Aircraft Lend-Lease in the USSR

On November 4, 1939, US President Roosevelt signed a new version of the neutrality law, which lifted the ban on the supply of weapons and other material assistance to countries that fought with Hitler Germany, primarily the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the United States continued to prevail on the need to maintain a policy of non-interference in European affairs. In the United States, a large-scale deployment of military production began, in one of the radio addresses to the nation, Roosevelt called for turning the US industry into a "great arsenal of democracy." By the end of 1940, it became clear that the economic condition of Great Britain did not allow it to conduct a wide purchase of the necessary weapons and equipment. After the end of the presidential election campaign of 1940 and the next victory of Roosevelt, the US president began an insistent search for a possible solution to the problem of British assistance. In his opinion, the use of US-made weapons in the UK contributed much more to the defense interests of the United States than their storage in army warehouses. On January 10, 1941, the Lend-Lease Act (the official name is the “US Defense Assistance Act”) was introduced into the US Congress and after two months of discussion it was approved by Congress and the Senate. On March 11, 1941, the law was signed by President Roosevelt ^[1] .

The main principles of the Lend-Lease Act were:

- all goods delivered to the lessee country - military or industrial, used for their intended purpose, destroyed or lost during the war, were not subject to payment;

- civilian property remaining in the recipient country after the end of hostilities should have been paid to the United States;

- military equipment at the end of hostilities should have been paid by the recipient country, but the United States had the right to demand his return;

- the term of the law expired on June 30, 1942 (subsequently it was annually renewed until August 21, 1945, when the United States announced its termination) ^[2] .

With the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, on June 22, 1941, British Prime Minister Churchill spoke about the readiness to help the Soviet Union, and two days later, US President Roosevelt announced the same. Despite the fears that Stalin, as a result of the heavy defeats of the first days of the war, might be forced to come to an agreement with Hitler, on July 26, Churchill informed Stalin of his readiness to transfer 200 American Tomahawk fighters from among those intended to help Britain itself, and also a number of commodities. On July 28, the representative of the US President Hopkins arrived in Moscow, one of the main tasks of which was to prepare a future tripartite conference between the USA, Great Britain and the USSR on military assistance to countries fighting with Hitler. The conference was held from September 29 to October 1 in Moscow. The signed agreement, known as the first Moscow Protocol, prescribed the creation of six commissions, which were to determine the number and nomenclature of upcoming deliveries to the USSR under the American law on land lease. One of the six commissions was aviation. According to the first Moscow protocol, the allies committed to deliver to the USSR including 3,600 aircraft ^[3] .

Northern convoys

The northern route for the supply of aircraft through the ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk began to operate in August 1941. With the first PQ-0 convoy , the first batch of 64 aircraft arrived in Arkhangelsk. In 1941, 484 British Hurricane fighters, as well as American P-40s and P-39s, 246 and 11 units, respectively, were delivered by seven convoys to the USSR through Arkhangelsk. On December 20, 1941, the first consignment with American bombers arrived in Murmansk with the Decembrist steamer. During the polar night, the passage of convoys was relatively safe, but with the beginning of spring the loss of ships from the convoys began to increase rapidly as a result of the active actions of German submariners and aviation, based in Norway. In total, by July 1942, the northern convoys delivered 1902 aircraft, but after the defeat of the caravan of PQ-17, when 210 aircraft were lost, deliveries were suspended until late autumn ^[4] .

Despite the danger that threatened the crews of transport ships and escort convoy ships due to the actions of the German submarine fleet and aircraft, the Allies did not refuse to deliver goods by the northern route even after the opening of a safer Transiran route. The northern route, for all its danger, remained the shortest; the delivery of goods from England along it took 10-14 days. As the means of detecting the enemy and defending convoys improved, the percentage ratio of the losses of ships and the goods delivered by them decreased during the war. With the opening of aircraft supplies along the ALSIB route, the supply of aviation equipment by the northern convoys gradually decreased. In 1941-1942, 2,352 aircraft were delivered along the northern route; in 1943 - 804; in 1944 - 766; in 1945 - 688 aircraft. The last of the northern convoys, JW-67, arrived in the Kola Bay after the surrender of Germany, May 20, 1945. Among other cargoes delivered to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk, 4,790 aircraft were delivered to the USSR along this route ^[5] .

Persian Corridor

The growing danger of deliveries by northern sea convoys compelled us to study the possibility of alternative routes for the supply of military goods to the USSR. In August 1941, British and Soviet troops occupied Iran and in 1942 the Allies supplied Lend-Lease cargo along the Iranian route, called the Persian Corridor. The route was much safer, but only the marine part of the route from US ports bypassing Africa took about three months. The aircraft were delivered to the port of Basra disassembled, as the delivery in containers made it more efficient to place cargo on ships. The organization of assembly production was required; at first it was organized at the Margile British airfield in Iraq. In May 1942, the assembly plant was moved closer to the port of Basra in Shuayba, where another 20 British airbases were located 20 miles from the port ^[6] .

After assembly, the British crews drove the aircraft to the airfield in Abadan , where they were received by Soviet specialists. During the acceptance of each aircraft, the first demonstration flight was carried out by British crews, then by the Soviet from the 6th Air Regiment, after which the aircraft was considered accepted or sent to eliminate the detected malfunctions. The further route of the received aircraft passed through the airfields of Baghdad and the airport of Adzhikabul in Soviet Azerbaijan. Later, already directly in Abadan, the assembly production of aircraft of the American airline Douglas was organized ^[7] .

For the supply of American B-25 bombers, it was initially decided that sending them on their own would be optimal, since these aircraft had a significant flight range. This significantly reduced the time for their delivery to the USSR. The route of their flight from the factory to the United States was laid with intermediate landings in Brazil and the west coast of Africa. After another intermediate airfield was equipped on the Ascension Island in the South Atlantic, it became possible to send A-20 bombers on the same route. On the whole, the Persian corridor delivered 5648 planes to the USSR, including 680 in 1942, 3016 in 1943, and 1944-1938. In addition to the bomber models mentioned, the British Hurricane and Spitfire fighters , the American P-39 , P-40 , P-47 , as well as AT-6 training fighters were supplied with this route. In practice, the supply of aircraft by this route stopped in the autumn of 1944, in 1945 only 14 aircraft arrived on the transiran route ^[8] .

ALSIB (Krasnoyarsk Corridor)

The State Defense Committee instructed to begin exploration on the route of possible transit of goods from the United States back in 1941. In the early summer of 1942, representatives of the American government through the Soviet ambassador Litvinov proposed to organize a new route for the supply of aircraft through Alaska and Chukotka , the width of the Bering Strait between which was not difficult to fly with any type of aircraft. But in the USSR in Eastern Siberia there was no network of aerodromes necessary for the further transit of received aircraft. Few existing sites were able to accept only light U-2s . One of the options was proposed route along the Northern Sea Route , where the pilots of Polar Aviation already had a network of landing sites that required a little revision. But this route was rejected, since most of the year flights would have to be carried out in polar night conditions. Another variant of the route through Kamchatka and Komsomolsk-on-Amur was potentially dangerous because of its proximity to Japan, with which the United States was already at war, and the USSR was seriously afraid of a possible attack by Japan as an ally of Hitler Germany in the Triple Pact ^[9] .

As a result, it was decided to organize the route Uelkal - Seymchan - Yakutsk - Kirensk - Krasnoyarsk . The entire population of nearby settlements, workers of the Siberian and Far Eastern branches of the Civil Air Fleet and prisoners of the many GULAG camps in Chukotka and Kolyma working in the Dalstroy system were involved in the construction of the missing landing sites on the route. At critical moments, all students of the region’s schools were involved in the work, up to the age of 12–13 years. The construction of individual airdromes was complicated not only by a shortage of workers, but also by the impossibility of delivering building materials other than seaplanes or reindeer and dog teams. In total, over a dozen and a half take-off sites — main and reserve ^[10] - were again built on a route of 6000 thousand kilometers.

The conditions in Alaska for such a large-scale transfer of aircraft were also difficult, primarily from a climatic point of view. The Americans faced technical difficulties - failures when starting engines at low temperatures, freezing of oils and process fluids in aircraft construction, instrument failures. Improvements were made to the design of airplanes and airfield equipment while fuel and grease brands were replaced with more frost-resistant types. The central airbase before the start of the flight to Alaska was located in the town of Great Falls , in the state of Montana, near the border with Canada. Routes came from cities where the factories — manufacturers of aircraft equipment — were located. At the airbase, the 7th ferry division was stationed, which was part of the Alaskan wing of the US Air Force Transport Command. The group’s pilots, they included female pilots, taking the planes, drove them to the airfield in Fairbanks , where the Soviet mission was located. The mission included 50 engineers and aircraft technicians, as well as translators, part of the mission already had experience in receiving aircraft in Iran ^[11] .

For the transfer of airplanes from Fairbanks to Krasnoyarsk in the Soviet Union, the first ferry division was formed, headed by Colonel I.P. Mazuruk , in the past - a polar pilot. The division included five ferry regiments of two fighter and two bomber squadrons, whose pilots had previously undergone retraining to pilot American aircraft. The division also included the 8th transport regiment, staffed by pilots of the Civil Air Fleet and the Polar Aviation, and the transport Li-2s were at their disposal. The haulage scheme was as follows: the 1st pop dad took planes at the Ladd Field (Fairbanks) base in Alaska and drove them to the Wielkal airfield in Chukotka (with an intermediate landing in Nome ). Then the pilots were returned to Fairbanks on Li-2. Meanwhile, pilots of the 2nd popes from Huelkal drove the planes to the Seymchan aerodrome, where the 3rd popes took over, relaying the planes to Yakutsk, where the command of the ferry division was located. The 4th popes was responsible for the stage from Yakutsk to the airfield in Kirensk, and the main base of the 8th transport air regiment was located at the airfield of Kirensk. On the last leg of the route from Kirensk to Krasnoyarsk, planes were distilled by pilots of the 5th popes. From Krasnoyarsk, most of the planes went further by rail, but part of the planes continued to move on their own, they were piloted by pilots of the 9th popes ^[12] .

The first batch of aircraft began its route along ALSIB from Fairbanks on September 30, 1942, but in Nome this group delayed until October 7. The further first stage continued to experience difficulties associated with the lack of experience and coordination of pilots and ground personnel, the first aircraft were lost, and pilots died. Only in early November did the first 28 P-40 fighters, 14 A-20 bombers and 10 C-47 transport aircraft reach Krasnoyarsk. Until the end of 1942, another 10 B-25 bombers were delivered to Krasnoyarsk, 42 ​​A-20 bombers, 12 P-39 and 15 P-40 bombers. With the beginning of winter, difficulties increased, the temperature in Chukotka and Yakutia dropped to −60 °. At the 3rd distillation stage, the route passed through the cold pole and the command had to lay a hook to bypass Oymyakon , where temperatures dropped to −70 °. During the first 5 months of the journey, 45 air crashes occurred. But as the ALSIB pilots and technical personnel went through the first stages, they gained experience, in 1943 the number of distilled aircraft steadily increased. At the peak in June 1943, about 300 aircraft arrived in Krasnoyarsk. Всего за годы действия АЛСИБа по нему было доставлено в СССР 8094 самолёта, в том числе 2593 самолёта P-39, 2340 — P-63, 1330 — A-20, 725 — B-25, 705 — C-47, 63 — P-40, 54 — AT-6F, 3 — P-47 и 1 C-46. На территории Канады и США были потеряны 133 самолёта, на территории СССР была списана 81 машина. Аварий было больше, но инженеры и техники старались восстановить и вернуть в строй самолёты, когда это было возможно. За годы перегона погибло более 100 лётчиков. Часть самолётов и пилотов обнаруживали в безлюдных местностях на протяжении десятков лет после войны ^[13] .

В первые недели и месяцы Великой Отечественной войны Советский Союз по разным причинам потерял огромное количество самолётов военной авиации. Часть из них была потеряна на аэродромах в первые дни боёв, часть брошена по различным причинам, часть потеряна в воздушных боях. Трагедия советской авиации 1941 года является одной из самых дискуссионных тем для военных историков и публицистов. Ситуация усугубилась потерей многих авиационных заводов, производивших самолёты и комплектующие для них, оставшихся на оккупированной немцами территории. Часть из заводов спешно эвакуировали на восток страны, но требовалось время для возобновления производства и выхода его на максимальные мощности. Так, в декабре 1941 года все авиационные заводы СССР произвели всего 600 самолётов всех типов. Это стало причиной того, что поставка самолётов, в первую очередь — истребителей и бомбардировщиков, стала главной темой на переговорах высшего руководства СССР, Великобритании и США. Подавляющую долю в общем количестве самолётов, полученных СССР по программе ленд-лиза составили английские истребители «Спитфайр» и «Харрикейн», американские истребители P-39 «Аэрокобра», P-40, известные в СССР под именами «Томагаук» и «Киттихоук», P-63 «Кингкобра», американские бомбардировщики A-20 «Хэвок», B-25 «Митчелл». Значительную долю в своих типах составили также поставленные транспортные самолёты C-47 «Скайтрейн» и летающие лодки PBY «Каталина» ^[14] .

Не все из поставленных самолётов можно было полноценно назвать современными моделями. Но даже те из них, что можно назвать устаревшими (английские «Харрикейн» и американские «Томагаук»), были более современными и превосходящими по большинству характеристик, чем самолёты И-153 , И-16 , составлявших основу советской истребительной авиации в самые тяжёлые первые месяцы войны. Превосходство в высотных характеристиках американских и английских самолётов, мощное вооружение и обеспечение средствами связи обеспечило их применение в войсках ПВО — из 10 тысяч самолётов, полученных в годы войны, 7000 тысяч были из числа полученных по ленд-лизу. Нужно также учитывать, что поставки в Великобританию имели более высокий приоритет и количественно, и качественно. С вступлением США в войну с Японией собственные потребности союзников в авиации выросли многократно ^[14] .

Частью авиационного ленд-лиза можно назвать также поставку различного авиаоборудования и комплектующих: приборов, в основном радиооборудования, радиокомпасов, фото- и кино-аппаратуры для воздушной разведки. Вместе с поставленными самолётами США и Великобритания поставили и запасные авиадвигатели к ним — всего около 5700 комплектов. В ходе изучения конструкции двигателей советскими специалистами появились проекты их возможной установки на самолётах советского производства. Так двигатели Роллс-Ройс « Мерлин » и Аллисон V-1710 предполагалось устанавливать на истребителях Як-1 , Як-7 и Як-9 и бомбардировщике Пе-2 , двигатели Райт R-2600 — на Ла-5 и Ил-4 . Но до практического внедрения этих проектов дело не дошло. Тем не менее, конструкции ленд-лизовских двигателей оказали большое влияние на советское моторостроение. Советских специалистов впечатлили культура производства комплектующих и их сборки, экономичность расхода топлива и масла, ресурс работы до ремонта. Представители советских закупочных комиссий в США и Великобритании получили запрос на закуп небольших серий новых авиадвигателей с самолётов, не поставляемых в СССР. Но союзники, как правило, отказывали в подобных контрактах, либо предлагали к закупу лицензию на их производство ^[15] .

Для потребностей советской авиапромышленности закупалось также и различные конструкционные материалы — легированная сталь, алюминий, медь, латунь, бронза и другие. Особенно остро авиазаводы нуждались в алюминии — с потерей продукции Волховского и Запорожского заводов было потеряно 60 % его довоенного производства. По первому Московскому протоколу союзники обязались поставлять 2 тысячи тонн этого металла ежемесячно. В ходе войны объём поставок постоянно возрастал. Всего было поставлено 99000 тонн алюминия из США, 35400 тон из Великобритании и 33600 тонн из Канады, большая часть которого пошла на нужды авиапромышленности. В дополнение к металлу, из США был поставлен алюминиевопрокатный завод. Критически важными были также поставки тонких латунных трубок для изготовления радиаторов — 800 тонн ежеквартально. На авиазаводы было поставлено 1488 станков из США и 178 — из Англии, а также прессы и ножницы, молоты и ковочные машины, электропечи, сварочное оборудование, режущие и измерительные инструменты. Объём поставок технологического оборудования позволял неуклонно снижать в ходе войны долю человеко-часов на единицу произведённой продукции ^[16] .

• Butenina N.V. Lend-Lease. The deal of the century. - M .: Publishing House of the Higher School of Economics , 2004. - 312 p. - 1,500 copies - ISBN 978-5-7598-0239-6 .
• Jones R.H. Lend-Lease. Roads to Russia. US military supplies to the USSR in World War II. 1941-1945. - M .: Centerpolygraph , 2015 .-- 252 p. - 2000 copies. - ISBN 978-5-9524-5156-8 .
• Kotelnikov V. R. Aviation Lend-Lease. - M .: Russian Knights Foundation, 2015. - 368 p. - (Air wars of the 20th century). - 1000 copies. - ISBN 985-5-9906036-3-9.
• Stettinius E. Lend-Lease - a weapon of victory // Mysteries of Lend-Lease. - M .: Veche, 2000 .-- S. 8−304. - 400 p. - 10,000 copies. - ISBN 5-7838-0696-X .