Герата до базы «Кокари — Шаршари» на иранской границе в горном массиве Луркох, в районе Лашкаргаха, в провинции Кандагар и непосредственно за Кандагаром .

— из воспоминаний генерала армии Варенникова В. И.

Итогом общевойсковых операций являлся разгром многочисленных хорошо организованных формирований афганских моджахедов по всей территории Афганистана, овладение важными опорными пунктами (фортификационными сооружениями) и перевалочными базами, с широким арсеналом вооружения, боеприпасов и разведывательной документацией.

Тактика отрядов вооружённой орппозиции при ведении боевых действий против регулярных сил Советской Армии и афганский Правительственных сил сводилась к тактике партизанской войны, потому в основу боевых действий были положены следующие главные принципы:

• избегать прямых столкновений с превосходящими силами регулярных войск;
• не превращать боевые действия в позиционную войну;
• главным методом ведения боевых действий считать внезапное нападение;
• в ходе вооруженной борьбы широко использовать террор и идеологическую обработку ^[25]

Главную силу мятежников составляли региональные группы и отряды. Их цели, организационные формы и тактику ведения боевых действий определяли местные племенные и религиозные авторитеты - «полевые командиры», а зона действий ограничивалась районами проживания членов формирований вооруженной оппозиции. На начальном этапе формирования не имели постоянного состава и организации. Состав отрядов и групп в социально-этническом отношении был неоднороден.

Как правило в состав формирования входили представители одной национально-этнической группы. На своем уровне полевые командиры не имели контакта с зарубежными организациями афганской контрреволюции, это являлось прерогативой лидеров оппозиции. Их главным преимуществом была активная поддержка местного населения».
В ходе вооруженной борьбы силы оппозиции применяли различные приемы боевых действий — засады, налёты, обстрелы. Широко практиковались: минирование, диверсии, террор, проводка караванов.
Засадные действия оппозиции проводились с целью срыва поставок народно-хозяйственных и военных грузов, захвата материальных средств, оружия, боеприпасов, а также физического уничтожения военнослужащих ОКСВА. Такие случаи носили системный и частный характер».

Засады и налёты

Засады, в основном проводилась небольшой группой из 10-15 человек. Их боевой порядок состоял из наблюдателей и трёх-четырёх подгрупп. Наблюдатели создавали наблюдательные пункты в горах или выдвигались на вероятные маршруты движения колонн противника. Наблюдатели были не вооружены и выдавали себя за мирных жителей (пастухов, крестьян). Часто в качестве наблюдателей использовались дети.

Основу засады составляла огневая подгруппа, включавшая основным силы и огневые средства оппозиции. Она, как правило, располагалась в центре боевого порядка в непосредственной близости от района поражения противника и тщательно маскировалась. Силы нападения на колонны размещались вдоль дороги на расстоянии от 150 до 300 м от полотна. На флангах располагались гранатометчики, пулеметчики, снайперы. На господствующих высотах устанавливались ДШК, приспособленные вести огонь по наземным и воздушным целям.

Так, только за три года (с 1985-го по 1987-й) было зафиксировано более 10 тысяч засад. Засады оппозиции на колонны с техникой СВ, устраивались на участках дорог, проходящих через перевалы, ущелья. В горах позиции для засады устраивались на склонах или гребнях высот, входе или выходе из ущелья, на перевальных участках дорог.

В «зеленых зонах» они организовывались в местах вероятного отдыха правительственных и советских войск или на направлениях их ожидаемых действий. Поражение наносилось огнем как с фронта, так и с флангов. Часто, засады устраивались на нескольких рубежах по мере продвижения войск — как в колоннах, так и в боевых порядках. В населенных пунктах засады проводились из-за глинобитных заборов, домов — с расчётом, обманными действиями завлечь противника в «огневой мешок.

Боевые действия частей и соединений ОКСВА в зонах ответственности носили регулярный характер. Группировка противника располагалась на большой территории, относительно небольшими отрядами, занимавшими населённые пункты, ущелья, горы, что не позволяло осуществить её окружение. Поэтому вся территория делилась на зоны, в каждой из которых самостоятельно действовала дивизия или полк.
«Зона боевых действий на территории Афганистана условно подразделялась на четыре района, которые контролировались подразделениями армейской авиации и частично войсками:

• На севере страны это районы городов: Кундуза, Ханабада, Файзабада, Пули-Хумри, Ташкургана, Мазари-Шарифа
• На востоке: Хост, Асабад, Джелалабад, Гардез, Газни, Кабул, Баграм
• На юге: Мунарай, восточная и южная приграничная зона с Пакистаном, Кандагар, Лашкаргах
• На западе — районы: Герата, Шинданда, Фараха»

Северная территориальная зона

«Северная территориальная зона» — территории так называемых земель: «афганского туркестана» и «Хазарджата». Народы населяющие данную территорию имеют — исторические, культурные, а также родственные связи с народами бывших Советских Среднеазиатских Республик.

Населена: таджиками (большинство); узбеками (племена: каттаганцы, сарайцы, кенегесцы, кураминцы, мангиты, кунградцы, локайцы, дурмены, минги, юзы, барласы, карлуки, сунаки, кипчаки, найманы, канглы, чагатайцы и др.); хазарейцами — (в равных долях); пуштунами (в разные времена заселялись афганскими правителями — племена: шинвари, сафи, мангал, саларзай, джаджи, читрали, тури, африди и др.); туркменами (племена: эрсары(и), али-эли, сарыка, салоры, текинцы); также казахами; арабами и др.

«Северная территориальная зона» — включает в себя провинции: Балх, Саманган, Сари-Пуль, Фарьяб, Джаузджан

В Северной территориальной зоне в провинции Фариаб в декабре 1981 – январе 1982 года Правительственными силами ДРА была проведена «тщательно подготовленная операция по уничтожению «исламских комитетов»». Кроме сухопутных сил, к операции привлекался воздушный десант (1200 человек) и 52 самолета ВВС: 24 Су-17МЗ, 8 Су-25, 12 МиГ-21 и 8 Ан-12. От армейской авиации в операции участвовали 60 советских и 12 афганских вертолетов. Вся операция готовилась в строгом секрете. Утечка информации из узкого круга лиц, посвящённых в детали операции с участием афганских военных приводил к тяжёлым последствиям. На этот случай для афганских военных была разработана «легенда». Лишь за два-три часа до начала операции афганские военные вводились в план операции.

Главная часть «Операции» приходилась на 15–16 января 1982 года. Масштаб операции предусматривал привлечение значительных сил и средств: самолеты МиГ-21 (для подавления групп ПВО), три ударные группы по 8 Су-17МЗ (первой из них придавались еще и восемь Су-25, особенно эффективны при штурме). Ударные группы несли вооружение из ФАБ-250 и РБК-250 с шариковыми бомбами. Налёт наносился одновременно «по складам с вооружением, позициям ПВО и опорным базам вооруженных отрядов. Уничтожению подлежали штабы исламских комитетов, жилые здания, где могли скрываться члены вооружённых формирований, и сельские школы, в которых велась антиправительственная агитация.

After the departure of the shock groups, the terrain was treated with Mi-24D, they also provided fire support during the landing from Mi-8T and Mi-6. The landing was carried out with a minimum of "clearance" - starting the landing with a segment of 20 minutes, at the end of the aviation strike. Even the low cloudiness in the area of ​​the operation did not prevent aviation from achieving success - the base in this area ceased to exist. Losses amounted to aviation: one Mi-24D and two Mi-8T, shot down by fire from machine guns DShK in the landing zone "

Northeast Territorial Zone

The "Northeast Territorial Zone" includes the provinces: Kunduz, Baghlan, Tahar, Badakhshan
"Northeastern territorial zone", the historical region of "Kattagana and Badakhshan". Populated by: Tajiks (evenly distributed); Pashtuns - mainly in the provinces: Kunduz, Baglan (tribes - Gilzai, Shinvari, Safi, Brazier, Salarzai, Jaji, Chitral, Turi, Afridi, etc.); Uzbeks - mainly in the provinces: Tahar, Kunduz (tribes: Kattagan, Sarai, Kenegans, Kuramin, Mangits, Kungrads, Lokays, Durmens, Mingi, Yuzas, Barlas, Karluks, Sunak, Kipchaks, Naimans, Kangly, Chagatis and others); Hazaras - in the province of Kunduz, Baghlan; also by the Arabs; Pashai Kazakhs. In the province of Badakhshan live: Ismaili Tajiks; various Pamir peoples: Rushans (Rykhen, Rukhni), Ishkashim (Ishkoshumi, Ishkoshim), Vahan (Wahi, Hik), Sanglits, Zebak, Mundzhan, Shugnans (Hugni), Darvaz, etc. In the highlands of the far north-east of Afghanistan, in the region (Vakhan corridor) of the same province, Afghan Kirghiz live.

In the period from the beginning of 1918 to the beginning of the 1940s, the counties of the provinces: Kunduz, Tahar, Baghlan, Faryab, Badgis were the outpost and transshipment base of the thousands of armed Basmachist units and their leaders, the Kurbashi, Ibrahim-Bek, Madamin-Bek, Muetdin-bek, Mahmud-bek, Dzhunaid Khan, Utan-Bek, Kurshirmat, Abdul Ahad Kara, Katta Ergasha, Kichik Ergasha, Seyid-Mubashir Khan Tirazi, Enver Pasha, Jafar Khan, D. Sardar, Nurmamada, Kizil Ayaka et al. In the course of many years of armed confrontation, the Basmachi units were either destroyed or squeezed out tryadami Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army outside the borders of the "Red Turkestan" in the adjacent territories - in the Emirate of Afghanistan. A significant part of the survivors - active, irreconcilable members of the Basmach movement settled in the counties of the northeastern provinces: Kunduz, Tahar, Baghlan and integrated into Afghan society. In the early 1990s, strong points and transshipment bases of the “implacable Tajik opposition” were located on this territory.

Western Territory

“Western territorial zone” includes the provinces: Herat, Badgis, Gore, Farah - (it also includes: northwestern, southwestern - parts of Afghanistan)
"Western territorial zone", historically - the land of the Persian "Khorasan", a territory previously, for the most part, part of the Persian Empire. It is mainly inhabited by Tajiks (some of whom are Shiites), they also live: Farsivans (Persians), Charaimaks, Pashtuns (tribes: Nurzai, Achakzai, Isakzai, etc.); Kyzylbashi; Afshars Turkmens (tribes: Ersary (s), Ali-Eli, Saryka, Salory, Tekinians); Uzbeks (tribes: Kattagans, Sarai, Kenegans, Kuramin, Mangits, Kungrads, Lokay, Durmen, Minga, Yuz, Barlas, Karluks, Sunak, Kipchaks, Naimans, Kangly, Chagatais, etc.); Hazaras Talysh; Kurds Firuzkuhi; teimuri; taimoni; jamshids and others. The population of this region has ancient historical and cultural ties with neighboring Iran. Over the years, the Iranian government has been providing political and financial support to the region.

Central Territory Zone

“The central territorial zone, including the Panjshir gorge” includes the provinces: Bamyan, Parvan, Panjshir, Kapisa (the places of compact residence of the Panjshir Tajiks of the Panjshir people - the Afghans Panjeri) and the Hazaras (Khazars) - Bamyan, the historical and cultural capital of the Hazaras, the so-called Khazardzhat.

Eastern Territory Zone

The "eastern territorial zone" includes the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar, Lagman was inhabited by the tribes of the Pashtun union Karlani (Karrani), the largest of which are the Safi tribe (Gandari clan), as well as the tribes of Momand, Gigiani, Shinvari, Khugyani, Tarklani, Myshvani , Sarkani, Safi, Waziri and others; various Nuristan peoples. This territory has always been a zone of absolute influence of the Pashtun tribes - historically using their geographical position for military and economic purposes from the time of "Western India" and the Anglo-Afghan Wars to the present day.

Southeast Territory Zone

The “Southeast Territorial Zone” includes the provinces: Ghazni, Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Zabul

The “Southeast Territorial Zone” is inhabited by Pashtuns of two large tribal unions: the First - “Gilzai” it includes: Suleimanheil, Haroti, Hatoki, Tohi, Nasyr and others. The second - “Karrani” (Karlani), includes: Jadran, Dzhadzhi, Tani, Waziri and others. The Pashtun tribes inhabiting the provinces: Paktika, Paktia, Khost, Zabul include the Karlani tribal union (Karlanri, Karrani), consisting of the tribes - Dzhadzhi, Jadran, Mangal, Makbil, Chamkani, Waziri, Gurbuzi , Mandozai, Sabri, Tani, Turi, Orakzai, Shinwari, Hugyani, etc.

This territory, as well as the Eastern Territorial Zone, has always been a zone of absolute influence of the Pashtun mountain tribes - historically using their geographical position for military and economic purposes since the time of “Western India” and the Anglo-Afghan Wars to this day.

Southern Territory

The "southern territorial zone" includes the provinces: Kandahar, Helmand, Nimroz, Uruzgan - (it also includes southwestern Afghanistan)

The “southern territorial zone” is inhabited by Pashtuns of two large tribal unions, one of which, “Durrani” or (Abdali), consists of two branches: “Zirak”, tribes: Popalsai, Sadozai, Alikozai, Barakzai, Muhammazayami, Achakzai; Panjpai branches: Nurzai, Alizai, Iskhakzai, it includes: Mohamedzai, Yuzufzai, Nurzai and others. The second large tribal union is Gilzai. It consists of branches - “Turan”, it includes the tribes: Hotaki, Tohi (Toki), Haroti (Haruti), Nasir (Nasyr); And “Burkhan: Ibrahimheil, Suleimanheil, Aliheil, Sahak, Andarheil, Nasar, Tarakheil and others; also the branch of Musa, consists of tribes: Ahmadzai, Andar, Taraki, Sahak, etc.
The following people also live in southern Afghanistan: Balochi, Bragui, Kyzylbashi, Tajiks, Afshars, Hazaras, etc. This territory has always been a zone of absolute influence of the Pashtun tribes Durrani and Gilzai - historically using their geographical position for military and economic purposes since the time of “Western India” to date.

Events prior to Operation Storm 333 and the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

• April-May 1979, at the request of the Afghan leadership of the CPSU Central Committee, decided to deliver to Afghanistan special assets worth 53 million rubles: 140 guns and mortars, 90 armored personnel carriers, 48,000 small arms, 100 grenade launchers, 680 aviation bombs
• May 5 - The formation of the “Muslim battalion” of the GRU began in TurkVO . It was equipped with indigenous nationalities of the Central Asian republics.
• July - A parachute airborne battalion was redeployed to Bagram to ensure the protection of Soviet transport aircraft (see photo). In Afghanistan, the special group of the KGB "Zenit-1"
• August 5 - rebellion in the 26th Afghan parachute regiment and commando battalion Kabul
• August 28-25 - Visit to the DRA of the Soviet military delegation led by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces I. G. Pavlovsky
• September - The KGB special group Zenit-2 arrived in Kabul.
• November 22 - Lieutenant General V. S. Paputin, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, flew into the DRA
• December 3-14 - The Muslim Battalion (154th separate detachment of special forces) of the GRU of the General Staff and the 3rd infantry regiment of the 345th special operations detachment were transferred to Bagram airbase
• Beginning of December - The opposition brought the size of its armed formations to 40 thousand people and launched military operations against the new government in 12 provinces of Afghanistan
• The KGB general Kirpichenko, the first deputy, arrived in the DRA. KGB foreign intelligence chief.

The end of 1979. Representatives of the PDPA, led by Babrak Karmal, who has been living as an emigrant in Czechoslovakia since August 1978, create illegal structures with the support of the special services of the socialist states to fight the regime of X. Amin. Moscow is preparing for a coup in Kabul. Islamists in Afghanistan are also continuing their struggle. In fact, a civil war broke out in the country. December 1979

• At the request of Amin, two Soviet battalions were transferred to Afghanistan to strengthen protection for the residence of the head of state and the Bagram airfield. With one of them B. Karmal arrived.
• December 10 - Minister of Defense D. Ustinov informed the Chief of the General Staff N. Starkov that the Politburo had made a preliminary decision on the temporary deployment of troops in the DRA and set the task to prepare an estimated 75- to 80-thousandth force grouping. At the College of the USSR Ministry of Defense D. Ustinov said that it was necessary to prepare a force grouping. Directive No. 312/12/00133 was sent to the troops.

D. Ustinov gave an oral order to N. Ogarkov on the formation of a new combined arms army in TurkVO

• December 12 - At a meeting of the Politburo, a decision was made to send Soviet troops into the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan . According to the memoirs of A. A. Gromyko, the decision "on the introduction of certain contingents of Soviet troops deployed in the southern regions of the country into the territory of the DRA in order to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as to create favorable conditions for the prohibition of possible anti-Afghan actions by neighboring states .. . "was unanimously adopted by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.
• December 13 - The operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense was formed, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army General S.F. Akhromeev, a little later the group was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov . Colonel-General Yu.P. Maksimov, commander of the TurkVO troops, ordered his first deputy, Lieutenant-General Yu.V. Tukharinov, to prepare the troops for deployment. He flew to Termez and was appointed the first commander of the 40th Army.
• December 14 - A special group of the KGB of the USSR "Thunder" arrived in Kabul, reinforcing the Zenit-2 group.
• At 22:00 a task force of the USSR Ministry of Defense arrived in Termez.
• December 17 - The "Muslim battalion" advanced from Bagram and concentrated in the area of ​​the residence of X. Amin - the Taj-Bek / Kabul / palace.
• December 23 - The task force headquarters of the Airborne Forces, led by Deputy Commander of the Airborne Forces General Guskov, arrived in Kabul.
• December 24 - Directive of the Ministry of Defense and the National High School No. 312/12/001 33 define specific tasks for the deployment and deployment of troops on Afghan territory. Participation in hostilities was not provided.
• December 25 - At 12:00 /isk../ an order was received to cross the state border. At 15:00 began the introduction of troops / 108 honey, 103rd airborne division /.
• December 27 - Directive of the USSR Ministry of Defense N 312/12/002 set specific combat missions to suppress the rebel resistance.

OKSVA DATA

• Irrecoverable losses-86 people.
• Losses: tanks-1, armored vehicles-1, aircraft and helicopters-6

Military operations and general reports for 1980

• The 1st Kunar operation to neutralize the rebel Afghan mountain infantry regiment in the Asmara Gorge. On February 28-29, the personnel of the 3rd Parachute Airborne Battalion of the 317th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division in the region of Asmara, mistakenly planning a military operation, turned out to be blocked by dushmans in Asmar . Killed 35 soldiers, injured 40, 1-n soldier went missing ^[26] .
• The first military operation in Nahrin County, Baghlan Province .
• 1st Combined Arms Panjshir Operation .
• August 3 - during the arrival to the rescue units of the 149th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment , leading the battle in the mountainous section of the Mashhad Gorge of Kishim County, Badakhshan Province - were ambushed and accepted the battle near the village of Shaest 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion ( 783rd ORB ) 201st MSD , 49 servicemen were killed (37 scouts of the 783rd ORB and 12 guardsmen of the 149th guards. SMEs)., 48th total number was wounded.
• Autumn - 2nd Panjshir Operation .
• military operations in the provinces of Kapisa , Kabul , Logar , Wardak , in the Lurkokh mountain range ( Farah ) - “ Herat Cleansing”.
• the first large-scale combined-arms operation "Strike" -1 ~ in the central provinces.
• the rebels (oppositionists) began to equip warehouses and bases of weapons, ammunition, food in hard-to-reach mountainous areas, as well as preparing the caves for winter.

OKSVA DATA

• Irrecoverable losses - 1484 people.
• Injuries and Diseases - 30612
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (for injuries, injuries and diseases) - 725
• Losses: tanks - 18, armored vehicles - 173, aircraft and helicopters - 40

Military operations and general reports for 1981

• January-February - Operational-military operations to eliminate the counter-revolutionary underground in the cities of Kabul , Kandahar , Herat , Jalalabad , Khost
• March - “3rd Panjshir operation”
• in eight northern provinces of Afghanistan (out of 26) there are 200 rebel groups with a total number of 8.5 thousand people.
• early September - “Marmol Operation” rout of the rebel base areas 30 km south of Mazar-e-Sharif
• since September 6 - “4th Panjshir operation” - “Canyon”.
• mid-October - “Urgun operation”
• (September-December) - 46 operations, 250 actions of duty units were carried out against the Mujahideen .
• December - military operation to defeat the large base region of the rebels "Darzab" in the north of the DRA

“During the year, the fighting was especially active in the provinces of Logar , Paktia , Nangarhar , around Kabul. For 1981 - 4 collection points were set up for the bodies of the deceased personnel in Shindand , Bagram , Kabul , Kunduz . According to the General Staff , more than 20 thousand rebels were destroyed, 7763 were captured, up to 12 thousand small arms were captured, 1.5 million various munitions, 79 infantry fighting complexes, 22 mortars and other ... "

OKSVA DATA

• Irretrievable losses - 1298 people.
• Injuries and diseases - no data
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (for injuries, injuries and diseases) no data
• Losses: Tanks - 28, Armored vehicles - 128, Aircraft and helicopters - 26, Guns and mortars - 17

Military operations and general reports for 1982

“Planned combat operations were, as a rule, large-scale, relatively long in time, a large number of troops participated in them. In total, during the years in Afghanistan, our troops operated in 416 planned operations. In 1982, operations were carried out that could be recorded in the annals of the Afghan war ... "

“In late January - early February, opposition groups were defeated in a wide valley - the“ green zone ”of Jabal-Ussaraj , Charikar , Mahmudraki. In this zone, the IPA groups of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan operated. They constantly bombarded the Bagram airfield, garrisons and government buildings, robbed peaceful vehicles, and carried out sabotage against Soviet guard outposts and columns. The presence of a large group of "IPA" near the capital had a destabilizing effect on Kabul ... "

“By the end of January 25, our units suddenly blocked the area for the enemy. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of Afghanistan organized filtration points. In the following days, the encirclement was compressed, the resistance groups of the rebels were destroyed. On February 5, combing operations were completed. The enemy suffered heavy losses. The situation in the provinces of Kabul , Parvan and Kapisa has improved significantly, which has a positive impact on the situation in the capital and on the Hairaton-Kabul highway ... "

“Another example of a major military operation is the defeat of a large base opposition region in the Darzab region on the border of the provinces of Jauzjan and Faryab :

• carried out from February 15 to February 19, 1982. But the most famous were six operations in the Panjshir .
• in (April-May) 1982, the so-called "2nd Panjshir" was held - the most high-profile operation in the history of the Afghan war ... "

“The Panjshir River Valley is one of the most geographically difficult areas of the DRA. It stretches for 70 km in length with a width of 12 km all the way to the Pakistan border. It has a huge number of caves, holes, gorges, passes, dominant heights, passages (adjacent to the main valley and giving free access to various areas and to the main highway connecting Kabul with the Soviet Union through the Salang pass ... "

“That is why the Panjshir, which also has significant wealth of emeralds, rubies and lapis lazuli , was chosen to host the so-called Central Partisan Base Ahmad Shah Masuda . He created here a well-equipped system of defense, fire and control of the rebel forces operating in the vast vital territory ... "

“The fighting began on the night of May 16, 1982. The Soviet units suddenly for the enemy captured all the dominant heights at the entrance to the gorge and at a depth of 10 km from the entrance to it. Then the landing of the airborne assault began, which divided the entire enemy grouping into four isolated parts .... "

“Soviet and Afghan battalions moved to join the landing force on foot in the heights to the right and left of the gorge and military equipment along its bottom. During the fighting, 203 fire installations, 25 mortars, 120 large-caliber machine guns, about 30 warehouses with weapons and ammunition were destroyed and captured, about 100 caves adapted for defense were blown up ... "

“During the year, along with planned combat operations, private military operations of the OKSVA command or according to the decisions of the commanders of formations and units were carried out. By tactics, they did not differ from major operations. If the situation demanded, rounds were used, troops landed, the enemy was surrounded, settlements were blocked, etc. The operations were most effective if they were carried out at a distance of no more than 10-15 km from the deployment points, with advancement to areas at night. In total, more than 220 private operations of various sizes were carried out in Afghanistan ... "

Continuation of large-scale military operations of the Soviet troops in the provinces:

• Kandahar , Kapisa and Parvan
• January-February, (especially intense battles took place in the provinces of Parvan - in the Green Zone of Charikar , near Jabal-Ussaraj at the entrance to the Panjshir Gorge, and Kapisa - near the settlement of Mahmudraki
• April - combined arms operation in the province of Nimroz
• "5th Panjshir operation"
• May-June - a large-scale combined-arms operation in the province of Logar
• August-September, “6th Panjshir Operation”
• December - withdrawal of troops from the Panjshir
• January, fighting in Kandahar .
• end of January-beginning of February-Fighting in the green zone Jabal-Ussaraj , Charikar , Mahmudraki
• operation in Nimruz province
• May 16-June, "5th Panjshir operation." It involved 36 battalions: (20 Afghan and 16 Soviet, with a total number of about 1.2 thousand people), more than 320 armored vehicles, 155 guns and mortars, 104 helicopters and 26 aircraft. Soviet units lost 93 people killed and 343 wounded.
• August-September, “6th Panjshir Operation”

The situation around Kabul has become much more complicated in connection with the strengthening of mujahideen in the provinces of Parvan , Kapisa , Logar , Wardak , Lagman and their effective actions. Significant forces of the "Mujahideen" were concentrated in the province of Kunar . On March 1, 1982, the year in the rebel camp, the number of troops reached the number of up to 50 thousand people.

OKSVA DATA

• Irretrievable losses - 1948 people.
• Injuries and Diseases - 29455
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (for injuries, injuries and diseases) - 894
• Losses: Tanks - 17, Armored vehicles - 107, Aircraft and helicopters - 40, Guns and mortars - 14

Military operations and general reports for the year 1983

“The main small arms were Kalashnikovs of Chinese and Egyptian manufacture, American rifles, assault rifles and grenade launchers of West German, English, Swedish and Israeli manufacture. Widely used heavy machine guns DShK , mortars 60-82 mm. Since 1983, a large number of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines began to appear: Italian, American, English. The most widely used are mines and a plastic case, as well as landmines with remote control and radio-controlled mines. Often used and mine-surprises of artisanal production ... "

• January 2 - in Mazar-i-Sharif, the Dushmans abducted a group (16 people) of our civilian specialists. They managed to free them only a month later, and six of them died.
• fighting in the province of Logar
• April - Operation to defeat opposition groups in the "Nijrab Gorge" ( Kapisa province). Soviet units lost 14 people dead and 63 wounded.

“Autumn - For the first time, opposition groups did not leave for the winter to rest in Pakistan and Iran . The creation of fortified areas and bases began directly in Afghanistan . At the end of 1983, there were a total of 212 specialized centers and training centers for rebels (1,178 in Pakistan and 34 in Iran), allowing training over 75,000 people a year.

For a year - in funerals they are most often called: Kunduz , Puli-Khumri , Kabul , Herat , Shindand , Kandahar ... "

OKSVA DATA

• Irretrievable losses - 1446 people.
• Injuries and Diseases - 4127
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (for injuries, injuries and diseases) - 945
• Losses: Tanks-13, Armored vehicles-186, aircraft and helicopters-37

Military operations and general reports for 1984

“1984-1985 was a period of maximum intensification of hostilities in Afghanistan. In essence, OKSVA was drawn into a full-scale civil war unfolding throughout the country. The political and military leadership of the USSR posed two tasks for the Soviet troops: together with the Afghan government army, to defeat large armed rebel forces in the base regions and assist Kabul in strengthening local government bodies ... "

“In the military history of 1984, operations in the provinces of Parwan , Kapisa , Kabul , Lagman (February-March) should be noted. Due to the partisan nature of the enemy’s actions, as well as serious miscalculations, not all operations achieved their goal. The year was the most tragic in the number of losses incurred by our troops - 2343 soldiers and officers died ... "

“The Mujahideen have a large number of rockets and installations made in China. The American Stinger MANPADS and the English Blowpipe appeared. On April 20, the number of "Stingers" reached 47. In 1984, 62 launches of MANPADS were noted "

• (end of February - beginning of March) Fighting in the provinces of Parvan , Kapisa , Kabul , Lagman
• since April 21 - a large-scale combined-arms operation in the Panjshir Gorge. During which he was ambushed and suffered heavy losses at the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion atalon of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and lost: 53 killed, 58 wounded.
• the largest “in composition, attracted forces and means, duration and significance” were operations in the river valleys: Panjshir , Andarab and in the “green zones” around the cities of Kabul and Herat
• December, operation to defeat the basic areas of the rebels in the mountains of Lurkokh , Farah province ), located in three gorges.
• (January-May) 85 operations were carried out, 51 of them, joint with the units of the Afghan army and 84 independent, destroyed 18 thousand rebels, captured 3839 small arms, 146 DShK, 42 mortars , 101 hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers .

1984 is the most bloody year in the history of the Afghan war (1979-1989)

OKSVA DATA

• Irretrievable losses - 2343 people.
• Injuries and Diseases - 7737
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (for wounds, injuries and diseases) - 1388
• Losses: Tanks -7, Armored vehicles - 88, aircraft and helicopters - 66

Military operations and general reports for 1985

“This year, the fighting in Afghanistan reached a peculiar peak. The fighting became increasingly fierce, and Soviet troops remained the main force in the confrontation between the official Afghan authorities and the armed opposition. It was in 1985 that the largest operations were carried out against the forces of counter-revolution in the provinces of Panjshir , Kunar , Herat , Paktia , Khost and several other regions of Afghanistan . Especially heavy and bloody were the battles against the detachments of Ahmad Shah Masoud in Panjshir and Kunar province. Parts of the limited contingent of Soviet troops, continuously participating in operations, suffered significant losses. In a year, 1868 people died in battles in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan . ”

• On April 1, another military operation in the Panjshir Gorge against the formations of Ahmad Shah Masud .
• April 21, battle of the 1st company of the 500th (later 334th) separate special battalion of the 15th separate brigade of the GRU GSh special forces (5th separate motorized rifle battalion), which resulted in the gorge in the zone of the Afghan-Pakistani border in an ambush and killed 28 scouts.
• Large-scale combined arms operation involving significant forces and assets (including government forces of the DRA ) to seize the Javara base region in Paktia province
• On April 26, a group of Soviet and Afghan prisoners of war (24 people), detained for several years in a special prison in the Badaber district (24 km south of Peshawar in Pakistan), made an armed demonstration to free themselves from captivity. All died in battle with the Dushmans.
• May, fighting in Helmand province
• (May-June), large-scale “Kunar operation” - military operations throughout the “Kunar Gorge” from Jalalabad to Barikot (170 km), more than 11 thousand people landed in helicopters during the first stage of the operation. (divisions 103rd Guards Airborne Division , 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade , 56th Guards Separate Airborne Assault Brigade , 108th Motorized Rifle Division , 201st Motorized Rifle Division , 45th Engineering and Engineer Regiment, Air Force 40 Army ) and other parts of OKSVA
• On May 25, during the “Kunar operation (1985)” , a fierce battle was taken by the personnel of the 4th company guardsmen and the attached forces of the 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the 149th motorized rifle regiment near the village of Konyak near Asadabad , Kunar province with a large number of losses (23 were killed, 19 were injured of varying severity)
• September, the large-scale “Marmol operation” in the province of Balkh
• mid-October, large-scale military operation in the south of Baghlan province , counties ( Andarab , Banu, Nakhrin, Burka, Sayyid)
• On October 19, during the hostilities in the Panjshir gorge, as a result of an orientation error from hypothermia, 5 servicemen were killed and 35 received frostbite of varying degrees
• October, fighting in the provinces: Farah , Baghlan , Kapisa , Parvan
• more than 80 operations performed
• OKSVA reached its maximum number - 105.8 thousand people.
• loss of the rebels amounted to 17 thousand people.
• the blackest year for our border guards - 124 dead

OKSVA DATA

• Irretrievable losses - 1886 people.
• Injuries and Diseases - 8219
• Dismissed from the army (for wounds, injuries and diseases) - 1751
• Losses: tanks - 18, armored vehicles - 185, aircraft and helicopters - 66

Military operations and general reports for the year 1986

By the beginning of 1986, the domestic political situation in Afghanistan continued to escalate. If in 1981-1983, opposition formations were active on the territory, numbering 45 thousand people, then by 1986 their number was already 150 thousand.

• in February-April, a large-scale military operation was conducted in Khost County, during which the IPA transshipment base of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan was destroyed (Javara - Wolf Pit)
• large-scale military operation against the Abdul Basir group in the province of Badakhshan
• the defeat of the transshipment "base Marulgad" ( Nangarhar )
• March, large-scale hostilities in the area of ​​Shekude ( Paktia )
• repeated large-scale combined-arms operation at Marulgad
• large-scale combined-arms operation to defeat the group Abdul Vahed Wadud ( Badakhshan )
• large-scale military operation in the area of ​​the Apushello Gorge ( Zabul )
• April, large-scale military operation against the groups of Najmuddin (Badakhshan) and S. Mansour (Baghlan)
• April, a large-scale combined-arms operation in Paktia province (in the Khosta region), the result - the defeat of the Javara base
• large-scale military operation in Baghlan province
• (May 10-25), fighting in the province of Paktia (Daj and Aliheil counties)
• June, fighting in Kandahar province
• June, large-scale combined-arms operation "Maneuver" ( Kunduz , Tahar , Badakhshan )
• fighting in the province of Parwan ( Panjshir Gorge )
• fighting in Lagman province
• (August 18-26), the large-scale combined-arms operation "Trap" in the province of Herat , the rout of the Kokari-Sharshari base area , the liquidation of the border transshipment base and the Ismail Khan group in the "green zone" of Herat .

On July 15, the number of armed opposition reached 150 thousand people. Per year. 847 launches of MANPADS were noted. US aid to the armed opposition totaled $ 500 million

OKSVA DATA

• Irretrievable losses - 1333 people.
• Injuries and diseases - 62 129
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (for wounds, injuries and diseases) - 1311
• Losses: tanks - 14, armored vehicles - 126, aircraft and helicopters - 61

Military operations and general reports for the year 1987

“The most famous operation of 1987 was Operation Magistral . The situation in Paktia province , namely in Khost district, was extremely difficult. Armed opposition forces almost completed blocking Khost. The situation with food was critical after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Khost there was a real threat of losing the city. By the fall of 1987, the Mujahideen had restored their Javar base here, which had been defeated by Soviet troops in the spring of 1986. The situation was further complicated by the fact that it was here that was supposed to eat the so-called “Afghan government” as opposed to the “Najibullah’s government.” After repeated requests by the Afghan leadership of the OKSV command, it was decided to plan and carry out a major military operation to break the blockade to provide Khost’s population with food and necessary material supplies. 1987 - January 1988.

“After the announcement of a policy of national reconciliation, the Soviet troops tried to stop active hostilities, focusing on protecting communications, but this did not succeed, and at the request of the Afghan leadership a number of operations were carried out against the irreconcilable counter-revolution - around Kabul , in the Kandahar region. They had to conduct constant military operations against caravans delivering weapons and ammunition from Pakistan and Iran to opposition groups. The second half of January. The opposition has stepped up hostilities. ”

• January – February 21, the large-scale combined-arms operation “Strike” (Kunduz province)
• February 4 - March 11, large-scale general operation "Flurry" (Kandahar province)
• March 2 - 21, large-scale combined-arms operation "Thunderstorm" (Ghazni).

March 8

• March 8 - March 21 large-scale combined-arms operation "Circle" ( Kabul , Logar )
• April 11-1, fighting in the province of Herat
• April 12-24 large-scale military operation "Spring" in the province of Kabul
• May - large-scale combined-arms operation "Volley" (provinces Logar , Paktia , Kabul)
• the end of May, the large-scale combined-arms operation "South-87" ( Kandahar province, Argandab river valley)
• (November January - 1987, 1988) large-scale combined-arms operation "Highway" to release the Gardez - Host road

OKSVA DATA

• Irretrievable losses - 1215 people.
• Injuries and diseases - 56,498
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (for wounds, injuries and diseases) - 1472
• Losses: tanks - 7, armored vehicles - 128, aircraft and helicopters - 68

For the year, US assistance to the Afghan armed opposition amounted to $ 706 million.

Military operations and general reports for 1988

“After the withdrawal of Soviet garrisons from Kunduz , Talukan and Khanabad, these settlements were surrendered by government forces to the Afghan armed forces virtually without a fight. President Najibullah appealed to our command to assist in the liberation of Kunduz. In a short time, the city was captured. ”

• With the withdrawal of several parts of the OKSVA , four provinces gradually passed under the control of the opposition - Kunar , Paktika , Tahar and Bamyan . The centers of the provinces of Kandahar , Ghazni , Uruzgan , Badakhshan were blocked. The rocket and artillery shelling of Kabul and many of the provincial centers of the country intensified.
• May 15 - August 1, Soviet troops left the garrisons of Jalalabad , Ghazni , Gardez , Kandahar , Fayzabad , Kunduz
• On August 7, the government forces of Armenia, without any resistance, fled from Kunduz. In addition to Kunduz, the rebels captured Khanabad , Talukan , Bamiyan

As a result of the combat activity of the 40th Army, more than 1,000 anti-aircraft mountain installations and more than 30,000 rockets for them, more than 700 mortars and about 25,000 minutes were captured. From the GRU reference: “... the volume of official US assistance to the counter-revolution exceeded $ 2 billion. In 1988, assistance is planned in the amount of more than $ 700 million ...."

OKSVA DATA

• Irrecoverable losses - 759 people.
• Injuries and Diseases - 55121
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (for wounds, injuries and diseases) - 1549 4.
• Losses: tanks - 22, armored vehicles - 176, aircraft and helicopters - 30

Military operations and general reports for the year 1989

“The withdrawal of units of the 40th Army in January-February continued strictly according to plan. At the same time, communications from Kabul through the Salang Pass were reliably guarded from possible attacks by the Mujahideen , especially Ahmad Shah Masouda detachments. But it was not possible to avoid a large-scale military operation. ”

“January 23 - 26, a joint military operation of the Soviet troops against the detachments of Ahmad Shah Masud on the South Salang . On the morning of January 23, an air and artillery fire strike was fired at Panjshir and its adjacent gorges. The combing of the terrain from gangs of rebels and the deployment of blocks on the highway by Afghan troops began. The main efforts were focused on the protection of bridges, galleries and tunnels. Over two days of hostilities, more than 600 rebels, 10 warehouses, 36 strongholds, and a large number of weapons were destroyed. In the Chaugani region, a tent camp was deployed to receive local residents who left the war zone and provide them with material and medical assistance. Losses of Soviet troops - 3 killed, 5 injured. "

• February 4, 1989. The last unit of the Soviet Army left Kabul
• On February 15, the last unit of the 40th Army and Colonel General B.V. Gromov left the army with him. The opposition, in turn, began large-scale hostilities against the Najibullah regime.

OKSVA DATA

• irretrievable losses - 53 people.
• wounds and diseases - 93
• losses: tanks - 2, armored vehicles - 17, aircraft and helicopters - 7

Fulfillment of Government tasks to protect the southern borders of the USSR and provide international assistance to the Republic of Afghanistan A limited contingent of Soviet troops was provided by forces and means of units and formations:

• three "motorized rifle", one "airborne" - divisions
• separate: two motorized rifle, air assault, (since 1985) two special purpose GRU, material support - brigades, etc.
• separate: two motorized rifle, paratrooper, engineer-sapper, rocket artillery - regiments of others.
• separate: regiments and squadrons - parts of OKSVA aviation and KSAPO border troops.

The deployment of formations on the territory of the DRA assigned for each zone of responsibility, taking into account the particularity (site) of the area, the concentration of military tension, and the political and military tasks.

With the transition of armed opposition units to the tactics of constant ones - sabotage, terror, shelling of troops, capturing of watch outposts of the 40th A unit, they were forced to defend the most important communications linking Afghanistan with the USSR: Termez-Kabul-Jalalabad; Kushka-Herat-Kandahar; Mazar-i-Sharif-Kunduz-Fayzabad with a total length of more than 2 thousand km. 1. The purpose of the defense of communications is the defeat of rebel groups along highways and roads; failure of their sabotage; ensuring the unimpeded movement of Soviet and Afghan convoys with material goods. Defense was carried out by divisions, regiments, battalions and companies. 2. The area of ​​responsibility in defense on the front was: 108 MSD - 420 km; 5 MSD - 640 km; 201 MSD - 400 km. Battalions defended the site on average 30-40 km. So, the defense front of the 177th SME of the 108th MRD on a particularly dangerous section of the Salang Pass amounted to 120 km. In total, the defense of communications and security zones was carried out by about 1000 watch posts set up by formations, units and subunits of the 40th Army. ”

The capital of Afghanistan - the city of Kabul, the airport, the airfield, other important objects were assigned to

• 103rd Guards Vitebsk Airborne Division ( 317, 350, 357, 1179 - Guards Airborne Parachute and Artillery, regiments ). In different periods, the 2,3rd battalions were deployed at a distance - in the provinces of Bamian , Kandahar , Helmand , Zabul . At the same time, units of the division participated in private, divisional and large-scale (army) military operations, both in their area of ​​responsibility and remotely from its borders.
• The 108th Nevel Motorized Rifle Division is the reserve of the 40th Army: ( 177, 180, 181, 682 — motorized rifle regiments and other parts of the division) was responsible for the situation: around Kabul, in the area of ​​“South Salang ”, “Panjshir Gorge” , on the tracks : “Jabal Us-Saraj - Kabul”, “ Kabul - Jalalabad ” (provinces: Parvan , Kapisa , Wardak ). At the same time, units of the division participated in private, divisional and large-scale (army) military operations, both in their area of ​​responsibility and remotely from its borders.
• The 5th Guards Zimovnikovsk Motor Rifle Division : ( 12, 101, 371 Guards - motor rifle regiments and other parts of the division) provided control over the military situation in western Afghanistan, the border with Iran (provinces: Badghis , Herat , Farah , Helmand ), including on the highway " Kushka - Herat - Shindand - Kandahar " . At the same time, units of the division participated in private, divisional and large-scale (army) military operations, both in their area of ​​responsibility and remotely from its borders.
• The 201st Gatchina Motor Rifle Division : ( 122, 395, 149 Guards - motor rifle regiments and other parts of the division), was traditionally responsible for northeast Afghanistan (provinces: Kunduz , Baghlan , Balkh , Samangan , Tahar ), including for the following routes: "Hairaton - Salang Pass", " Kunduz - Talukan - Fayzabad . " At the same time, units of the division participated in private, divisional and large-scale (army) military operations, both in their area of ​​responsibility and remotely from its borders.
• In the east, south, and southeast of the Republic of Afghanistan, along the long border with Pakistan, combat missions were carried out: the 66th separate motorized rifle brigade (provinces: Lagman , Nangarhar , Kunar ), the 70th separate guards motorized rifle brigade (provinces: Helmand , Nimruz , Uruzgan , Kandahar ), the 56th separate guards air assault brigade (provinces: Logar , Paktia , Paktika , Khost ), their guard outposts were scattered along the strategic highways “ Jalalabad -Kabul”, “Girishk-Kandahar”, “Baraki-Barak” - Gardez ", respectively governmental. At the same time, these “brigades” participated in private and large-scale (army) military operations, both in their area of ​​responsibility and remotely from its borders
• Separate - two "motorized rifle", "parachute-landing", "engineer-sapper" - regiments (860 OMSP, 191 OMSP, 345 ODPP , 45 OIPS) were deployed in the provinces: Badakhshan , Ghazni and Parvan . At the same time, these “separate units” participated in private and large-scale military operations, both in their area of ​​responsibility and remotely from its borders
• In 1985, to the previously operating in Afghanistan: the 154th, 177th battalions (detachments) and the 459th separate company of the special forces of the GRU GSH MO were additionally introduced six: 334th, 668th - included in the 15th ObrSpN , as well as: 173rd, 186th, 370th, 411th - included in the 22nd Guards ObrSpN . "Separate motorized rifle battalions" , in fact - "special purpose" were deployed in the eastern, southeastern and southern - bordering Pakistan, the provinces of Kunar , Nangarhar , Logar , Ghazni , Zabul , Helmand , Kandahar , Farah and are included in the 15- The 22nd and 22nd “Separate Special Purpose Brigades of the GRU GSh” with permanent deployment points in the cities: Jalalabad and Lashkargah participated in private military operations and raids in the immediate area of ​​responsibility. The list of tasks included reconnaissance and search and ambush actions.

General of the Army V. Varennikov on military operations:
“During my stay in Afghanistan, a number of interesting and complex operations were carried out. Of course, the operation of the operation is discord. Some left no memories. Others will never fade. The operations in the Kunar Gorge, during the storming of the Javar base, on the Parachinar ledge, in the Kunduz region, west of Herat to the Kokari-Sharshari base on the Iranian border in the Lurkokh mountain range, in the Lashkargakh region, in Kandahar province and directly beyond Kandahar are especially memorable ".

- from the memoirs of Army General V. Varennikov

Excerpt from Valentin Runov’s Book “The Afghan War. Fighting ":

“In the zones of responsibility of large opposition groups, base districts were created, located on hard-to-reach areas near the areas of upcoming actions. They created stockpiles of weapons of warfare and material and technical equipment, organized a control system, an alert, air defense, had a center for training rebels, workshops for the repair of weapons and the manufacture of improvised ammunition, a garage, a prison, a hospital, and recreational facilities for personnel. In such a base area, as a rule, up to 500 people could simultaneously be located. ”

“For the temporary storage of weapons, ammunition, materiel and caravan routes near the borders with Pakistan and Iran, transshipment bases were organized. They were intermediate supply bodies for groups and detachments where weapons were distributed and sold, access control, a surveillance, warning, air defense and security system were established. Sometimes the transshipment bases were combined with the base areas. On the territory of Afghanistan, there were 18 large supply bases, including 9 base areas, two transshipment bases and 7 transshipment points ” ^[27]

The period from 1980-1981. In his memoirs, Lieutenant General Gennady Zgersky, commander of the Central Asian Border District KSAPO KGB of the USSR from 1980 to 1984, divided the periods of military operations of units of the border troops in Afghanistan into four periods.

1st period (initial) - from January 1980 to January 1982. Special forces of the border troops on the territory of the DRA in the period from 1980-1981. carried out dozens of planned and private operations, hundreds of military raids and ambushes, which helped to stabilize the situation and strengthen the authorities in the northern regions of Afghanistan. The crews of border helicopters took the most direct part in the fighting ”From the book“ Dangerous Sky of Afghanistan. The experience of the combat use of Soviet aircraft in the local war 1979–1989. Author M.Zhirokhov.

"Mountains-80" The first major operation to clean the Mujahideen of the Afghan border in the northern part of Badakhshan was carried out in February - March 1980. The units of the Khorog, Moscow and Pyanj border detachments of 30 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, in collaboration with the landing troops, under cover of helicopters, cleared fighters of field leader Abdullah Wahob kishlak zone with a strip of more than 150 km and to a depth of 10 kilometers. The landing and combat support was carried out by 11 Mi-8T helicopters. On a holiday for us on February 23, 1980, at the time of the border landing, one of the helicopters was shot at by the enemy and shot down. Border troops aviation in that war worked hard. In 1980, there were major operations: “Spring-80”, “Summer-80” and “Autumn-80”, in the border areas of northern Badakhshan and Tahar province, where a significant territory was liberated, this allowed the DRA authorities in a region remote from the center, create authorities.

"Murghab operation" To cover the DRA border with Pakistan and China, on May 23, 1980, the operation "Roof" was carried out. Border guards of the Murgab detachment of the Red Banner Eastern Border District (KVPO) set up garrisons in northeastern Afghanistan (in the "Hindu Kush appendix"), covering more than 200 kilometers of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, intercepting further caravans of weapons, fighters and enemy agents following from behind line to Afghanistan. In this operation, more than a dozen Mi-8T helicopters of the Alma-Ata 10th AARP were involved in landing the air defense and covering the advanced ground group.

The Kufab Operation October 17, 1981 In the Operation in the Kufab Gorge against the detachment of field commander Abdullah Wahob (150 bayonets). “Despite careful preparation, surprise was not achieved. Helicopters of the combined detachment came under Mujahideen fire: the first helicopter could not land border guards, and the second threw out only three who immediately died in the shootout. But most of all went to the fourth car, in which there was a squad leader Captain Bogdanov. Mi-8 Senior Lieutenant Skripkin came under fire DShK. In the very first minutes, the helicopter commander died. "...." The second pilot managed to land a car and throw an airborne assault, the helicopter caught fire on the ground, and then exploded. At the initial stage, 43 people landed, who fell under the fire of a pillbox equipped under a large boulder. Border guards managed to throw grenades at him. The battle lasted 12 hours. Victory came at a high price: 19 border guards perished, and about thirty were wounded. ”

2nd period (active) - from January 1982 to January 1987, from the beginning of the announcement of the policy of national reconciliation (PUP).

“Tashkurgan operation” One of the most difficult tactically was the operation to send troops to the northern part of the provinces of Tahar and Kunduz in January - February 1982, carried out by six MMGs and an airborne assault maneuver group of 78 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles with the support of two infantry The battalions of the 20th Afghan division and parts of the Soviet 201st motorized infantry division were the "Tashkurgan operation" in April 1982. 16 military armed opposition units were drawn into the Tashkurgan area. They were thrown against them by 6 motorized groups with 51 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, an airborne assault maneuvering group of the Eastern Border Guards and 10 infantry battalions of the 18th and 20th Afghan divisions, the Soviet motorized rifle battalion, artillery division and Grad battery of the 201st motorized infantry division and 8 border helicopters. The strongholds of the rebels, providing fierce resistance, were suppressed by the fire of mortars, howitzers and rocket artillery, helicopter missile and bomb attacks were widely used.

3rd period (passive) - from January 1987 to 1989 - the period of execution of the policy of national reconciliation

4th period - since 1988 - preparation for the withdrawal of troops and the withdrawal in February 1989

The period from 1982-1987. The main type of hostilities in the period from 1982-1987 was the airborne assault operation, the essence of which consisted of a quick, sudden and massive landing of well-armed and as light as possible airborne assault units and groups to capture landing sites around the perimeter of the cover (blocking) area. The landing was carried out with strong fire support of the combat operations of the airborne assault units, followed by the buildup of forces and assets on captured or newly selected landing sites. With the occupation of the initial borders (areas), the enemy was searched and destroyed. Usually such operations were prepared for a long time and carefully, carried out boldly, boldly and in a limited time. "Landing and combat support of the DShMG personnel, launching missile and bomb attacks on the Mujahideen, aerial reconnaissance, evacuation of the sick and wounded, this was the combat activity of the Border Troops Aviation in Afghanistan ..." From the book “We attack from heaven” by S. Sergeev.

“Kufab operation” From May 2 to 18, 1982, a “ceremonial” special operation was carried out in the area of ​​the Kufab Gorge. It was directly led by the chief of the border troops of the KGB of the USSR, Army General V.A. Sailors, arrived for this purpose from Moscow to the Moscow border detachment. At the site of the local airport, at the Iol border outpost, from where the helicopter group worked, there was a deputy chief of PV, Lieutenant General I.P. Skewer. Major General N.A., Air Force Commander of the Border Troops, took a personal part in this operation. Rokhlov. For the special operation, more than 15 Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters were involved. Helicopter missile attacks and landing of border assault groups were carried out in the areas of Dargak, Mushtiv, Madut, Saidan, Karniv, Chashm-Dary, Navabad, Rogak, Kalai-Kufa, Sshari-Pula and other points. And on the positions of the Mujahideen near Mushtiv, a massive simultaneous bomb attack was carried out by nine helicopters, following in a single formation a column of units, and naturally, Major General Rokhlov led the column. The operation lasted 17 days. Only one side from this group of helicopters during the operation was spent: bombs (OFAB-250, OFAB-100) - 40 pieces, incendiary tanks (ZAB) - 2 pieces, NURS (S-5KPB) - 646 pieces, cartridges (12 , 7 mm) - 1845 pieces, cartridges (7.62 mm) - 500 pieces; landing: 66 people and 7850 kg of cargo.

“Kunduz operation” In the early days of August 1982, near the city of Imam-Sahib, an operation was carried out to neutralize the group of “doctor” Shams, who had influence over almost the entire Kunduz province. At that time, the 7th company of the 56th airborne assault brigade was deployed in the Imam Sahib. So border guards often had to interact with paratroopers in solving combat missions. During its course, border guards first encountered the use of a new weapon - MANPADS. At the next approach to the enemy firing position, the Mi-24 helicopter, piloted by senior lieutenant Zhernov, was fired not only from the DShK, but also missiles. One of the missiles overtook the rotorcraft, which caught fire. Having lost maneuverability, the “crocodile” began to fall under the continuous fire of the Mujahideen. One of the large-caliber bursts halved the cockpit of the helicopter pilots.

“Andkhoy Operation” The most significant operation to defeat a gang in the city was the “Andkhoy Operation”, conducted in July 1983. Andkhoy was turned by dushmans into a powerful defensive unit with fortified armored underground structures, approaches to which were mined by guided landmines. In the course of the operation to liquidate the Andkhoy group of the enemy, the border guards first used sapper groups, which, while clearing the blocks, blocked and detonated pillboxes and other underground structures of the Mujahideen. Having suffered heavy losses at the end of 1983, the armed opposition changed its tactics. Preserving their forces, the militants began to evade direct clashes and intensified the counter-revolutionary underground, sabotage and terrorist acts. The main forces went high into the mountains, where in hard-to-reach areas they created a very fortified defense, making sorties to the northern regions of the country and to the border of the USSR.

“Marmol Operation” The border guards were given the task of liquidating the mountain bases of the Mujahideen. One of the first operations of this kind was Marmolskaya, carried out in January - February 1984. It was attended by 3 motorized groups, 4 air assault maneuver groups, 30 helicopters, 9 Afghan infantry battalions, 1 combined artillery division of the 201st motorized infantry division and an air force fighter regiment. Созданная группировка заняла исходное положение на афганской территории – в городе Мазари-Шарифе. Отсюда же осуществлялось управление операцией. Операция проводилась без войсковой разведки на основе оперативных данные. В ходе боевых действий блокирование осуществлялось десятью одновременно высаженными десантами пограничников. Афганские подразделения, действуя в составе двух обходящих отрядов с востока и запада, блокировали «Мармольскую впадину». На исходные позиции поисковые группы афганских военнослужащих забрасывались вертолетами и действовали под их огневым прикрытием. Широкомасштабным действиям войск предшествовала мощная артиллерийская и авиационная подготовка, в ходе которой надежно подавлялись огневые средства ПВО, подрывались минные поля и управляемые фугасы. Не выдержав натиска, мятежники покинули базу, оставив в пещерах огромное количество оружия и боеприпасов.

«Ташкурганская операция» В марте – апреле 1985 г. была проведена еще одна Ташкурганская операция по разгрому горных баз. К операции привлекались 6 мотомангрупп, 3 десантно-штурмовые маневренные группы на 72 БМП и БТР, 28 пограничных вертолетов, 10 афганских батальонов 18-й и 20-й пехотных дивизий, 3 мотострелковых батальона, 1 артполк и 12 вертолетов 201-й мотострелковой дивизии. С учетом тактики действий моджахедов (уход из-под ударов в период их блокирования) в этой операции блокирование и чистка местности осуществлялись одновременно с проведением крупномасштабных демонстрационных действий в стороне от направления главного удара. Противник был застигнут врасплох и разгромлен.

«Впоследствии, операции методом одновременного или последовательного блокирования (прикрытия) нескольких районов, расположенных на значительном удалении друг от друга, применялись советскими пограничниками неоднократно. Основная роль в них принадлежала десантным подразделениям и пограничной авиации».

Военная судьба многих офицеров Советской армии, прошедших «первый Афганистан», показала их неуклонное стремление вновь оказаться на войне, предпочтение ими тягот и лишений боевой обстановки возвращению в Союз и началу размеренной службы в условиях мирных будней.
Ряд известных советских военачальников, прошедших Афганскую войну (1979-1989) дважды: Громов Б.В. , Грачёв П.С. , Аушев Р.С. , Востротин В.А. , Кот В.С. , Горошко Я.П. и другие ^{[28] [29]} .

В ходе боевых действий Афганской войны (1979-1989) имело место совершения подвигов советских солдат, связанных с подрывом себя и сил противника взрывными средствами.
В большинстве случаев, это военнослужащие Советской Армии, получившие в бою ранение, оставшиеся прикрывать отход своего подразделения, которые «израсходовав весь боезапас, подпускали на противника на близкое расстояние и подрывали их, и себя, последней гранатой» ^{[30] [31]} :
— Герои Советского Союза ( посмертно ): Мироненко А.Г. ; Чепик Н.П. ; Шорников Н.А. ; Демаков А.И. ; Гаджинв Н.О. ; Демченко Г.А. ; Анфиногенов Н.Я. ; Задорожный В.В. ; Левченко А.Н. ; Арсенов В.В. ; Исламов Ю.Б. ; Павлюков К.Г. ; Онищук О.П. ^[32] .
— Орден Ленина ( посмертно ): В.А. Кузнецов; Н.П. Кандауров; А.В. Букаев; В.А. Сулин; В.Н. Пузин; A.N. Рзянкин; В.В. Тамчишин; О.И. Егоров; Веремчук Н.А. ; Орденами «Красной Звезды»: В.В. Бойчук; A.S. Вакулюк; В.Ч. Гавраш; V.F. Кухарчук; В.В. Марченко; Н.М. Мустафин; В.Н. Музыка ^[33] и другие.
— Погибшие заслонив собой командира: Корявин А.В. Герой Советского Союза , А.М. Нижниченко (орден Ленина посмертно) ^{[34] [31]} .

• «Неповторимое. Книга 5 Афганистан. И доблесть и печаль. Чернобыль» В. И. Варенников
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• «Афганская война. Все боевые операции» автор В.А. Рунов жанр :«nonf-military» Издательство: Яуза, Эксмо год:2014 ISBN 978-5-699-70597-9
• «Афганская война (1979—1989). Воспоминания» генерал-лейтенант В.А. Богданов: — М.: Советский писатель, 2005 года
• «40 Армия — война в горах» генерал-полковник В. М. Барынькин, Москва — 2002 год, стр. 26, 48, 74, 75, 83. Типография ВАГШ ВС РФ
• «Ограниченный контингент» Б.В. Громов
• «В погоне за львом Панджшера» генерал Ю.А. Меримский
• «Восток дело тонкое» автор Е.Г. Никитенко 15ВК 5-17-018154-Х (ООО «Издательство АСТ») 15ВК 5-271-07363-7 (ООО «Издательство Астрель») УДК 94(581) ББК 63.3(5Афг) Н63
• В.М. ТОПОРКОВ "АФГАНИСТАН: СОВЕТСКИЙ ФАКТОР В ИСТОКАХ КРИЗИСА" УДК 94(100-87) ББК 63.3(5Афг) Т58 Рекомендовано к печати Ученым советом ФГБОУ ВПО «ЧГУ им. И.Н. Ульянова» Научный консультант: д-р ист. наук, профессор, О.Н. Широков Рецензенты: д-р полит. наук, канд. юрид. наук, профессор А.А. Мкртычян д-р историч. наук, профессор, И.И. Бойко д-р историч. наук, профессор, Т.Н. Иванова Топорков В.М. Афганистан: советский фактор в истоках кризиса /Монография. – Чебоксары: ЦНС «Интерактив плюс», 2014. – 319 с.
• «Особенности подготовки и ведения специфических операций 40 А : (По опыту боевых действий в Афганистане)» : Монография / Барынькин В. М.; Воен. Acad. Генерального штаба Вооружённых Сил РФ. — М. : Рус. воздухоплават. о-во. Воен. отд., 1999. — 141 с.; 21 см. Военное искусство стран России — Боевые действия в горах FB 1 01-3/9-1 OVL ВО 878/438 OVL ВО 879/5
• «Звёзды, пронесённые сквозь ад» командарм 40-й Армии Игорь Родионов
• «На страже границ Отечества. Пограничные войска России в войнах и вооруженных конфликтах XX века». — М.: «Граница», 2000. — ISBN 5-86436-294-8 — О Мармольской операции 1984 года . Авторы А.И. Николаев , Н.Н. Бордюжа
• IN AND. Варенников НЕПОВТОРИМОЕ часть.5 «О боевых действиях в Панджшере в марте 1985 года» стр.69-72
• «Граница Афганистана: Tрагедии и уроки» генерал-лейтенант Ю.А. Нешумов «о Мармольских операциях 1983 и 1984 годов»
• генерал армии В.Ф. Ермаков книга «АФГАНСКИЙ ЗНОЙ»
• генерал-полковник Б.В. Громов «Ограниченный контингент»
• «Границы Афганистана: Трагедия и уроки» генерал-лейтенант Нешумов Ю.А. — начальник штаба, первый заместитель начальника Пограничных войск КГБ СССР (1976-1985)
• «Война в Афганистане» Н.И. Пиков Воениздат, 1991
• «Холодные рассветы у Мазари-Шариф» из воспоминаний генерал-лейтенанта Вахренева В.Н., Постников О.В., — Мармольская операция 1983 года — «Операция по спасению Советских Специалистов»
• «Афганистан От войны 80-х до прогноза новых войн» генерал Никитенко Е.Г.
• «Ориентир» Минобороны РФ стр.29 выпуск 1-6 Изд-во «Красная звезда», 1999 Мармольская операция 1984 года
• «На страже границ отечества: Пограничные войска России в войнах и вооруженных конфликтах XX века» Автор А.И. Николаев, Федеральная пограничная служба Российской Федерации, В.И. Боярский Граница, 2000 стр.412 Описание Мармольской операции 1984 года
• «Пограничники на Афганской войне» Издатель: Яуза, Эксмо год печати: 2013 год
• «По периметру границы Афганистана: Записки генерала пограничных войск КГБ СССР» (о Мармольской операции 1983 года ) /-2-е изд., испр. — Новосибирск: Изд-во НГОНБ, 2010. — 352 с.ББК 68. 571 УДК 355 Я-744 (24) л. ил. ISВN 978-5-88742-081-3 генерал-лейтенант И.Д. Ярков — заместитель начальника войск КСАПО, начальник Оперативной группы по связи от Пограничных войск КГБ СССР с Оперативной группой ГШ ВС СССР и аппаратом Главного военного советника в Кабуле, заместитель Главного военного советника по Погранвойскам — советник командующего Пограничными войсками Демократической Республики Афганистан
• «Фарьябский дневник» Воспоминания Начальников войск КСАПО (1980-1984) генерал-лейтенанта Г.А. Згерского Автор В.Носатов о Мармольской операции 1984 года
• «Войны и военные конфликты (Афганистан)» автор генерал-майор Е. Г. Никитенко Журнал «Военно-космическая оборона» (ВКО)
• И. Дауди «Шагнувшие в бессмертие»«Казанский репортёр»
• И. Дауди «Шагнувшие в бессмертие» Портал Героев Отечества

• « Военная энциклопедия в восьми томах»: Том.6, с.20 Авторы И.Н. Родионов, П.С. Грачев, С. Иванов (редактор) Институт военной истории - 1994 год
• «Загадки Афганской войны» генерал В.А. Меримский — Заместитель Начальника Оперативной группы Минобороны СССР в Афганистане
• «ВСЕГДА ВПЕРЕДИ» декабрь 2010
• Документальный фильм Михаила Лещинского «Спрятанная война»
• «Организация и ведение боевых действий по проводке транспортных колонн»
• Документальный фильм «Операция в провинции Тахор» в июне-июле 1986 года, телеканал «ЗВЕЗДА» А.Украинский «Телепередача На Войне, как на войне» ТК «ЗВЕЗДА» «Операция в провинции Тахор»
• * Войсковая операция «Западня» в провинции Герат (Афганистан) 19-25.08.1986 телепередача «Военная тайна» № 173 ТК «Рен ТВ» 18.02.2013
• The book "Hot Sky of Afghanistan" by General V. Markovsky
• Army, units of border troops (deployed on the territory of Afghanistan) "Main combat formations and units of the 40th Army"
• Article “Assault Aviation in the Afghan War” Magazine “REPORTER OF THE ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES” No. 2 (23) / 2008 “PAGES OF MILITARY HISTORY” author V. I. Pupynin Candidate of Historical Sciences
• "General characteristics of the Pashtun tribes"
• “Pashtun tribes want to be masters of their territories”, author V. Kravtsov
• "Peoples and tribes of Afghanistan"
• “Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and others”
• "Tribal Afghanistan" by Yu.O. Serdyuk
• Pashtuns - “people of honor”
• Afghanistan.Ru | Pashtuns - “people of honor” ”
• "Pashtun tribes - endless war"
• I. Daudi “Twice Past” “Kazan Reporter”
• I. Daudi “Twice Past” Heroes of the Fatherland Portal
• I. Daudi “Stepping Into Immortality” “Kazan Reporter”
• I. Daudi "Stepping into Immortality" Portal of Heroes of the Fatherland
• “Army, units of the border troops (deployment on the territory of Afghanistan)” “Main combat formations and units of the 40th Army”

Foreign Literature

• “War in Afghanistan” Mark Urban ISBN 978—0—312—04255—4

• Afghan Mujahideen
• Panjshir operations
• 1985 Panjshir Gorge Operation
• “Offensive in Panjshir (1980-1985)” (English — Wikipedia) “Panjshir offensives” (English Wikipedia)
• 1983 Marmol operation
• Marmol Operation 1984
• Operation Maneuver
• Operation Trap
• Operation Highway
• Operation Typhoon (1989)
• Islamic Party of Afghanistan (“IPA”)
• Islamic Society of Afghanistan ("IOA")
• Armed Forces of Afghanistan
• Provinces of Afghanistan
• Pashtuns , Durrani , Gilzai , Karani
• Tajiks of Afghanistan , Uzbeks in Afghanistan , Turkmens in Afghanistan , Kyrgyzstan in Afghanistan
• Charaimaki , Kyzylbashi , Farsivany
• Sunnis , Shiites , Ismailis

Category: Afghan War (1979-1989) Category: Geography of Afghanistan