Functionalism is one of the leading theories in modern philosophy of consciousness , which has emerged as an alternative to the theory of identity and behaviorism . Functionalism takes its roots from the philosophies of Aristotle , Thomas Hobbes and William James , however, as an independent theory, it took shape in the last third of the 20th century. The basic idea of functionalism is that mental states are not physiological states and not phenomenal properties [comm. 1] , but functions that are defined in the causal chain of information processing. The causal chain consists of an entrance, a set of causally related mental states and an exit. Functionalism is an attempt to build scientific psychology without considering the soul-body problem. He takes an outwardly neutral position with respect to materialism and dualism . In accordance with the functionalist approach, consciousness can exist without a brain, since the causal chain can be implemented in any complex system, including the intangible. However, many functionalists are materialists. Functionalism is very well consistent with modern scientific methodology, so it not only became one of the most influential areas in the philosophy of consciousness (along with physicalism and antiphysicalism ), but also received the status of the philosophical basis of cognitive science [1] [2] [3] [4] [ 5] .
Key
Functionalism is a theory of consciousness, according to which mental states are determined not by their internal structure, but by the roles that they play in a system that includes them as an integral part. In its simplest form, functionalism can be expressed in the form of two main provisions:
- ;
- neutral character of functions.
Multiple realizability means the possibility of the existence of the same mental states on a very different physical basis. For example, pain is experienced not only by people, but also by animals, whose brain structure is significantly different from the structure of the human brain. From the point of view of functionalism, it is hypothetically possible that alien beings are capable of experiencing the same pain, the physico-chemical processes in the body of which are radically different from the physico-chemical processes in the body of terrestrial beings. Therefore, for functionalism, the main role is not played by the structure of the brain, but by the realization of mental states, regardless of their physical basis. The multiple realizability argument was put forward by functionalists to refute the theory of identity, which identifies mental states with brain states.
The neutral nature of functions means that mental states should not be regarded as a property of matter or an ethereal spirit, but as an independent phenomenon - functions of the system, determined by the structures of connections in it in the process of its operation and having causal effectiveness. This position distinguishes the methodology of functionalism not only from the reductionist methodology of identity theories, considering the brain as the only possible neurological basis of consciousness, but also from the methodology of behaviorism. If the behaviorist approach considers the behavior of people and animals as a result of stimulation from the external environment, then functionalism considers the behavior of people and animals as a result of their mental states. The neutrality of functions implies the methodological requirement of functionalism for the study of consciousness: they should not rely on the study of the substrate (brain) per se, but proceed from considering the relational relationships between the elements of the substrate in the process of functioning [6] [2] [3] .
Comments
- ↑ Both in religious and mystical interpretations (for example, “consciousness is a spiritual phenomenon independent of the body”), and in the psychological approach to the study of mental experiences as integral phenomena without their reduction to components.
Notes
- ↑ Priest, Stephen. Chapter 5. Functionalism: Putnam and Lewis // Theories of consciousness / Translation from English and foreword: A. F. Gryaznov. - Moscow: Idea Press, House of Intellectual Books, 2000. - 288 p. - ISBN 5-7333-0022-1 .
- ↑ 1 2 Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy / Thomas W. Polger. Functionalalism
- ↑ 1 2 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy / Janet Levin. Functionalalism
- ↑ Arne Dietrich. Introduction to Consciousness . - Palgrave Macmillan, 2007 .-- P. 49-52. - 328 p. - ISBN 978-1-4039-9489-9 .
- ↑ Sekatskaya M. A. Functionalism as a scientific philosophy of consciousness: why the argument about qualia cannot be decisive // Problems of Philosophy . - 2014. - No. 3 . - S. 143-152 .
- ↑ Yulina N.S. Physicalism: divergent vectors of the study of consciousness // Problems of Philosophy . - 2011. - No. 9 . - S. 153-166 .