The Iroquois Theater fire was a disaster on December 30, 1903 in Chicago , Illinois . As a result of the fire, more than 602 people died, this theatrical fire became the deadliest in the history of the United States .
| Fire at the Iroquois Theater | |
|---|---|
Iroquois Theater before the fire | |
| Type of | Fire |
| Cause | Fire Safety Violation |
| A country | |
| A place | Iroquois Theater , Illinois , Chicago |
| date | December 30, 1903 |
| Time | 15:15 |
| Dead | 605 |
| Injured | 250 |
Content
Theater
The Iroquois Theater in Chicago was built by Fuller Construction and opened on November 23, 1903, after many problems and delays in construction. Despite this, many American critics called this theater the most elegant and architecturally perfect in Chicago. The theater had a capacity of 1602 seats with three levels. On the ground floor (in the stalls ) there were about 700 seats at the same level as the lobby and the Grand Stair Hall. On the second level, the first balcony, there were more than 400 seats. The third level, the gallery, had about 500 places. There was only one entrance to the theater. A wide staircase leading from the lobby to the level of the balcony was also used to access the stairs to the gallery level. Theater designers argued that this allowed visitors to "see regardless of the price of their seats." However, the common staircase violated Chicago fire safety rules, which required separate staircases and exits for each balcony. Such a design turned out to be catastrophic: in a fire, people leaving the gallery faced a crowd leaving the balcony, and people descending from the upper levels met spectators of the orchestra level in the lobby. The backstage was unusually large. Dressing rooms were on five levels, where there was also an elevator for transporting actors to the stage level. The gallery, where the scenery hung, was also unusually large.
Fire safety deficiencies
Despite the fact that in the posters and advertisements the theater was described as “Absolutely fireproof”, its design allowed significant shortcomings in terms of fire safety:
- The editor of the Fireproof magazine visited the building during construction and noted the excessive presence of wood trim and the insufficient capacity of fire exits, as well as their small number.
- The captain of the Chicago Fire Department, who had made an unofficial tour of the theater days before the official opening, noted that there was no fire alarm , telephones and fire hydrants . The captain also pointed out the absence of a theater fire inspector, but later he was told that there was still a fire inspector in the theater.
- The extinguishing equipment on site consisted of six Kilfire fire extinguishers . Kilfyre was a type of powder fire extinguisher, also sold for extinguishing fires in residential buildings. It consisted of a 2 × 24 inch tube with tin filled with approximately three pounds of white powder, mainly sodium bicarbonate . The user needed to “forcefully” throw the contents of the tube into the base of the flame. But since the fire started high above the stage , Kilfire, when thrown, fell uselessly to the floor.
Fire
December 30, 1903, on Wednesday, Iroquois presented the morning performance of the popular musical Drury Lane. This performance attracted an unusually large number of spectators - tickets were sold for every seat. Despite the fact that the theater was designed only for 1602 seats, the number of spectators on that day reached 2100-2200 people. Due to the overcrowding of the theater, there were not even enough seats in the “standing rooms” at the back of the building, which is why many spectators sat right in the aisles, blocking the exits. In addition, special lattice gates were installed and closed on the stairwells, separating the classes of places from each other. At approximately 3:15 pm, shortly after the start of the second act, eight men and eight women spoke in the pale moonlight. At this time, from a spark of an acetylene lamp imitating moonlight, a muslin theater curtain caught fire. A volunteer on duty on stage tried to extinguish the flames with a Kilfire fire extinguisher, but it turned out to be useless. At this time, a fire unusually quickly swept the curtain and climbed to the upper gallery above the stage, where several thousand square feet of flammable painted towels were hung as decoration . The stage manager immediately tried to lower the special fire curtain made of asbestos , cutting off the stage from the auditorium, but it jammed. It was later revealed that the curtain was blocked by a reflector located under the stage arch. At this time, comedian actor Eddie Foy, who was preparing for the performance, ran onto the stage and urged the audience not to panic , despite the fact that huge burning pieces of scenery were already falling from the ceiling onto the stage. At the same time, he ordered the orchestra to play funny music. At first, the audience did not even suspect the danger and even applauded , looking at the burning scene. But then over the stage from the heat exploded 2 cylinders with acetylene . Explosions and falling pieces of scenery destroyed the building’s power system, and the lights went out all over the theater. Because of this, a strong panic suddenly began, and all the spectators at once began to try to get out of the burning building.
At this time, it turned out that all 30 fire exits were hidden behind the draperies on the north side of the building, and also closed to intricate espanolet latches . Bar owner Frank Houseman, a former baseball player , was able to open the door only because his home refrigerator had a lock like that. The audience also managed to open or break another 2 doors by force, but the remaining 27 emergency doors were impossible to open. For this reason, a huge number of people died, being at an impasse. Meanwhile, the dancers on stage were also forced to flee with the artists backstage and in the numerous locker rooms. When the performers left the back exit, an icy wind flew into the building and significantly increased the power of fire. Many escaped from the theater through the windows in the locker rooms, while others tried to escape through the western stage. She opened inward and got stuck when the actors pressed themselves against the door, desperate to get out. A train agent accidentally passing by saw a crowd clinging to the door and unfastened the hinges from the outside with the tools that he usually carried with him, thereby allowing actors and spectators to get out. Someone opened the huge double cargo doors on the north wall, commonly used to transport scenery. But because of this, fresh air from the street burst into the building with a powerful stream, which instantly fanned the fire to tremendous proportions. Since the huge ventilation openings ( smoke hatches ) in the ceiling behind the stage were boarded up or tightened, fire and hot gases could not harmlessly exit the roof. A wall of fire appeared in the space behind the scene, then ducked under a stuck fire curtain and with all its might burst into the gallery and onto the balconies, where about 900 people were sitting at that time. The fire instantly burned the people who remained there alive and ignited everything in its path. Trying to escape from the wall of fire, many people in a panic rushed from the height to the ground, killing and mutilating themselves and the people below. People who were in the section of the orchestra were able to get out in the lobby and leave the building. But the people who survived the passage of the wall of fire through the gallery and balconies were trapped on the stairs: the slatted lattice gates were still closed. Because of the unthinkable panic in the crush , the largest number of people died here - hundreds of people were crushed, trampled or strangled. The fire continued to gain strength and spread rapidly, spanning the entire building. Escaping from the fire, people climbed out the windows onto the eaves and exterior balconies , which is why one of these balconies collapsed, unable to withstand the overload. At this time, people who managed to get out of the burning building through emergency exits in the northern part were on fire escape. And then it turned out that they were simply not completed and far from reaching the ground. In a panic, trying to escape from the fire, people jumped from unfinished flights of stairs and crashed to death. However, students from Northwestern University, located to the north directly near the theater, tried to overcome the staircases with the help of boards between the spans. In addition, with the help of boards, they tried to connect the theater with their university, making impromptu “bridges”. Also, wooden stairs were thrown by students from the windows and eaves of the theater into the windows of their university from the north side through a narrow lane . Thus they managed to save several people.
At about 3:33 pm, the Chicago Fire Department No. 13 began a rescue operation. But the evacuation was complicated by the fact that fire ladders could not reach people on the unfinished stairs in the northern part of the theater, since this part was in a narrow icy lane filled with smoke from the fire. At the same time, people were already dying en masse right on the fire escape from the thick toxic smoke. Many people running out of the burning building were engulfed in flames and soon died on the spot from fatal burns .
Consequences of a fire
When the fire died down and was extinguished, the damage assessment and counting of the dead began. Since there was no lighting at all in the theater, the rescuers had to take all the portable lights from the nearest shops in order to work in dark rooms. Many transitions of the theater were covered with a layer of crushed bodies twice as tall as human growth - victims crawled over the bodies of the dead, choked to death in smoke and lay down in the next layer. Some of the corpses were disfigured beyond recognition, many were completely torn off clothes. In some places, under a layer of bodies were found living people whom the layer of corpses saved from smoke and fire. While the rescue operation lasted, looting also took place in the theater - some people, pretending to be firefighters or rescuers, stole jewelry, money and jewelry from dead people. At the same time, some of the looters came into the theater right during the fire, which caused them to die. Because of looting, the bodies carried out of the building were piled near the doors and windows, under the protection of the police . At the same time, the jewelry found on the corpses was put in baskets and as a result, 10 baskets of 63 liters each were filled.
About 575 people died on the day of the fire, and about 30 more later died in hospitals from burns, injuries and smoke poisoning. Of the theater staff, only 5 people died. For example, ballet soloist Nellie Reid was trapped high above the stage in a retractable platform, from where she was supposed to shower the stage with rose petals during the performance. During the fire, Nellie suffered serious burns and fell from the platform to the stalls, which is why she died in the hospital a few days later. Since the members of the theater staff knew the location of all the exits, its main part quickly left the theater through the rear entrance.
Action taken
Immediately after the fire, the mayor ordered the closure of all Chicago theaters within 6 weeks. Some New York theaters excluded standing places, while others were completely closed for a while. The rules for construction and fire safety were subsequently reformed. Theaters were closed for conversion throughout the country and in some European cities. All the exits of the theater should now be clearly marked, and the doors configured so that they could be opened from the inside. For example, this fire became the reason for creating the so-called push panel on the doors of the evacuation exits - in case of panic and strong crush in the crowd, such a door can be easily opened from the inside with one click on the cross bar. Smoke manholes and automatic mechanisms opening them were instructed to check strictly and regularly. In addition, all theaters were now required to keep the fire curtain closed, opening it only for the duration of performances or rehearsals, and then closing it again. It was also ordered to gradually abandon the use of asbestos and make a fire curtain made of durable refractory and smoke-resistant metal.
Litigation
As a result of public outrage, many were charged with crimes, including Mayor Carter Harrison Jr. Businessman Arthur Hull, who lost his wife and three children in a fire, demanded to arrest the theater management. After that, the owners of the theater Davis and Powers, as well as several managers were arrested. Davis and Powers hired a clever Chicago lawyer, Levy Mayer, who was famous for his lawyer tricks. Mayer immediately secured the release of the accused on bail , and he himself began to drag out the process. The process lasted for 3 years, during which the lawyer Mayer “proved” that there is no direct connection between ignoring fire safety rules and killing people. He also claimed that no one forced people to stampede and rush from above. As a result, the owners and managers were acquitted , and only the owner of the tavern , who was caught looting, received the verdict. Most of the accused theater workers were fired three years later. The outside of the Iroquois Theater was mostly intact. After restoration, the building was reopened as the Colonial Theater, which was demolished in 1926 to make way for the Eastern Theater.
Fire Factors
In theaters, there are two main protective barriers: a fire curtain and smoke hatches in the ceiling behind the stage. With proper operation in the event of a fire, the area behind the stage becomes a “chimney” or “fireplace” - fresh air flows through the emergency exits, and smoke and hot gases escape safely through the roof. But at the Iroquois Theater, the fire curtain mechanism jammed, and the smoke hatches were closed. The following errors were identified during the investigation:
- the smoke roof hatches of the stage, which were to open automatically during a fire and allow smoke and heat to escape, were closed.
- the fire curtain was not tested periodically, and it got stuck when theater staff tried to lower it.
- The curtain material was not fire resistant. A curtain made of asbestos, interwoven with wire , creates a strong and effective barrier against fire. The asbestos curtain in the theater not only did not fall, but also turned out to be flammable. Chemist Gustav J. Johnson of the Western Society of Engineers investigated a piece of material after a fire: “[This] was mostly wood pulp . If you mix cellulose with asbestos fiber, the life of the curtain will be extended, the cost will be cheaper ... This all does not matter in the fire. ”
Evacuation Errors
- The crowd pressed against the doors, closing them. When people were able to open the doors enough to get out, some people were jammed in the doors, while people from the back kept pushing the door. Today, exit doors open outwards, so people trying to escape have the opportunity to open the doors.
- Many emergency exits were hidden by flammable drapery, and many were locked.
- Theater staff have never had a training evacuation. They were not familiar with the exits, and some refused to open the locked front doors.
- There was no emergency lighting. The main lights of the auditorium never turned on, so the theater remained dimly lit, as during a performance. When tons of burning decorations crashed onto the stage, the electric switchboard was destroyed and all the electric lights went out.
- During the performances, the stairs were blocked by an iron gate so that people with inexpensive tickets did not sit in other parts of the theater.
- Many of the exit routes were confusing.
- The theater had several fake decorative “doors” that looked like exits. 200 people died in one passage, which was not an exit.
- The unfinished fire escape on the north wall was a deadly trap. People could not come down due to the high height of the stairs above the ground, and smoke and fire soon even penetrated the stairs. For these reasons, at least 125 people died in that part of the building.
Memorial
The bronze bas-relief monument of the sculptor Lorado Taft without any identification marks was in the hospital on Wacker, until the building was demolished in 1951 . The monument was placed in warehouses at the City Hall until it was erected in its current location, near the entrance to the building of Lasalle Street in 1960 . Five years after the fire, Andrew Kircher, the founder of the Montrose Cemetery , erected a memorial on its territory to perpetuate the memory of the tragedy. And in Chicago, they held an annual memorial service at City Hall until the last survivors died.