Operation Medvedka 19

In 1981, a new aggravation of the situation in Lebanon began , related to the attack of the Syrian troops on the Christian city of Zahle in the Bekaa Valley . Syrian troops advanced north into the mountainous regions north of the Damascus - Beirut highway and northeast of Beirut. In July 1981, PLO militants bombarded 33 Israeli cities ( Kiryat Shmona , Nahariya , Metula ...) and agricultural settlements along the northern border of Israel from 130-mm long-range Soviet guns and Grad multiple rocket launchers. Artillery firefight on the northern border of Israel lasted for ten days ^{[1] [2]} . In total, from July 10 to 20, 1981, the PLO launched 1970 MLRS shells in northern Israel, resulting in the death of 6 Israelis and 111 injured ^[3] ). Life in Kiryat Shmona was paralyzed, many residents were forced to leave their homes. On July 19, 1981, Israel carried out a massive bombardment of the PLO bases in southern Lebanon and its headquarters in Beirut, during which more than 300 people died ^[4] . At the same time, the Israeli government began preparations for an operation to expel the PLO from southern Lebanon, but under pressure from the United States, the operation was postponed.

On April 5, 1982, an Israeli diplomat, Yaakov Bar-Simantov, was killed in Paris . Three days earlier, masked persons fired automatic weapons at an Israeli trade mission near the embassy. The terrorists managed to escape ^[5] .
On June 3, 1982, the Israeli ambassador to Great Britain, Shlomo Argov, left the Dorchester hotel in London . A Palestinian terrorist awaiting him shot and severely wounded Argov in the head ^[6] .

Israel decided that in this situation, it can no longer remain indifferent. In response to the assassination attempt, the Israeli government approved a plan of air attack on 11 sites in Lebanon on June 4, and Israel launched a massive bombardment of PLO positions in Lebanon ^[8] .

On June 5, the Government and the Knesset of Israel decided to invade Lebanon ^[9] .

On June 6, large units of the IDF troops crossed the Lebanese border.

In the early days of the invasion, Israeli tank and motorized divisions destroyed the PLO formations. However, on the way to Beirut, a clash with the Syrian army, under the command of Soviet military advisers and armed with Soviet weapons, became inevitable. There were no regular Soviet units in Lebanon, however, the Syrian units stationed here had a significant number of Soviet military advisers and specialists who were directly involved in the hostilities ^[10] . The management of the Syrian army was carried out by Soviet generals and officers. The main military adviser and adviser to the Minister of Defense of Syria was Colonel General G.P. Yashkin , who had a deputy in charge of the Air Force - Lieutenant General V. Sokolov, for Air Defense - Lieutenant General K. Babenko, and for EW - Major General Yu. Ulchenko. At all levels of command and control of the Syrian troops - from batteries and companies to the Ministry of Defense of Syria, there were thousands of Soviet officers ^[11] .

The group of Syrian troops that was in Lebanon at that time included four air defense brigades equipped with Soviet anti-aircraft missile systems Kub , S-75M Volga and S-125 M Pechora . On the night of June 9–10, 1982, the 82nd mixed anti-aircraft missile brigade and three anti-aircraft artillery regiments were additionally introduced into Lebanon ^[12] . Thus, 24 Syrian anti-aircraft missile battalions were deployed in combat order with a length of 30 km along the front and 28 km in depth. These forces were required to provide cover for the Syrian forces in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley ^[13] .

On June 9, 1982, a meeting of the IDF command was held. It was attended by Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon and Chief of General Staff Rafael Eitan . It was decided to conduct a large-scale operation to destroy the group of Syrian forces in Lebanon. The Government of Israel has approved this decision.

Operation Artsav 19 began at 4 a.m. on June 9. Israeli UAVs IAI Scout and small-sized remotely piloted aircraft Mastiff conducted reconnaissance and surveillance of Syrian airfields, air defense systems and troop movements. For the first time in the world, Israel made extensive use of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft in combat. They broadcast live images to command posts. Receiving visual information, the command made decisions for launching missile strikes. A distracting group of Israeli aviation before the strike of the main forces caused the inclusion of radar stations of the Syrian air defense systems, which were hit with homing anti-radar missiles " Shrike ", and those means that were not destroyed were suppressed by interference.

The radar support group included the E-2C Hawkeye early warning radar aircraft, which controlled the activity of the Syrian Air Force. Equipped for electronic warfare, a Boeing 707 , Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters and IAI-202 Arava aircraft listened to the Syrian Air Force and Air Defense radio networks and put passive and active interference. So, an hour before the strike, they began staging passive electronic interference at a front of 150-200 km; in 12 minutes - intense interference to communication systems and control of air defense systems; in 5-7 minutes - active interference of high power, suppressing enemy radar reconnaissance equipment. The operation also used dozens of false Tactical Air-Launched Decoy targets to create a full-size airplane mark on the radar screen.

The destruction of Syrian air defense systems was carried out by ground-to-ground missiles ^{[ what? ]} and long-range and rocket artillery; in this case, ammunition was used that has the ability to aim at the target using a laser beam. 10-12 minutes after a missile strike on Syrian positions, a strike was carried out by forces of about 100 aircraft. Israeli aviation operated in groups of 2-6 fighter-bombers. They were equipped with special engines that did not leave a condensation trail. ^{[ clarify ]} , which made visual detection difficult. They struck using conventional, cluster , ball and cumulative bombs, as well as guided and homing missiles AGM-78 "Standard-AWP" , "Shrike" , "Mayverik" , specially modified for the operating frequencies of the Syrian radar. The remaining Syrian radars and launchers were destroyed from a distance of 60-80 km, exceeding the range of the Syrian anti-aircraft missiles of medium range. The Syrian air defense system in Lebanon was almost completely destroyed ^{[14] [11]} .

On June 7–11, 1982, a series of air battles broke out between the Syrian and Israeli air forces in the skies over Lebanon. On both sides, about 350 aircraft participated in them. According to the estimates of the participants in the events, 120-200 combat vehicles were simultaneously participating in separate fragments of the battles. In total, the Syrian Air Force during this time, according to various estimates, lost 78–82 MiG-21, MiG-23 and Su-22 aircraft. The Israelites had no losses ^{[11] [13]} .

G.P. Yashkin - chief military adviser to the Syrian armed forces, commander of a group of Soviet military specialists in Syria :

All receivers of the Syrian complexes were suppressed by very high density interference in the entire frequency range. And in order to fight them, it was necessary to weaken their power at least 20-30 times. Unfortunately, the Syrians did not have such opportunities. We did not have them either. At that time, radio-electronic reconnaissance and interference equipment of the SAR Armed Forces could not provide for violation of command and control of the enemy’s troops, or even minimal protection for their aircraft, air defense systems and their other air defense forces and only for one reason - a limited frequency suppression range.

In this war, the Israelis created a well-functioning and equipped with modern technology electronic warfare system. EW tools were installed even on tanks, ships, not to mention combat aircraft, and even more special ones, such as the Boeing 707, S-97 Hokai, Phantom (AF-4ji).

The comprehensive and massive use of electronic warfare systems, missiles and guided bombs with optoelectronic and radar homing heads was a decisive condition for Israel's success in suppressing the Syrian air defense group in Lebanon and gaining air supremacy. Experience has shown that without a modern automated control system, stable noise immunity of radar and communication equipment, and the creation of the necessary radar field for aircraft, it is impossible to control modern aviation and air defense systems ^[12] .

Abu Jihad (Dayab Abu Jahya) - a native of Lebanon and a former Hamas activist, - head of the Arab European League (AEL):

Everyone was staring into the air. I also looked up - and saw one of the most breathtaking spectacles that I have ever seen. Directly above our heads, the battle of hundreds of fighters unfolded. Israeli air attacks never caused us significant damage, but this time it was not about bombing: the fight was between Israeli and Syrian fighters. Israel bombarded Syrian missiles stationed in the Bek Valley, and now Syrian fighters tried to prevent the destruction of the remnants of Syrian air defense by the Israelis. A very tragic picture unfolded before our eyes. Israeli fighters shot Syrian aircraft one by one like flies, and the support of the United Armed Forces from the ground was useless. The Zionists had at their disposal the modern F-14s, F-15s, and F-16s, while the Syrians had mostly old Russian MIGs. It was like a car race between a new Ferrari and an old Toyota: no matter how good a driver you are, you have not the slightest chance of victory ^[15] .

• Mario de Arkangelis . Electronic warfare: From Tsushima to Lebanon and the Falkland Islands . Myrsia as La Guerra Elettronica (1981), Blandford Press Ltd. (1985), translation by Yu. Repka (2000) - ISBN 0-7137-1501-4

• Syrian rock // RS / RFE , October 4, 2016
• Bekaa Valley combat - Interview with a representative of the Israeli Air Force on the fighting in Lebanon, a correspondent for Flight International magazine. ( Flight International, No. 3832, 10/16/1982 )