Fight near Duba-Yurt (1999)

The Chechen village of Duba-Yurt is located at the entrance to the strategically important point of Chechnya - the Argun Gorge . The “Wolf Gate”, as this region is called, the militants under the leadership of Khattab prepared for protracted defensive battles in order to prevent Russian troops from entering the southern regions of Chechnya ^[1] . By early December 1999 , up to 3 thousand trained militants had accumulated in the Argun Gorge under the command of Colonel of the Armed Forces of the CRI, Amir Khattab . ^[2]

The "Western" group of federal troops General Shamanov was ordered to drive the enemy out of a strategically important area. Here is the only asphalt road to the mountainous regions of Chechnya. According to the plan of the military leaders, the smallest units of the GRU special forces and the 84th separate reconnaissance battalion of the armed forces were the first to strike. Their task is to secretly rise to the key heights of the Wolf Gate and gain a foothold there, and in the event of a retaliatory strike by militants, hold out until the main forces approach. ^[2]

By the beginning of 2000, the Wolf Gate was an important strategic point. This area, in fact, was the gateway to the southern regions of the republic, so the militants were preparing for a clash long before the start of the assault. The militants prepared numerous camouflaged trenches, carriages dug deep into the ground, equipped with bunkers and shelters, streamers, and firing points. The militants knew the surrounding mountainous area very well and had a wide network of informants among the local population. Many of the participants in the assault on the “Wolf Gate” are convinced that among the agents of Khattab there were also individual Russian commanders who received considerable rewards for transmitting information.

Near the gorge, the village of Duba-Yurt was located, which belonged to the “negotiated”, which meant that the residents observed neutrality. Accordingly, the military operations of the federal troops in Duba-Yurt were categorically prohibited, and violation of these conditions by our forces entailed criminal liability for both those who issued the order and those who directly violated peace agreements ^[1] . The federal troops did not have the right to introduce military equipment into the contract settlements, however, in fact, the agreement was respected only by the federal command, while local residents actively supported the Khattab forces.

For the occupation of the “Wolf Gate”, combined assault detachments from the 84th separate reconnaissance battalion and the 664th GRU special forces detachment were completed. Each reconnaissance detachment, consisting of two GRU special forces groups, was assigned one reconnaissance group of the 84th reconnaissance battalion. There were three combined detachments, consisting of 6 special forces groups and 3 reconnaissance groups. All the combined detachments were commanded by officers of the 664th GRU special forces detachment.

The commander of the 1st assault detachment "Aral" was appointed senior lieutenant of the GRU Aralov. He was given the reconnaissance group of senior lieutenant Solovyov “Daisy”.

The commander of the 2nd assault detachment "Baikul" was the senior lieutenant of the GRU Baykulov. He was given the reconnaissance group of senior lieutenant Klyandin "Owl".

The commander of the 3rd assault squad "Taras" was the senior lieutenant of the GRU Tarasov. He was given the reconnaissance group "Shark" by Lieutenant Mironov

The general command of the operation was carried out by Lt. Col. Mitroshkin. For the convenience of coordinating the actions of groups, the operation management determined the same frequencies of radio airs. ^[one]

The 84th battalion, together with special forces, was instructed to find out the number and location of the militants in this sector. Intelligence was supposed to be carried out in battle . To complete the task, the reconnaissance battalion was assigned to occupy the heights above the Duba-Yurt to ensure the free approach of motorized rifles. The follow-up plan was quite simple: use the data, displace the militants in the valley, and then destroy them in the open. According to the plan, special forces were to move ahead, followed by reconnaissance groups, which periodically had to stop and wait for the infantry. The promotion of the combined groups was supposed to be supported by aviation and artillery. The 160th Tank Regiment of Colonel Yu. Budanov was concentrated nearby .

On the night of December 29, a group of commandos climbed to heights and without a fight took up the positions of militants equipped there. Those, as usual, went to sleep at bases located in the mountains. When the enemy patrol returned here in the morning, he came under the fire of scouts. In response, the militants opened heavy fire on small arms and mortars against special forces. ^[2] Solovyov’s reconnaissance group "Camomile", numbering 27 people in 2 infantry fighting vehicles, had to come to the rescue of special forces. Only after six hours of battle, the scouts managed to break through to a height. The militants, having taken away the dead and wounded, retreated. Russian soldiers, by order of the commander of the operation, Lt. Col. Mitroshkina, also returned to their original positions. During the battle on December 29, commandos lost 1 man killed and 3 wounded. Scouts lost 2 people wounded. ^[one]

On December 30, the chief of intelligence of the Zapad group refined tasks for the prepared consolidated assault squads. In the middle of the day, all three consolidated groups spoke - the operation began. At 12.30 almost simultaneously, each along its routes, the combined units Aral and Baikul began to advance. The Taras group came out last. For assault detachments, motorized rifle units advanced. Already at this stage, the commanders gradually came to understand that the militants were listening to radio communications and were well aware of the plan of the assault. On the places defined on the map, ambushes awaited the attackers. The second combined detachment, which included “Baikul” and “Owl”, at this time was under fierce fire from mortars and anti-aircraft installations. Wherever reconnaissance groups went, militants waited for them, meeting with heavy fire. ^[2]

In the meantime, the Aral and Camomile groups safely reached the heights from where the special forces had been evacuated the day before. In the ravine, caches with dead militants were discovered, covered hastily with fresh leaves. By night, the militants ceased fire - they probably received orders to retreat to the entrance to the "Wolf Gate" - in the village of Duba-Yurt. The Baikul, which was at a certain distance ahead of the Owl group, discovered the movement of several groups of militants towards the village of Duba-Yurt. In the darkness, a string of glowing points flocked to Oak-Yurt. ^[2]

At 4 o’clock in the morning on December 31, information arrived at the headquarters of the group that the Taras detachment, art. Lieutenant Tarasov, who acted in the immediate vicinity of the village of Duba-Yurt , was ambushed and blocked by militants. The command sets the task of the reserve of the 84th reconnaissance battalion — the reconnaissance group of senior lieutenant Shlykov (call sign “Nara”) to advance to the southern outskirts of Duba-Yurt and take up defense at 420.1 to prevent militants from breaking through. All motorized rifle units at that time were fulfilling the task of blocking the heights east of the village. The shortest route to 420.1 passed through Duba-Yurt. The Nara group was tasked with staying in the indicated area until the main forces of the motorized rifle approach before the combined assault squads destroy the militants in the direction of the Taras group. As it became known later, the Taras group did not enter the specified area, having become entangled in the search for heights. They did not transmit any signals about the environment to the command post of the group. It was not possible to identify the voice. Obviously, the militants prepared disinformation on the air in advance. ^[one]

“Nara” under the command of the deputy commander of the 2nd reconnaissance company for the educational work of senior lieutenant Vladimir Shlykov in three BMP-2s in the amount of 29 people at about 6 am began to advance from the source area in the direction of Duba-Yurt . The village was covered with dense fog, visibility was almost zero. ^[one]

IFVs moved almost in continuous darkness and dense fog. The headlights for camouflage were off. At the entrance to the village - an order to stop. The commander of the group, having contacted the command of the operation, asked for confirmation of his actions in conditions of limited visibility of the area. They waited twenty minutes. Then again the command: “Forward!” ^[1]

Having passed the convoy 400 meters into the depths of the village, the militants simultaneously opened fire on the scouts from all that they had. The first shot from a grenade launcher hit the head BMP-2 , in which there was a senior lieutenant Shlykov. Private Sergei Voronin, who was next to the commander, was fatally wounded in the stomach. Under crossfire, the scouts dismounted, taking up a circular defense . It was not possible to determine the specific location of the militants. ^[one]

Says Yuri Babarin, in 1999 an ordinary, senior intelligence officer of the 84th ORB ^{[2] [3]} :

“It was a feeling that the mountains came to life, that is, from all sides the shooting started, firing. Beat from all types of weapons with which you can come up with. Machine guns, grenade launchers. For almost two hours we just lay there, could not raise our heads. Their calculation was probably such that while it was dark, they would beat one “behu” (BMP), the second ... They prepared thoroughly. There, probably, a square meter was not empty, because there was either a mine or a shell from a grenade launcher. “There were exactly 10 kilograms of lead per square meter.”

Artillery could not provide quality cover due to poor visibility. In the village, a Russian column was shot from grenade launchers, soldiers were knocked out by snipers. The air was filled with cries for help. However, it turned out to be impossible to use aviation, since a thick veil of fog covered the Duba-Yurt. “Shark” came to the aid of Shlykov, but the second column was immediately fired upon at the entrance to the village. Scouts dispersed and began to shoot back. When one of the Nara group infantry fighting vehicles was hit, its commander, sergeant Ryakhovsky ordered the gunner to leave through the airborne squad, and he himself opened fire on the militants surrounding him. The shots taken by the militants themselves show that no one dares to approach the burning car, the militants keep close to the shelter. After several direct hits in the BMP, the ammunition exploded. Ryakhovsky burned alive, covering his comrades to the last. ^{[2] [4]} The driver of the same car, Private Nikolai Adamov, was hit by a sniper bullet. The squad commander, Junior Sergeant Chander, injured, fought until a second grenade launcher cut short his life. ^[1] Private Mikhail Kurochkin, grenade launcher of the Nara group: ^[1]

“Snipers worked for us. Fire came from all directions. We saw how fighters from the mountains descended into the village. They shot at us and from the houses of this village. The fire was so dense that it scattered from the bullets hit the wire over the road. Our second Beha was not yet burning, its machine gunner fired. A grenade launcher of "spirits" crawled closer to it - the first shot ricocheted, exploded behind the houses. The second hit the BMP tower. Sergeant Sergey Yaskevich dies there, his right leg is torn off. Until the last seconds of his life, he asked for help on the radio, and died with headphones on his head. Around this BMP lay our dead and wounded. ”

At this time, at the location of the 84th reconnaissance battalion, it was decided to pull out the Nara group from Oak-Yurt. The remnants of the reconnaissance battalion came to the aid of dying colleagues: signalmen, cooks, sick and wounded - 30-40 people, armed with AK-74U assault rifles . ^[2]

At this time, three kilometers from Duba-Yurt was the 160th tank regiment of Colonel Yuri Budanov . As the later lieutenant colonel of the tank regiment Oleg Metelsky recalled: "Our regiment was ordered not to open fire on the Oak-Yurt, as it is a peaceful village . " Major of the 84th reconnaissance battalion Sergey Polyakov went there to ask for a tractor to evacuate the damaged in the village BMP. ^[2] Sandwiched in the militant ring, support was given to the battalion commander of the 160th Tank Regiment, Vladimir Pakov. With the tacit consent of Colonel Budanov, Pakov sent 2 T-62 tanks with crews of officers to the scene of the battle. By evening, a third tank joined them. According to the commander of the Romashka reconnaissance group Solovyov, without the support of tanks, the fighters would not be able to get out of the ring. Apparently, the militants did not expect tanks in the village, so their appearance caused confusion and turned the tide of the battle. The tanks opened fire on the positions of the militants in the village, and under their cover, the Shark group on the BMP managed to break through to the surrounded Nara group and begin the evacuation of the wounded. The militants clamped the last car of the Akula group with BelAZ trucks , intending to cut off the escape routes. Private driver Eldar Kurbanaliev and junior sergeant Mikhail Sergeev were killed. The surviving infantry fighting vehicles fired several smoke grenades towards the village. Under cover of smoke, the remnants of the scouts with the wounded were able to get out of the fire bag. Six hours of fierce battle virtually destroyed the center of the village. It was not possible to evacuate the wrecked equipment and several killed fighters ^[1]

Not far from the village, in an open field, a first-aid post was whipped up in haste. The wounded were unloaded right into the mud. Doctors here provided them with first aid and sent them to the infirmary. ^[2]

Almost simultaneously with the shooting of a column in Duba-Yurt, reconnaissance and commandos located in the mountains began to shell intensively fighters. After a night break, their anti-aircraft gun resumed fire. I had to call the aircraft and request the fire of the artillery battalion, which stood in Old Atagi . The attack aircraft, due to the dense fire of the militants and poor visibility, could not work out the targets qualitatively. The artillery of the federal troops partially suppressed the enemy firing points, but did not create barrage and soon ceased to operate.

The losses of the reconnaissance battalion amounted to 10 people killed, 29 seriously wounded and 12 people slightly injured, who refused to go to the hospital. Irreplaceable losses of armored vehicles amounted to: BMP-2 - 3 units, BRM-1 K - 1 unit. A few months later, another participant in the battle in Duba-Yurt from the Nara group died in the hospital.

The next day, January 1, the militants still continued to hold off. Duba-Yurt. A few days later, an exchange of the dead took place. Private Mikhail Kurochkin, took part in the battle as part of the Nara group: ^[1]

“Three days have passed. The special forces brought the corpses of militants for an exchange. I was sent to identify the dead. I knew Seryozha Voronin well. Shortly before this operation, he and I made tattoos on our hands. The dead are lying: the “spirits” cut off their heads to the contract soldiers, and the ears to conscripts. Seryozha's face was stretched out, covered in mud, no ears - cut off. A person does not recognize, so disfigured. At first I recognized him by his jacket. I say: “Cut the jacket on your left hand. If a tattoo is he. ” Cut ... This is Earring Voronin. I was shaking, sausage, it was so scary ... "

A few weeks after the shooting of the second reconnaissance company in Duba-Yurt, special forces destroyed a detachment of militants in the mountains of the Argun Gorge. Among the trophies was a recording of the battle, shot by militants. In the footage, which was shot from about three hundred meters above the village, episodes of the battle in Duba-Yurt on December 31, 1999 and the morning of January 1, 2000, when bandits examine the remains of burnt equipment and the corpses of Russian soldiers. ^[1] The video taken by the militants shows how the place of the battle looked like: burnt cars, bodies of dead soldiers, which comrades could not get out of the battlefield. ^[2]

During the assault, the courage of Russian rank-and-file officers and officers showed up, but the operation was obviously unsuccessful. Units entered the battle with the enemy, superior in numbers, weapons and technical equipment. The inertia of leadership in decision-making also played a sad role. In some cases, assistance to groups dying under shelling was not provided for fear of being punished for unauthorized actions, orders were given out of time.

After the defeat of the Nara group of the 84th reconnaissance battalion, a strong conviction appeared among the fighters that they had been betrayed by the command. The commander of the "Camomile" group A. Soloviev, in his interview, admits that already at the stage of preparation for the operation, he was faced with the inexplicable behavior of the command, namely Lieutenant Colonel Mitroshkin. He still does not understand why the commanders were taken to Duba-Yurt itself for reconnaissance, because the actions were planned to be carried out at the heights. Separate fragments of phrases conveyed by the major, suggest the idea of ​​betrayal in command circles.

Says Senior Lieutenant Alexander Solovyov: ^[5]

“While we were looking at ridges and hills on the outskirts of the village, Lieutenant Colonel Mitroshkin took several shops to the pistol, a couple of grenades, flares and one of us, Senior Lieutenant Tarasov. The lieutenant colonel told us: “I’ll go to the commandant's office of Duba-Yurt, I will learn the situation in the village. If you see a red rocket, save me. " Mitroshkin at that moment had everything: a map, the numbers of the radio frequencies that we later worked on, our callsigns, and the communication scheme with artillery and aviation. The lieutenant colonel left for Duba-Yurt according to the same scheme as General Verbitsky, transferring to a Chechen jeep. When, after about 40 minutes, the lieutenant colonel and senior lieutenant returned, Mitroshkin told us: “Get out of here faster!” Sweat poured from Tarasov. We ask him: “Why are you so sweating? ..” He answered: “In this village everyone is armed to the teeth and dressed in NATO uniform.” - “Have you even found a commandant? ..” - “What kind of commandant can there be ?!” Then, when all of us dispersed, I lingered and heard Mitroshkin tell Tarasov: “Senior Lieutenant Tarasov, I’ll clarify the task for you.” Involuntarily I heard this clarification: “Chechen scouts will work with you tonight.” I remember that I was very surprised: what kind of Chechens can have scouts ??? ” A little later, the command lined up scouts at the foot of the mountains - so that all three reconnaissance detachments that were to carry out a secret mission were clearly visible by the militants who had settled in the mountains. Even our scouts could be counted on their heads ... On the same day, on the hills of the Argun Gorge, they were all ambushed. And the next day - a new order: "Go ahead, go there!" .

Another participant, Vladimir Pakov, claims that he knows both the commander of the Zapad group and Colonel Miroshkin himself and other commanders and does not believe in their betrayal. In his opinion, the militants, having at their disposal more advanced communication devices, tuned in to the frequency, which is confirmed by the facts of the radio game during the assault.

However, after a bloody battle, the command of the reconnaissance battalion expected a new "battle" - a battle with investigators of a special department. Only Alexander Solovyov was summoned for questioning about eleven times, and, according to him, exerted great psychological pressure. It turned out that there were no official orders for a reconnaissance operation on December 29-31, 1999, they tried to blame the direct commanders for the deaths and the failure of the assault. They were especially interested in the candidacy of Pakov, who arbitrarily used tanks and had a decisive influence on the outcome of the battle.

Sergeant Oleg Kuchinsky recalls: ^[2]

“Very soon, officers from the command of the group and the special department came into the tent. They were looking for switchmen. ... They listened to us for thirty minutes and realized that we needed to leave quickly, otherwise there would be trouble in this tent. They understood that it was necessary to restrain those guys so that they would not do fever right now. Otherwise there will be trouble. If they go to the headquarters and someone says something wrong to them - and they all have machine guns, machine guns ... They’re like they will be in front of this command post - and they’ll only go to the command post and a half kilometer ... They’ll blow it all. Well, everyone felt, everyone felt that it was a betrayal. "

The question about the awareness of the militants about all the actions of the Russian groups was raised already in the early days of the battle, even the reason for such awareness was revealed - the availability of radio frequencies. However, there was no solution to the problem. Attempts to blame the deaths of fighters of direct commanders are also especially visible fear of senior management for their own well-being. Against the background of everything that happened, it is not surprising that most of the participants in the hostilities to this day consider the tragedy that was unleashed in the Argun Gorge to be a betrayal.