The crash of Boeing 727 in Salt Lake City

Boeing 727-22 with registration number N7030U (factory - 18322, serial - 130) made its first flight on February 25, 1965 ^[2] , and on April 7 entered United Air Lines , having 6 hours and 2 minutes running time. It was equipped with three tour-fan (dual-circuit) engines of the Pratt & Whitney JT8D-1 model, each of which developed a thrust force of 14,000 pounds ( 6,350 kgf ). The total operating time of the aircraft was 1781 hours 39 minutes. Serviced in accordance with the guidelines and instructions applicable to the airline. Weight and centering during the execution of a fatal flight were within the limits allowed ^[3] .

• The aircraft commander is 47-year-old Gale C. Kemaier ( eng. Gale C. Kehmeier ). The airline since July 1, 1941 , at the time of the incident had a current pilot qualification of Boeing 707 , 720 , 727 , Douglas DC-3 , DC-4 , DC-6 and DC-7 aircraft, as well as a flight engineer qualification. Qualification for the Boeing 727 confirmed August 2, 1965 . Medically, he had to wear corrective lenses; the commander himself said that at the time of the incident was in glasses. The total flight time in the pilot position was 17,743 hours, of which 334 hours were on the Boeing 727 and 1,510 hours on the Boeing 720 ^[4] . The raid in the last 24 hours before the crash was about 1 hour ^[3] .
• The co - pilot is 39-year-old Philip E. Spicer ( born Philip E. Spicer ). In the airline since September 22, 1955, he had the qualification of a pilot of single and multi-engined aircraft. The total flight time in the pilot position was 6074 hours, of which 84 hours were on the Boeing 727. The attack in the last 24 hours before the crash was 6 hours 19 minutes. Rest before the fatal flight lasted about 12 hours ^[3] .
• The third pilot is 28-year-old Ronald R. Christensen ( Eng. Ronald R. Christensen ). In the airline since January 27, 1964, he was qualified as a pilot of single-engine aircraft. The total flight time was 1027 hours, of which about 500 hours were in the pilot position, including 166 hours in the position of the third pilot of the Boeing 727. The flight for the last 24 hours before the crash was about 1 hour ^[3] .
• Flight attendants ^[3] :
  • Victoria J. Cole ( eng. Victoria J. Cole ). In the airline since July 17, 1961 .
  • Fay B. Jones ( Eng. Faye B. Johns ). In the airline since July 24, 1964 .
  • Annette P. Foltz ( born Annette P. Folz ). In the airline since September 16, 1964 .

The plane operated a regular passenger flight UA227 on the route New York - Cleveland - Chicago - Denver - Salt Lake City - San Francisco . At 10:35 ^{[* 1]} flight 227 departed from La Guardia airport (New York) and gradually arrived safely at Stapleton airport in Denver, where the crew changed. At 16:54, with 85 passengers and 6 crew members on board, the plane flew to Salt Lake City and, after climbing, took the flight level 310 (9.4 km) established by the plane. The flight duration was to be 57 minutes ^[1] . Aircraft control throughout the flight carried out the commander of the crew. On the approach to the airport of destination, the crew, by contacting the Salt Lake City Air Traffic Control Center, requested permission to enter not through Provo , but through the intersection of “ Lehi ” ^{[* 2]} , which was 23 miles southeast of the airport, i.e. direct entry from the east, not from the west. At 5:35:45 pm, the dispatcher gave permission to the crew to descend at their discretion to 16,000 feet (4.9 km). The crew commander confirmed the receipt of the information and asked to be informed when they would be 60 miles east of the Lehi intersection. At 17:38:05, the dispatcher reported that the plane was 60 miles east of Lehi, to which the commander reported: Ok, we are starting to descend ^[5] .

In the process of descending, the plane passed through a layer of clouds about 6000 feet thick (1.8 km), while the anti-icing system of the engines was turned on. When flight 227 was five miles south-south-west of Lehi, control over it was transferred to the approach controller, who gave new permission to continue descending. Following at an altitude of 16,000 feet in the clouds, the crew set the engines for low gas and activated the air brakes. At an altitude of 11,000 feet, the air brakes were removed, as the plane emerged from the clouds and a lane was visible. At 17:47:00, the dispatcher relayed: ... United seventy two twenty seven ... you are five miles from the lighthouse Riverton . Come out to the landing course, landing on ILS is allowed on lane three four left . Then the dispatcher asked about the altitude, to which at 17:48:10 from the aircraft they reported the beginning of a decrease in the flight speed to 250 knots, and they are at an altitude of 10,000 feet and see the runway. Then flight 227 was transferred to the take-off and landing dispatcher (dispatcher on the tower), who at 17:49:40 gave permission to land ^[5] .

With a vertical speed of 2000 feet (610 meters) per minute, the airliner began to descend to the runway, although the recommended vertical speed for the landing approach was 600–800 feet (180–240 meters) per minute, and the flight indicator on the HUD completely deviated down. Approximately one and a half to two minutes before the crash at an altitude of 6500 feet above sea level, the co-pilot tried to slow down the decrease by increasing the engine mode, but the commander removed his hand from the engine control levers, saying: Not yet . After 20-30 seconds, at a height of about 5,500 feet above sea level, the co-pilot increased the engine mode to half. However, there was no increase in thrust, then the commander took control and tried to half-nose the plane to slow the decline. At the same time, the co-pilot, regardless of the captain, transferred the engines to take-off mode. At the same time, flight attendants and passengers heard a characteristic increase in engine speed. After about 10 seconds, a Boeing crashing into a landing configuration crashed into the ground at 335 feet (102 meters) from the end of the 34L runway. Upon impact, both main landing gears separated, causing the back of the fuselage to fall to the ground. At the front landing gear and the rear of the fuselage, the airliner flew onto the concrete strip and slid along the ground for a total of 2,838 feet (865 meters). The car flew to the right from the strip, after which it stopped 150 feet (46 meters) east of it, turning on the course of 123 °. In the process of slipping, the left engine was torn off, and in the area of ​​the right engine the fuel pipe was torn, after which spilled jet fuel ignited from sparks, causing a fire. At 17: 52: 1 *, a message was received on the intercom from the airport that a United plane crashed while landing. Three and a half minutes after the incident, two airport emergency services arrived at the plane, which began to put out the fire in the tail section. However, these measures were ineffective, since the fire was mainly in the cabin. Only by 18:30 the fire was taken under control. As a result of the fire, 43 passengers died (2 of them died in the hospital several days later) from burns and smoke poisoning, 6 crew members and 29 passengers were injured, and the remaining 13 passengers did not suffer relatively ^{[4] [5] [6] [7 ]} .

After examining the pilot history of the crew commander, the commission found interesting details from his past. On January 10, 1944, he was upgraded from co-pilot to the commander of another screw aircraft, and on November 4, 1960, as part of the training program conducted at the airline, he obtained the qualification of jet aircraft pilot, the first of which was Douglas DC-8 ^[4] . However, during the ground preparation, problems with the development of the material were noted, so Gale was sent for additional training, after which they only allowed to fly. During the checks, he showed unsatisfactory results in crew work, evaluation, standard operating procedures, and landing performance, which was not soft enough. On the basis of such results and recommendations of the pilot-instructor, on February 6, 1961, Kemaer was removed from the jets and transferred back to the screw Douglas DC-6 , where the test results were already above average. In May 1962, the pilot returned to the jets and after training he received qualifications for the Boeing 720 . The results of the tests on this type were generally satisfactory until December 31, 1963 , but on January 2, 1963, Gail failed the test on the implementation of a precision instrument landing approach. In the course of this test, in two passes he was above the glide path, completely released the flaps with engines operating on low gas, slowly increased the mode of the engines during a go-around, while bringing the power of the engines to only 50% . The recheck, carried out in two days, showed satisfactory results ^[8] . Training on the Boeing 727 was started in January 1965 , and on February 5, 1965 was qualified for this type. The inspector, who checked the commander Kamaer, during the hearings could not recall the details, although in general he estimated the test results as below average. The test of September 8, 1965 on the performance of the flight along the route, however, showed results above average ^{[3] [3]} .

On July 7, 1966, the commission issued a report in which it came to the conclusion that the crash was caused by a rough landing due to the error of the crew commander, who was performing a reduction with a significant excess of the vertical speed ^[9] . Among the recommendations to prevent such incidents, it was recommended to change the training program for pilots B-727, and the airline was recommended to change the location of the flight attendants closer to the exits. There was also a lack of effectiveness in evacuating passengers from a burning aircraft, which required additional programs and tests on this issue ^[10] .

Comments

Sources

• United Air Lines, Inc., Boeing 727, N7030U, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 11, 1965 (English) . Council on Civil Aviation (3 July 1966). The appeal date is December 19, 2015.