An oblique , indirect battle order is the use of military tactics when the advancing army concentrates its forces in order to attack only one of the enemy’s flanks .
Content
Description
In an oblique attack, the warlord concentrates his main forces on one flank and uses the rest of the army to deter enemy lines; at the same time, he intentionally weakens part of his line (center and opposite flank) in order to concentrate his troops on one flank. They thus form an “oblique” formation, leaving the weaker flank of the enemy outside the decisive battlefield, and strike at its stronger flank, providing a numerical superiority here. This makes it possible to achieve local numerical superiority with lesser or equal strength. After the enemy’s dangerous flank is overturned by oblique forces, the military leader can deploy these units 90 degrees to flank the enemy’s line and, continuing the offensive, break up the enemy’s forces in parts [1] .
Units not involved in this attack play an important role in holding in place the opposing enemy forces, thus protecting their advancing flank by diverting a significant part of the enemy army [2] . A widely known example of the application of this technique is the actions of the troops of the Prussian King Frederick II in the 18th century . The use of the oblique system required disciplined troops capable of performing complex maneuvers in different conditions. Sometimes both opponents simultaneously use this tactic against each other (for example, the Diadochis (commanders of Alexander the Great ) who tried to reproduce his tactics in internecine wars after the collapse of his power).
Using Tactics
The use of the oblique system, however, carried a certain risk, namely, the appearance of a dangerous gap between the two flanks (defending and attacking), or even a complete loss of communication between them [3] . Moreover, the oblique system of Frederick often required long marches, sometimes at night, or in the early morning before the battle, which led to the fact that the advancing Prussian troops were almost exhausted at the time of their collision with the enemy line [4] . Another danger of this technique was that it required strict certainty and precise execution, and once started, it made it impossible to recall or regroup the advancing units [5] .
The correct execution of the oblique system of Frederick required the fulfillment of three basic conditions. The first was that each officer had to know exactly how to reform the battalion from “line to column, maintain its place in the column, and then rearrange it in the usual order, either by echelons, for a final attack.” Two other conditions were that soldiers marched in tight formation, and in foot [6] . The agreed step has not been applied in military affairs since the time of the Roman Empire; an inconsistent step or “marching step” required a less dense formation, so that the soldiers did not collide with each other while moving, and the oblique order was not applicable in such a dispersed structure [7] . And finally, the last: the military leaders should not suspect that Frederick would apply this tactic against them, and be unable to quickly respond to it. This type of attack required a confused command of the enemy, incapable of quickly changing the location of his troops [6] . The oblique system of Friedrich aimed at creating an overwhelming numerical superiority on the vulnerable part of the enemy line, allowing the smaller Prussian forces to achieve a decisive advantage on the battlefield [8] .
History
The first use of tactics similar to the oblique formation was in the Battle of Levktra , in ancient Greece , when the Thebans, under the command of Epaminondas, defeated the previously invincible Spartan phalanx, creating on one flank a structure in fifty rows in depth instead of an even distribution of forces along the front [9] [10 ] [10 ] ] . The Macedonian king Philip II , who was taken hostage by Thebes as a boy, probably studied Epaminondas well and his followers, including Alexander the Great, used its variations in their military campaigns. The ancient author of Vegetius was the first to describe the tactics of the oblique order in battle [11] . Subsequently, the commanders of the New Age again applied this tactic after they found antique texts relating to military affairs. [12] Generalissimo Raimondo Montecuccoli argued that the best forces should always be located on the flanks, moreover, a stronger flank should launch an attack; he was the first of the commanders of the New Age who applied tactics similar to the oblique formation in battle, and Frederick II was well acquainted with his works [11] .
Prussian commanders led by Frederick the Great used this tactic in their own way. The advancing Prussian army advanced significant forward forces in the direction of the enemy. These detachments diverted the attention of the enemy, while the other part of the Prussian army usually maneuvered behind them. For the secrecy of her maneuvers, she also used any obstacles to the view, including folds of terrain, or smoke from cannon and musket fire. Prussian cavalry usually covered the flanks. Friedrich even instructed his generals that when performing the maneuver of his oblique formation, a smaller number of troops is actually an advantage, since it is easier to weaken one wing of the army, while strengthening the other [13] [3] .
The main part of the army then moved in one direction and was built up by echelons (or oblique formation), opening fire and attacking a more powerful enemy flank with increasing force. The cavalry supported the infantry, using any breaks in the enemy system for their strikes. Friedrich first applied his oblique system at the Battle of Hohenfriedberg in 1745 [14] , and subsequently in the more important battle of the next war - at the Battle of Leuthen , in 1757 [15] , which he won, despite the numerical superiority of the enemy. It was in this decade, during the wars for Silesia and at the initial stage of the Seven Years War that his army showed itself brilliantly in a maneuver of an oblique formation on the battlefield [13] [16] .
The theoretical assumptions of the oblique system of Frederick can already be seen in two instructions of Zeelowitz in March 1742 [17] [12] . Historians of the German General Staff are of the opinion that Frederick II fell in love with the “oblique system” tactics during the Second War for Silesia, and subsequently, during the Seven Years War, he began to use it constantly. However, Otto Herman objects to the historians of the General Staff regarding the unclear definitions of the “oblique system,” and states that Frederick II tried to apply this technique in the battles of Molvitz and Shotuzitz . The most plausible and convincing arguments are given by Rudolf Keybel, arguing that in reality Frederick II began to use this tactic starting from the Battle of Hohenfriedberg [12] .
Since the Austrians received valuable lessons from the Prussian army during the wars for Silesia , the tactics of Frederick, as he learned from his informants, became the subject of discussion in the Vienna Cabinet , where Franz I , Emperor of Austria , noted that “old Fritz prefers in the war one-wing attack style ”, which had such a disastrous effect on the Austrian forces [4] . But later, in 1760 , the official documents captured during the capture of Major General Gertzitz already showed a clear understanding by the Austrians of the tactics of the “oblique order” of Friedrich, which meant that now Frederick would have to deal with a well-informed enemy army that could successfully confront him tricks. [4] In the battles that followed, Prussian troops, exhausted by a long transition to the moment when they reached the goal of their maneuver, were not able to overturn the competently located enemy troops, as in the Battle of Kunersdorf , or when the enemy made a sudden turn during the battle, as in the battles of Zorndorf or Torgau [18] .
See also
- Meeting engagement
- Line Tactics
Notes
- ↑ Battle formation
- ↑ Colonel HL Scott. Military Dictionary: Comprising Technical Definitions; Information on Raising and Keeping Troops; Actual Service, Including Makeshifts and Improved Matérial; and Law, Government, Regulation and Administration Relating to Land Forces. New York: Greenwood Press, 1968, p. 401
- ↑ 1 2 Dennis E. Showalter. The Wars of Frederick the Great. New York: Longman Publishing, 1996, p. 108
- ↑ 1 2 3 Christopher Duffy. The Military Life of Frederick the Great. New York: Atheneum Books, 1986, p. 312
- ↑ Christopher Duffy. The Military Life of Frederick the Great. New York: Atheneum Books, 1986, p. 311
- ↑ 1 2 Dennis E. Showalter. The Wars of Frederick the Great. New York: Longman Publishing, 1996, p. 109
- ↑ Dennis E. Showalter. The Wars of Frederick the Great. New York: Longman Publishing, 1996, p. 110
- ↑ Christopher Duffy. The Military Life of Frederick the Great. New York: Atheneum Books, 1986, p. 310
- ↑ Boeotian war (378-362 BC)
- ↑ Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. A History of Warfare. London: Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1968, p. 70
- ↑ 1 2 WH Koch. A History of Prussia. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1993, p. 107
- ↑ 1 2 3 Christopher Duffy. The Military Life of Frederick the Great. New York: Atheneum Books, 1986, p. 309
- ↑ 1 2 The evolution of military art: the development of standing armies, Frederick the Great, the fate of military art in Russia - General Staff
- ↑ Dennis E. Showalter. The Wars of Frederick the Great. New York: Longman Publishing, 1996, p. 83
- ↑ WH Koch. A History of Prussia. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1993, p. 128
- ↑ WH Koch. A History of Prussia. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1993, p. 121
- ↑ “Instruction für die Cavallerie”, March 17, Oeuvres, XXX, 33; “Disposition für die sämmtlichen Regimenter Infanterie”, 25 March Oeuvres, XXX, 75
- ↑ Christopher Duffy. The Military Life of Frederick the Great. New York: Atheneum Books, 1986, p. 313