One-man management

One-man management is officially fixed by the legislative bodies of the state in military law . For example, in the USSR and the Russian Federation, a normative legal act confirming the commander’s right to one-man management in the military unit entrusted to him is the Charter of Internal Service .

The commander (chief) has the right alone (without anyone's intervention or direction) to make decisions, give orders, orders and ensure their implementation in accordance with the provisions of military charters, state laws and service instructions ^[2] :

Article 33. One-man management is one of the basic principles of the construction of the Armed Forces, their leadership and relations between military personnel. One-man management consists in endowing the commander (chief) with the entire completeness of administrative power in relation to subordinates and assigning him personal responsibility to the state for all aspects of the life and work of the military unit, unit and each serviceman.
One-man management is expressed in the right of the commander (chief), on the basis of a comprehensive assessment of the situation, to make decisions individually , give the appropriate orders in the prescribed manner and ensure their implementation.

- The Charter of the Internal Service of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Section “One-man management. Commanders (chiefs) and subordinates. Seniors

The commander (chief) has the right to give orders to the subordinate and demand their execution. The subordinate is obliged to fulfill the order given to him.

The refusal of a subordinate to fulfill the order of the commander (chief), depending on the legislation of the state, the level of consequences and circumstances, is considered a disciplinary offense or a criminal offense that undermines unity of command.

One-man management and centralization

The success of hostilities is based on the centralization of command and control . Combined arms combat is conducted in accordance with the plan of the senior commander, who, in order to fulfill a common task, must coordinate the efforts of all the forces and means involved in the battle.

Centralization of command and control is the unification by a senior commander of all actions of subordinates and assigned units and units with a common plan of military operations in the direction of their efforts to accomplish the assigned combat mission. Centralization does not exclude, but involves a wide initiative of subordinates. The desire for decisive action, the desire to find rational ways to carry out a combat mission, the desire for independence in a difficult environment play a big role in achieving success on the battlefield ^[3] .

Use of unity of command

According to Soviet military theorists, the right to unity of command should be used in the following ^[3] :

• Each commander is required to take reasonable initiative in determining how to accomplish the tasks received;
• In the event of a sharp change in the situation and in the absence of the opportunity to promptly receive the necessary orders from the higher command, the commander must assume full responsibility and, guided by the common goal and plan of the senior commander, independently respond to changes in the situation, take the necessary measures to carry out the combat mission;
• Providing full initiative to officials in determining ways to accomplish tasks at all levels of command and control;
• The officer must, without fear of responsibility, at the critical moment of the battle, use all available opportunities to achieve success.

The main condition for the effective use of all the advantages provided by one-man management, with sudden and sharp changes in the situation and the absence of instructions from the senior commander, should be timely orientation by commanders and staffs of subordinates about possible actions of troops during the battle ^[3] .

Single Responsibility

One-man management is inextricably linked with the principle of personal responsibility of commanders (commanders) for decisions made and the results of tasks.

Single-commanding commanders at all levels bear full responsibility for all aspects of the life and activities of the troops subordinate to them. Despite the fact that each commander, in solving troop command tasks, relies on the military team and uses the help of other officers of the command and control agencies, the commander is personally responsible for the appropriateness of the decision made for the battle, for the correctness and validity of decisions made during the battle, for the efficient use of the battle of available forces and means and for the final results of the fulfillment of the assigned combat missions by the troops.

When making inappropriate decisions, for the inept and inefficient use of subordinate units and units in battle, for the incomplete fulfillment of assigned tasks (with violation of timelines or failure to complete assigned tasks), the commander is held accountable under the laws of war ^[3] .

According to the Charter of the internal service of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the commander who is the one-man commander is responsible ^[2] :

• for failure to fulfill the tasks assigned to the formation headed by him;
• for the lack of order described in military manuals and service instructions, in the formation entrusted to him;
• for the lack of combat readiness of a subordinate formation;

It should be noted that in the early historical periods unity of command was not a mandatory attribute of the armed forces. In the states of the ancient era, there were cases of the presence of collegiality in command and control. For example, this phenomenon took place in the ancient Roman army in the era before the military reform of Gaius Maria in the 1st century BC. Before the reform, 6 tribunes commanded the legion in turn, and two centurions commanded the manipulation . Collegiality at all levels at that time was characteristic of the magistrates of the Roman Empire. After the reform of Guy Maria, aimed at professionalizing the Roman mercenary army, a transition to unity of command was made and the legate became command of the legion. These reforms strengthened the centralization of command and control and obedience to the commander ^[4] .

It is believed that the modern basis of unity of command in the German army in the 19th century was laid by Field Marshal Helmut von Moltke ^[5] .

In the further history of Germany, the principle of unity of command was emphasized as the most important in the command and control of troops ^[6] :

... The principle of unity of command in command and control of troops, which did not allow side ways of giving orders and orders, as well as freedom of decision-making, enabled the combined-arms commander to confidently carry out his decision. In the ground army, in contrast to the higher OKW bodies ^[7], this principle of unlimited command power was carried out, as before, with sufficient consistency.

- Muller-Gillebrand

In the history of the USSR, there were precedents for moving away from the proven principle of unity of command. This was due to the subjective perception by the Soviet authorities of some commanders as unreliable executors. This phenomenon appeared during the Civil War .

Due to the acute shortage of personnel officers in the Red Army , the Soviet authorities were forced to accept the so-called " former officer of the tsarist army " ("former"), which were considered politically unreliable, to command positions. The institute of military commissars was established to control their activities. Moreover, the commissars were assigned to all commanders, including those who were members of the Communist Party. In everyday life, this led to dual power: the commander’s order without the signature of the commissioner was considered invalid, which could not but affect the functioning of the troops ^[8] .

Even before the end of the Civil War, on the initiative of a number of front commanders, the positions of military commissars were abolished. So, on January 24, 1920, the commander of the Turkestan Front M.V. Frunze introduced unity of command in the troops entrusted to him, abolishing the posts of commissars under commanders and commanders, appointing political work assistants instead of commissars.

At the end of the Civil War, the transition from the supervisory institute of commissioners to one-man management began in stages. On January 23, 1920, the order of the PBC No. 117 “On the Establishment of a Unified Structure of the Political Bodies of the Red Army” was issued, which introduced one-man command in the battalions. The post of assistant commander for political work was maintained at the level of regiment commander. By the same order, the post of commissioner was retained only for the most important headquarters and institutions. One-man management was also introduced for non-party commanders who were not members of the CPSU (b) .

In 1922, at the XI Congress of the RCP (B.), The gradual transition of the armed forces to one-man management was officially announced. Until 1925, the Soviet government introduced certification for commanders who, after verification, had the right to be single-commanding commanders ^[9] .

The main and, in fact, the only factor undermining unity of command and, accordingly, discipline in the troops, is disobedience or non-fulfillment of the order given by the commander (chief) ^[10] .

This factor acquired and is particularly important in war conditions, when situations arose and arise in which commanders (commanders), due to circumstances, subjective reasons, or other personal motivation, gave orders to their subordinates that clearly violated moral and ethical standards, the rules of warfare and criminal law (obviously criminal order). According to world practice, most often such criminal orders are issued against civilians.

In this case, depending on the state’s membership, the commander’s one-man management may be legally limited.

For example, in the armed armies of many Western European states (as well as in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation ), a subordinate has the right not to carry out the order of the commander (chief) if he considers him obviously criminal. In this case, the subordinate will not bear any administrative or legal responsibility if the outstanding order was indeed such ^[11] .

According to international legal norms, the one-man command of the commander (chief) does not exclude the criminal liability of a subordinate under international law for the execution of an obviously criminal order. Moreover, the wording of the possibility of not executing a criminal order reads as follows: “a conscious choice was actually possible for him” ^[12] .

In one-man management, a negative moment is laid. It consists in the consequences of irrational or rash decisions made by the commander (chief) due to a subjective assessment by coincidence, as a result of misinformation by the enemy, due to health reasons or due to other personal motivation when considering the following issues:

• assessment of the situation during the hostilities;
• assessment of any aspect of the functioning of the formation headed by him in peacetime or in wartime;
• assessment of the personal qualities of a subordinate (personnel issue).

In other words, the commander (chief) in the armed forces is also subject to the human factor when choosing an important decision.

In the armed forces, the consequences of making erroneous decisions during hostilities always lead to severe irrevocable human and material losses. In many cases, the erroneous actions of a high-ranking commander affect the outcome of the war. Therefore, the armed forces of many states provide for collegiality in making an important decision on any issue. At the highest level of formations ( association , type of troops ), this manifests itself in the form of a military council . ^[1] . At the level of units , military units and formations, collegiality is represented by a working meeting at the headquarters, at which a discussion is held of the current situation, received combat orders and the opinions of unit commanders and service chiefs are heard. At the same time, the decision adopted by the collegial council is not binding. It is purely advisory in nature and the final word in the final decision is left to the commander. That is, one-man management in the armed forces is higher than collegiality ^[13] .

In rare cases, the decision of the collegial council may fall outside the sphere of unity of command (the influence of the commander). These include the decision of the Court of Officer Honor , which is adopted by members of the collegial council, who got there on an elective basis. The formation commander cannot influence their decision, but can only appeal it.

Also, the one-man commander (depending on membership in the armed forces) may be limited in personnel matters. For example, the commander of a military unit ( compound ) is obliged to take the decision of the certification commission, represented by senior officers who decide on the next promotion of military rank, on official compliance or occupation of a higher position by any military personnel, etc. ^[14]

In Peacetime

Disobedience or failure to comply with an order in the armed forces (regardless of state affiliation) bears disciplinary or criminal liability.

In peacetime, these penalties are:

• the appointment of one or more extraordinary daily shifts;
• official punishment (reprimand, severe reprimand, announcement of official non-compliance);
• pecuniary punishment (salary restriction, fines);
• restriction of official (career) growth;
• suspension from official duties;
• demotion;
• demotion in military rank;
• arrest and detention on guardhouse ;
• dismissal from the armed forces.

In wartime

It is believed that the grave consequences of disobedience or non-execution of an order most often arise in conditions of hostilities, when the performance of a combat mission and the lives of military personnel are directly related to the rigorous implementation of all orders of the commander (chief) ^[15] :

... Failure to comply with the order causes harm, and in a combat situation is paid for in blood. Failure to comply with a combat order is a grave crime ...

- Rights and obligations of the Red Army

.

In this regard, in many states, particularly stringent measures were enacted to enforce unquestioning execution of orders.

Severe disciplinary punishments related to the execution of servicemen for disobedience or failure to comply with military orders have been recorded since ancient times. For example, in the Roman Empire, such a punishment was decimation .

The military commanders of the Mongol Empire Army resorted to such measures, in which for the failure to comply with a combat order one rider executed the whole dozen, one dozen - the whole hundred ^[16] .

In the Disciplinary Charter of the USSR Armed Forces throughout the existence of the state until the collapse of the USSR , a provision was written requiring the commander (chief) of all measures, including the use of weapons in a combat situation, if the subordinate refused to carry out the order. At the same time, the commander (chief) was responsible if he did not take measures against the subordinate who did not fulfill the order ^[17] :

The use of weapons is an extreme measure and is allowed if all other measures taken by the commander (chief) were unsuccessful or when, under the circumstances, the adoption of other measures would be impossible.
Before using weapons, if the situation allows, the commander (chief) is obliged to warn the disobedient about this. The commander (chief) immediately reports the use of weapons at the command of.
The commander (chief), who has not taken measures to restore order and discipline, is responsible for this.

- Article 7 Disciplinary Charter of the USSR Armed Forces

This provision of the Disciplinary Statute actually meant shooting on the spot without trial or investigation.

Of modern states, a similar method of maintaining unity of command and discipline in military units at this historical stage decided to introduce Ukraine in February 2015 ^{[18] [19]} :

Article 22-1 (in the original) : The commander (chief) in the minds of a special period, including in the minds of a military man I will become ready to fight, by means of which I’ll make the military service worse, I’m always ready to do it, I won’t be reluctant, relying on the bogeyman for bosses, forgiveness of violence, for unauthorized surplus of fighting positions and for those who are in good standing at military units (pidrozdіlіv) near the areas of the war, I need to be comfortable osluzhbovtsya that spetsіalnі zasobi, dostatnі for pripinennya protipravnih Act reasonably.

In a combat situation, the commander (chief) can condemn zbroi chi viddati pidleglim command about її zastosuvannya, but in the last way it’s not possible to pin down zlochin, without which I will not be condemned to death.

I am allowed to arrange it at times, the commander (chief) is obliged to vote for the whole person before the congestion of the guests, the special needs, and the general reason for guilty people, even if you can get in the same way.

In the Russian translation : Commander (chief) in a special period, including in conditions of martial law or combat situation, in order to detain a soldier who commits an act that has signs of a crime related to disobedience, resistance or threat to the commander, the use of violence, unauthorized by the abandonment of combat positions and certain places of deployment of military units (subdivisions) in the areas where combat missions are performed, has the right to personally apply physical measures without harm th soldier and special funds sufficient to stop illegal actions.

In a combat situation, the commander (chief) can use a weapon or give his subordinates the order to use it, if the crime cannot be stopped in another way, without causing death to the soldier.

If circumstances permit, the commander (chief) before applying physical measures, special means or weapons must, with a voice up shot, warn the person about whom such measures can be applied.

- The Law of Ukraine "On introducing amendments to the deed legislative acts of Ukraine more often than not, the number of employees, the abovementioned commanders of additional rights and the lender of provisions for a special period"
- The Law of Ukraine "On Amending Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Regarding Strengthening the Responsibility of Military Personnel, Giving Commanders Additional Rights and Assigning Duties in a Special Period"

• Principle of Directive Management
• Collegiality

• Burkhart Muller-Gillebrand. German Army, 1939-1945 - M .: Izografus, Eksmo , 2002 .-- 800 p. - 5,000 copies. - ISBN 5-94661-041-4 .
• Colvocoresses, Alden P. Unity of Command or Unity of Effort? . // Military Review . - June 1963. - Vol. 43 - No. 6.