Fredericksburg Campaign

After the Battle of Entitem, Lee completed the Maryland Campaign and retreated to Virginia (September 19), where he immediately set about restoring the fighting efficiency of his army. Lee gave the army 5 weeks of rest, organized food delivery and rearmed the army with rifles seized in federal warehouses, so that by the end of the year there were almost no smoothbore muskets left in the army. Gradually, he was able to restore the size of the army: if on October 10 it numbered 64,273, then on October 20 it was already 68,033, and on November 10th it was 70,909. At the same time he brought the whole army into two corps and obtained the assignment of a general from the senate Lieutenant ranks Longstreet and Jackson . Meanwhile, Jeb Stewart launched (October 9) a long Chambersberg raid (80 miles in 77 hours) to the rear of the Potomac Army ^[4] .

Lee's army stood in the Shenandoah Valley , but on October 22, he threw some units east over the mountains and deployed a chain of pickets from Martinsburg to Frederiksberg to observe the enemy’s maneuvers. On October 26, the Potomac Army crossed the Potomac River. Lee still did not know exactly where the enemy would be heading - west of the Blue Ridge Mountains, up the Shenandoah Valley, or east of the mountains, to Warrenton and Culpeper . On October 28, Lee divided the army into two parts: the corps of Thomas Jackson was left in the valley with instructions to act at the discretion of Jackson, and the corps of Longstreet and Lee himself went to Culpeper. However, at that moment he was called to Richmond (where he had not appeared since August 14), in order to decide with President Davis which particular reinforcements it makes sense to transfer from southern Virginia to strengthen the North Virginia army . Lee arrived in Richmond on November 1, and there at the meeting it was decided to leave 6,000 people to defend the south, and send everything above that number to the north ^[4] .

On November 7, Lee returned to Culpeper, where he discovered that the situation had changed: the Potomac Army launched an offensive east of the Blue Ridge Range, as if trying to wedge between the Jackson and Longstreet corps (although Lee doubted that Federal General McClellan would advance south, having Jackson on his right flank). McClellan really conceived an attack on Warrenton, although he doubted his success ^[4] .

On November 7, the northerners went to Warrenton, and here their advance suddenly stopped. Later it became known that on November 7, General McClellan was removed from command, and General Ambrose Burnside was appointed in his place. Lee met this news with some regret: he knew McClellan well, but was not familiar with the principles of Burnside. General James Longstreet, on the contrary, believed that a change of command was in the hands of the southerners; McClellan, in his opinion, quickly improved his strategy and over time could become a very dangerous opponent. Other officers believed that the displacement of command demoralizes the Potomac Army ^[4] .

Burnside, who was crushed from Washington, decided to launch an offensive on Richmond in late autumn. Already on November 9, he proposed to Halleck his plan of attack. According to the plan, it was planned to concentrate the army near Warrenton, depicting an attack on Culpeper or Gordonsville , and then swiftly transfer the army to the southeast, cross the Potomac at Frederiksberg and move to Richmond along the RF&P railway . This maneuver avoided Jackson's sudden attack from the Shenandoah Valley. In addition, he made it possible to reliably cover Washington and provided convenient communication between the army and the supply base in Aquila Creek. A similar plan was already being developed by McClellan before his resignation, and he even instructed the cavalry detachment Ulric Dahlgren to study the condition of the RF&P railway. Burnside's plan met with objections from President Lincoln and General-General Henry Halleck , who thought it wiser to step strictly south against Lee’s army instead of attacking Richmond ^{[5] [6]} .

Burnside considered the capture of Richmond to be the ultimate goal of the campaign. He believed that the fall of the capital would be a severe blow to the Confederation. He did not explain exactly what advantages the North would receive from the fall of Richmond, given that the enemy army would remain intact in the west of the state. He also did not explain why he decided to cross the Rappahanok precisely at Frederiksberg along the pontoons, and not along the numerous fords upstream. Edward Stackpole wrote that it would be more logical to directly attack the enemy, rather than make a roundabout march in order to capture a bunch of bricks and a crowd of unarmed residents, which was Richmond. The only real acquisition would be an artillery factory in Richmond. If Burnside hoped in this way to deprive Lee of his supply base, then he underestimated his opponent, who was ready for this kind of scenario and had already created an additional base in Stouton ^[7] .

Many years after the war, General Longstreet wrote that it would be more logical for Burnside to go to the Chester Gap, which is 20 miles from Warrenton. From there, “[o] n could restrain Jackson and attack me, or restrain me and attack Jackson, thus breaking us in pieces. You can argue about whether he had time or not to beat me in this way. But in any case, it was the only profitable maneuver at the time he took command. ... If they added equally good skill to a good chance, he could have won. This was the maneuver that then bothered us the most, and we were just thinking about what we would be able to oppose such a maneuver when news came of its attack on Frederiksberg ” ^[8] .

Henry Halleck personally arrived at the Burnside headquarters to agree on a plan, and then handed the plan over to the president for approval. In the version discussed with Burnside and sent for approval, it was assumed that the army would cross the Potomac on the crossings above Frederiksberg. On November 14, Lincoln approved precisely this plan ^{['' i '' 3]} , warning Burnside that for its successful implementation it is necessary to move as quickly as possible ^[9] .

Burnside also admitted that during his advance the southerners would be able to roll north, but believed that the loss of half a dozen Pennsylvania towns in this case is permissible ^[10] .

Burnside needed the assistance of Halleck to implement the plan. He was supposed to ensure the timely delivery of crossing facilities to Frederiksberg. But Halleck did not understand the essence of the matter: he decided that Burnside would need the crossing means after taking Frederickberg to provide a shorter supply route for the army. As a result, the pontoons were delivered to Frederiksberg with a delay of 10 days (November 27) ^[11] .

Meanwhile, while the offensive plan was being agreed upon, Burnside decided to reorganize the Potomac Army . He doubted that he would be able to effectively manage such a large number of corps, so he reduced the corps in pairs to three "grand divisions" ^[12] :

• Left Grand Division; (I and VI corps), under the command of Major General William Franklin
• Central Grand Division; (III and V corps), under the command of Major General Joseph Hooker .
• Right Grand Division; (I and IX corps), under the command of Major General Edwin Sumner
• The XI Corps is in reserve with Washington and the XII Corps at Harpers Ferry.

The commanders of the grand divisions were Sumner, Franklin and Hooker. By grouping the corps in this way, Burnside adhered to the logic of his predecessor McClellan: Sumner and Franklin (and Burnside himself) already commanded a group of corps during the Maryland campaign . Hooker was elected to this position clearly because of the reputation of an aggressive commander, which he won in the campaign on the peninsula and in the Maryland campaign. Sumner and Franklin were nothing more than rank-and-file generals, and showed no performance in previous campaigns ^[13] .

On November 14, Burnside received a telegram from Washington informing him that his plan was approved. He immediately ordered the advance. On the morning of November 15, Sumner’s Grand Division left the camp near Warrenton and over the course of two and a half days covered a distance of 40 miles to . It was an unusually fast march: the army marched 15 miles a day, which corresponds to the standards of World War I, although it does not reach the standards of World War II, when the norm was 25 miles a day. For the army, accustomed to going 5-6 miles a day under McClellan, it was an unprecedented pace. This march took Lee by surprise. Intelligence did not have time to react, therefore, only 24 hours after Sumner arrived in Falmouth, Lee found out only about the direction of the enemy’s movement ^[14] .

On November 18, the news came about the Burnside attack. This news in the north was received with optimism and enthusiasm. It seemed that now the army has everything necessary for a successful attack on Richmond. The Philadelphia Inquirer wrote that fierce battles await ahead, but Richmond will be taken soon. Burnside advances quickly and compares favorably with the uncertain McClellan. Newspapers pinned the most unfounded hopes on the campaign and thus only created excessive psychological pressure on Burnside and his subordinates ^[15] .

Lee already noticed on November 12 that the enemy was not continuing the offensive to the south, and suggested that a change of command led to a change in strategic plan and that Burnside would probably head along the Rappahanok River to Frederiksberg. He told Jackson that in this case he would need to immediately join the Longstreet corps, and advised him to begin preparations for such a throw. On November 13, Stuart’s intelligence reported that the enemy’s right flank was apparently moving east. On November 14, Lee finally became convinced that Burnside was aiming at Fredericksburg , and he again reminded Jackson that it was time for him to join Longstreet. On November 17, it became known that the three infantry brigades of the northerners approached Frederiksberg, and the federal fleet and vehicles entered the port of Aquila Creek. Lee immediately ordered one Longstreet division (under Maclow's command) to move to Frederiksberg, and the rest of the corps to go there, if the enemy’s intentions become more clear ^[4] .

At first, Lee did not intend to occupy the lines of Frederiksberg, believing a more advantageous position on the North Anna River. On the morning of November 18, he even sent some units to this river, but on the same day it became known that Sumner’s corps was approaching Frederiksberg, and Lee decided that if there were no other corps on his way, then Sumner should be stopped near Frederiksberg until the Burnside’s intentions were clarified . In addition, Lee did not want to admit the enemy to the south bank of the river, where the area had not yet been ravaged by war ^[4] .

On November 19, it became clear that not only Sumner was going to Fredericksburg, but also the rest of the army of the Potomac Army ^[16] . Lee moved his headquarters from Culpeper closer to Frederiksberg and again reminded Jackson that he would be better off joining Longstreet. Jackson’s answer wasn’t preserved, so we don’t know why he stood in the valley for so long. Probably, he was planning an offensive to the north, down the valley, or he planned to launch a raid behind enemy lines, similar to his August raid on Manassas station . Douglas Freeman wrote that Lee’s intuition during this campaign is just as amazing as during the North Virginia campaign: on the day that Lee suspected Burnside of intending to move to Frederiksberg, Burnside was still requesting permission from Halleck for this maneuver. The first units of Sumner came to Frederiksberg on November 15, the same day that Lee sent his troops there ^[4] .

On November 27, Jackson led his corps to Orange Courthouse (36 miles from Frederiksberg), having traveled 120 miles in 8 days. At some point, Lee thought that the separation of his army would provoke Burnside to attack and be able to repeat what happened during the second Bull Run battle , when Longstreet's corps attacked Pope ’s army on the flank. He ordered Jackson to stay put. Three days later, Lee decided that rains could ruin the roads and prevent Jackson from reaching Frederiksberg, so on November 29 he ordered the march to continue, to Frederiksberg and get up to Guinea Station, from where he could quickly come to the aid of Longstreet or go to the lower crossings through Rappahanok - if Burnside decides to cross the river there ^[17] . On December 1, Jackson took the indicated position. He didn’t like the place: “We will defeat the enemy,” he said to D. Hill , “but we won’t achieve anything” ^[18] .

The historian Edward Stackpole calls the story of the missing pontons ( The case of the missing pontons ) the most important phase of the entire Fredericksburg campaign. When Sumner’s corps approached Frederiksberg on November 17, he had the opportunity to cross the river and seize a bridgehead to ensure the crossing of the army. However, for some reason, Burnside did not give way to these plans. On November 19, Burnside personally arrived in Fredericksburg and found that the requested pontoons were missing. Sumner proposed crossing the river upstream and capturing the city, which was quite possible at that moment, but Burnside was afraid that a flash flood could cut this detachment from the main army, and did not give its consent to such a maneuver. Edward Stackpole wrote that if Burnside possessed the flexibility of mind characteristic of the great commanders, he could calmly transfer his army (without convoys) to the other side and would have experienced supply problems for several days, but he would have taken Frederiksberg and could not have crossed fearing enemy countermeasures ^[19] .

If Burnside received the pontoons on time, or if he had the thinking of Lee, Grant, or General George Patton and crossed the Rappahanok without wagons, then the Longstreet corps coming from Culperer would have been welcomed by the entire Potomac army, numbering 120,000, when the corps Jackson would still have to go 150 miles ^[20] .

The story of the late pontoons could be perceived as an ordinary "comedy of mistakes", if not for its tragic consequences. Perhaps Henry Halleck was simply too slow, or his subordinates did not understand his orders, and then this can be considered a misunderstanding, which often happens during the war. But this could be malicious intent: Halleck was annoyed that Burnside did not want to follow his instructions, and then that Lincoln approved the Burnside plan through his head, so that he could deliberately delay the sending of pontoons. General Oliver Howard thought this story was very strange and even suggested that Halleck deliberately delayed the pontoons so that Burnside went to the winter apartments and no one would be personally responsible for this. In any case, he considered it impossible to attribute to chance the fact that work requiring three days was completed in thirteen ^[21] .

The sequence of events was as follows: on June 6, Halleck sent an order to deliver pontoons to Washington (near Harpers Ferry). This order was sent by mail, so it reached the addressee only on November 12. On November 14, 36 pontoons arrived in Washington, and the senior engineer, General , notified Burnside and informed that the pontoons would be shipped to Fredericksburg on November 16 or 17. But they managed to send the pontoons only on November 19, while rains and dirt made it difficult to move them. They arrived at the place only on November 27 ^[22] .

General Woodbury subsequently claimed that an order had come to him on November 13 and it stated that the army was preparing to advance on Fredericksburg. When exactly this offensive will begin, the order did not say. After that, Woodbury personally appeared in Halleck’s office and asked him to postpone the offensive for at least five days to complete all preparations, but Halleck refused him. Subsequently, journalists wrote that Halleck could easily follow Woodbury’s advice and suspend the attack, but did not do this, which essentially led Burnside ^[23] .

The story with the pontoons frustrated Burnside's plans, and since he was not capable of improvisation, the situation was hanging in limbo. Burnside regularly sent reports to Washington, they were clearly transmitted to Lincoln, but there was no information about his reaction to these reports. It was not until November 26 that the president invited Burnside to a meeting in Aquila Creek. It is not known what they were talking about. Two days later, Burnside went to Washington for a second meeting. The details of this meeting are also unclear - it is likely that the president and the commander in chief were reflecting on a strategic solution to the problem. The obvious decision was to move the Rappahanok part of the forces somewhere east of Frederiksberg, for example, at . As a result, the engineers advised Burnside to cross the river even further, at Skinkers Neck. Meanwhile, Lee has already deployed one division at Port Royal and a second at Skinkers Neck. Either he foresaw the Burnside maneuver, or he deliberately scattered his divisions so that the enemy had a desire to attack ^[24] .

As soon as the federal army was fully concentrated, Burnside called a military council and outlined his plan: to transfer part of the forces across the Skinkers-Nek River. A little later, he told General William Smith that he expected to cross somewhere closer than the Skinkers Neck. Burnside apparently believed that Lee's divisions were scattered on a wide front, and if he quickly attacked and captured the heights between the two wings of the enemy army, then Lee would be forced to retreat to Richmond. Burnside did not take into account the fact that it is impossible to suddenly throw an army on pontoons to the other side and that Lee has the ability to quickly concentrate his forces ^[25] .

Edward Stackpole wrote that Burnside drove himself into a corner from which there was no obvious way out. The longer he dragged on, the worse the situation became. None of his plans met with the approval of the corps commanders. Lincoln was right when he said that an offensive through Fredericksburg had a chance of success only if it was carried out quickly. Now both the officers and the rank and file understood that nothing good would come of the offensive, and they lost faith in the commander, who obviously did not know what to do and how to do it ^[26] .

Burnside, meanwhile, sent telegrams to Washington, hoping that the opinion of the leadership would help him make the right decision and, perhaps, would remove some of his responsibility. On December 9, he sent this message:

POTOMAKS ARMY HQ
December 9, 1862-232.30

GENERAL: all orders were given to the commanders of the grand divisions and the heads of departments regarding the transition of the river on Tuesday morning (December 11). The plans for the offensive changed slightly due to the maneuvers of the enemy, who concentrated large forces in the place where we first intended to cross. I think that now the enemy can sooner be taken by surprise by crossing from the front than elsewhere. The commanders of the grand divisions agreed with me and I already gave the order for a maneuver that would allow us to keep our forces concentrated and reliably maintain contact with the rear. I am sure that a significant enemy force is concentrated at Port Royal, its left flank is at Frederiksberg, and it is he who I am going to get around. We have enough artillery and we are well prepared to defend the crossings. The importance of the entire maneuver and the details of the plan seem to be understood by the commanders of the grand divisions and we hope that we will succeed.

If the commander in chief does not mind, I will send a telegram tomorrow morning. The maneuver is so important that I would like to have your sanction. Answer, please.

EE Burnside, Major General, Commander.

Original Text (Eng.)

- Headquarters Army of the Potomac,

December 9, 1862 - 11:30 pm

GENERAL: All the orders have been issued to the several commanders of grand divisions and heads of departments for an attempt to cross the river on Thursday morning (December 11). The plans of the movement are somewhat modified by the movements of the enemy, who have been concentrating in large force opposite the point at which we originally intended to cross. I think now that the enemy will be more surprised by a crossing immediately in our front than in any other part of the river. The commanders of grand divisions coincide with me in this opinion, and I have accordingly ordered the movement, which will enable us to keep the force well concentrated, at the same time covering our communications in the rear. I am convinced that a large force of the enemy is now concentrated in the vicinity of Port Royal, its left resting near Fredericksburg, which we hope to turn. We have an abundance of artillery, and have made very elaborate preparations to protect the crossings. The importance of the movement and the details of the plan seem to be well understood by the grand division commanders, and we hope to succeed.

If the General-in-Chief desires it, I will send a minute statement by telegraph in cipher to-morrow morning. The movement is so important that I feel anxious to be fortified by his approval. Please answer.

AE BURNSIDE, Major-General, Commanding.

- ^[27]

In response, Burnside received neither approval nor encouragement, but only a request not to transmit information by telegraph in order to avoid information leakage. And that made sense, because the southerners really kept their agent at Aquila Station. As a result, Burnside decided to cross the Rappahanok in three places: on two crossings at Frederiksberg and on the third, a mile east of the city. On December 9, at 05:00, he ordered to begin preparations for the crossing, give the soldiers three-day rations and 60 rounds of ammunition per gun, and senior officers to arrive at headquarters on the afternoon of August 10. Even before that, on the evening of December 9, Burnside had gathered the officers of Sumner’s Grand Division at Sumner’s headquarters (in Lasi’s house, also known as the Chatham Manor), partially outlined the plan to them and asked their opinions. General said, “If you attack this way, this will be the greatest slaughter of this war; in our entire army there is not so much infantry to take these heights if they are properly defended. " Darius Couch , who was present at the meeting, later recalled that the officers unanimously considered the conceived insanity. Only General Sumner himself did not oppose the plan because of his allegiance to the commander in chief ^[28] .

The artillery cover for the offensive was led by Henry Hunt . He took all the corps artillery, merged it with the artillery reserve and thus obtained 147 guns. He placed all the batteries at Stafford Heights with all his professionalism. From these positions, artillery could effectively cover the flanks of the army, cover crossings and prevent the southerners from sending reinforcements to Frederiksberg. All of Hunt's artillery was rifled, but subsequently Hunt spoke very poorly about the quality of the ammunition. 19 batteries were subsequently transported across the river along with Sumner’s Grand Division, but only 7 batteries were able to enter the battle. The rest did not find a place ^[29] .

Both armies had enough time to build serious earthen fortifications, but no one began to seriously engage in this. Southerners made shelters for batteries, but did not dig fortifications for infantry. On November 23, General Lee ordered William Pendleton to choose battery positions, while Pendleton noted that the enemy had already completed excavation work on batteries, while the southerners had only started them in places. On December 1, Pendleton indicated locations for two 30-pound Parrot guns (one on Howison Hill and one on Telegraph Hill), and on December 2, Lee approved his choice. Lee also noticed that the terrain was clearly visible from Telegraph Hill, and therefore moved his headquarters there ^[30] .

Nowadays, traces of three artillery positions on Telegraph Hill have been preserved. None of them has a moat from the front, only a line of pits, from which the builders took land for parapet. One battery has an L-shaped parapet and a platform for the gun at ground level, the second battery has an embankment on the left side, but does not have a parapet on the front, and the third has an embankment on the right and left sides ^[30] .

In the Russian-language book Civil War in the United States 1861-1865, it says that “General Lee, who took into account the lessons of the Battle of Entity , ordered Longstreet to strengthen the already impregnable corps positions with field fortifications. ... the heights of Marie have turned into a real fortress ” ^[31] . However, this did not happen. Even Jackson, whose position was most vulnerable, made no effort in this direction. After the war, Moxley Sorrel was surprised at how little was done in those days to strengthen his position. “Subsequently, during the war, such miscalculations were never allowed,” he wrote ^[32] .

Lee did not spend time on fortification, mainly because he wanted to maintain freedom of maneuver. If he began excavation work on the entire front, this could alert the enemy and, perhaps, force him to abandon the offensive, while Lee already had an extremely advantageous position and wanted to provoke rather than prevent a federal offensive ^[18] . There were other crossings downstream, and Lee was ready to transfer his army there if necessary ^[33] .

By December 11, the gunners further strengthened their positions, increasing the height of the parapet. The engineers did not show interest in this, but the gunners said: "We are here to fight, and not to you, we will do what is more convenient for us." Longstreet agreed with the gunners, saying: “If you manage to save at least a finger on your hand, this will also be useful” ^[34] .

Lee did not give orders to dig trenches even when the enemy crossed the river (December 12) and when the direction of his attack became obvious. Only MacLouse’s division dug a trench on its front and strengthened it with blockages from trees. The Kershaw brigade, which occupied the left flank of the division, began work on the night of December 12 and finished them by 08:00 the next day. William Davis of the 13th Mississippi Regiment claimed that the Barksdale brigade began to build fortifications on its own initiative, without any order from above. But according to the reports of Kershaw and MacLouse, there was still an order at the divisional level ^[35] .

The same thing happened on the right flank: Jackson's corps took up a position on December 12, replacing John Hood's division. Hood’s people had already dug trenches where one and a half infantry brigades could fit, but Jackson placed his 14 guns behind the trench and used the trench as a shelter for artillerymen. After the war, one of the veterans of his corps wrote that it seemed to the feds that Jackson's position was well strengthened. In fact, Jackson did nothing in this direction, mainly because he was thinking about the offensive. Before him was flat terrain, his position was vulnerable, and in this position it was more advantageous to attack than to defend. But Lee made the decision to conduct exclusively defensive battles ^[35] .

On the night of December 11, preparations began for crossing at once in several places: the two main ones at Frederiksberg and the distracting one from Snickers Neck. This preparation did not go unnoticed by the southerners, and already at 04:30 General MacLouse ordered to give a signal shot from the gun. As soon as the fog cleared a little, federal engineers fell under the fire of snipers of the Mississippi Barksdale brigade, who lay in shelters on the right bank of the river. The artillery of the south did not fire at the crossings so as not to damage the houses in Frederiksberg. At 10:00, federal artillery opened fire with the intention of suppressing snipers. 9,000 volleys of cores and shells were made, but they did not produce a tangible result. Then several infantry regiments were sent across the river with the 7th Michigan Regiment at the forefront. Having lost only one person killed, the Michigan drove the Mississippians off the coast, captured many prisoners and occupied a bridgehead ^[36] .

The shootout in the city lasted until 19:00, after which the Barksdale brigade left Frederiksberg and moved to the heights of Marie, occupying an intermediate line behind a stone wall at the foot of the heights. The federal army began the crossing, but only the Howard division and the Hawkins brigade managed to cross. On the same day, bridges were built at Hamilton Crossing. Southerners did not expect a crossing there, so federal engineers did not meet resistance here. Two bridges were built by 11:00, and another at night. At the same time, having captured the crossing at 11:00, Franklin did not help his neighbors to cope with the Barksdale brigade, although there was about a mile to that crossing. Только в 16:00 его первые подразделения перешли реку ^[37] .

Ли весь день наблюдал за происходящим с высоты Телеграфного холма. Эдвард Стакпол заметил, что он вполне мог помешать переправе Франклина, например, силами кавалерии Стюарта или артиллерии Пелхама , но он не сделал этого. Стакпол предположил, что Ли как раз хотел, чтобы Франклин перешёл реку и оказался отрезан как от гранд-дивизии Самнера, так и от тыла. Только ночью Ли приказал выдвинуться к Фредериксбергу корпусу Джексона: дивизии Э. Хилла и Тальяферро подошли из Гвинея-Стейшейн и заняли позиции напротив переправы Гамильтон-Кроссинг. Дивизия Д. Хилла осталась у Сникерс-Нек, где Ли всё ещё полагал возможной переправу ^[38] .

Утром и днём 12 декабря Потомакская армия переправлялась через Рапидан. В конце дня Франклин собрал корпусных командиров Рейнольдса и Смита в своём штабе в Бернардс-Хаус. Они решили, что логично будет атаковать противника двумя колоннами и любой ценой обойти его фланг. В 17:00 прибыл Бернсайд. Он обсудил с Франклином положение и покинул Бернардс-Хаус, при этом Франклин решил, что его план одобрен, и стал ждать формального приказа. Но приказа так и не пришло, так что в 03:00 Рейнольдс устал ждать и ушёл спать. Только утром 13 декабря пришёл приказ, но совершенно не тот, которого ждал Франклин. В своём утреннем приказе Бернсайд требовал направить в бой хотя бы одну дивизию, занять, «если возможно», высоту перед фронтом и обеспечить пути отступления ^[39] .

Франклин поручил атаку корпусу Рейнольдса , который выделил для этого пенсильванскую дивизию Джорджа Мида . В 10:00 Мид начал наступление, затем приостановился, попав под фланговый огонь батареи Пелхама , и только в 13:00 атаковал основную линию противника. Дивизии удалось опрокинуть бригаду Макси Грегга , но она попала под контратаку дивизии Джубала Эрли и отступила. Сражение, в котором была задействована только треть сил Франклина и часть сил Джексона, не дало никакого результата. Впоследствии Бернсайд утверждал, что он рассчитывал силами одной дивизии захватить дорогу, проходящую вдоль позиций противника, тем самым лишить его связи между частями, вынудить отступить, а атаковать отступающего противника всем корпусом Франклина. Но если в этом состоял его план, то Франклину он этого по какой-то причине не сообщил ^[40] .

Около полудня Бернсайд решил, что наступление Франклина отвлекло на себя значительные силы противника, и приказал атаковать высоты Мари с фронта. Это было неожиданное решение: южане полагали, что федералы атакуют севернее или южнее высот, но Бернсайд выбрал самый сложный участок для атаки. II корпус пошёл в атаку, но был остановлен у подножия высот, где бригада Томаса Кобба заняла позиции за каменной стеной. Несколько атак федеральных войск подряд были отбиты. Лонгстрит усилил Кобба бригадами Кершоу , Ренсома и Кука. Северяне провели ещё несколько безрезультатных атак, но так и не смогли взять каменную стену. Атаки прекратились с наступлением темноты. В этих атаках участвовало 27 000 человек, из которых было потеряно 3500 ^[41] .

Последней атакующей дивизией была дивизия Сайкса. Когда атаки прекратились, она осталась лежать в низине перед позициями противника у каменной стены. Дивизия провела на этой позиции всю ночь, а утром 14 декабря обнаружилось, что с этой позиции невозможно отступить назад. В итоге дивизия пролежала в поле на ветру весь день и отошла в тыл только вечером. Между тем ещё вечером (в 21:00) 13 декабря федеральные генералы (без командиров гранд-дивизий и Бернсайда) собрались на совещание. Все были уверены, что атаки возобновятся с утра, но Раш Хоукинс категорически запротестовал даже против самого обсуждения такой вероятности. Ему удалось убедить генералов, и они поручили ему поговорить с Бернсайдом. Хоукинс явился в штаб Бернсайда в доме Филлипса, где застал командиров гранд-дивизий. Они выслушали мнение Хоукнса и так же предложили ему высказать всё Бернсайду. Тот появился в штабе только в 01:00. По воспоминаниям Хоукинса, Бернсайд вошёл и сразу с порога сказал: «Ну что ж, всё готово, мы атакуем на рассвете, IX корпус пойдёт в центре, и я поведу его в наступление сам». Ответом ему была тишина. Затем генерал Самнер осторожно заметил, что по этому вопросу есть некоторые сомнения, и предложил выслушать Хоукинса. Бернсайд выслушал, после чего спросил мнение Самнера. Тот ответил, что после всего, что произошло, повторять атаки неразумно. Генерал Хукер прямо сказал, что атаки не в коем случае нельзя повторять. После некоторого обсуждения решено было отменить подготовку к атакам ^[42] .

На следующее утро Бернсайд снова собрал совет и спросил, стоит ли продолжать удерживать Фредериксберг или же разумнее отойти за реку. Генералы высказались против отхода и решено было остаться во Фредериксберге. Бернсайд вернулся в штаб и снова начал размышлять над тем, что же делать дальше ^[43] .

Когда сражение завершилось, почти все генералы армии Юга были убеждены, что Бенсайд повторит атаку на рассвете. Только Джон Худ предположил, что атаки не будет. Сам Ли полагал, что Бернсайд атакует, понесёт потери, и тогда Северовирджинская армия сможет перейти в контрнаступление. «Я ожидаю, что сражение возобновится на рассвете», написал Ли в Ричмонд в 21:00. Он так же допускал, что Бернсайд не станет на этот раз штурмовать высоты Мари, а попробует совершить какой-то обходной манёвр. Поэтому Ли приказал начать земляные работы и укрепить позиции, чтобы можно было удержать высоты Мари малыми силами, а стальную армию перебросить туда, куда потребуется. К утру 14 декабря укрепления были уже возведены ^[44] .

Однако наутро Ли не заметил никаких признаков подготовки к атаке на своём левом фланге. Он отправился к Джексону на правый фланг, он и там противник не проявлял активности. Весь день прошёл в ожидании, и к вечеру Ли сел составлять рапорт для президента. Утром 15 декабря южане продолжили укреплять свои позиции, и в то же время было замечено, что и северяне начали рыть траншеи, как будто ожидая атаки. Ли был расстроен: если федералы не будут атаковать, то все жертвы 12 декабря окажутся бесплодными и шанс разгромить противника будет упущен. В ночь на 16 декабря северяне отступили на северный берег реки ^[44] .

Утром 16 декабря Ли и Джексон выехали на передовую и не заметили у Фредериксберга федеральных знамён. Они встретили генерала Дэниеля Хилла , которому полковник Брайан Граймс только что сообщил, что противник исчез. «Я побывал там, где вчера была их пехотная линия, — сообщил Граймс, — и не заметил там никого». Ли ничего не ответил, но Граймс заметил, какое тяжелое впечатление произвели его слова на Ли и Джексона. Ли тяжело переживал то, что не смог нанести противнику решительного удара. «Мы действительно ничего не достигли, — сказал он впоследствии, — мы не отвоевали не фута земли, и я знаю, что противник может легко возместить потери, которые здесь понёс» ^[44] .

Уже на следующий день после сражения южане начали укреплять свои позиции. Они усовершенствовали земляные укрепления у Каменной Стены и соорудили баррикады на тех участках, где стена имела интервалы. Одновременно были прорыты траншеи на вершине высот Мари, которые соединили укреплённые ранее артиллерийские позиции в единое целое. Джексон так же возводил укрепление на вершине высоты Проспект-Хилл. В результате образовалась исключительно мощная оборонительная линия, каких ещё не было в ту войну. Лишь «линия Уорвика» под Йорктауном и укрепления Ричмонда имели с ней что-то общее. Уже не известно, кто именно отдал приказ об этих работах — Ли или Лонгстрит ^[45] .

В итоге образовалась укрепленная линия длиной 35 миль. Лонгстрит думал о том, чтобы продлить линю ещё дальше на север, но для этого проекта не хватило людей и инструментов. Если бы такая линия всё же была бы построена, она несомненно оказала бы существенное влияние на ход последующего сражения при Чанселорсвилле ^[46] .

При постройке этой линии время от времени возникали технические проблемы, и сохранилась переписка между Лонгстритом и Джексоном относительно этих проблем. Некоторые историки полагают, что эта переписка характеризует Лонгстрита как выдающегося эксперта в области теории фортификации. Другие обращают внимание на то, что Лонгстрит излагал хорошо известные в то время вещи, и переписка скорее характеризует плохое знание Джексоном основ фортификации ^[47] .

17 декабря Бернсайд составил свой рапорт о ходе сражения, где признал, что во всех событиях виноват только он один. Сразу после Рождества, 26 декабря, Бернсайд отдал приказ армии заготовить трёхдневные рационы и ещё дополнительный запас в обозе и быть готовой к выступлению. Бернсайд решил обойти армию противника с запада, перейти Раппаханок по броду Бэнкс-Форд и атаковать Фредериксбергские высоты с другой стороны. Он опасался утечки информации, поэтому посвятил в свои планы немногих. Кавалерии было приказано совершить глубокий рейд в тыл противника и выйти в итоге к Саффолку. Приказы для командиров гранд-дивизий были уже готовы, но в этот момент пришло сообщение от президента: Линкольн писал, чтобы Бернсайд не совершал никаких манёвров без предварительного согласования. Бернсайд отменил наступление и рейд и отправился в Вашингтон ^[48] .

В Вашингтоне президент сообщил Бернсайду, что, по мнению некоторых офицеров, армия не готова к наступлению. Бернсайд изложил президенту свой новый план, и Линкольн одобрил его с тем условием, что армии дадут две недели отдыха. Бернайд пожелал узнать имена недовольных офицеров, но ему было отказано в этом. Однако Линкольн счёл заговор против Бернсайда подозрительным, а Халлек полагал, что эти люди должны быть уволены со службы ^[49] .

20 января 1863 года Бернсайд издал приказ о новом наступлении: гранд-дивизии Хукера и Франклина должны были перейти Раппаханок около Бэнкс-Форд и начать наступление на Фредериксберг с севера, а гранд-дивизия Самнера должна была идти в резерве. Это был амбициозный и сложный план. Он был труден для выполнения даже без учёта возможного сопротивления противника. 20 января наступление началось, но, как писал Стакпол, вмешалась погода и спасла Потомакскую армию от очередного унижения. Наступление было отменено. 29 января генерал Ли отправил в Ричмонд отчёт об этом новом манёвре противника ^[50] .

Как только армия вернулась в лагерь возле Фалмута (23 января), у Бернсайда, видимо, сдали нервы и он решил устроить чистку командного состава Потомакской армии. Он оставил Генеральный приказ № 8, где требовал сместить генералов Хукера и Франклина, корпусного генерала Смита, а также ряд дивизионных и бригадных командиров. Так как у Бернсайда не было права смещать офицеров без постановления трибунала, то он направился в Вашингтон, чтобы получить санкцию президента. Но Линкольн сказал ему, что в настоящий момент важнее наладить дисциплину в армии и для этого лучше всего послужит отставка самого Бернсайда. Он отказался утвердить приказ без предварительного совещания, и тогда Бернсайд попросил принять его отставку прямо сейчас. В результате 25 декабря военный департамент издал Генеральный приказ № 20: отстранить Бернсайда от командования, отстранить генерала Самнера от командования по его просьбе, отстранить генерала Франклина от командования, назначить генерала Хукера командующим Потомакской армией ^[51] .

Лишь спустя 10 месяцев, в ноябре 1863 года, генерал Халлек составил рапорт относительно Фредериксбергской кампании, и только 13 ноября 1865 года свой рапорт для Военного Департамента составил сам Бернсайд. Он написал, что столкнулся со множеством трудностей: он оказался первым офицером, принявшим командование армией после отставки её создателя, Макклеллана; он не участвовал в кампании на полуострове и поэтому был плохо знаком со многими офицерами; время года было крайне неудобным, а невыплата жалованья вызывала недовольство солдат. Он писал, что предпринял четыре попытки наступления: первая сорвалась из-за отсутствия понтонов, вторая привела к сражению при Фредериксберге, третья была остановлена президентом, а четвертая не удалась в силу различных причин. Он так же написал, что не переживает по поводу отставки и, ввиду последующих громких успехов армии, полагает, что его отставка пошла ей только на пользу (I am quite willing to believe that my removal was for the best) ^[52] .

Рапорт Халлека от 15 ноября, видимо, был причиной дискуссии, которая развернулась в прессе в конце 1863 и начале 1864 года. В ряде публикаций Халлек утверждал, что согласованный им и президентом план подразумевал переправу по бродам выше Фредериксберга, а не по понтонам у Федериксберга. Бернсайд же утверждал, что все детали плана были им подробно изложены Халлеку ^[53] .

Влияние на военную тактику

Фредериксбергская кампания оказала сильное, хотя и не решающее, влияние на эволюцию окопной войны. Историк Хегерман писал, что Ли осознал преимущества укреплённых позиций и в будущем предпринимал фронтальные атаки только когда на его стороне был эффект неожиданности или же когда иного выхода не оставалось. Фрэнсис О'Рейли тоже полагал, что именно под Фредериксбергом южане оценили преимущества укреплений и это изменило весь ход войны. Но Эрл Гэсс считает такую оценку сильно преувеличенной: Ли прибегал к атакам и при Чанслорсвилле , и при Геттисберге , где у него были возможности манёвра. Он стал склоняться к оборонительной тактике лишь после Геттисберга, но и тогда продолжал думать об атаках. Как и прочие командиры той войны, Ли начинал строить укрепления только тогда, когда собирался оставаться в обороне ^[54] .

Но Гэсс согласен с тем, что как минимум сражение у каменной стены показало преимущества полевых укреплений: у каменной стены соотношение сил было 7.5 к 1, и федеральное наступление было отбито с пропорцией потерь 4.5 к 1 в пользу обороняющихся. Вероятно, это привело впоследствии к появлению гораздо более мощных и совершенных укреплений в 1864 году ^[55] .

Дуглас Фриман также полагал, что укрепления Фредериксберга были важнейшим этапом эволюции оборонной тактики, и называл эти укрепления одним из самых важных вкладов генерала Ли в военную науку. От этих земляных сооружений оставался всего один шаг до настоящей полевой фортификации ^[56] .

Comments

References to sources

Books

• Brooks, Victor. The Fredericksburg Campaign: October 1862-January 1863. — Da Capo Press, 2000. — 256 p. — ISBN 1580970338 .
• Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. — New York: New York, 2001. — 990 p. — ISBN 0-684-84944-5 .
• Gallagher, Gary W. The Fredericksburg Campaign: Decision on the Rappahannock. — Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995. — ... p. — ISBN 0-8078-2193-4 .
• Hess, Earl J. Field armies and fortifications in the Civil War: the Eastern campaigns, 1861–1864. — Chapel Hill and London: The university of north carolina press, 2005. — 428 p. — ISBN 0-8078-2931-5 .
• Marvel, William. Burnside. — Chapel Hill: The university of north carolina press, 1991. — ISBN 0-8078-1983-2 .
• Rable, George C. Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!. — Univ of North Carolina Press, 2009. — 688 p. — ISBN 0807867934 .
• O'Reilly, Francis Augustín. The Fredericksburg Campaign: Winter War on the Rappahannock. — Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003. — ... p. — ISBN 0-8071-3154-7 .
• Stackpole, Edward J. The Fredericksburg Campaign: Drama on the Rappahannock. — Stackpole Books, 1991. — 336 p. — ISBN 0811723372 .
• Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 1861–1865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. — Bloomington: Stackpole BooksIndiana University Press, 1989. — 336 p. — ISBN 0-253-36453-1 .

Articles

• Jones, Gordon W., The Medical History of the Fredericksburg Campaign: Course and Significance, Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, Vol. 18, No. 3 (July, 1963), pp. 241–256
• Shea, Shannon M. The First Battle of Fredericksburg: Lessons of Strategic and Operational Command and Control. — 2011. — 41 p.

• Matching Wits with Changing Opponents
• Фредериксбергский рапорт Бернсайда
• Battle of Fredericksburg History