The coup d'etat in Italy , better known there as the “July 25th” ( Italian: 25 Luglio ), took place on July 25, 1943. Unhappy with the actual defeat of the country in World War II, fascist functionaries formed several opposition groups to the Prime Minister Benito Mussolini , demanding the convocation of the Great Fascist Council . One of them, headed by the chairman of the House of Fascias and Corporations, Dino Grandi, with the support of King Victor Emmanuel III, passed through the Council a resolution on transferring the supreme power and high command to the king and the dissolution of fascist institutions of power. July 26 Duce was called to an audience with the king and arrested. The 21-year reign of the Nazis ended. German troops invaded the country. On September 8, a truce between Italy and the Allies entered into force. On September 12, 1943, Mussolini was liberated by the Germans and headed the Italian Social Republic .
Prerequisites. The first signs of discontent
At the beginning of 1943, the situation on the Italian fronts seemed bleak: the collapse of the African front on November 4 and the allied landing on November 8-12, 1942 opened the way for naval landing in Italy [1] . The defeat of Italian troops in the USSR , the constant bombing of cities, the lack of provisions and fuel had a demoralizing effect on the country's population: most citizens now wanted to get out of the war and leave the “ axis ” [2] . To maintain control of the last stronghold of the alliance in North Africa - Tunisia - Italy, significant assistance was needed from the Germans. Mussolini, convinced that it was the Mediterranean theater that would play a decisive role in the conflict, tried to convince Hitler to conclude a truce with the Soviet Union and transfer the bulk of the German troops to the south [3] . At a meeting in Salzburg on April 29, 1943, the Duce presented his ideas to the Führer, who did not agree with them. The request for immediate reinforcement in order to protect the Tunisian bridgehead was rejected by the Wehrmacht , whose generals did not believe in further resistance of the Italians [4] . Another factor that fueled political instability was Mussolini's state of health: he was depressed, after several months of severe stomach pains, he was diagnosed with gastritis and duodenitis of nervous origin. After some hesitation, doctors rejected cancer [5] . Due to illness, the Italian Prime Minister rarely became involved in public affairs.
The way out of this situation was the subject of discussion of various groups, which included courtiers, representatives of anti-fascist and fascist circles and the leadership of the General Staff. Some aristocrats, including Crown Princess Maria José , members of the upper classes and the old political elite tried independently to establish contacts with the anti-Hitler coalition. They did not know that at a conference in Casablanca, the Allies considered acceptable only unconditional surrender. The British and Americans were waiting for steps from the country's top leadership and neglected further contacts [6] . Anti-fascist parties, weakened over 20 years of dictatorship, could not oppose the Duce [7] . Most of his political opponents, with the exception of the Communists and the Party of Action, expected the king to speak first, however, because of his own fears about the success of the coup, the unwillingness to violate the constitution and the lack of prospects for the monarchy in post-war Italy [8], Victor Emmanuel did not dare to do so [9] [10] . He despised pre-fascist politicians [11] , feared that after the end of the war the allies would demand indemnification from Italy [12] , and still trusted Mussolini, hoping that he would improve the situation again [13] . The king called his own council and removed from himself those who tried to reveal his plans [14] . Among them was the new chief of the general staff, General Vittorio Ambrosio , devoted to Victor Emmanuel and hostile to the Germans. The general considered the war lost, but did not dare to oppose Mussolini without consulting the king [15] . Together with his closest associates, the generals Castellano and Carboni, who played a leading role in concluding a ceasefire on September 8, 1943, Ambrosio gradually promoted people devoted to the king to key posts in the armed forces and tried to deploy as many troops to Italy as possible, but not cause German suspicion it was difficult [16] .
On February 6, 1943, Mussolini made the largest cabinet reorganization in 21 years in power [17] : almost all ministers lost their posts, including previously had significant influence from their son-in-law Duce Galeazzo Ciano , Count Mordano Dino Grandi , Giuseppe Bottai, Guido Guidi and Alessandro Pavolini . The goals that the Prime Minister set for the resignations - to calm public opinion and key elements of the National Fascist Party - were not achieved, as the new figures were too compromise. Mussolini took the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, and appointed Giuseppe Bastianini as his deputy [18] . On the one hand, he advocated the conclusion of peace between Germany and the USSR [19] , on the other, he tried to create an alliance of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania led by Italy, which would become a counterbalance to German influence in Europe. In April, the Duce removed the chief of police loyal to the king, accusing him of inefficiency in suppressing the March strikes, and replaced the young and inexperienced NFP secretary, Aldo Vidussoni, with the hard-line supporter Carlo Skortsa in the hope of reviving the party [20] .
Conflict Development
The surrender of the Italo-German forces in Tunisia on May 13, 1943 radically changed the situation in a strategic plan. Italy became vulnerable to invasion, so control of the country, which turned into a foreign bastion of the Reich, became necessary for him. In case the kingdom concluded a truce with the anti-Hitler coalition, the Germans developed plans for the occupation of Italy and the territories it occupied in the Balkans and the disarmament of the Italian army [21] . In preparation, they wanted to deploy more troops in the country, but Mussolini and Ambrosio, who wanted to maintain its independence, asked for only more planes [22] . On June 11, 1943, the Allies captured the Italian island of Pantelleria , which the Nazis turned into a fortress, but after a week of continuous bombing it suffered significant damage and surrendered with little or no resistance [22] . It became apparent that the next enemy target would be the large islands of Sicily , Sardinia or Corsica [23] . In mid-May, the king began to think about Italy’s withdrawal from the war, to which he was prompted by the court minister, Duke d'Aquarone, concerned about the future of the monarchy [24] . Public opinion, which had long been waiting for Victor Emanuel to take the first step, began to turn away from him [25] . In late May, d'Aquarone and King’s adjutant General Puntoni met with two influential representatives of the old political elite Ivano Bonomie and Marcello Soleri, who demanded the resignation of Mussolini and the formation of a military government [26] . On June 2 and 8 they were given an audience with the king, but Bonomi and Soleri were dissatisfied with his passivity [27] [28] . On June 30, the first proposed to Crown Prince Umberto II three candidates for the post of Prime Minister: Ambrosio and Marshals Badoglio and Cavilla [29] . On July 4, Umberto invited Badoglio to his house and informed him that the king did not object to the resignation of the government [30] . Cavilia spoke in favor of his courage and staunch anti-fascist stance, while his shortcomings included old age and long-standing Freemasonry [31] . Badoglio, who resigned from his post as chief of the General Staff in 1941 after the defeat in Greece , considered Mussolini a personal enemy and looked forward to revenge. Marshal was friends with d'Aquarone, once his former adjutant, and, like Cavilla, was a freemason. Both warlords hated each other.
On June 4, Victor Emanuel received Grandi, who, having lost his post in his office, remained the chairman of the Chamber of Fascias and Corporations . Despite the fact that he worked for 20 years side by side with the Duce, Grandi believed that fascism with the death of Mussolini would decline, and was a more right-wing conservative than a fascist. Earlier, Count Mordano was Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to Great Britain [32] and was considered the most likely successor to the Prime Minister [33] . Being personally loyal to him, Grandi, however, believed that for the good of the Duce it was sometimes necessary to ignore his orders. On March 25, 1943, the king awarded the count the highest dynastic order of the Annunziata , which gave him the right to call himself "the cousin of the king" and have unlimited access to the court. At the last meeting with Victor Emanuel before July 25, Grandi boldly offered to kill Mussolini and attack the Germans [34] and compared his interlocutor with the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus II , in order to save the dynasty who had betrayed France, taking the Holy Roman Empire in the war for the Spanish inheritance [35] . Victor Emanuel needed a sacred sacrifice, in which the count offered himself [36] . In response, the king recalled that there is a constitutional monarchy in the country and he cannot act without the approval of the parliament or the Great Fascist Council [37] . Victor Emanuel was wary of hasty decisions that would be tantamount to betrayal, and asked Grandi to trust him. He was dissatisfied with the inaction of the monarch [38] and in anticipation of the development of the situation for several days left for his native Bologna .
On June 19, the last meeting of the fascist government took place [39] . Communication Minister Chini, one of the most influential industrial tycoons, directly proposed to Mussolini to seek a way out of the war [40] and resigned immediately after the meeting. Cheney’s attack was one of the signs of the premiere’s decline. The loyal figures, OVRA agents and Germans informed him of several conspiracies, but he did not heed the warnings, attributing the concern of others to excessive reading of crime novels and a mania of persecution [41] . On June 25, the Duce delivered his last speech as chairman of the government, stating that the only Italian territory that could be "forever" [comm. 1] to occupy the allies, the Italian coast will become, while incorrectly calling it [42] . For many Italians, Mussolini's confused speech was evidence that something was wrong with him [30] .
On the night of July 10, Anglo-American troops landed in Sicily [43] . The Italian command expected this, but the forces of the Italians were defeated, and in some cases, including the most fortified Augusta peninsula, they completely surrendered without a fight [44] . In the early days, there was still hope that the landing could be repelled, but it soon became clear that Sicily was lost. On July 16, the Duce received Bastianini in his office at the Palazzo Venezia . The deputy foreign minister suggested the prime minister send a telegram to Hitler with a rebuke in the absence of reinforcements [45] , to which Mussolini agreed. He supported Bottai’s proposal to begin negotiations with the Allies, but on condition that the contacts be mediated [46] [47] . The Vatican banker Fummy, who needed to get to the UK from Spain or Portugal, was to become a liaison. [48] That same evening, he handed over to the Secretary of State of the Holy See Cardinal Malone a document explaining the Italian position on a unilateral exit from the war [49] .
Fascist Opposition
Many members of the fascist party established themselves in the opinion that the war was lost [50] . The Sicilian operation, the lack of Italian resistance and the reaction of the Duce shocked them. Some of the party members were waiting for steps from the king, some from Mussolini. A significant difficulty was the search for an authority that could oppose it [51] . Of the four, the NFP, the House of Fascias and Corporations, the Senate and the Great Fascist Council, only the Senate and the Council were suitable for this role, where several opposition politicians were in opposition. On July 22, 61 senators asked him to convene the upper house of the legislative assembly, but he refused. Only Mussolini could hold a meeting of the BFTU and set an agenda for it [52] . Only Grandi had a clear plan to get out of this situation, not counting Farinachchi , who acted in opposition to the count. He planned to remove the Duce, form a government into which the Nazis would not enter, and attack the German troops stationed in the country. Count Mordano believed that only in this way, bypassing the decision of the Casablanca conference, it would be possible to conclude a truce with the anti-Hitler coalition [53] . Later, the new NFP secretary Carlo Skorca developed his own plan, which, as Farinachchi suggested, was “political embalming” of Mussolini and the beginning of a “total war”. While Farinachchi acted side by side with the Germans, Skortsa believed that the power should belong to the party, which for several years had lost its former popularity [54] . On July 13 and 16, several party functionaries led by Farinachchi met at the NFP headquarters in Piazza Colonna and decided to ask the Duce to convene the Great Fascist Council [55] . To their surprise, he gave his consent [56] . Opposition within the party turned out to be split: Skorce and isolated Farinachchi [31] advocated totalitarianism and close cooperation with Germany, while others considered it necessary to empower the king with extraordinary powers during the war [57] . None of the moderate fascists had power sufficient to prevail in the internal party struggle. On July 15, the king met with Badoglio, who shortly before told his friends that he was organizing a coup without the support of the monarch [31] , and informed the marshal that he would succeed Mussolini as chairman of the government [58] . Victor Emanuel told Badoglio that he was categorically opposed to a civilian government and that the new prime minister should not at first seek a truce. [59]
Feltre Meeting
With the defeat of Italian troops in Sicily, resistance to an allied landing on the mainland proved impossible without large-scale German assistance. Mussolini prepared a message to Hitler requesting a meeting to discuss the situation in Italy, but the Führer, who was informed every day about what was happening by the German ambassador to the Vatican and Himmler’s agent Eugen Dolman, proposed to be the first to meet [60] .
The meeting took place on July 19 in the villa of one of the senators in the city of Feltre near Belluno . Hitler, who arrived with OKW generals, was welcomed from the Italian side by the Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Minister Mussolini, Chief of General Staff Ambrosio and Deputy Foreign Minister Bastianini. The German delegation did not include either Ribbentrop or Goering , which made it clear that the situation on the fronts would be the main subject of negotiations. The chief of the Italian general staff carefully prepared for the visit and the day before he directly told Mussolini that his task was to conclude a truce within 15 days [61] . The Germans did not believe in Italians and were only interested in the occupation of the northern and central parts of the country, shifting the defense to the shoulders of Italian troops. The delegation of Germany proposed the appointment of the “axis” on the peninsula of the German general, presumably Rommel , as commander of the forces. In the first two hours only Hitler spoke, accusing Italians of failure on the battlefield and proposing draconian measures. Mussolini could not say a word [62] . Suddenly the meeting was interrupted - the adjutant Duce entered the room and informed him that the enemy was bombing Rome for the first time [63] . Во время обеда Амброзио и Бастианини убеждали премьера, чтобы тот сообщил Гитлеру о необходимости для Италии политического разрешения войны, однако Муссолини, заявивший, что уже месяцами раздумывает над дилеммой — выйти из «оси» или продолжать сражаться, отказался, сославшись на застенчивость, которая не позволяла ему откровенно поговорить с немецким коллегой [63] . После обеденного перерыва дуче, к неудовольствию фюрера, закончил встречу, запланированную ещё на ближайшие три дня. Обе делегации поездом вернулась в Беллуно , где Муссолини попрощался с Гитлером, сказав ему: «Наше дело общее», а вечером на личном самолёте вернулся в Рим [64] .
Тем временем Гранди решил действовать самостоятельно [65] . В тот же день он выехал из Болоньи в столицу с черновиком резолюции, которую должен был утвердить Большой фашистский совет. Из-за ущерба, причинённого бомбардировкой [66] [67] , граф добрался до Рима только на следующий день [68] и утром 21 июля встретился со Скорца , сообщившим ему о том, что премьер-министр решил созвать Совет [69] .
Два заговора
After the failure of the negotiations in Feltre and the bombing of Rome, the crisis began to rapidly gain momentum [70] . On July 20, Mussolini received Ambrosio twice. During his second, evening visit, the Duce told the general that he decided to write a message to Hitler, in which he recognized that Italy should get out of the "axis". Outraged by the fact that such an opportunity was missed at yesterday's meeting, the chief of the general staff resigned, but the prime minister did not accept it [71] . Now he was useless for Ambrosio, who did not believe that Mussolini could resolve the conflict, and the general decided to begin preparations for an armed coup [72] . In the meantime, Grandi and his close ally, nationalist leader Luigi Federzoni, began counting the votes while approving the Count’s resolution. According to them, 4 out of 27 BFS members will vote in favor, 7 against, 16 have not yet decided [73] [74] . Grandi could not reveal to the party leadership the true consequences of the adoption of the document: the arrest of the Duce, the dissolution of the fascist party and the withdrawal of Italy from the war [73] . Most of the count's colleagues still believed that the Prime Minister was capable of a miracle, and Grandi decided to include vague language in the resolution, allowing for various interpretations. It consisted of three parts: the first began with a long and pompous appeal to the armed forces and the people, glorifying their resistance to the invaders, the second called for the restoration of pre-fascist state bodies and laws, in the third the Council asked the king in accordance with article 5 of the constitution to accept the supreme civil and military power. In the BFS decision, Grandi saw a signal for Victor Emanuel. On July 21, Mussolini ordered Skorz to convene the Council. A day later, he sent out invitations. [75] The dress code demanded that the sitting “in the name of victory” wear “a fascist uniform: a black tropical shirt, field-color shorts” [76] . In the late evening of July 22nd, Grandi met with the party secretary and explained to him the meaning of the resolution; to the count's surprise, Skortsa supported him [77] and asked for a copy of the document. The next morning, the NFP secretary showed him to the Duce, who called the resolution unacceptable and treacherous. [78] Skortsa secretly prepared his other project, which looked similar to Grandi's proposal, but provided for the transfer of power to the party.
On July 22, the king met with Mussolini, who reported on the outcome of negotiations with Germany. The content of their conversation is unknown, but Badoglio suggested that the prime minister reassured the monarch with assurances that Italy would withdraw from the war by September 15 [79] . Such a delay can be explained by the fact that Bastianini established contacts with the allies, and the Duce took time to justify themselves and the country in betrayal. Victor Emanuel probably agreed with him, so Mussolini was not worried about how the Council would vote [80] . Without the help of the king, the coup was doomed to failure. After the audience, the Prime Minister thought that the monarch was on his side, who, in turn, was disappointed that the Duce did not respond to the proposal to resign [81] . The putsch threat increased: while Bastianini was trying to get in touch with representatives of the anti-Hitler coalition, a supporter of the hard line Farinachchi was preparing a coup in order to remove both the king and Mussolini and turn the country into a German puppet [82] . Victor Emanuel began to act only after the Council approved the resolution of Grandi [83] .
At 17:30 local time, Grandi arrived at the Duce at the Palazzo Venezia [84] . The meeting, scheduled for 15 minutes, lasted more than an hour, while the chief of police and field marshal of the Luftwaffe Kesselring were waiting for the reception [75] . In his memoirs, a year later, Mussolini denied that he spoke with the count about the resolution, which is doubtful [85] . Probably Grandi, who respected the Duce, explained to him the meaning of the document and offered the last opportunity to maintain his reputation - to resign before the vote [86] , which would make him unnecessary [87] . The Prime Minister listened to the Count, who called the resignation a way to prevent a catastrophe, but at the end of the conversation said that such conclusions were wrong, because Germany would soon have a “ miracle weapon ” [88] . After that, the Duce met with Kesselring and the police chief, to whom he said that Grandi, Bottai, and Ciano were easy to put in place - you just need to convince them [89] . On the morning of July 23, Mussolini accepted the resignation of the Minister of Communications Chini, which was to serve as a signal to the opponents of the prime minister [90] . Meanwhile, at Federzoni’s house, he himself, Grandi, lawyer de Marsico, Bottai and Ciano edited the resolution, removing from it an introduction explaining the functions of the Council, thus demonstrating that he had the constitutional authority to resign the Duce [91] . According to constitutionalists, with the adoption of "fascist laws" in 1925, the basic law of the kingdom did not cease to apply. In accordance with these laws, Mussolini ruled the country on behalf of the monarch, always a source of executive power, therefore, if the BFS votes for the removal of the prime minister, Victor Emmanuel will be authorized to dismiss him and appoint his successor [92] . Bottai acquainted Ciano with the resolution: Grandi objected to this, since he was the son-in-law of the Duce and was notable for his varied views, but Ciano insisted that he should read the document. Six months later, the decision of Mussolini's son-in-law provoked the death sentence of Ciano at the Verona process. After meeting with him, Grandi in his office in the Palazzo Montecitorio received Farinachchi, who showed the resolution. He agreed only with the first part and stated that command should be transferred to the Germans so that Italy finally began to fight for real, and Mussolini and the generals should be disposed of [91] . Farinachchi also asked for a copy of the document and changed it for his own purposes [93] . Before the meeting of the council, the count asked the other members of the Council to support him [94] .
Fascist Great Council meeting
On July 24, at 5 p.m., 28 Council members gathered in the conference room in the Venice Palace. Duce sat above the rest, the table in front of him was draped with red fabric with the image of fascia [95] . There was no usual guard in the building [96] : it was replaced by armed black shirts , who took control of the courtyard, lobby and staircase [95] . Mussolini refused the presence of the stenographer [97] . According to Grandi's recollections, he thought that he was unlikely to be able to leave the palace alive, and hid two hand grenades under his jacket. Before the meeting, he made changes to the will and confessed [98] . The prime minister, dressed in the uniform of the commander of the black shirts, began the meeting with a pre-prepared speech. He summed up the history of the high command, trying to show that in fact much of the attributed to him is the merit of Badoglio [99] , then he examined the situation on the fronts in the previous months and stated that he was ready to move with the government to the Padan Lowland , like the Italian leadership after defeat at Caporetto was ready to move to Sicily [100] . In conclusion, he invited those present to share their own opinions on the dilemma - war or peace? Duce spoke calmly and confidently, because he knew that, with the exception of three or four of his opponents, most of the members of the Council had not decided, and hoped to convince them to vote for Skorz’s project, which provided for the transfer of only command to the king. Next came one of the two living quadrumvirs de Bono , then Farinachchi, after him the second remaining quadrumvir de Vecchi [101] .
Grandi began to speak, whose speech lasted an hour and a half. He read out the draft resolution and explained it, and ended his speech with the words of Mussolini: “Let all the factions die so that the nation lives” [102] . Next, Farinachchi once again took the floor, saying that the prime minister did not betray the constitution, as the count claimed, but fascism [103] , and that in order to win the war it is necessary to remove the remaining democrats and liberals from the party, dismiss the generals, transfer supreme command of the king, unite the fronts with the German [104] and strengthen the party [105] . At the end of his speech, Farinachchi read out his draft resolution containing these proposals. After a little discussion, Bottai began speaking in support of Grandi [101] , then Ciano, who openly summed up the alliance with Germany and directly stated that the Italians were not traitors, but devotees [106] . At 23:30, the chief of staff of the Nazi police, Galbyati, winked at Skorts, who was whispering to Mussolini. He announced that due to the prolongation of the meeting, some of those present offered to continue it tomorrow [107] . According to Grandi, he got out of his chair and announced in a raised voice that no one would leave the building before the vote, because it was shameful to sleep at a time when Italian soldiers were dying [108] . Duce stared at him, but reluctantly agreed. For his 21-year reign, no one has yet decided to demand a vote: since fascism was sharply anti-parliamentary, only discussions were allowed at the meetings, the prime minister had the last word. At midnight, a 10-minute break was announced: while the BFS members drank lemonade and coffee substitutes, and Mussolini, suffering from an ulcer, limited himself to a mug of milk, Count Mordano collected signatures for his project [109] .
After a short delay, the Prime Minister again appealed to the members of the Council, urging them to think about a vote, because the approval of the Grandi project would put an end to fascism, and warned that it would not satisfy the allies, since their goal was to end Italy, which had become too strong under his power. Duce said that it wasn’t the matter at all - at the age of 60 he was ready to give up his life, which he called “an exciting adventure” [110] , and refused to admit defeat in the war, saying that he had a way to win it, but he will not disclose it [110] [111] . Mussolini did not intend to surrender to the king without a fight [110] , on the other hand, if the Duce had again secured his trust, the consequences for Grandi and his supporters would be dire [111] [112] . Towards the end of his speech, many of those present looked noticeably shocked [113] . The count rose again from the chair and shouted that the prime minister was blackmailing them, and if you choose between loyalty to him and loyalty to the homeland, the choice is obvious [111] [114] . The next speaker was Skorts, who, to the surprise of the Council, presented his draft resolution [115] , which provided for the “tripling” of defense and interior ministers, subordinate to the Duce, and the concentration of power in the hands of the NFP [116] .
Mussolini furiously interrupted the party secretary. His speech put an end to the Prime Minister’s hopes of defeating Grandi: the party has discredited itself in the eyes of almost all members of its leadership [117] . Old Senator Suardo , crying under the influence of the words of the Duce, withdrew his signature on the Count’s draft and proposed combining the three drafts [117] . Ciano hesitantly asked Farinachchi to remove his document from the vote and ask Grandi to combine the two resolutions, but Farinachchi refused [118] . Finally, at 2 a.m., after nine hours of discussion, Mussolini declared the meeting closed and ordered Skortsa to begin the vote. At first, the project of Count Mordano was approved as the most supported [119] . The NFP Secretary was the first to vote against, then de Bono voted “for”, he was supported by undecided. With a result of 19 votes in favor and 8 against, the document was approved [120] . Duce recognized the result of the vote and asked who would acquaint the king with it. Grandi invited the prime minister to do this himself. He said that the count "provoked a crisis of the regime." Skortsa tried to salute Mussolini, but he raised his hand in protest [121] . Council members left the palace [122] , with the exception of the party secretary and its leader, who remained to discuss the legal aspect of the resolution. They concluded that she was merely a recommendation to the monarch [123] . Skortsa suggested that the Duce obey the decision of the Council, which Mussolini did not agree to because of the belief that such a move would mean betraying his supporters in the BFS [124] . Before going home, he phoned his mistress Clara Petacci and said: “It's over,” calling the incident “the greatest watershed in history” [125] .
Resolution text
| Resolution Dino Grandi Great Fascist Council | Ordine del giorno grandi Il Gran Consiglio del Fascismo | |||
Voting
| Per (18) | Abstained (1) | Cons (7) |
|---|---|---|
|
|
|
Roberto Farinacci left the room during the voting.
Mussolini's arrest
Immediately after the meeting, Grandi spoke to the Duke of d'Aquarone until 6 in the morning, who handed him two copies of the resolution [126] . An hour later, he informed Victor Emanuel [127] . At 9:00, he called Badoglio and announced to him that on July 29 [128] he would replace Mussolini as Prime Minister [129] . At 8 a.m. he as usual came to work and found on his desktop a letter from Tulio Chanetti in which he withdrew his vote for the count’s resolution. Дуче приказал разыскать его, однако Гранди, находившийся в своём кабинете в палаццо Монтечиторио, несколько раз сообщил, что его нет в городе [128] . Вероятно, Муссолини хотел, чтобы граф начал переговоры с союзниками о перемирии [130] . Начальник штаба фашистской милиции Гальбьяти предложил премьер-министру арестовать 19 членов Совета, поддержавших графа, на что дуче не дал своего согласия [131] . После этого он попросил об аудиенции у короля, что нарушило его планы. Посоветовавшись, он принял решение арестовать Муссолини [132] . Тем временем он принимал японского посла, который три недели ждал встречи. Ожидавшего выслушать обмен любезностями дипломата дуче поразил предложением премьер-министру Хидэки Тодзё убедить Гитлера примириться со Сталиным [133] , иначе, по словам дуче, Италия будет вынуждена покинуть «ось» [134] . После полудня он приехал в квартал Сан-Лоренцо, пострадавший от бомбардировок [135] , затем вернулся в свою резиденцию Вилла Торлония , где скромно пообедал. Жена Муссолини Ракеле предложила ему проигнорировать аудиенцию, так как королю нельзя доверять, и заявила Бенито, что тот не вернётся со встречи. Он ответил, что король — его лучший друг [136] .
В 17:00 премьер, одетый в гражданское, прибыл в монаршую резиденцию на автомобиле в сопровождении охраны. При нём был закон о Большом фашистском совете, принятая им резолюция и письмо от Чанетти. Виктор Эммануил встретил гостя во внутреннем дворе. Тот попытался убедить собеседника, что резолюция не имеет никакой юридической силы, а многие из её подписантов за ночь успели передумать. Король прервал его и спокойно сказал дуче, что страна разбита, а новым премьер-министром станет маршал Бадольо. Ошеломлённый Муссолини ответил: «Значит, всё кончено? Всё кончено, всё кончено. Но что будет со мной, с моими родными?» [137] . Монарх заверил дуче, что лично позаботится о безопасности его и его семьи, и сопроводил его к двери, где Муссолини встретил капитан карабинеров Виньери. Дуче пошёл к своей машине, но капитан приказал ему ради его же безопасности сесть в рядом припаркованную карету скорой помощи [138] . Муссолини поначалу отказался, но был вынужден подчиниться. Увидев внутри трёх полицейских и трёх карабинеров, он воскликнул: «И полицейские? Нет!», тогда Виньери взял его за локоть и впихнул в машину, проследовавшую до армейских казарм в Трастевере [139] . Час спустя пленника перевезли в казармы карабинеров в Прати [140] . Той же ночью ему передали тёплое письмо от Бадольо, объяснявшего необходимость ареста и предлагавшего выбрать место содержания. В ответном письме дуче попросил перевода на виллу в Романье — единственную недвижимость, которая ему принадлежала, и выразил готовность помогать новому правительству. Вместо Романьи Муссолини отправили на остров Понца , несколько недель спустя — на острова Ла-Маддалена и наконец на горнолыжный курорт на плато Кампо-Императоре в Гран-Сассо . 12 сентября отряд под командованием Скорцени освободил его . После аудиенции король долго бродил по саду вместе с адъютантом, которому сказал: «Сегодня моё 18 брюмера » [141] .
Тем временем все основные телефонные узлы были блокированы верными монарху силами. Новый начальник полиции, назначенный д'Аквароне спустя 30 минут после начала встречи, приказал арестовать всех руководителей фашистской партии, находившихся в столице [142] . Здание государственного радио, к которому имели доступ чернорубашечники, было также взято под контроль. В это время Виктор Эммануил принял Бадольо. В 18:00 Скорца, ожидавший встречи с Муссолини, попытался узнать новости в штабе карабинеров и был арестован, однако, пообещав верность НФП новым властям, отпущен [143] . В 19:00 Гальбьяти получил известие об аресте дуче. Увидев, что штаб-квартира фашистской милиции окружена армейскими подразделениями, он отдал приказ избегать провокаций. Несмотря на то, что большая часть офицеров хотела проигнорировать указание начальника, после консультации с четырьмя генералами он позвонил замминистру внутренних дел и объявил, что чернорубашечники сохраняют верность и королю, и дуче, а так как война продолжается, то долг каждого его бойца — продолжать сражаться. Теперь Бадольо было нечего опасаться со стороны фашистской милиции. Гальбьяти, сменённый генералом Армеллини [131] , вскоре был арестован. Чернорубашечники вошли в состав вооружённых сил и были распущены.
Реакция на переворот
Внимание, внимание. Его величество король и император принял отставку председателя правительства, премьер-министра и государственного секретаря господина Бенито Муссолини и назначил председателем правительства, премьер-министром и государственным секретарём маршала Италии господина Пьетро Бадольо.
— Сообщение итальянского радио об отставке Муссолини
В 22:45 диктор государственного радио Джамбаттиста Ариста, по обыкновению зачитывавший важную информацию, сообщил об отставке Муссолини и назначении Бадольо премьер-министром [144] . Коммюнике заканчивалось словами: «Война продолжается. Италия сдержит слово». Граждане медленно осознавали, что произошло. Журналист Паоло Монелли писал об обстановке в столице:
Тишину летней ночи взрывают песни, крики, шум. Разгорячённые кофе посетители поднимаются по Виа дель Тритоне с криками: «Вставайте, граждане! Они арестовали Муссолини! Смерть Муссолини, долой фашизм!». Всё это словно говорил немой, спустя двадцать лет обретший голос. Всюду вспыхнули окна, двери открыты настежь, все обнимаются друг с другом, делятся новостью, в запале активно пользуются несложными жестами. Горячие головы бросаются на тех, кто ещё носит фашистский значок, срывают его и топчут. «К чёрту жука!» Толпы людей бросились приветствовать короля и Бадольо.
— [145]
По всей стране народ вышел на улицы, уничтожая фашистские символы и срывая плакаты [146] . В большинстве случаев месть ограничилась срыванием фашистских значков — «жуков» — и принудительными тостами в честь маршала [147] .
В Германии отставку Муссолини восприняли крайне остро. Гитлер понимал, что с уходом Дуче с политической сцены, новое правительство Италии во главе с маршалом Бадольо начнёт отходить от курса фашизма и постарается провести переговоры с Антигитлеровской коалицей, чтобы выйти из войны или же станет их союзником. Хотя Бадольо и заверял, что курс Италии остаётся прежним и она будет продолжать являться верным союзником Рейха. Однако, целью этих заверений было недопустить оккупацию страны немецкими войсками.
Фрагмент № 14 Совещание в ставке Гитлера 25 июля 1943 г., 21.30:
- Гитлер. Вы знаете о событиях в Италии?
- Кейтель. Я слышал только несколько последних слов.
- Гитлер. Дуче ушел в отставку. Это еще не подтверждено. Бадольо возглавил правительство. Дуче ушел в отставку.
- Кейтель. По собственной инициативе, мой фюрер?
- Гитлер. Видимо, по просьбе короля под давлением двора. Я вам вчера говорил, как вел себя король.
- Йодль. Бадольо возглавил правительство.
- Гитлер. Бадольо возглавил правительство, и он наш злейший враг. Нам надо немедленно выяснить, сможем ли мы найти способ возвращения наших людей на материк [из Сицилии].
- Йодль. Главное, собираются итальянцы воевать или нет?
- Гитлер. Они говорят, что будут, но это предательство! Нам должно быть совершенно ясно: это чистое предательство! Я просто все еще жду, когда сообщат, что говорит дуче. Этот – как его? – пытается сейчас поговорить с дуче. Надеюсь, он повлияет на него. Я хочу, чтобы дуче доставили сюда немедленно, если удастся повлиять на него так, что мы могли сразу же вернуть его в Германию.
- Йодль . Если есть какие-то сомнения, остается только одно.
- Гитлер. Я думал насчет того, чтобы отдать приказ 3-й танковой гренадерской дивизии немедленно захватить Рим и арестовать все правительство.
После этого Гитлер поручил ОКВ разработку операции по поиску и освобождению из заключения Муссолини , а так же поручил разработать масштабную операцию по вводу германских войск в саму Италию и захват контроля над итальянскими зонами оккупации на юге Франции, на Балканах, Корсике.
Последствия
Немцы узнали об аресте Муссолини около 19:30. Гитлер, получив известие об этом, пришёл в ярость и несколько раз воскликнул: «Измена!». Фариначчи прибыл в германское посольство, где Кессельринг предложил ему вступить в дивизию «М» из преданных делу фашистов, расквартированную в Монтеротондо близ Рима [148] , но Фариначчи отказался и попросил вывезти его в Германию. Несколько часов спустя он вылетел из Фраскати в Мюнхен [149] . Тем временем 44-я пехотная дивизия и 36-я горнострелковая бригада перешли через Альпы и заняли Южный Тироль , другие немецкие соединения вторглись в провинции Венеция-Джулия и Пьемонт [150] . 26 июля — 8 августа в Италии без согласия властей разместились 8 дивизий и одна бригада вермахта, в чём две недели назад Гитлер отказал дуче в Фельтре [145] .
26 июля власти объявили чрезвычайное положение и ввели комендантский час [151] . 27 июля состоялось первое заседание кабинета Бадольо, на котором было решено сослать Муссолини на остров, распустить Большой фашистский совет, Палату фасций и корпораций и Особый трибунал в защиту государства и запретить воссоздание партий [152] . Несмотря на это, их представители 26 июля встретились в Милане, а 27 июля и 2 августа — в Риме. Христианско-демократическая , либеральная , социалистическая , коммунистическая партии и «Партия действия» координировали борьбу против властей [153] , вылившуюся в массовые беспорядки, в ходе которых было убито 83 человека, сотни ранены.
Утром 25 июля Гранди передал запись заседания иностранному корреспонденту, но в тот же день узнал, что власти не дадут опубликовать его [154] . Понимая, что новое правительство хочет забыть об усилиях фашистов по свержению Муссолини, граф пригласил к себе в офис послов Испании и Швейцарии, которым передал документ при условии его публикации в газетах [155] . На следующий день он появился в швейцарской прессе. Тем временем Гранди при личной встрече крупно поссорился с герцогом д'Аквароне, затем говорил с королём, Бадольо и папой . Граф Мордано предложил тайно переправить его в Мадрид, где он надеялся через британского посла Сэмюеля Хора начать переговоры о перемирии. Немцам уже было известно о визите Гранди к папе, за графом следило гестапо . 31 июля его наконец принял новый министр иностранных дел Гварилья, однако он не торопился с переправкой Гранди в Испанию, так что время было упущено [156] .
Поначалу новое правительство не предпринимало никаких шагов по установлению контактов с союзниками или обороне страны от немцев. Гварилья до назначения министром иностранных дел был послом в Турции. Пока он возвращался из Анкары, драгоценное время было потеряно [157] . После ареста Муссолини король вновь бездействовал [158] и передал политические вопросы на откуп д'Аквароне и Бадольо. Заявление о продолжении войны, не убедившее Германию, поставило антигитлеровскую коалицию в замешательство, и бомбардировки итальянских городов возобновились. 46 дней между свержением дуче и вступлением в силу перемирия привели к тому, что 8 сентября армия потерпела коллапс, Рим, оставшийся без защиты, был занят немецкими войсками, а король и правительство бежали вглубь страны. Муссолини был освобождён и возглавил Итальянскую социальную республику — началась гражданская война [159] .
Отражение в кино
- Ход переворота в довольно сокращённом и исторически не совсем достоверном виде показан в начале фильма "Прорыв" киноэпопеи Юрия Озерова "Освобождение" .
Comments
- ↑ в качестве трупов
Notes
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1092
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1117
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1125
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1137
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 283
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1168
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 29th
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 74
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1174
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1132
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 77
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 76
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1180
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1169
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1126
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 46
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 56
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 57
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 65
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 58
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1136
- ↑ 1 2 De Felice, 1996 , p. 1148
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1151
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 81
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 82
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 379
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 382
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 392
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 413
- ↑ 1 2 Bianchi, 1963 , p. 417
- ↑ 1 2 3 Bianchi, 1963 , p. 427
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 196
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1229
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 384-6
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 386
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 384
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1236
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1237
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 401
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 403
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 405
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 410
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1219
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 432
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1313
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1316
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 435
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 436
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 71
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1193
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1198
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1199
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1203
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1220
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 445
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 451
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1226
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1186
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 85
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 454
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1242
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1324
- ↑ 1 2 De Felice, 1996 , p. 1325
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1338
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1228
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1239
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 468
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 224
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 225
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1227
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1243
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 466
- ↑ 1 2 De Felice, 1996 , p. 1248
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 236
- ↑ 1 2 De Felice, 1996 , p. 1349
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 472
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 238
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 239
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1188
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1350
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 477
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1187
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1189
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 481
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1251
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1252
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 484
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 486
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 487
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 489
- ↑ 1 2 Bianchi, 1963 , p. 490
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 516
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 243
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 496
- ↑ 1 2 Grandi, 1983 , p. 250
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 510
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 249
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 246
- ↑ Monelli, 1946 , p. 120
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 536
- ↑ 1 2 Bianchi, 1963 , p. 540
- ↑ Monelli, 1946 , p. 123
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 256
- ↑ Monelli, 1946 , p. 125
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 257
- ↑ Monelli, 1946 , p. 124
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 575
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 260
- ↑ Monelli, 1946 , p. 126
- ↑ 1 2 3 Grandi, 1983 , p. 263
- ↑ 1 2 3 Monelli, 1946 , p. 128
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 588
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 264
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 605
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 590
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 265
- ↑ 1 2 Bianchi, 1963 , p. 596
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 597
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 608
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 268
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 609
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1381
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 615
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1382
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 616
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 611
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1388
- ↑ 1 2 Grandi, 1983 , p. 272
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1390
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1385
- ↑ 1 2 Bianchi, 1963 , p. 732
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1391
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 647
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 73
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 655
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 661
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 668
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 670
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1400
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1401
- ↑ Monelli, 1946 , p. 142
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 687
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 694
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 704
- ↑ 1 2 Bianchi, 1963 , p. 715
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 729
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 1366
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 702
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 703
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 713
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 724
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 746
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 740
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 282
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 283
- ↑ Grandi, 1983 , p. 368-76
- ↑ Bianchi, 1963 , p. 751
- ↑ De Felice, 1996 , p. 106
- ↑ De Felice, 2008 , La catastrofe nazionale dell'8 Settembre.
Literature
- Monelli, Paolo. Roma 1943 : [ итал. ] . — 4. — Roma : Migliaresi, 1946.
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