Sariiannis, Ptolemeos

Sarijannis was born in Piraeus in 1882 . In 1900 he entered the Evelpid Military School , which he graduated on July 9, 1903 with the rank of junior lieutenant. He took part in the struggle for Macedonia in the period 1906-1908. But he did not take direct part in the battles against the Bulgarians and Turks. Serving in the consulate of Greece in Ottoman Bitola , Sarriyanis under the pseudonym Kalamidis (Καλαμίδης) ^{[1] [2]} , was involved in the organizational struggle. In the book of Konstantin Mazarakis, Junior Lieutenant Sarijannis is listed at number 13 in the list of officers of agents ^[2] .

Upon his return from Macedonia, in 1909 he was promoted to lieutenant and entered into contact with the anti-monarchist “Military Union of Officers,” headed by Colonel N. Zorbas ^[3] . The “Military Union” summoned revolutionary Eleftherios Venizelos from semi-autonomous then Crete , who became the country's prime minister. Among the measures undertaken by Venizelos to strengthen and reform the army, was in 1910 a number of officers sent for retraining to France. Among these officers was Sariyannis ^[3] , who continued his military education, as a staff officer, at the Saint-Cyr French military school.

In the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) he commanded the engineering division of the third infantry division ^{[4] [5]} . In 1913 he was promoted to the rank of captain, and in 1915 to the rank of major. Since the beginning of World War I, he joined the “National Defense Movement” headed by Venizelos and fought as chief of staff of the “Fifth Division of Crete ” on the Macedonian front . After that, in 1917, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel, and in 1919, to the rank of colonel, as a recognition for his merits in the Battle of Skra di Legen in May 1918.

In 1919, under the mandate of the Entente , Greece occupied the west coast of Asia Minor . Subsequently, the Sevres Peace Treaty of 1920 secured the control of the region over Greece, with the prospect of deciding its fate after 5 years, in a referendum of the population ^[6] . The ensuing battles with the Kemalists acquired the character of a war that the Greek army was forced to wage alone. Of the allies, Italy, from the very beginning supported the Kemalists, France, solving its tasks, also began to support them. The Greek army firmly held its position. Sarijannis played a key role in the events. In the initial period, when the Greek army occupied a limited bridgehead around Smyrna , Sariiannis served as chief of staff of the expeditionary force in Asia Minor. After the Greek army, in response to the actions of the Kemalists, was forced to expand the theater of military operations, Sarijannis took the post of deputy chief of staff of the reinforced Asia Minor Army ^[7] .

The geopolitical situation has changed radically and became fatal for the Greek population of Asia Minor after the parliamentary elections in Greece in November 1920. Under the slogan "we will bring our guys home" and having received the support of the considerable Muslim population of that period, the monarchist "People's Party" won the elections.

The return to Greece of Germanophile Constantine freed the allies from obligations towards Greece. Winston Churchill , in his work “Aftermath” (pp. 387-388), wrote: “The return of Constantine terminated all allied ties with Greece and annulled all obligations except legal ones. With Venizelos, we made many commitments. But with Konstantin, no. Indeed, when the first surprise passed, the feeling of relief became apparent in the leadership circles. There was no more need to follow the anti-Turkish policy ” ^[6] .

Initially, the government of monarchists on November 4, 1920 was headed by D. Rallis . Rallis unsuccessfully tried to provide at least financial support to the allies, after which, on January 22 / February 4, 1921, he surrendered his powers to the king ^[6] .

January 25 / February 7, 1921 N. Kalogeropoulos headed the monarchist government. The new prime minister studied in France, was considered a francophile and a suitable person in order to influence the French government, which demanded radical changes in the policies of the allies towards Greece ^[6] . The prime minister led the delegation to the London conference, which included Colonel Sarijannis, as deputy chief of staff of the Asia Minor Army. Along the way, the delegation drove to Paris , but did not receive support. Both Briand and President Millerand stated that they must first take into account the interests of France. On February 5/18, the delegation arrived in London , where they suddenly found understanding with Prime Minister Lloyd George .

On February 8/21, the Allied Conference was held in London . Chairman Lloyd George asked for information about the situation on the Greek front, about the strength of the Greek army, about the possibility of an offensive into the depths of Asia Minor, about the possibilities of Greece to maintain these forces only by its own means. Kalogeropoulos said that he had an army of 120,000 bayonets and that if Greece received a mandate to establish order, he would be able to do it within 3 months.

Colonel Sarijannis was enthusiastic and was not only confident of the victory of the Greek army, but believed that it would be achieved easily and quickly ^[6] .

French Prime Minister Briand said he did not share this optimism. French General Guro declared that the Greeks could send no more than 60 thousand soldiers to the front line, who must go 600 km on a march from Smyrna . Guro declared that in order to enforce peace in Asia Minor, it was necessary to have 27 divisions, but the Greeks had only 9 divisions ^[6] .

Upon the arrival of the Turkish delegations (the Sultan and Kemal), the allies who signed the Peace of Sevres, turned the confrontation of the Entente - Turkey into a confrontation of the Greek-Turkey. As the Greek historian D. Fotiadis writes, “from the allies they were transformed into arbitrators” ^[6] .

On February 28 / March 10, 1921, a preliminary French-Turkish agreement was signed, which allowed the Turks to transfer forces to the Greek front ^[6] .

The Italians left Attalia , leaving Kemal with all his arsenal and supplies ^[6] .

The modern English historian D. Dakin writes that the actions of France and Italy were "the prelude of the subsequent betrayal." “Having rectified their obligations and signatures in a flagrant manner, they, among other things, outrageously ignored the question of the fate of Greek as well as Armenian Christians” ^[8] .

Finding no diplomatic solution to the issue with the Greek population of Ionia , in a completely different geopolitical situation, the government of Kalogeropoulos continued the war. By straining their limited human resources, Greece mobilized another 3 conscription. The Greek army launched the Spring Offensive of 1921, which was the first attempt to defeat Kemal's regular army. The 3rd Army Corps (III, VIII, X, XI divisions), under the command of A. Vlachopoulos, was located in the north of the bridgehead, in the Prus region - Nicomedia . The First Army Corps, under the command of General A. Condulis , actually had only two divisions (II, XIII), since its third division was forced to cover the southern flank from hostile actions from the Italian occupation zone.

The original offensive plan, developed by Sarriyanis, envisaged that the pincers of the two army corps, located at a distance of 300 km from one another, would converge in the area of ​​the city of Kutahya . However, the chief of staff, A. Pallis, found this plan to be extremely simple and made its own, corrective, amendments. The attacks of the two corps are not convergent, but divergent. At the same time, the XI Division was entrusted with distracting actions, which weakened the already few forces of the attackers ^[6] .

On the Turkish side, Ismet Pasha realized the weakness of the Greek plan and transferred all his reserves to the northern front. The core of the Turkish defense here were the heights of Kovalitsa and Avgin (near the village of Inonu). During the 3-day battle, the Northern (III) Corps of the Greek army took Kovalitsa, but failed to take Avguin and was forced to retreat to their original positions. After this success, Ismet Pasha received the name Inyonu. Ismet Inonu decided that he had the opportunity to defeat the small I Corps of the Greek Army (2 divisions), which occupied Afyonkarahisar by that time. The commander of the Greek corps realized the danger and persistently and repeatedly asked for permission to leave Afyonkarahisar and occupy a key position of Tumlu-Bunar. With great difficulty, permission was obtained. The brunt of the multiple Turkish forces took the 2nd division of General P. Kallidopoulos. Particularly distinguished was the incomplete 34th regiment (detachment) of Colonel D. Dialetis , who for two days fought the offensive of 3 Turkish divisions at Tumlu Bunar. At the critical moment of the battle, 5/12 Guards regiment of Colonel N. Plastiras , after a counterattack, made an impressive maneuver and went to the rear of the Turks, who in a panic turned to flight, leaving 800 dead and 200 prisoners on the battlefield ^[9] .

The Greek army won a tactical victory, but did not achieve complete defeat of the Turks. After this failure, Kalogeropoulos, realizing his responsibility, resigned on March 22 / April 4, 1921. The government was headed by Gunaris ^{[6] [10] [11]} .

Guanaris faced the same dilemma. The first decision was to leave Ionia in order to save Eastern Thrace . The second decision was to gather troops around Smyrna. Gunaris decided to ask the nation, which at that time numbered 4 million people, human and material resources that exceeded its capabilities ^[6] .

The army launched the Great Summer Offensive of 1921, defeated the Turks in the biggest battle of the war in Afyonkarahisar-Eskisehir , but the defeat of the Kemalists did not take place. The Turks went to Ankara and the government again faced a dilemma: what to do next ^[6] .

On July 13/26, 1921, a meeting of the Expeditionary Army Command was held in Kütahie, occupied by the Greek Army. The meeting was attended by the Commander of the Expeditionary Army, General A. Papulas , the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Pallis, his deputy, Colonel Sarriyanis, and the Head of the IV Division (Supply and Transport), Lieutenant Colonel Spiridonos ^[6] . Sarriyanis said that the haste with which the enemy retreats means that he lost his combat ability after he tried with all his might to launch a counteroffensive. Sarriyanis stated that he believes that the army should not waste time, but should continue its offensive as quickly as possible in order to prevent the Turks from regrouping and organizing their defense. However, the head of the IV department, Lieutenant Colonel Spiridonos, said that the army only had ammunition for 2 days of fighting and that the army could not cross the Sakarya river without dooming itself to remain without supplies ^[6] . The next day, Prime Minister Gunaris arrived and the “Great Military Council” was convened.

The government rushed to end the war and decided to advance further. July 28 / August 10, 1921 7 Greek divisions forced Sakarya and went east. In one of the episodes of this campaign, Sarijanis was forced to go beyond his narrow staff duties. III Army Corps, under the command of General [[Polimenakos, Georgios | G. Polimenacos]] and as part of only two divisions (III and X), unlike the main forces crossing the “Salt Desert”, followed the Eskisehir-Ankara railway line, with the task to force Sakarya in the northern bend and then take Polatla station , 50 km from Ankara. III Corps forced the tributary Sakarya, Geuk River. August 11/24 and then attacked the fortified mountain range of Sapanj across the river. The attack was not swift and was repelled. Saryannis arrived in the III Corps to explain the vital need for the whole Greek army to move the III Corps to the north and force Sakarya to bend it, since it was the only way to supply the army, avoiding the “Salty Desert”. On August 15/28, the X division decisively attacked the Turkish positions, and the soldiers of the 27th and 30th regiments stabbed the Turks with bayonets in the trenches. On the same day, the Greek soldiers occupied the “Naked Top”. Turks night attack on the "Naked Top" was repulsed. On the same day, the Greek General Staff, by order, informed all the corps of the army that "because of a large shortage of ammunition," "prohibits artillery preparation before the attack." The X division, which was left not only without shells, but for 3 days without food and water, was unable to move on. But the III Division managed to take the Gildiz Dag mountain range on August 17/30. Immediately thereafter, the engineering corps created a ferry at the northern bend of Sakarya near the town of Kavundji Köprü, thus providing the opportunity to supply the Greek divisions that approached the mountain ranges covering Ankara. bypassing the "Salty Desert" ^[6] .

The army showed its fighting abilities suffered heavy losses in the ensuing “epic battle”, where victory was close ^[8] , but having exhausted all its material resources and not having material and human reserves, it was not able to take Ankara and in order went back Sakaryu. Historian D. Fotiadis writes: “tactically we won, strategically we lost” ^[6] . The government of Gunaris doubled the territory under its control in Asia, but did not have opportunities for further offensive. Without resolving the issue with the Greek population of the region, the government did not dare to evacuate the army from Asia Minor. The front froze for a year. The army continued to hold the front of “colossal length in relation to the disposable forces”, which, according to A. Mazarakis , apart from political mistakes, became the main cause of the ensuing catastrophe ^[6] .

Part of the officers removed from the army, supporters of Venizelos, settled in Constantinople, which was under the control of the Entente, and organized the “Center of National Defense” with cells in Paris , London , Athens, and so on. The “Center” had information about the Allied plans being prepared “at the expense of Greece”. Back in February 1921, the “Center” went to the commander, General Papoulas, trying to convince him to declare the autonomy of Ionia , which, according to the “Center,” would have allowed the army to be evacuated, providing the Entente guarantees to the population ^[3] . The proposal was repeated in open form in February 1922, when the Greek leadership was at an impasse both politically and financially and militarily: “General, we know that the decision of the Great Powers will be extremely unfavorable and that we will evacuate from Asia Minor. Do you not think that after so many sacrifices and so much blood we must proclaim autonomy and save the population. ” But Papulas hesitated, hoping to get the support of the Greek government on the issue of autonomy and sent Colonel Sarriyannis and Major Skilakis to Constantinople to continue contacts with the “Center” ^[3] .

In March 1922, at a conference in Paris , the Allies announced to the Greek government that they had decided to evacuate the Greek army from Asia Minor. Papoulas tried to convince Prime Minister D. Gunaris that the proclamation of the autonomy of Ionia was the only solution and, after receiving the refusal, resigned. General Hadzianestis , who was appointed to the position of Papulas, one of his first decisions, removed from the army Chief of the General Staff Colonel Pallis and his deputy Sarriyannis. Staff officer Colonel Passar resigned voluntarily due to the inability to cooperate with the “unbalanced” ^[6] Hadzanestis ^[3] .

The reign of the monarchists ended with the defeat of the army and the massacre and the expulsion of the indigenous population of Ionia . D. Dakin blames the government of monarchists for the outcome of the war, but not for the Greek army, and believes that even in the unfavorable conditions created, "as with Waterloo, the outcome could turn both this and the other" ^[8] .

An anti-monarchist uprising of the army of September 1922 followed. In September 1922, together with General A. Mazarakis , Sarriyanis was a member of the Greek delegation at a conference in Moudania , where, under the pressure of its former allies, Greece agreed to give the Turks without a fight Eastern Thrace ^[3] , despite the fact that Asia Minor and Thrace stood the Greek fleet and the Turks did not have a fleet ^[12] . In October, an emergency tribunal sentenced Gunaris , his four ministers and the commander of Hadzianestis to death ^[8] . At this trial, Colonel Sariyannis made a witness for the prosecution ^[3] .

In 1925, Sarijannis was among the officers who supported General T. Pangalos in establishing the dictatorship. In the same year, Sarriyanis was appointed Chief of the General Staff with the rank of Major General ^[3] . Sarriyanis remained in this post until August 31, 1926, when he was demobilized after the removal of General Pangalos from power. . ^[4] Until the beginning of World War II, retired General Sarriyanis led an unobtrusive lifestyle.