The raid on the German convoy in Norrköping Bay is a naval operation (in terms of that time “cruising operation” [1] ) conducted by a special detachment from among the ships of the Imperial Baltic Fleet on the transport routes of the German Empire in the Baltic Sea in June 1916 during the First world war .
A raid on a German convoy in Norrköping bay | |||
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Map with the paths of movement of the Russian and German units and the battlefield |
As a result of miscalculations in planning and conducting the operation, the goals set were not achieved.In Soviet historiography, the significance of the operation and the success of the Russian fleet were greatly exaggerated.
Historical Background
Neutral Sweden and the military-economic importance of the German-Swedish trade
The protracted war, which took on Germany the nature of the war on two fronts, increased the vulnerability of the German economy to the imported strategic raw materials needed for the work of the German military industry. The naval blockade of Germany, undertaken by Great Britain from the very first days of the war, significantly narrowed both the geography of imports and their volumes [1] .
In connection with this, the military-economic importance of German trade with neutral Sweden increased, primarily supplies of Swedish iron ore to Germany [K 1] , which were possible exclusively on the Baltic Sea. Historian D.Yu. Kozlov wrote that, without exaggeration, it can be considered that the maintenance of the uninterrupted functioning of communications in the Baltic has grown for Germany into a problem of strategic scope. Trade routes up to 700 miles connecting the Baltic coast of Germany with Swedish ports and passing within the reach of the Russian naval forces (the distance from the main Revel base to the Swedish coast in the Landortort area is about 190 miles) could and should have been targeted by the Russian Baltic Fleet the empire, which had the goal of hindering or completely suppressing sea transportation [1] .
By the beginning of the world war, Germany had satisfied only about 60% of its iron ore industry's needs with its own reserves (and the deposit in Lorraine produced ore with low iron content), the rest was supplied from Spain, France, Russia and Sweden. Since the beginning of the war, Sweden, which until then had been the largest supplier of ore to Germany, remained the only country from which it was possible to continue to supply ore not only to Germany, but also to Austria-Hungary allied to the Germans. At the same time, Germany was the largest buyer of Swedish ore. So, in 1913, out of 6440 thousand tons of ore mined in Sweden, 77% - 4977 thousand tons were exported to Germany. Significant German capital was invested in the mining industry of Sweden. It was Swedish iron ore that was used for the production of steel for the needs of the military industry, including military shipbuilding. Erich Ludendorff wrote that without the supply of ore from Sweden, the Germans would not have been able to deploy a "submarine war" on a dangerous scale for England. And the German historian Groos wrote that “Germany was able to maintain its combat capability only as long as the ways of transporting Swedish ore through the Baltic Sea were ensured” [1] .
According to Russian naval intelligence, in late 1915 and early 1916, German-Swedish trade served over 250 merchant ships under German, Swedish and Norwegian flags [2] [1] .
The intelligence information received by the Naval General Headquarters testified to the conclusion of a special agreement between Sweden and Germany, according to which the Swedish navy provided security for German merchant ships within Swedish territorial waters (three miles), which was quite useful to the German command. The German Baltic group experienced a significant lack of escort forces. In addition, the reconnaissance of the Baltic Fleet reported that the Swedes handed over to the German admiral headquarters valuable information concerning the presence of Russian and British ships off its coast [1] .
At the same time, both Russia and Great Britain tried to avoid misunderstandings with neutral Sweden — the transit of the cargo of the Entente passed through its territory. Fearing the interruption of this cargo flow in the event of diplomatic or military complications, the Russian government was even prepared to put up with the fact that from Sweden to Germany there was a re-export of Russian goods purchased specifically for such purposes by the Swedish merchants [1] .
The situation in the Baltic theater of operations by the beginning of the summer of 1916
In the campaign of 1916, Germany shifted the center of gravity of its military efforts from the Eastern to the Western Front . In this regard, the fighting in the Baltic Sea took a positional character [1] .
Baltic Fleet
The priorities of the Baltic Fleet of the Russian Empire for 1916, as before, were purely defensive, and active operations for "causing possible harm to the enemy" should not have been taken to their detriment. Although the Russian high command was aware of the strategic importance for Germany of iron ore supplies from Sweden, there were no plans to break them. Russian submarines, as before, were tasked with destroying enemy warships, although the Baltic campaign of 1915 showed their high effectiveness in combating merchant shipping between Swedish and German ports. Despite the fact that the fleet continued to be replenished with ships [K 2] , which created favorable conditions for organizing large-scale operations on German sea communications, the “Plan of active operations” for the campaign of 1916, independently drawn up by the command of the Baltic Fleet, attributed to the number of secondary and formulated in general phrases, without defining both the purpose and methods of such actions, and the forces and means allocated for the solution of this task. [1] At the same time, the actions themselves on the sea lanes of Germany were considered by the command of the Baltic Fleet only from the point of view of the possibility of “luring” German warships into the open sea in order to substitute them for the blow of the Baltic Fleet, and not from the point of view of the violation of German maritime trade [3 ] . At the same time, the fleet command tried once again not to provoke neutral Sweden with actions that could be regarded as unfriendly - the commanders of the ships were ordered to strictly observe its neutrality [1] .
Germanic Forces of the Baltic Sea
The German fleet on the navigation in 1916 also set defensive tasks - “1) to prevent the energetic performance of the Russian naval forces, 2) to protect our trade from heavy losses, 3) to prevent British submarines from breaking through into the Baltic Sea”. After the Battle of Jutland, which took place on May 31 - June 1, 1916 , the Germans could no longer strengthen their Baltic grouping with ships of the High Sea Fleet , without thinking more about the active operations of their fleet in the Baltic [1] .
Since April 1916, Germany launched a system of maritime convoys for the carriage of goods along the coast of Sweden. Convoys from the ports of Sweden to Germany were sent three times a week. The courts were ordered whenever possible to follow inside the territorial waters of Sweden. The points of formation of the convoys were determined Libau , Swinemunde , the area of the floating lighthouse Giedzer and the southern exit from the Kalmarsund strait. Merchant ships were recommended to paint over all signs of nationality. From the second half of 1915, they began to install artillery guns on them. The command of the German forces of the Baltic Sea formed a "fleet of protection of commercial shipping", consisting of eleven escort ship groups. Each group consisted of three armed trawlers. The armament of these ships was effective in combat with a submarine, but not against large Russian surface ships. In addition to the escort groups, by the beginning of the summer of 1916, the , “Kronprinz Wilhelm” (“K”), “Alexandra” (“A”) and "Primula" ("P"), armed with 105-mm guns and who carried the service outside the Swedish territorial waters [1] .
Formulation of the problem. Creation of a special squad
In the first days of June 1916, the British embassy in Stockholm informed the Russian colleagues of the planned shipment of large quantities of iron ore from Sweden to Germany - 84 thousand tons. Transportation, according to the English, was planned for May 23 [ June 5 ], May 28 [ June 10 ] and May 31 [ June 13 ] from Stockholm and Oklezund on German transports [4] [1] .
Russian intelligence had information that such convoys left, as a rule, during daylight hours and between 7 and 8 pm they were in the Land Land port , leaving for a short time from the territorial waters of Sweden [4] [1] .
Based on this information, the headquarters of the Baltic Sea Fleet Commander developed a Plan of Operation No. 12, approved by the Commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral V. Kanin on May 26 [ June 8 ], 1916 . Formed to solve the task, the “special purpose detachment” was instructed to “conduct a survey of the Landsort- Gotland area — the northern tip of Öland island, with the aim of destroying the patrol and escort ships and escorts usually located in the area and capturing or destroying enemy commercial ships whose caravan, in particular , with a large load of iron ore, should leave from Landsort to the south at 19-20 hours on May 28 ” [1] .
The command of the special assignment detachment was assigned to Rear-Admiral P. L. Trukhachev, Chief of the 1st Cruiser Brigade. The squad included the cruisers “ Rurik ” (the flag of Trukhachev, the commander was the captain of the first rank A. M. Pyshnov), “ Oleg ” and “ Bogatyr ” [4] ; four of the newest "oil" destroyers of the destroyer (destroyer) - the flagship destroyer of the Novik minefield chief and three destroyers of the 1st division Thunder , Pobedite , Orfey ; eight "coal" destroyers of the 6th battalion of destroyers "Steregushchy" , "Terrible" , "Ukraine" , "Military" , "Zabaykalets" , "Turkmen-Stavropol" , "Kazan" and "Don Cossack" . The commander of the mine division, Rear Admiral A. V. Kolchak, received an order from Admiral Kanin to "enter into submission to the Chief of the Special Purpose Unit for the duration of Operation No. 12" Kolchak left the command of the ship's strike group of "oil" destroyers [1] .
To cover the "special purpose squad" and, incidentally, to destroy the enemy transports and warships, in the southeastern part of the Baltic Sea, the British submarines E19 and E9 and the Russian Tigr , Vepr and Wolf were deployed. With the same task, the Bayan and Admiral Makarov cruisers were put forward in the Abo-Aland region [1] .
According to the “plan of operation No. 12”, the search and destruction of the enemy ships found was to be held in the area located between the island of Gotland and the coast of mainland Sweden. The detachment of special purpose was divided into two parts, go to the southern and northern borders of the designated area and comb it in opposite directions. Cruisers and destroyers of the 6th division were to leave Utö and, entering the strait between Gotland and the Swedish coast, follow in a southerly direction up to the parallel of the northern tip of Öland island. In turn, the group of oil destroyers under the command of A.V. Kolchak was to leave Daguerort in the strait between the islands of Gotska-Sande and Gotland, then turn to Oland and from there follow north to meet with the main forces of P.L. Trukhachev. After connecting the two groups, the search actions were stopped and all ships returned to their bases [1] .
In the sea
May 28–30 [June 10–12] 1916
The cruisers and the 6th division of destroyer destroyers were anchored in Utya at 8:00 on May 28 [ June 10 ]. Soon after, the detachment entered a band of thick fog and was forced to stop the movement and anchor. At 3:00 pm, with the permission of the fleet commander, the detachment headed for the Lüm maneuver base station of the Baltic Fleet, located on the edge of the Finnish skerries in the Abo area [1] .
Rear Adm. Kolchak didn’t have it either: at 14:00 on the destroyer Novik he, accompanied by the destroyers Winner and Orpheus (the destroyer Grom did not have time to get out of the dock) left Revel , but reached only Daguerre where he learned about the problems with the weather in the detachment of Trukhachev. Kolchak, who received an order from Trukhachev to “act according to his discretion,” decided to go to Rogokyul. The destroyer Orpheus also dropped out of the squad, as during the transition it became clear that the ship could not pick up the assigned speed of 24 knots [5] [1] .
Thus, by the evening of the first day of the march, only submarines had advanced to the designated deployment sites. However, the German aerial reconnaissance discovered them in the central part of the sea on the very first day. The English boat "E19" was attacked by German airplanes four times. Their own attacks and subjected to the Russian submarine "Wolf". In Operation No. 12, neither Russian nor British submarines managed to sink or damage enemy ships, although they undertook several torpedo attacks both on transports and on escort ships — but none of the released torpedo targets struck [1] .
The ships of the special-purpose squad stayed anchored in the Lum roadstead until May 31 [ June 13 ].
May 31 - June 2 [June 13–15] 1916
At 1:30 pm on May 31 [ June 13 ], the special purpose detachment ships were anchored and all together (rear-admiral Trukhachev, the head of the detachment changed the initial plan for deploying ships off the Swedish coast) during the last days at anchor, went to the enemy search area. The detachment was accompanied by destroyers of the seventh division, which were released to the base around 18:00, when the group of Russian ships approached the Swedish coast [1] .
Meanwhile, around 21:00, the German convoy, consisting of ten "valuable ore carriers" under the escort of the Germann trap vessel and three armed trawlers from the 5th group of the 1st "shipping security flotilla" commanded by Lieutenant Reserve Plikert (flag on the trawler “William Jurgens”), left in a southerly direction, stretching in the wake column along the Swedish coast [1] .
The night that fell was quiet and clear. At 22:00 a group of oil destroyers (destroyers) "Novik" , "Winner" , "Winner" and "Thunder" under the command of Kolchak separated from the main detachment and, increasing the course to 25 knots, lay down the course of 248 °, leading to Norchöping the bay The head of the detachment Trukhachev instructed Kolchak that if unidentified ships were found, Russian destroyers would have to try to cut them off from the Swedish coast in order not to give the first an opportunity to escape under the protection of Swedish territorial waters, and if it was determined that enemy ships would “first of all attack the end armed steamer ". At 22:15 the rest of the detachment's ships turned left on the course of 215 ° [1] .
At 11:15, both the German and the Russian ships of the Kolchak detachment found smoke on the horizon of each other, but both detachments "remained in ignorance, the enemy in front of them or neutral ships." The Russian destroyers, having a threefold speed advantage, quickly caught up with a group of these ships. At 23:30, the German convoy went beyond the borders of the Swedish territorial waters southeast of the floating lighthouse of Hevring. At 23:33, Kolchak ordered a warning shot ahead in the direction of the end of the ship, although his ships still remained in the stern of course corners of the German convoy. After the second warning shot sounded, the commander of the convoy Plikert at 23:38 gave the crew to leave for the Swedish coast and set up a smoke screen to cover them. The three converted trawlers, armed with only one 88-mm cannon, turned to meet the Russian ships and engaged them in battle. At that moment, Kolchak made a dubious decision, in the opinion of D. Yu. Kozlov, from the point of view of tactical expediency, although it was going in full compliance with the instructions received in advance from Trukhachev — instead of heading after the ore carriers, evading combat with low-speed escort ships, whose the speed did not exceed 9 knots, he decided to engage with them, pursuing the goal of “attacking the terminal armed steamer,” which in fact was the Germann trap ship [1] .
After the Russian ships fired a few volleys and fired two torpedoes at the “group of small ships that opened fire on us,” the attackers stopped firing and were scattered, although the Russian projectiles and torpedoes did not harm them [K 3] , and all three Russian destroyers they switched all their attention to the Hermann vessel, which depicted, as befits a trap vessel, a transport lagging behind the convoy. The Hermann, built in 1901, was a coal load carrying capacity of 2,030 brt , which was converted into a trap vessel only two months earlier - in April 1916. In this capacity, it was his first trip to the sea. Although he had four 105-mm guns in his armament, he was unable to offer any resistance due to the weak training of hastily made up crew [1] .
In the very first moments of the battle, the Hermann bridge was broken by artillery fire and steering controls were destroyed, three guns were put out of operation, the main steam line was interrupted. The middle part of the vessel caught fire. Part of the crew, cut off in the bow of the vessel, headed by the commander of the vessel Hofman left the vessel in a lifeboat. Those who were at the stern were left without commanders — the “first officer”, chief lieutenant of the reserve, Heinrich, was killed — and unorganized left the ship engulfed in fire. However, the Hermann, loaded, as befits a ship of this class, with unsinkable material — in this case, empty barrels — did not sink at all. Then Kolchak ordered to finish off the ship with torpedoes. At the same time, the Russian sailors beat Hermann almost to their support, not taking into account that the safety device on the torpedo coaxed the drummer into a firing position only after the torpedo passed through one and a half cable . Of the four torpedoes fired, none exploded when they hit the target. Kolchak even decided that on their ship "mines are not in order." Only after that the destroyer "Thunder", moving away by about eight cables, the fifth torpedo blew up "Germann". At about 1 am on June 1 [14] the ship sank [1] .
In the sea around Novik there were several dozen German sailors who, according to the testimony of a Russian officer, “swam around us on various wrecks, broken boats and just in the water, frantically calling for help”. Only after the Novik had boarded the nine members of the Hermann crew did the Russians be able to determine the type of vessel they had attacked and sank. Of the 86 people on the crew of the German armed steamer, twenty-nine died, nine were rescued by the Russians, the rest were picked up by German and Swedish ships that approached the battlefield later. The Russian destroyers did not waste time raising German sailors out of the water, but rushed to join up with the covering forces. The fact that Kolchak refused to help German sailors from Hermann was explained by the fact that "at that time ... silhouettes of some ships appeared, and shells began to fall around us." In his memoirs, Rear-Admiral Pilkin wrote about this episode as follows: “You cannot throw out the words from a song, and Kolchak did not pick up the Germans after the drowning of the enemy, who were swimming and clinging to his destroyer. „ Crime de guerre? “True, there was a danger from submarines and I had to leave soon” [1] .
Meanwhile, the cruisers and destroyers of the Trukhachev detachment, being 15 miles seaward of the unfolding events, observed flashes from the shots on the horizon and heard rumbling gun volleys, but remained unaware of what was happening in the Norrköping bay. So without taking any action that was not provided for in the previously prepared plan, at 01:45 they strictly, according to the plan of the operation, turned around and lay down on the opposite course. At about 03:00 the detachment found four ships, stopped and inspected them, but they turned out to be Swedish merchant ships [6] . At about 4:00 am, Kolchak's oil destroyers overtook the Trukhachev detachment, and then both detachments followed together. At the end of the crossing, the ships followed the mine trawls, as there was a danger from mines set up by a German submarine. On the way back, the Russian ships made anti-submarine maneuvers three times, evading the "discovered" German submarines. However, according to data published by German researchers, at that time the only German submarine was in the Baltic Sea, but it was also in the area of Dago Island . On 2 [15] June , the special forces unit was officially disbanded. By the evening of the same day, the ships went to their bases, and even earlier, on June 1 [14], the submarines participating in Operation 12 [1] returned to their bases.
Subsequent events
Taking into account the experience gained and the results of "Operation No. 12", the command of the Baltic Fleet decided to "undertake a new search in the Norrköping region by cruisers and destroyers, with the aim of attacking a convoy." The new raid, which was attended by almost completely updated composition of the Baltic Fleet ships (from the special purpose squad "Operations No. 12", only the destroyers "Winner" and "Thunder" participated in the new raid, took place two weeks after the first, but its results were more modest than the results of the operation on May 31 [ June 13 ] [1] .
Implications and evaluations of the operation
The Russian fleet did not succeed in interrupting or significantly hampering freight traffic between Germany and Sweden. When meeting with the superior forces of the Russian fleet, the German fleet, which had only improvised forces and means, resolutely entered the battle, seized the tactical initiative and managed to successfully accomplish its main task - ensuring the safety of transport ships loaded with strategic raw materials. From 23 June 1916, that is, only ten days after the raid, the German command increased the number of weekly convoys from Swinemünde to Landsort from three to six [1] .
From the very beginning, the command of the Baltic Fleet really evaluated the modest results of the operation. The summary of the information of the Naval Staff of the Supreme Commander dated 2 [15] June 1916 stated: "The ships were fired upon by the destroyers, but managed to escape into Swedish waters." The fleet commander reported to the headquarters of June 5 [18] : “It was not possible to develop success, since the steamboats, using the time of the battle with escort and darkness, managed to escape into neutral waters.” As the fleet command considered, as a result of the operation “the enemy only increased his vigilance on the trade routes”. Kolchak himself also correctly assessed the result of the operation and the loss of the enemy - in January 1920, during interrogation of the extraordinary investigation commission, he showed, telling about this case: "I ... attacked the caravan at night, scattered him and sank the escorting ship." [1] However, already on July 27 [ August 10 ] of 1916, the commander of the Baltic Fleet wrote to the Supreme Commander General Headquarters about the results of this operation: “After a successful search in the Norrköping region of cruisers and destroyers of June 1, which ended with the sinking of the enemy auxiliary cruiser Herman, two armed patrol vessels and, apparently, a certain number of steamships ... ” [7] . Data on the sunk "ships" were taken from Swedish newspapers [1] .
Researcher D. Yu. Kozlov believed that Kolchak had revealed himself and deprived the Russians of surprise, ordering them to make a warning shot ahead of the end of the ship. Researcher A. S. Kruchinin of this connection noted that some modern historians endure the “sentence” as a naval commander in connection with this operation [8] , complaining about the modesty of the results of the operation (one 2030-ton transport was sunk, armed with four 105-mm guns «Q-ship» «Hermann"), and the present day "prescribing 'it cut extending from Stockholm caravan from Swedish waters, put the blame commander destroyers premature" warning shot ahead tip vessel Exchange ", deprived attack surprise and allowed trans orts ore hide in the territorial waters of a neutral Sweden; concentrating the fire of their destroyers not on transports, but on escort ships; the inconsistency of the actions of his shock group with the main forces of P. L. Trukhachev [9] . Such a theoretical "replay" of past battles, in turn, is itself criticized - as not being a fruitful method. Critics of Kolchak, personally pointing out the proximity of the territorial waters of a neutral country, do not take into account the factor of significant danger of attacking neutral Swedes instead of Germans in conditions when the reliability of intelligence data on the basis of which the operation was undertaken could be questionable. Meanwhile, it was on the basis of these considerations that Kolchak did not want to bypass the caravan from the side of the alien sea border and instead tried to stop him with a warning shot for inspection, and then for the same reason did not rush to catch up with the caravan in the direction of the Swedish coast. In this operation Kolchak-General Staff prevailed over Kolchak - a lover of adventures and "cavalry raids" of his destroyers: "... I, bearing in mind the opportunity to meet with the Swedish courts ... decided to sacrifice the surprise of the attack and cause some proceeding from the proceeding ships, which would give me the right to consider these ships to be hostile, ”the admiral later admitted, who was supposed to find Sweden’s performance on the German side quite plausible, and the consequences of this event were rather heavy: war, which was worth one increase in the length of the land Russian front for the entire length of the border of the Grand Duchy of Finland, with its long tradition of dissatisfaction with Russian rule [8] .
In the works of Soviet naval historians, this operation was evaluated, despite some critical comments, on the whole is satisfactory. As early as 1940-1950s, its study was included in textbooks on the history of naval art. The description of the raid in the collection “Fleet in the First World War”, released in 1964, became canonical. The collection stated: “During the short battle, the auxiliary cruiser Hermann, two escort ships (armed trawlers) and from two to five transports were sunk ... The remaining transports managed to take refuge in the territorial waters of Sweden” [10] . A more balanced approach to the description of the battle was the Soviet historian N. B. Pavlovich , who in his major work “Development of Navy Tactics” limited himself to stating the “positive results” of this operation, achieved despite serious miscalculations in battle management [1] .
The German maritime historian Ernst von Gagern ( him Ernst von Gagern ) attributed the success of the German escort and his commander, Lieutenant Pliert, to preserve transports exclusively "lack of combat experience from the commander of the Russian ship detachment." Russian historians D. Yu. Kozlov, E. F. Podsoblyaev, V. Yu. Gribovsky [9] agree with him. Sevastopol researcher G. N. Ryzhenok wrote that it was necessary to look for the reason for the failure of the Russian operation in that Kolchak did not want to “share the winner’s laurels” with P. L. Trukhachev (it was Trukhachev who replaced Kolchak as chief of the mine division) [1] .
Some Soviet and Russian historians believed that the commander of the strike group of oil destroyers AV Kolchak made the wrong decision, launching an attack on the enemy’s armed ships, rather than pursuing the ore carriers, thus violating the command order and disrupting the fulfillment of the main objective of the operation - “a sudden torpedo-artillery with a blow to destroy the main target — enemy transports with cargo of valuable strategic raw materials ” [11] [12] .
Other modern historians disagree with them [8] , incl. researcher M. A. Partala, who wrote that both Soviet and post-Soviet researchers ignore real operational planning documents of the Baltic Fleet, on the one hand, and extrapolate all the experience gained during the war of the sea in the summer of 1916 by the middle of the 20th century, on the other. , which leads them to incorrect estimates and conclusions. According to this researcher, the analysis of these documents relating to the campaign of 1916, as well as the maritime campaigns of the previous two years, suggests that the command of the Baltic Fleet its main goal was to destroy the enemy’s military force at sea. Thus, the June 1916 raid operation was also described by Partal as an auxiliary operation of “primarily subversive or demonstrative character”, which, if successful, would have forced the enemy to withdraw larger forces into the sea in order to substitute them for the attack of Russian ships and submarines . In this case, the actions of Kolchak, although they were deprived of creative initiative, were completely subordinate to the fulfillment of the main task of the Baltic Fleet - the destruction of the military force of the enemy, while Kolchak clearly followed the instructions received from the fleet headquarters [13] .
Historical Myths
In the Soviet scientific and historical literature, the myth was widespread that as a result of the raid the "German auxiliary cruiser", two escort ships and from two to five ore carriers were sunk. Many post-Soviet researchers did not bother to double-check this information and replicate this misinformation in their own works, which were released in the 21st century [1] .
For the first time in the Soviet scientific literature, information about this appeared in the collective work "Fleet in the First World War", published in 1964. In the same year, the official history of the Kayserlhmarin in the First World War, Der Krieg zur See 1914–1918 , was published in the Federal Republic of Germany. It was dedicated to fighting in the Baltic Sea. It was written in it that “skillful and prudent actions of the escort ships were crowned with complete success, and all the ore carriers reached the ports of destination”. However, these data were not taken into account in Soviet historical science, and information about the sinking of "escort ships and ore carriers" wandered in the USSR from one job to another throughout the second half of the 20th century [1] .
Historian D.Yu. Kozlov wrote that many researchers in the XXI century continued to present in their works the same erroneous information about the results of this operation [12] .
Comments
- ↑ In addition to the strategically important iron ore, Germany imported wood, cellulose, food, which Germany critically needed in Sweden, when its own agriculture was unable to meet the needs of the army and the population from Sweden; For its part, Germany exported potash fertilizers, rails, pipes, paints, medicines, coal and other goods to Sweden ( Kozlov D. Yu. 2.4 Actions of diverse forces of the Baltic Fleet on enemy messages in the campaign of 1916 // Violation of sea communications according to experience Of the Russian Navy in the First World War (1914–1917). - Moscow : Russian Foundation for Assistance to Education and Science, 2012. - p. 193–236. - 536 p. )
- ↑ In 1916, ten destroyers of the Azard, Gabriel, Thunder, Desna, Izyaslav, Captain Izylmetiev, Lieutenant Ilyin, Letun, Orpheus and Samson "- and thirteen submarines -" AG-11 "," AG-12 "," AG-13 "," AG-14 "and" AG-15 "," Wolf "," Unicorn "," Cougar ", "Leopard", "Lioness", "Panther", "Lynx", "Tiger". The fleet was replenished with minesweepers and patrol ships. A grouping of British submarines also acted on the Baltic ( D. Kozlov. 2.4 Actions of the diverse forces of the Baltic Fleet on enemy messages in the campaign of 1916 // Violation of naval communications from the experience of the Russian Navy in the First World War (1914–1917). - M. : Russian Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Science, 2012. — pp. 193–236., 536 p. )
- ↑ It became known for certain with the release in Germany in 1964 of the official history of "Kayserlmarine in the First World War" - " him. Der Krieg zur See 1914–1918 ”( Kozlov D. Yu. 2.4 Actions of the diverse forces of the Baltic Fleet on enemy messages in the campaign of 1916 // Violation of sea communications from the experience of the actions of the Russian fleet in the First World War (1914–1917). - M. : Russian Foundation for Assistance to Education and Science, 2012. — pp. 193–236., 536 p. ). Initially, the Russians believed that they had fallen into enemy ships. Kolchak wrote about it like this in a report: “The very first volleys from the destroyer Novik and Winner covered two ships on which they were hit, after which the ship that was fired by the destroyer Victory ceased fire and began to sink, leaving a cloud of smoke and a couple ”( Partala MA. Cruising operations of the Russian fleet in the Western Baltic in May – June 1916. On the question of assessments // St. Petersburg and the Nordic countries: Materials of the 15th annual scientific conference. (16— April 17, 2013) St. Petersburg Center on the history and culture of Scandinavia and Of Finland. The Department of Historical New and New Times of the Institute of History of St. Petersburg State University .. - St. Petersburg : Russian Christian Humanitarian Academician, 2014. - P. 134. - ISBN 978 -5-88812-628-8 . )
Notes
- ↑ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 33 33 35 35 37 Kozlov D. Yu., 2012 .
- ↑ Swedish ore, 2008 , p. four.
- ↑ Partala MA, 2014 , p. 131
- ↑ 1 2 3 Swedish ore, 2008 , p. 13.
- ↑ Swedish ore, 2008 , p. sixteen.
- ↑ Partala MA, 2014 , p. 125, 136.
- ↑ Partala MA, 2014 , p. 128
- ↑ 1 2 3 Kruchinin, 2010 , p. 79-80.
- ↑ 1 2 I must admit, 2006 , p. 29-31.
- ↑ Partala MA, 2014 , p. 125
- ↑ Partala MA, 2014 , p. 130.
- ↑ 1 2 I must admit, 2006 , p. 31.
- ↑ Partala MA, 2014 , p. 131-134.
Literature
- Kozlov D.Yu. Purpose - Swedish ore: actions of the surface forces of the Baltic Sea fleet on enemy communications in the 1916 campaign. - M .: Tseykhgauz, 2008. - 48 p. - (Battle of the Great War). - ISBN 978-5-9771-0085-4 .
- D. Yu. Kozlov. 2.4 Actions of the dissimilar forces of the Baltic Fleet on enemy communications in the campaign of 1916 // Violation of sea communications in the experience of the actions of the Russian fleet in the First World War (1914–1917). - M .: Russian Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Science, 2012. - p. 193–236. - 536 s.
- Partala M. A. Cruising operations of the Russian fleet in the Western Baltic in May – June 1916. On the issue of assessments // St. Petersburg Center for the Study of History and Culture of the Scandinavian countries and Finland. Department of History of New and Newest Times of the Institute of History of St. Petersburg State University St. Petersburg and the Nordic countries: Materials of the fifteenth annual scientific conference (April 16-17, 2013): collection. - SPb. : Russian Christian Academy of Humanities, 2014. - p . 124-141 . - ISBN 978-5-88812-628-8 .
- Ayrapetov, O. R. Participation of the Russian Empire in the First World War (1914-1917). 1916 Over voltage. - M .: Kuchkovo Pole, 2015. - T. 3.
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