Philosophical Doctrine of Proclus the Diadochus

Like the Greek Neoplatonist, Proclus sought to discover a logical and metaphysical structure in which unity embraces but does not stifle diversity. He assumed the underlying unity of the universe and of himself, the Self , but sought to affirm the diversity of thought and existence. This led him to understand things as different types of one common whole, each part of which is comprehending the rest, but in its own special, limited way. There are successive levels of awareness, thought, and existence that range from the level of ordinary experience, where we constantly come across a fleeting understanding of an equally fleeting world, to that last level where we contemplate the initials and the complete whole with indistinguishable, superintuition. The reason, which the imagination helps, elevates us to that higher state, which is immediately the foundation of religious and ethical values.

Proclus was interested in an integrated understanding of the nature of things. Asking questions about how and what exactly we know, our perceptions and beliefs raise questions of the form: what is the beginning of cognition? What is the nature of the mind? The things that we think and feel? Existing? For Proclus, even questions about virtue, moral judgment and action, God, faith and salvation are all clarified by referring them to questions about their principles and nature. No subject escaped his attention, including the interpretation of poetic works, where Proclus regarded language as a medium for deeper truths. Philosophical research leads to the question of exactly what order of things lies at the base of things, whether in the field of the mind, values, science or literature.

The system of Proclus is complex, and it uses very technical terms (most of which are rooted in the writings of Plato , Aristotle and Plotinus ). There are various complex concepts about our environment and about our selves, not because people necessarily have vivid dreams, but because reality itself is complex. The presence in us of a glimpse of knowledge means a certain unity between our mind and objects of thought. In addition, unity is essential for the identity of things, and without it they would be unthinkable and conceptually unrealistic. The “ One ” is the original absolute, and it is fundamental to intelligibility and existence. The thinker, thoughts and beings are one thing. Things are not disconnected, but distributed across levels of ever-increasing unity. Consequently, questions about various types of being, cognition, good, etc., become questions about levels. For the Neoplatonist, understanding this scheme of things is the key to moving towards a good life and achieving what has since been praised as the goal of human aspirations, “true happiness” or eudaimonia since the days of Plato.

Metaphysics

Proclus shares his metaphysical position with the Neoplatonists . He is a realist in the sense that he accepts things that are independent of what we humans think of him. But actually existing is not physical, because accessible to the five senses, it is episodic and illusory. Things that exist are accessible to the mind under the condition that such a mind and its ideas are not only personal, but also objective and universal (this can be traced to the revision of the concept of mind by Aristotle by Alexander Afrodisiysky ).

In his answer to the problem of one / many, Proclus keeps between comprehending things as incommensurable and their indistinguishable unity. He uses the mixture rule formulated in Anaxagoras' theory of material substances , but which, in Plotin's time, was extended to the field of mind and concepts: "Everything is in everything, using a method that is appropriate for everyone." If things (conceivable and material) are ultimately united, then they cannot have clear boundaries that distinguish them, but must, in a sense, be “everything inside everyone”. Similarity and dissimilarity are replaced by strict identity and difference ( Platonic theology III 7 S and W, VI 347-50 Portus; statement of the Fundamentals of theology 108). This metaphysical foundation is combined with enumeration of logically possible sentences with x (i.e.: x; x and non-x; non-x), and leads to the chains of 'intermediaries' that Proclus is famous for.

The triadic development of the Proclus system is due to the principle: " Any two polar (directly opposite; x and non-x are also considered opposite) terms have one or more intermediaries that are more or less similar to each pole ." This principle can also be represented as a special case of a more general principle: “ terms or concepts that differ in something should be similar in something ”. It can be seen from the last formulation that for the assumption of opposite terms, the existence of something in common between them is necessary. This intermediary will be a universal, which makes the question of its ontological status inevitable, that is, it brings us to the problem of universals .

So, for Proclus to think, you need to distinguish, and that there was something different, there must be something in common. This goes back to the Platonic proposition that thinking consists in discrimination and conjunction. The presumption of having something in common between any conceivable things leads to the complete unthinkability of the One - the beginning of the Proclus system (see below), since the presence of a common aspect with something else would contradict its absolute unity. The difference in conceivability leads to a difference in the ways of existence of the conceivable and the One : the first exists insofar as it is defined, and the second insofar as its existence is a condition for the possibility of any definiteness. Although triple leitmotifs appear in the vast majority of cases (for examples, see below on involvement ), in reality, you can insert as many intermediaries as you need (see multi-valued logics ).

However, Proclus does not recognize that everything that can be thought deserves a place in reality: only those conceivable things that do not depend on a single mind ( Comment on Plato's Parmenides , line 1054, 895-7), but can already stand on their own ' basis' (in other words, based on your own existence, on your own hypostasis ). The philosopher’s task is to discover true, true terms. To make sense of diversity, we group things with common characteristics. But this raises the question of the status of such a characteristic and how it relates to the group and its parts. Proclus distinguishes between the three meanings of the 'whole', and recognizes all the conclusions from the statement that the whole is the sum of the parts plus the reason for its unity (see also Aristotle , Metaphysics 1041b, and especially Plato , Teetet 204-5). Essentially, the whole is a monad , which cannot be divided: it is 'the whole into parts' (the statement of the Fundamental Principles of Theology 67-9). A typical characteristic for a group in its pure state is such an indivisible whole. It relies as a prototype that defines and covers all possible particular forms of this group. Many parts of the whole express the prototype, but it is not equivalent, because they have it in various states (for example, the light itself, the light of the sun, the light of a firefly). Then the attribute can be considered as a series headed by its own prototype (for example, the monad of life), followed by many different forms, where the same attribute is found (for example, the life of an animal, the life of a plant). In Platonic philosophy, the relationship of the 'Idea' to its material individual things was often described as involvement , because each individual thing cannot be declared to have the whole Idea - see, for example, Parmenides of Plato.

For the late Neoplatonist, involvement extends to the relations between conceptual objects, so Proclus speaks in general terms about what he “participates in” and about him “involved”. The problem of “involvement” (how the Idea can be divided and nonetheless maintain its integrity) is solved in the proclamation theorem on the whole and part: the whole in itself is actually a separate (from the lower) thing, which is freed from direct distribution in part: she is "not involved" - see The Origin of Theology . Thus, we achieve the triad of "not allowing self-involvement - allowing self-involvement - participation." Since Proclus deals with a metaphysical order, where an attribute is more perfect and real than its subject-subject, he further distinguishes between an attribute which is completed and materialized in itself ('self-hypostasis'), and subject to involvement, which should always be within the sacrament to perform the involvement (such attributes are called image and trace ). Between a completely transcendental ('unaffected by involvement' or 'not admitting any involvement in himself') attribute and a completely immanent attribute (that is, an attribute not only comprehended by us, but dependent on our thinking in its existence) is an independent immanent attribute. This mediator is the basis of the point of view of Proclus. The mediator points to objective realities (for example, cosmic bodies, certain universal forces and properties, spirits) that are within the reach of our comprehension, but independent of us.

The constant "outflow" from unity to plurality, Proclus calls "exodus" ( emanation ). It leaves the source "abiding", inescapable. The thing that “emanates” dilutes the characteristics of the source and changes due to the conditions in which it is found (for example, Life itself becomes the life of the mind, or the life of plants). However, that which “descends” into plurality never disconnects its connection with its original, pure state, otherwise it would completely lose its definition (that is, the life of a plant is still life, and not part of the plant). “Return” is the tendency or movement to restore a lost pure definition (which “remains” unchanged). Stay, departure, return are not separate static states, but three distinguishable moments of a single dynamic process; everything is exposed to all these moments, being in a contradictory position with the One. These three processes apply to each form, property, or object. The source of this triad is already in Plotinus ).

Levels of Existence

Things consist of quality levels of corresponding degrees of reality. The various degrees are also modes (states), because they change any form, property, or object "in a manner appropriate to each." (This is the philosophical basis for a large number of specific circumstances in the vocabulary of Proclus and subsequent Neoplatonists). The degrees are related to broad levels (in addition to unity), typical: real existence, life, mind, soul, nature and body. Each level has its own “unaffected monad,” followed by many that are exposed to involvement: for example, Mind and minds. Movement from one level to another involves a “decline” (hyphesis) or “elevation” (anagoogee). Properties accumulate sequentially: real existence has unity, life has real existence and unity, the mind has life, real existence, and unity, etc. Thus, “exaltation” is also the cause of some analytical raising to the initials.

Proclus has the levels of existence in degrees of perfection (completeness) and in degree of generality (both scales coincide, so that the more general is the more perfect - Platonic theology , III 20-6), in fact this is an inversion of the Aristotelian scheme of values. The soul transcends the body because it perfects it. The mind perfects the soul, but is also more general, because even animals have a “trace of knowledge”. Life surpasses the mind, because it is a more general concept, larger in volume, and there can be no lifeless mind. Existence is likewise higher because even inanimate objects have an existence. The rule that is deduced from the theorem of the whole / part of Proclus: The closer a concept is to being, the more general it is.

The One, Good, and Divine

The greatest unity, the One , transcends every possible attribution, positive or negative, and therefore cannot be understood directly. It surpasses the very state of existence, so Proclus calls it “nonexistent” ( The First Principles of Theology 138), that is, “before the existing.” This absolute metaphysical state coincides with the state of value, since undivided unity is the ultimate perfection (completeness) desired by all. The One is identical with the Good , and as the highest perfection, value and reason, is God. As completely unaffected by involvement, God is transcendental, incomprehensible, and inexpressible. As a unity, essential for everything that exists, the divine radiance is immanent to the lowest material (see The Fundamentals of Theology 145).

However, Proclus carefully distinguishes divinity itself from deification by participation (for example, from a divine body). In the proper sense, only the One and the “self-hypostatic” unity are divine (see the discussion of genes given below), and due to the broadening of the meaning of the term, these objects are predicated of such a unity ( Fundamentals of Theology 114). The incomprehensible deity can be approached intellectually, through the removal of attribution (in Christian theology this is known as the apophatic path to God ), or by analogy, concluding what the One is like through its own well-known consequences. Ultimately, people can achieve the One by combining their faith in it with their own immanent “one” through magical and mystical actions (see Chaldean Oracles ; Jamblica ).

Such extreme transcendence is almost doomed to failure. How can the One = Good generally correlate with being? Proclus rejected the two One Jambliches (completely transcendental and the one that causes the other). Nonetheless, two main problems — How is being produced from the pre-existent? How is diversity the result of absolute simplicity? - still have not been resolved. Responding to the first problem, Proclus emphasizes hypostatic principles: the Limit and the Infinite (and Providence). In response to the second problem, he distinguishes between the multiplicity of "single" genads . The single, in essence, is the limit, because there is nothing else but it. This means that the One has no border imposed on it: it is infinite in potency. Limit and Infinite become the starting points of the causality chain, which produces the levels of existence. The limit provides definition and discreteness, and the Infinite - the "overflowing" ability to exist in continuity.

The third factor is the providential activity of the One, which reaches the bottom, individual beings and improves them through unity. In addition, if the One is the prototype of unity, then it should be the head of many genies subject to involvement. The genada then is the unity in the core of every existing one, and there are as many genads as there are things that exist. Genads themselves appear in the Limit, the Infinite and the Providence, and therefore bring the seeds of discernment to the root of the individual diversity of things. Proclus further identifies "self-hypostasis genads" (that is, those unity that are characteristic of thinking without sensory perception) that refer to timeless or eternal objects, this is a species worshiped as gods by various religions. Simple (not self-hypostatic) genads are genads that are immanent to people, animals, plants, minerals, and so on.

Conceivable Entities and Soul

The highest level that thought can only reach is real existence, or pure existence, the first category of conceivable entities. This is the object of thought (noeeton) (the One is beyond thought). Here the content of the One acquires its first level of manifestation, in that it becomes actually existing and accessible for contemplation. Proclus considers the object of thought as a place for a universal pattern, a “paradigm” (Plato, Timaeus 31a) and as a place for eternity. Then he finds the average intelligible level corresponding to pure Life before it is embodied in living beings. Life means the ability to multiply the content of the whole.

At the last intelligible level, the thinking (noeron), the Mind resides on its own. From here and above we understand things directly, as if intuitively. The essence of the Mind is “pure thinking,” the content of the Mind becomes different due to the power of the Mind, identified with Rhea (Kratil 402) and the “Goddess” of the Chaldean Oracles. The active action of the Mind leads to a creative conception of things (poieetikon) (Plato, Timaeus 28c; Aristotle, On the Soul 430a12).

The Creative Mind is the God Demiurge (Plato, Timaeus 29d-30c), one who gives a certain form to the physical world. The Creator is different from the One, which clearly contrasts with Christian doctrine. The mind has two polar contemplations: one contemplates the conceivable entities of the higher and has intellectual ideas and forms; the other is involved in the creation of time, soul and physical things of ordinary experience.

The soul is what makes the body alive, and is the essence between actually existing and becoming ( Commentary on Timaeus Plato III 254.13-17). In the Platonic tradition, the soul oscillates between two areas: one is intelligent and beyond time; the other is physical and is limited by body, space and time. Proclus, therefore, defines the essence of the soul as timeless, but its activity is an action in time, because it cannot realize all of its contents immediately, but must deploy it to a passing time. He distinguishes the “uninvolved monad” of the soul, which is “above the (physical) world” (hyperkosmios) and is not connected with any body. The traditional Platonic world soul (the one that moves the cosmos in a way measured by science), although it is something unique, now becomes a soul subject to involvement, the body of which is the entire material universe.

Body, Matter, and the One

The characteristic qualities of the body are presented as its nature (physis). In living beings, nature is an instinctive, unreasonable aspect of life that is inseparable from the functions of the body. Nature may differ from the soul itself (which is purposeful and separate from the body) and from the pure body (which is passive in itself). However, such distinctions are not always necessary and therefore nature often groups with the soul or body. “Uninvolved involvement” Nature is paradoxical (How can it be separate from the body?), Which explains why Proclus does not explicitly attribute to it “ genads that exist above and in the (physical) world” ( Platonic theology VI). Nature has a Necessity that defines physical behavior. In fact, the activity of Nature creates bodies directly, and seems to be a monadic source of the body; there is no unsupported body involvement. The body considered in itself is the last of the things that in a sense exist. It is completely inert.

Living beings move because of their vitality, and inanimate ones according to their nature. For Proclus, a clean body is a quantity of a certain shape with a three-dimensional extension. Matter , on the other hand, is not even a certain being, but the possibility for something to be what it is. At the lower end of the metaphysical scale, objects gradually become less and less complex: living things without a glimpse of the mind (plants), inanimate creatures that lack life, and matter that lacks even a certain being. That is, the more general and perfect the reason is, the further it extends its power.

At lower levels, things receive attributes of an exceptionally more general kind, not general and special. The composition of the properties with their maximum number in a row is achieved at the level of phenomena that people inhabit. Starting from it and down, the number of particular properties is gradually decreasing. Thus, we achieve simplicity in two different ways: in the highest sense, this is the One; in the lower is matter.

According to Proclus, matter receives continuous, universal power and is the direct result of the spread of the One into the Infinite (in contrast to Plotinus's division of matter into intelligible matter and sensory matter ). Matter has a certain degree of good and value. Like the One, it is the most obscure and formless: the One is primary in relation to the intelligible definition, and matter is beyond its reach. This does not mean that Proclus considered material objects to be the shortest distance to the One. "Return" to the One - "exaltation" through the levels of existence in the maximum sense, with more advanced properties.

Evil

Proclus completely rejects the existence of evil as something absolute. He does not detect it at any of the levels of existence, and even in matter, which "is in some way good." Everything, including matter, has its roots in the One, which is Good.

If there was a source for evil ( Plutarch blamed the evil world soul, the Gnostics on the Demiurge, and the Christians on the devil), then the evil should be “beyond even a complete lack of existence ... further than the insignificance of non-existence” ( Comment on Timaeus I 374. 14 -17). What is usually described as evil indicates the relative weakness of the Good: for example, when something is unnatural, or when it is bad for its purpose or imperfect in some aspect (I 375, 381); in human actions, evil occurs when criminals are unaware of what is best and have a weak mind and soul ( O Evil 50, 40-6).

Since evil is a parasitic and fictitious existence (parhypostasis) ( Platonic theology I 84-5), the only real open choice is to pursue the Good. We are not able to achieve this Good due to ignorance, non-conformity to the Good with means of achievement, selfish passions and other restrictions. Freedom of action then initially means to be free from obstacles such as the prohibition or distortion of the person's inherent desire to pursue the Good.

Psychology

Psychee ( soul ) is a living, thinking entity, and man is a creature with a soul. 'The whole content of consciousness' is a useful translation when the soul is opposed to the perfect 'mind' (nous), which is higher than the attachments of the soul. Each soul can cause spontaneous movement. The difference lies mainly in the way in which the movement is invoked and maintained through the mental abilities of the soul.

Animal psychee is simple. It is unreasonable, and is associated with sensory perception and desires, although it has a glimpse of the mind. The human soul mixes the rational and unreasonable aspects (not parts, because the soul itself is inseparable). In this way, people can lead a wide range of lives depending on how much they allow one aspect of their soul to control another.

Reflecting the complexity of its constitution, the human mind / soul has many abilities or 'powers'. The unreasonable side of the soul deals with the external data of the physical world. With sensory perception (aistheesis), the soul receives the sensory qualities of material objects through the senses. A variety of impressions, “ affects ”, at the beginning are organized into a united impression. Then, with the help of her mind- forming ability (doxa), the soul forms the basic faiths from the senses and any judgments about the source of these sensory impressions. Finally, the soul visualizes things within itself, thanks to its ability to create images (phantasia).

The rational side of the soul deals with outpourings of the mind when it uses its highest ability, called the logos (justification, definition and modeling), the individual consciousness has access to the "inexhaustible source" of ideas and inspiration. But, being single, the human consciousness recognizes them as fragmented (not as thinking entities). The soul also has its own concepts: 'psychee has never been a blank board, but a board that is always inscribed and always writes itself and inscribed by the mind ( Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's Principles 16. 8-10). Understanding is the result of a mental debate between successive arguments and statements: that is, it is the result of a 'discursive' reasoning. To compare different concepts, the rational soul seems to use its own imagination (phantasia), and considers the representations of concepts as projections on the screen of consciousness, originating from internal and external sources. Through the harmonization of ideas, the soul can replenish or correct the impression of feelings.

Soul and body

The individual soul, being single, is incomplete and imperfect: it knows this and wants other things to complete it. Semi-knowledge brings a feeling of insolence (tolma), which results in a complete descent of the soul into the body (unlike Plotinus, which allowed part of the soul to remain non-descending). Once in the oyster shell of the body, the soul longs for its own completion and unification. From here, the soul can be raised, 'be saved,' in three additional ways that the appropriate teachers and leading spirits help. With erotic love, she seeks to unite with a higher life (as in Plato's Feast ). With philosophical contemplation, the soul reaches conceivable entities and reflects on the principles. With theurgy (see also Chaldean Oracles ; Jamblichus ), the soul culminates in a leap of faith (pistis), which combines its own “genad” of the soul with the all-perfect One. A single soul, through ignorance of its place, can thus come down and rise unlimitedly through all levels of thought and being (position of the Fundamental Principles of Theology 206). This 'journey' is ontological when it includes the cycle of birth and death, and epistemological when consciousness is involved in lower or higher occupations during the lifetime. The 'body', according to Proclus, has several senses. In the simplest case, the body is a pure cosmic extension, similar to the case in the case of an intangible light body. A body endowed with layers of qualities becomes the physical body of our sensory experience. When the soul descends into involvement, it acquires a series of bodies called 'vehicles' (ochaemata). Each soul involved has first a subtle, 'luminous' body-vehicle-vehicle (for example, the world soul has world space). However, any soul that descends further into the physical region acquires a further vehicle composed of four elements, fire, air, water, earth. Finally, those who incarnate on earth (for example, people) acquire their single bodily body. Thus, the types of souls correspond to their degree of involvement in the body (which is consistent with general metaphysics). Vehicles played an important role in religion. After death, the soul is cleansed, loses its unreasonable nature and the associated vehicle, consisting of 4 elements. She becomes free to climb with her luminous vehicle. Since the essence of human life resides in an immortal soul, which is separable from the physical body, Proclus adheres to the Pythagorean-Platonic doctrine of the transmigration of souls (see Plato ; Pythagoras ; Pythagoras ). However, he does not believe that the soul can reincarnate back on an evolutionary scale to full consciousness. References to the transformation of people into animals ( Plato , Timaeus 42b-c), for Proclus make sense if they are considered psychologically, not biologically: that is, a person can lead the life of a wolf (if he is unfair) or a donkey (if he is insatiable), but cannot be reincarnated as an actual wolf or donkey.

Through his students (e.g. Ammonia ) and works, Proclus influenced subsequent Greek philosophy in its two leading centers, Athens and Alexandria, until the end of antiquity in the seventh century. His metaphysical system was adapted by the Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite for the Christian heavenly hierarchy. In turn, this influenced both Byzantine thinkers ( Maxim the Confessor , John of Damascus ) and those from the Latin West (see Eriugen ; Grossetest ). Islamic theologians of the tenth century, such as Ihwan al-Safa , were inspired by the emanaciolism of Proclus and the theory of mathematical entities (see also Neoplatonism in Islamic philosophy ). In addition, Arab scholars compiled his First Principles of Theology under the name of Aristotle (see Theology of Aristotle ). Thomas Aquinas was the first to discover that Proclus was the author of the teachings in all these works. Aquinas friend William Morbique made the first Latin translations of the main works of Proclus. A new wave of direct influence of Proclus occurs in Byzantium from the eleventh to fifteenth century, and in Renaissance European humanism, especially among Marsilio Ficino and Nikolai Kuzansky . From there, Proclus' philosophy and science can be found in Kepler, Cambridge Platonists (see Cambridge Platonism ), Spinoza, English Romantics and various philosophers of idealism, culminating in Hegel (see also Idealism ).

Proclus wrote numerous comments on the dialogues of Plato , on Euclid , the works of Aristotle , Homer , Hesiod , explanations for students. Among them:

• Fundamentals of theology translation: Loseva A.F.
• On the theology of Plato
• About ten doubts about fishing
• About fishing, fate and what is in us
• On the guises of evil
• Proclus's comments on individual Platonic dialogues (some translated into Russian)
• Commentary on 1 book of “Beginnings” of Euclid / Translation of two introductions by Yu. A. Shichalin ^[1]
• Elements of physics / translation S. V. Mesyats ^[2]
• Astronomical Overview
• Eclogues from the Chaldean philosophy
• About Sacrifice and Magic

This list is poorly consistent with that in the Court , pi, 2473. The work of Proclus in the network is dedicated to the project Proclus Diadoch ^[3]

Gersh, S. (1973) Kineesis Akineetos; A Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus, Leiden: Brill.

Lloyd, AC (1967) Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonism ', in AH Armstrong (ed.) Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 302-25.

Lloyd, AC (1990) The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Saffrey, HD and Pepin, J. (eds) (1987) Proclus: lecteur et interprete des anciens, Paris: CNRS.

Siorvanes, L. (1996) Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

• A.F. Losev. The history of ancient aesthetics. The last centuries. Book II. M., 1988, pp. 23-336
• Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Article "Proclus".