Strategic frivolity

Strategic frivolity is the term of international politics to indicate the tendency of politicians and diplomats “accustomed to the world” to generate long-term risks in order to acquire short-term tactical benefits ^[1] . The term was introduced into Russian political discourse by T. V. Bordachyov ^[2] in the mid-2010s, but the expression itself is much older. In particular, it was used by G. Kissinger , describing the situation that led to the First World War ^{[3] [4] [5]} .

A typical example of strategic frivolity is the period preceding the First World War ^{[5] [6]} . After successfully resolving — without war — the Tangier crisis that followed the second Moroccan crisis and the crisis in Bosnia , European politics reinforced the idea that foreign policy maneuvering in order to obtain domestic political support in the nationalist press is safe and normal. As a result, the great powers began to provoke each other on minor issues, which in fact did not represent any of them of serious interest ^[5] .

Kissinger also considers Napoleon III's foreign policy actions to be a manifestation of frivolity, which reflected his current mood in the complete absence of a long-term strategy. Over and over again, the emperor generated crises, which he then was wary of ending, his foreign policy was dictated by the current assessment of what was required to maintain the emperor’s popularity in France ^[7] . Crises were created where benefits could be obtained without great risk, that is, on the periphery of Europe, while the vital task for France to contain German states was sacrificed for purely tactical reasons.

According to Kissinger’s often quoted quotation, “history sooner or later punishes strategic frivolity.” In 1914, retribution came when European statesmen were unable to control the tactical moves of the military; unhurried, accustomed to peace, diplomats did not have enough months in the summer holiday season (from the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand to the July ultimatum ) to resolve the new crisis in the same way as the previous ones ^[5] . In the case of Napoleon III, France lost the opportunity to influence Germany’s structure, which has remained since Richelieu , the catastrophic effect of this was already shown during the Austro-Prussian-Danish war in 1864, when Russia refused because of the consequences of the Crimean War and Napoleon’s support for the Polish uprising . participate in the restoration of the status quo ante and Germany (then Prussia ) received freedom of action ^[7] .

Bordachev ^[6] draws parallels with international politics after the collapse of the USSR: they firmly believe in the impossibility - due to the presence of nuclear weapons and, to a lesser extent, close economic ties - a large-scale war, Western politicians show strategic frivolity: they are ready for foreign political risks for the sake of domestic political popularity and do not think when provoking Russia and China (which in turn answer the same).