The letter of the old Bolshevik

On December 22, 1936, the émigré Menshevik publication Socialist Bulletin began publishing the article How the Moscow Process Was Prepared (from a letter from the old Bolshevik).

Just before the issue of the press, we received an extensive letter from the old Bolshevik informing us of extremely interesting information about the moods and struggles of the currents in the Soviet elite and casting light on the conditions under which the Zinoviev-Kamenev process was prepared and conducted. The size of the letter and its later receipt deprive us, unfortunately, of any opportunity to print it in its entire issue. We have to postpone the end of the letter to the first issue of 1937.

The real author of the document was the Menshevik B. Nikolaev , in the spring of 1936, who had the opportunity to personally communicate with Bukharin , who arrived to buy the archive of Marx and Engels. The document was compiled on the basis of these conversations. However, Nikolaevsky officially recognized his authorship only in 1965.

According to him, conversations with Bukharin took place in February-April 1936 in Paris, where he arrived as part of the Soviet delegation.

Apparently, the fact of Bukharin’s communication with the Mensheviks became known in the USSR, although he was not reported about it at the February-March plenum of the 1937 Central Committee. On December 27-29, 1936, Karl Radek stated in his testimony during interrogation that Bukharin allegedly had had talks with Dan, one of the leaders of Menshevism. According to the memoirs of L.O. Dan , Bukharin really appeared at their apartment, saying that "Stalin is not a man, but a devil."

The fact of Bukharin’s contacts with the Mensheviks was also considered at the Third Moscow process. Then, in 1938, Nikolaevsky declared that communication between him and Bukharin was limited only to the purchase of archives. Bukharin's wife, Larina A.M. , called the document a fake of Nikolaevsky.

It is indicated that we are talking exclusively about party leaders; the philistine was not just indifferent to politics, but even had a direct dream, “so that he would be left alone, giving him the opportunity to live in peace.”

According to the author’s description, as of 1932, the situation in the USSR was extremely difficult. The transition to forced “superindustrialization” at the expense of pumping money from the peasantry at first was unsuccessful - a significant part of the country was on the verge of starvation, among workers there was a drop in labor productivity due to malnutrition.

All this caused a certain discontent among the party elites of Stalin. Trying to develop an alternative to the general line headed by him, many studied various “platforms” - opposition program documents. Formally, it was not only their distribution that was formally forbidden, but since 1923 every member of the party was obliged to inform the GPU of every fact of opposition activity known to him. However, as the author emphasizes, in reality it was difficult to do - “fleeing to the GPU” about every opposition phrase heard would be too difficult.

Of the “platforms” that went around then, the so-called “Ryutin platform” was particularly successful. She stood out among many other “platforms” of that time with her special orientation against Stalin. His criticism took up to a quarter of the document, and was particularly aggressive.

The reaction of Stalin himself was extremely hostile. He supported the proposal of the GPU to execute Ryutin. Stalin pointed out that terrorist intentions arise from time to time among working and student youth, which sometimes even result in acts of terrorism against various kinds of small party and Soviet workers. It would be unreasonable, punishing executors with executions, to softly treat instigators of terror.

However, the majority of the Politburo, under the influence of Kirov, did not support this proposal then, and Stalin was forced to retreat.

In 1932, they still could not talk about the executions of the opposition, the Bolsheviks knew very well the history of the French Revolution, and they also knew about the fate of the Jacobin party, which was engaged in self-destruction. Separate facts of executions took place as early as the 1920s (in particular, at that time the well-known terrorist Blumkin was shot), however, they usually belonged to Trotsky's ideological supporters who worked at the GPU and warned their supporters about repressions being prepared against them. Such executions were perceived as punishment for betraying one's official duties, but not for the very fact of opposition. The author also gives an example of an anonymous Menshevik who stole from the secretariat of the Central Control Commission (party control bodies) certain documents for publication in the Socialist Bulletin (an emigrant Menshevik publication). He was shot.

A serious breakthrough, according to the author, occurred in 1933. Firstly, a large crop was harvested in the USSR. This was perceived as a major economic success, achieved, among other things, thanks to Stalin; he understood that if economic failures continued, discontent against him would sooner or later find a way out, and "worked hard himself, also forcing others to work." Under the influence of this, the party finally spread the sentiment that “Stalin won”, and interest in studying opposition “platforms” fell. The picture of the political struggle in the USSR in 1932–33 changed dramatically. If earlier it was a question of the struggle of informal groups of “Trotskyists”, “Zinovievites”, “Stalinists”, now it was a question of the struggle of some “Stalinists” against others. This struggle took the form of persistent attempts to exert influence on Stalin personally, convincing him to incline towards making this or that decision.

In addition, in 1933 the Nazis finally came to power in Germany, and the inevitability of a new big war finally became apparent. Data on German activity in Ukraine and on the so-called “conspiracy of homosexuals” of 1933 also made a big impression on the party leaders.

It began to go not only about technical preparations for war, but also about creating the "necessary psychology of the rear."

Two approaches clashed here. The Peace Party proposed a broad compromise with former factionalists and also the potentially disloyal non-partisan intelligentsia. The most prominent representatives of "reconciliation" were, first of all, Gorky and Kirov.

Gorky in the mid-1930s had a huge influence on Stalin, which he used to persuade him to "pacify". However, unlike Kirov, Gorky did not hold any posts and was not a member of the Politburo.

The popularity of Kirov in 1932-1934 was huge. At the XVII Congress (1934) he was met as a triumph. Stalin also valued Kirov as one of his closest associates during the period of the struggle with the opposition, but nevertheless Kirov somewhat annoyed him with his independence.

The author emphasizes that it was Kirov who was one of the leaders of "dispossession", and also led a number of camps, so that he cannot be blamed for scrupulousness in human life. However, then Kirov became one of the leaders of the "party of peace." Under his influence, a number of former opposition members were restored to the party, some of which (in particular, Kamenev) even made repentant speeches at the XVII Congress. These speeches, however, were rather ambiguous: for example, Kamenev made a frank apologetics of the sole dictatorship, but his speech also contained veiled hints that if Stalin could not cope with his role, then the catastrophe awaits not only him, but the whole country.

The success of the "peace party" of Kirov-Gorky seemed undeniable. The question of Kirov’s transfer to Moscow to work in the Central Committee secretariat was considered. In 1934, this issue was finally resolved.

The big shock for the party was the unexpected assassination of Kirov on December 1, 1934.

The author dwells in detail on the identity of the killer, Nikolaev L.V. He was a rather ordinary young man for his time, who, in his misfortune, fell into the orbit of Bolshevik propaganda. The hardships of the revolution and the Civil War seriously damaged his health and psyche. At 16, Nikolaev volunteered against Yudenich, later on he worked in various positions, including for some time at the GPU (which was classified in the 1930s). Judging by his diary, Nikolaev was seriously worried about the transformation of the early Bolshevik party, which he considered a kind of romantic "blood brotherhood", where much was built on informal connections and the spirit of camaraderie, into a highly formalized bureaucratic organization.

Nikolaev's character was difficult, due to a number of conflicts he was expelled from the party. However, it was then restored with the explanation that these conflicts were caused by a nervous breakdown due to overwork. Gradually, he fell under the strong influence of official party literature, glorifying pre-revolutionary terror against tsarist officials and generals. In Nikolaev, the decision to "sacrifice oneself" gradually grew, destroying one of the "usurpers".

It was obvious that Nikolaev was never any oppositionist. He did not belong to any factions. It is only known that in 1925 he voted for the resolution of Zinoviev, but it was also well known that then Zinoviev was 90% of the Leningrad Party organization (which Zinoviev very tightly controlled). After the purge of Leningrad from the "Zinovievites" Nikolaev was not even punished.

However, it was no longer a question of punishing the organizers of terror, but of instigators of it. By 1934, thanks to Kirov himself, many former opposition leaders had accumulated in Leningrad. Many of them previously held high positions, but, having lost the struggle for power in the 1920s, they lost them. All their opposition activities now came down to informal meetings with each other in private; in their kitchens they often made “front-line speeches.”

The question of the Leningrad NKVD Directorate also became acute. Strictly speaking, it was about negligence: Nikolaev was intemperate in language, and his terrorist intentions were known. However, he was able to freely get to Kirov with weapons.

For the investigation, Stalin seconded to Leningrad the Chekist Agranov, one of the most devoted supporters of Yezhov, who was absolutely loyal to him. Due to the special importance of the incident, Stalin himself arrived in Leningrad, where he personally questioned Nikolaev, and also personally supervised the clearing of the Leningrad NKVD department.

Gorky, learning about the Kirov murder, was at first enraged, and demanded the most severe punishment for the guilty. However, when it became clear that the murder would be used to turn from “reconciliation” to repression, he began to try to stop them. However, it was useless: Stalin refused to listen to him, distinct signs began to appear that Gorky was in disgrace.

The “party of war” confidently took the first place, insisting in fact on the mass extermination of former factionalists as a potentially disloyal “fifth column” in preparation for a major war. Of the leaders in this direction, the author names, first of all, Kaganovich and Yezhov. Kaganovich is characterized as a man of undoubtedly great capacity for work and a good organizer, but at the same time inconsistent and treacherous.

If Kaganovich is depicted by the author as a clearly talented, but immoral person, then Yezhov is depicted as a complete sadist; he has no abilities, and he deeply hates everyone who has them. Yezhov hated good speakers (he himself could not speak beautifully), writers (he did not know how to write either), old Bolsheviks with experience of pre-revolutionary underground activity (which Yezhov also did not have).

After 1934, Stalin clearly fell under the influence of Yezhov and Kaganovich. The report, compiled by the Yezhovite Agranov in Leningrad, depicted the fractionalists who had accumulated in Leningrad as direct organizers of the terror, who had founded almost a whole underground in the city. This was an exaggeration; in fact, it was a punishment for incitement to terror. The Leningrad Directorate of the NKVD responded to allegations that a large number of former oppositionists had accumulated in the city in accordance with the orders of Kirov himself.

However, now they were talking about the mass arrests of these factionalists (Kirov stream) and the preparation of the First Moscow process (Zinoviev-Kamenev-Smirnov process). The main organizer of this process was Yezhov, exalted by Stalin with the beginning of preparations for the Great Terror. The previous People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs, Yagoda, tried to resist what was happening, for which he was removed and arrested.

Yezhov soon tried to close, in particular, the society of former political prisoners, whose literature was read by Nikolaev. Employees of the Leningrad department of the NKVD were sentenced to insignificant, by the standards of the time, sentences.

After the First Moscow trial, Yenukidze, one of Stalin's personal friends, fell. Yenukidze had a negative attitude towards the beginning of the repressions, tried to help the arrested and exiled, and as a result, at the request of Yezhov, he was removed from all posts.

Gradually, Stalin came to the conclusion that the layer of “old Bolsheviks” could not be trusted. Swearing allegiance to him, at the first opportunity they will turn away.

Having grown up in a revolutionary struggle against the old regime, we all educated in ourselves the psychology of the opposition, irreconcilable Protestants. Whether we want it or not, our mind works in the direction of criticism ... Nothing strong can be built with such human material of skeptics and critics, and now it is especially important for us to think about the strength of the construction of Soviet society, since we are facing great shocks associated with inevitably us the upcoming war ... measures ... should help such a restructuring of the country's ruling stratum, in which all infected critics would be expelled from its ranks and a new ruling stratum with a new psychology aimed at the floor would be created busy construction

Having come to such conclusions, Stalin, through Agranov, Yezhov and Vyshinsky, organized the Second Moscow process, after which he went to rest in the Caucasus so that it would be impossible to assemble the Politburo and discuss what was happening.

The document ends with the expectation of the mass extermination of the "old Bolsheviks" with the complete indifference of the Soviet inhabitants, on whom "all kinds of privileges and concessions are streaming. This is done deliberately: even in his memoirs the reprisal against us will be inextricably linked with the memory of the relaxation received from Stalin. ”

• Felshtinsky Yu. G. Conversations with Bukharin
• Rogovin V.Z. Fate “Letters of the Old Bolshevik”