Accident DC-8 at Anchorage (1977)

Douglas DC-8-62AF ( registration number JA8054, serial number 46148, serial 553) was released on December 2, 1971, and on January 10, 1972 entered the Japanese airline JAL Cargo . It was equipped with four Pratt & Whitney JT3D-3B turbofan engines , each of which developed a draft of 8,200 kilograms. 19 744 hours flew on the day of the disaster, including 8708 hours from the last major overhaul and 45 hours from the last major inspection. According to the maintenance records for the last year, the liner did not have any serious comments and was technically fully operational ^{[1] [2]} .

In Anchorage, flight 8054 changed crew. The composition of the new crew of flight JL-8054 was as follows:

• The aircraft commander (FAC) is the 53-year-old Hugh L. Marsh, an American . He worked at JAL Cargo for 7 years and 6 months (from June 24, 1969). On October 30, 1969, he was trained as a DC-8 pilot, and on February 9, 1970 he was promoted to DC-8 commander. Also on September 10, 1970 he received the 2nd class in navigation. 23 252 hours flew, 4040 of them on DC-8, including 1186 hours at night and 187 hours of instrument flight . In connection with farsightedness, he wore glasses. Over the past 90 days, it flew 153 hours, including 83 hours at night and 10 hours in instrument conditions ^[3] .
• The co - pilot is the 31-year-old Kunihika Akitani ( English Kunihika Akitani , Japanese 秋谷 秋谷 ), Japanese . He worked at JAL Cargo for 6 years and 8 months (since May 6, 1970). On December 26, 1972, he received the qualification of the third pilot and flight engineer of DC-8, and on August 1, 1976 he was upgraded to the second pilot of DC-8. 1603 hours flew, 1207 of them on DC-8, including 461 hours at night and 90 hours of instrument flight (38 hours of them over the past 90 days) ^[3] .
• Flight Engineer - 35-year-old Nobumasa Yokokawa ( born Nobumasa Yokokawa, Japanese 横 川 信 正 ), Japanese. He worked at JAL Cargo for 16 years and 9 months (from April 1, 1960). November 20, 1960 received the qualification of flight engineer DC-8. He was also qualified as a flight engineer for Convair 880 and Boeing 747 aircraft . 4920 hours flew, 2757 of them on DC-8. Over the past 90 days, 89 hours have flown ^[3] .

Arrival at Anchorage Airport

On the morning of January 13, 1977, the crew consisting of a commander (American), co-pilot and flight engineer (both Japanese) woke up at 03:30 ^{[* 1]} , and at 04:30 got into a taxi, where he arrived at the airport, where at 05 : 00 entered the office of JAL Cargo. But the taxi driver who drove them seriously worried that the crew commander was as if drunk, as indicated by a number of signs: a “glassy" look, a red face, inconsistent movements, slurred speech, and when leaving the car with difficulty, the pilot almost fell on the door. At 04:50 a taxi driver told a JAL Cargo representative that the FAC was probably drunk; in response, he was informed that if they notice something unusual, then the airline will take the necessary measures. At 06:20, a representative of the airline told his management that if the commander was really drunk, the co-pilot should immediately cancel the flight. But during the pre-flight training, nothing suspicious of the crew’s behavior was noticed, and the preparation for the flight itself was normal ^[4] .

Douglas DC-8-62AF board JA8054, on which pilots Marsh, Akitani and Yokokawa were to fly, that day performed a charter cargo flight JL-8054 from Moses Lake (Washington) to Tokyo (Japan) with an intermediate landing in Anchorage for refueling crew changes. The transported cargo is cattle located in special pens that prevent horizontal movement of animals ^[5] . The first phase of the flight went fine and at 05:03, the Douglas landed at Anchorage Airport. The delivery crew reported that they had not encountered precipitation and icing, only when landing at an altitude of 240 meters above sea level, it fell into a layer of fog ^[4] .

Departure Prepare

At the airport, the plane underwent only an external inspection, which was carried out by JAL Cargo employees and hired aircraft engineers from Anchorage Airport. Two local aircraft during this inspection of the engines found that there was ice on the air intakes , casings and nose fairings, which, however, was not on the control surfaces. Therefore, one of the aircraft technicians told representatives of the airline so that the receiving crew included an anti-icing engine system. JAL Cargo employees inspecting the aircraft did not notice any ice ^[4] . According to calculations, a total of 53,200 kilograms of aircraft type “A” kerosene were in the DC-8 fuel tanks ^[6] .

The new crew took the plane and at about 06:03 carried out a check of inertial navigation systems , and also received the latest information from ATIS , according to which there was fog at Anchorage Airport at that time, visibility was about 1¼ mile (2 kilometers) and partly cloudy. After obtaining permission from the dispatcher, at 06:09, preparations for starting the engines began. At 06:15, after completing the reading of the checklist, the engines were started. Having received permission to taxi, flight 8054 with 5 people on board (3 crew members and 2 passengers accompanying the cargo) headed for lane 24L (left) ^[7] .

Following the Airport

In the process of traveling through the airport, the flight engineer asked the PIC for permission to turn on the anti-icing system of the engines, since ice was detected on the air intakes, which the commander agreed to. Also during taxiing, the operation of the control and mechanization planes of the wing was checked, and the flaps were released at 23 °. Next, a checklist was read out before takeoff, while the flaps position and trim tabs were checked again, and when asked about anti-icing, the commander replied that they would use only the anti-icing engine system, to which the flight engineer reported that this system was turned on. The PIC also warned the co-pilot and flight engineer about taking off at Anchorage Airport and the necessary actions during its interruption. At the same time, he noted that the strip is slippery, and therefore it is better not to interrupt the takeoff ^[7] .

Following the runway No. 24L, the JA8054 board was instructed to linger at the strip No. 24R (right). After several more radio exchanges with the dispatcher, the crew taxied to the lane and reported their readiness for take-off. However, the dispatcher in response said that they were actually in the “24 right” lane, and not the “24 left” one, so “Douglas” turned 180 °, drove into the taxiway and followed it to the beginning of the “24 left” strip . At 06:33:37 on board the flight, JL-8054 re-reported their readiness for take-off ^[7] .

Holocaust

According to the testimony of an eyewitness at the end of the runway, the liner rose to a height of about 30 meters, after which, falling to the left, began to shift to the side. At 314 meters from the end of runway No. 24L and 55 meters to the left of the continuation of its axis, JL-8054 hit 38 meters above sea level, after which, continuing to fly southwest (course 230 °), crossed the access road and crashed into a hill at an altitude of 43 meters above sea level and completely collapsed. The accident occurred 46 meters from the runway of Anchorage Airport in the conditions of darkness and fog at a point with coordinates The wreckage of the liner scattered over an area of ​​510 by 120 meters, all 5 people on board died ^{[6] [8] [9]} .

The investigation into the causes of the crash of flight JL-8054 was undertaken by the National Transport Safety Council (NTSB) .

Flight Tests

An analysis of the take-off of the JA8054 was carried out and its comparison with the take-offs of the remaining DC-8s under similar conditions. On the speed meter on the side of the FAC, three base speeds (V ₁ , V _R and V ₂ ) were indicated as 134 , 148 and 160 knots, and on the speed meter from the side of the second pilot - 130 , 158 and 160 knots. Climb speed for both was indicated as 170 knots . In this case, for the current weight with flaps released at 23 ° (according to the reference data), the speeds should have the following values: V ₁ - 137 knots , V _R - 152 knots , V ₂ - 161 knots ^[10] .

The co-pilot timely announced the achievement of a speed of 80 knots (148 km / h), and then the base speeds that were indicated on his device. But few could notice that it took 1.5 seconds longer from the start of lifting the front landing gear (V _R ) to the moment of tearing off the strip (V ₂ ) compared with the take-off of other DC-8s. Then, after separation from the runway, noise appears on the background, which is steadily audible until the end of the recording. As the investigators determined, this noise was caused by the strong vibration of the aircraft before moving to stall. Airspeed reached 164 knots (303 km / h), after which it began to fall. Rising to 87 meters (49 meters above the airfield), the airliner fell into stall and, entering the left bank, began to quickly lose altitude. Hazard signals were heard 1.2 seconds before the end of the recording, and during the last 0.2 seconds, the noise of the destruction of the aircraft from an impact on the ground was heard ^{[11] [12]} .

Computer analysis also showed that the acceleration interval from V _R to V ₂ took longer, and when the liner began to go into stall after separation, the crew only aggravated it, as it sought to gain altitude, it began to raise its nose higher, so when it hit the pitch on the ground was already at least 18 °. According to calculations, it was enough to reduce the lift by 15% to lead to such an effect. Since the flight from Moses Lake to Anchorage went well, taking into account the actual weather at the airport, investigators drew attention to the risk of icing. The estimated temperature of the remainder of the jet fuel after landing was -8.3 ° F (-22.4 ° C), and in Anchorage the fuel was stored at a temperature of about 32 ° F (0 ° C). After refueling, the temperature of jet fuel in the aircraft tanks could be in the range from 20 ° F (-7 ° C) to 25.5 ° F (-3.6 ° C). At outside temperatures of 20 ° F (-7 ° C), small droplets of water that began to freeze could settle out of the fog on the wing. During an external inspection, this ice has not yet been discovered, and therefore the pilots have not been informed about it. But over a long period of standing on the wing, an ice layer could have formed that markedly worsened its aerodynamic performance, including lowering its lift and critical angle of attack. Also, due to uneven ice formation, the wing surface became hilly, due to which aerodynamic drag increased, and therefore the liner should now gain speed a little longer ^[13] .

Pathological examination

All 5 people on board the aircraft (3 crew members and 2 passengers) died immediately when the plane was destroyed. Examination of the bodies of the pilots for carbon monoxide poisoning showed a negative result. Checking for the presence of alcohol in the blood and soft tissues of the co-pilot and flight engineer also showed negative results, but when checking the body of the FAC in blood samples and eye membranes taken 12 hours after the death, the alcohol content reached 298 mg / 100 ml and 310 mg / 100 ml, respectively. Tests conducted later at the Civil Aerospace Institute showed already lower values ​​- 210 mg / 100 ml and 281 mg / 100 ml, respectively. For comparison: according to the Alaskan traffic laws that were in force at that time, the driver was considered drunk if the blood alcohol content exceeded 100 mg / 100 ml (~ 1 ppm) ^[14] .

Because of the alcohol in the blood of the PIC, Hugh L. Marsh was actually unable to fulfill his duties: on the way to the airport, the taxi driver who brought him to the airport drew attention to inappropriate actions, scattered thoughts, slurred speech and problems walking. Further, when controlling the aircraft, the commander taxied to the wrong lane, without noticing it, until the air traffic controller indicated to him. Then, during take-off, the drunk pilot began to lift the nose of the aircraft too abruptly, and after breaking away from the runway and the occurrence of jolting of the helm, he could not recognize the stall and take the necessary measures, instead only aggravating the situation ^[13] .

Cabin Interaction

During this investigation, the investigators especially drew attention to the interaction inside the cockpit, because the inadequate actions of the PIC could not be overlooked by the rest of the crew. However, the high authority of the commander for the Japanese pilots played a fatal role here, so in this situation they simply showed indifference and did not interfere in his dangerous actions ^[15] .

The NTSB came to the conclusion that the crash of flight JL-8054 was caused by a plane crash during take-off due to improper pilot actions, aggravated by icing of the aircraft and intoxication of the crew commander. A concomitant factor was the lack of action by the rest of the crew to prevent the commander from attempting to take off ^[16] .

The catastrophe in Anchorage was largely due to the fact that the young crew members (co-pilot and flight engineer) simply did not dare to argue with the commander, who was 1.5 times older than them and had much more experience, despite the fact that this an experienced pilot was drunk and poorly aware of his actions. This aspect was especially emphasized during the investigation, and the NTSB more than once by then had insisted on the need to introduce new procedures for interaction within the crew so that all pilots in the cockpit worked on equal terms, regardless of experience.

As a result, the JA8054 catastrophe became one of those that ultimately led to the creation and implementation of the Crew Resource Management program ( Crew Resource Management ) ^[17] .

• Accident Tu-104 in Almaty - occurred on the same day

Comments

Sources

• Description of the disaster on the Aviation Safety Network

• Japan Air Lines, Company, Ltd., McDonnel-Douglas DC-8-62F, JA 8054, Anchorage, Alaska, January 13, 1977. (eng.) . National Council for Transport Safety (January 16, 1979). Date of treatment November 24, 2015.