New generation war

It is believed that the use of certain elements of the new strategy by the Russian armed forces could be seen during the wars in the Caucasus (in Chechnya and Georgia), but during the Ukrainian armed conflict it was significantly improved ^[5] . In the spring of 2014, the Crimean campaign led to the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation , demonstrating the impressive capabilities of the Russian armed forces at the level of strategic communications ^[2] . Despite the presence of some similarities with the conflict in South Ossetia in 2008 , it was difficult not to notice a significant difference with it, which showed the operational implementation of new guidelines in the command structure of the Russian army ^[2] . Their success was confirmed by the fact that within just three weeks the morale of the Ukrainian troops was broken without a single shot and all 190 military facilities on the territory of Crimea surrendered ^[2] . It is especially noted that the Russian military managed to avoid the massive use of armored vehicles with artillery, and the BTR-80 armored personnel carrier was the heaviest vehicle during the entire operation ^[2] .

At the same time, the Russian contingent consisted mainly of marines , airborne troops and special forces units ^[2] with a total number of less than 10,000 people against 16,000 from the Ukrainian side ^[2] . The operation showed a high level of discipline of the Russian military personnel, the presence of a large number of new equipment, personal protective equipment and lightly armored wheeled transport equipment ^[2] .

According to researchers at West Point National Academy , the cornerstone of the concept of a “ new generation war ” is the widely cited wording ^[3] given by Russian General Valery Gerasimov in the article “The value of science in foresight” from the newspaper Military Industrial Courier ^[7] :

Looking at Gerasimov’s work from different angles, American analysts note the attention he pays to the non-military aspects of any international confrontation: within the framework of this approach, the involvement of the armed forces becomes just an element of ensuring the sphere of activity in which non-military means work ^[3] . It is emphasized that his concept is deliberately aimed at exploiting the weaknesses of the American bureaucratic system, such as, for example, a long decision-making cycle in situations of pre-conflict confrontation ^[3] . In their opinion, this gives Russian capabilities additional flexibility and limits American ability to respond ^[3] .

The main provisions of the concept of a “ new generation war ” are based on Soviet developments in the field of theory of reflective control ^{[2] [6]} ; they can be represented as a combination of five key elements ^[5] :

• political pressure - through agents of influence, propaganda, information operations, compromising local authorities, etc.
• indirect influence - through the organization of cyberattacks, disruption of the transport infrastructure, training and arming of the rebels, etc.
• military intervention - through the demonstrative extension of their troops to the borders, the organization of voluntary combined arms formations, the unification of the efforts of rebel groups with units of the Russian army, etc.
• compulsory deterrence - through aggressive patrolling of air borders, the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons systems, troop maneuvers on the scale of a theater of war or a continent, etc.
• contractual manipulations - through juggling ceasefire agreements, introducing discord into the camp of Western countries with the help of economic levers, etc.

With their help, eight key stages of conflict development can be identified ^[2] :

• the first phase - non-military methods of asymmetric influence, based on informational, psychological, diplomatic, ideological and economic measures aimed at creating the necessary military-political background,
• the second phase - special operations to mislead the military-political leadership through coordinated work through diplomatic channels in the field of the media and by simulating leaks in the public access of important documents and data,
• the third phase - intimidation, deceit, bribery and recruitment of government and military officials in order to prevent them from performing their immediate duties in an appropriate manner,
• the fourth phase - propaganda aimed at destabilizing the situation among the civilian population and the appearance of paramilitary subversive elements in it,
• the fifth phase - establishing a no-fly zone and blocking the attacked country, using private military companies in close cooperation with local opposition forces,
• the sixth phase - the launch of military activity, which is preceded by a large-scale reconnaissance and sabotage-subversive campaign,
• the seventh phase - a combination of targeted information operations with intimidation through a demonstration of air superiority, electronic warfare and the use of precision weapons systems and weapons based on new physical principles from various platforms and carriers,
• the eighth phase is the suppression of the remaining centers of resistance and the destruction of the remnants of the surviving enemy groups with the help of airborne assault forces , sweeps and long-range strike weapon systems, which operate on the tip of special forces reconnaissance units.

According to the conclusion of Western experts, the Russian concept of the “ new generation war ” differs significantly from the Western theory of hybrid war in that it does not neglect the low-level means of covert intervention, combining them with high-level influence and provocative demonstration of the possibility of a superpower coming directly into conflict ^[5] . According to the international expert F. Carber on the pages of the American magazine ARMY Magazine , the Russian leadership plays this scenario with the virtuosity of Stradivari ^[5] .

The information obtained led to the conclusion that the guidelines for conducting military operations by Russian troops underwent a thorough review and were substantially changed ^[2] . For example, it is obvious that direct influence is now preferable to direct destruction, contactless combat is preferable to direct collision, detonation of the enemy from the inside is preferable to its destruction, cultural war is preferable to confrontation of weapons and technologies, the information-psychological component of war is preferable to the traditional three-dimensional battlefield, etc. ^{[1 ] [2] [6]} .

Particular attention should be paid to the fact that, apparently, during the operation in Crimea, the Russian military command shifted its focus to gaining the sympathy of society with the help of new organizational developments of the information war , using them to suppress the moral and psychological state of the enemy military personnel and civilian population ^{[1] [2]} . Within this framework, the vector of the application of the main efforts became man-centered, which corresponds to the third element of the Trinity Clausewitz (society) ^[1] . The main priority of such actions was the rejection of the use of harsh military force in favor of convincing the enemy personnel and pushing him to activity directed against his leadership and his country ^[2] . The cultivation of such sentiments in society, combined with a whole range of activities from the “ soft power ” toolkit (spreading propaganda, bribing local authorities, establishing contacts with local elites, etc.), made it possible to transform the operational environment, and as a result, the local population enthusiastically greeted the invasion group, and the Ukrainian war machine was bogged down in the problems of desertion and draft evasion ^[1] . It is noted that the idea of ​​“influence” became the cornerstone of all operational planning, and everything was put to use for its realization: a workshop organizing internal communication channels, operational measures to mislead the enemy, psychological operations and a well-designed system of external relations ^{[2 ]} . Russian experts demonstrated an innate understanding of the difference between three target audiences: the Russian-speaking majority in Crimea, the Ukrainian government and the international community ^[2] . Despite the fact that in the midst of Crimean events, all parties to the conflict actively used similar rhetoric, based on the concepts of “self-determination”, “self-defense” and “ sovereignty ”, the Russian side was the only one that was able to effectively support its words with concrete deeds ^[1] .

In this aspect, the necessity of recognizing the strategic importance of a new form of military operations, which is not a military operation in its classical sense, is emphasized ^[2] . The emergence of a “ new generation war ” blurs the obvious boundaries between military and non-military activity, preventing the possibility to clearly identify or identify the very fact of hostile influence ^[1] . Dr. F. Carber, arguing about the “ new generation war ”, noted that it provides an opportunity to take a fresh look at what in the near future is likely to become the scene of military clashes, and the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine for this concept acted as test site ^[5] .

In some publications, a call was made to the Western leadership to adopt the way of thinking associated with the concept of a “ new generation war ” ^[1] . On this occasion, the military historian L. L. Tikherin from the independent analytical center Katehon was skeptical that the Russian military elite relies on the intellectual experience gained over several centuries, and Russian military culture is characterized by patience and accuracy, which are not so easy to reproduce. or simulate a simple observation from the side of ^[8] .

• Bērziņš J. The Evolution of the Concept of Russian New Generation Warfare: Implications for European Security .
• Chekinov SG, Bogdanov SA The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War (Eng.) // Military Thought. - 2013. - No. 4 . - S. 12-22 . Archived on February 20, 2015.
• Chivvis C. Understanding Russian "Hybrid Warfare". And What Can Be Done About it. (English) // RAND Corporation. - 2017 .-- March 1.
• Fox AC, Rossow AJ Making Sense of Russian Hybrid Warfare: A Brief Assessment of the Russo – Ukrainian War // The Land Warfare Papers. - 2017. - March ( No. 112 ).
• Radin A. Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics. Threats and Potential Responses . - RAND Corporation , 2017. - (Project Air Force). - ISBN 978-0-8330-9558-9 .

• Ryabov K. American experts have identified "Russian methods of a new generation of war" (Rus.) . army-news.ru . The online journal "Army Herald" (May 26, 2016). Date of treatment May 26, 2016.
• Tony Balasevicius. Russia's “New Generation War” and Its Implications for the Arctic . The Mackenzie Institute (November 10, 2015). Date of appeal March 15, 2017. (unavailable link)