Operation Tirdrop

At the end of 1944, the Anti-Hitler Coalition received intelligence reports confirming the fact that the German naval forces planned to use V-1 cruise missiles launched from submarines to attack cities on the east coast of the United States . In September of the same year, a German spy captured by the US Navy during an attack on a submarine transporting him confirmed to investigators from the Federal Bureau of Investigation that several submarines were preparing for such an operation. Analysts of the US Navy Tenth Fleet carefully studied photographs of unusual elements on submarines in Norway , but came to the conclusion that these were wooden tracks used to load torpedoes . Over the course of the year, several more rumors arose about these submarines, including from Sweden , transferred to the Allied Forces High Command . The British Admiralty did not seriously consider these reports, since based on their assessment, such weapons could potentially be installed only on type IX submarines , which would require significant investments of already limited resources ^[1] .

Despite the findings of analysts of the Tenth Fleet and the British Admiralty , the military and the US government were still concerned that Germany might attack the cities of the East Coast. Since the beginning of November 1944, an intensive search for enemy submarines was carried out within a radius of 400 km from New York ^[2] . In early December 1944, spies William Kolpag and Erich Gimpel , captured in New York after landing from U-1230 in Maine, told investigators that Germany was preparing a group of submarines equipped with cruise missiles. On May 10, New York Mayor Fiorello La Guardia publicly announced that Germany was considering an attack on New York. La Guardia's speech and the statements of the captured spies received significant media coverage. ^[3] Despite this, on December 11, the US Department of War and the US Army reported to President Roosevelt that the likelihood of such an attack was so low that it did not justify the diversion of resources from other tasks. This assessment was not supported by the US Navy ^[2] .

In response to the alleged threat by the Atlantic Fleet , a defense plan for the east coast was prepared. Initially, it was given the code name "Operation Bumblebee" ( Eng. Operation Bumblebee ), and was later renamed. The plan was finally developed by January 6, 1945 and included participation in the operation of the US Navy, US Air Force and some army units, which together had to guarantee the destruction of any attacking aircraft and missiles. The centerpiece of the plan was assigned to two specially formed large anti-submarine defense units for work in the Atlantic Ocean against submarines approaching the east coast. These target groups were formed from several units of escort aircraft carriers , the operational base of new units located on the island of Newfoundland . In addition to defending against missile attacks, these forces were supposed to oppose new type XXI submarines if they were discovered in the central Atlantic Ocean. Atlantic Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Jonas Ingram at a press conference on January 8 warned the public about the threat of missile attacks and said that significant forces had been gathered to defend ^[4] .

In January 1945, German Reich Minister of Arms and Military Production Albert Speer stated that the V-1 and V-2 cruise missiles would “fall on New York on February 1, 1945,” which heightened the US government’s concern about the threat of a possible attack ^{[5 ]} . However, in reality, the Germans did not have the technical ability to launch such missiles from submarines; all attempts to develop such a technology have failed. In June 1942, U-511 , a German IX-C type submarine, tested short-range missiles that could be launched even when submerged. The development of this system was completed in early 1943, when it was discovered that other characteristics of submarines were deteriorating ^[6] . In November 1944, Germany began developing a technology for launching a V-2 ballistic missile from a submarine. Upon completion, it was planned to carry out an attack on the east coast of the United States, in particular to attack New York. By March or April 1945, it was planned to build a prototype. It was not possible to complete the work, since by this time Germany had been defeated in the war ^[7] .

Starting Positions

In March 1945, nine German Type IX submarines off the coast of Norway were sent to patrol the coast of North America and attack sailing ships. The main purpose of the redeployment was to divert the Allied anti-submarine forces from the coastal waters of Great Britain. In early 1945, this was the main venue for operations for German submarines, but heavy losses forced Germany to stop them at the end of March ^[8] . On April 12, seven out of nine submarines - U-518 , U-546 , U-805 , U-858 , U-880 , U-881 and U-1235 - were ordered to use the Wolf Pack tactic south of New York . The remaining boats - U-530 and U-548 - were sent to Canadian waters ^[9] .

The Allies were able to decipher German orders, from which they learned about the departure and goals of the group. Vice Admiral Jonas Ingram and the US Navy Tenth Fleet concluded that these seven submarines carry V-1 missiles. The launch of Operation Tirdrop was announced ^[10] . On March 25 and 27, the first anti-submarine force was formed at Hampton Roads , which included escort carriers , and 20 destroyers. By April 11th, the group was assembled east of Cape Cape Flight . Twelve destroyers stretched into a 190-kilometer line. Escort aircraft carriers, accompanied by four destroyers each, are located west of the line ^[11] . Air operations, however, were very difficult due to bad weather conditions ^[12] .

The German command was ordered to attack enemy ships. However, due to the threat of submarines and bad weather, the Allies changed the routes of their sea convoys, moving them south ^[10] . By April 8, German submarines took up positions east of the vast offshore shallow off Newfoundland Island. From April 2 to April 19, the command transmitted messages to the boats 12 times. These radio signals were decrypted by the Allies, which provided them with accurate information about the location of enemy submarines ^[13] .

First anti-submarine group

On April 15, at about midnight, the , an escort destroyer, discovered one of the submarines, U-1235, 800 km north of Florish Island. He immediately attacked the submarine with the Mk 10 Hedgehog multi-barreled launcher, but it sank and disappeared. With the support of the destroyer , USS Stanton discovered a new boat position and repeated the attack three more times. The last attack, carried out at 00:33 on April 16, destroyed the submarine with the team. Shortly afterwards, the USS Frost discovered a second submarine, the U-880, which was trying to get out of the firing zone along the surface. At 02:09, the destroyer opened fire from a distance of 590 meters from the Bofors L60 automatic anti-aircraft gun. The U-880 attempted a quick dive, but sonar operators of both destroyers continued to monitor the boat. Several salvos were fired from the bombing installations, and at 04:04 a second boat was destroyed ^[14] . The crew also did not survive. Submarine explosions proved to be very strong, which further increased concerns about their missile weapons ^[15] .

The ships of the first line of defense shifted to the southwest after the destruction of U-1235 and U-880. On the night of April 18-19, heavy Consolidated B-24 Liberator anti-submarine bombers found a U-805 submarine on the surface. The submarine was only 80 km from the escort carrier and its escort, but was not attacked, as it managed to sink before the bomber’s crew could confirm the target. On the night of April 20, the crew of the U-546 submarine attempted a torpedo attack on the escort destroyer, but missed. The following night discovered the U-805, but the submarine managed to escape ^[16] .

The last battle of the first group took place on the night of April 22. Shortly before midnight discovered the German U-518 submarine. joined the attack on the boat and was the first to drop bombs on it. After the USS Carter also dropped bombs, the submarine was destroyed. The entire crew died ^[17] . By this time, the first group was replaced by the second, and the first anti-submarine defense group returned to its base near the island of Newfoundland ^[18] .

Despite the fact that the operation was carried out in the sector of responsibility of Canada, Ingram for all the time never once asked for help from the Royal Canadian Navy . Moreover, until the destruction of U-518, Ingram did not even provide the Canadian military with a report on the current situation. However, Royal Canadian Air Force aircraft carried out regular patrols in support of the American forces ^[19] .

Second anti-submarine group

The second group included USS Bogue and escort carriers, as well as 22 escort destroyers. On April 16, the USS Bogue and 10 destroyers arrived from Narragansett Bay , and the USS Core and 12 destroyers from Bermuda and other positions ^[20] . The united group was initially located along the 45th meridian of west longitude, patrolling a 169 km long section, and began to move east ^[18] . The basis was 14 destroyers built with an interval of 8.0 km. In the north, the USS Core closed the circuit accompanied by four destroyers, in the south - the USS Bogue, also accompanied by four destroyers ^[20] .

On the night of April 23, the German command canceled the previous order and sent three surviving submarines to new positions between New York and Halifax . Shortly afterwards, U-881 , U-889, and U-1229 , who performed other tasks, were also ordered to take positions between New York and Cape Hatteras . These orders were also intercepted and deciphered by the Allies, further reinforcing fears that submarines would attack American cities ^[18] .

On the afternoon of April 23, an American torpedo bomber Grumman TBF Avenger found U-881 119 km northwest of the USS Bogue escort carrier. The plane dropped deep bombs , but could not seriously damage the boat. This was the first submarine aircraft attack during operation ^[21] . The next day, U-546 discovered the USS Core and began to maneuver to attack the escort aircraft carrier ^[22] . The submarine tried to go through the patrol line, but at 08:30 it was discovered by the destroyer , who immediately prepared to attack her. The submarine commander, learning about what was discovered, was the first to attack the destroyer with an acoustic torpedo from a distance of 590 meters. The false target did not help the ship, and at 08:35 a torpedo hit the engine room of the USS Frederick C. Davis. Five minutes later, the destroyer sank, 126 of the 192 crew members died ^{[20] [23]} . After that, eight American destroyers hunted for U-546 for almost 10 hours, until was able to seriously damage it. The submarine immediately surfaced, but the USS Flaherty and three or four other destroyers immediately finished off. The captain and 32 crew members survived and were taken prisoner ^[22] .

Some of the surviving crew members of U-546 were interrogated to find out if the submarines carried rockets. After brief interrogations aboard the USS Bogue, the survivors were sent to an American base on Newfoundland Island. On April 27, upon arrival, the prisoners were again questioned, after which eight specialists were separated, and the remaining 25 submariners were sent to prisoners of war. German experts were put in solitary confinement and interrogated using brute force. On April 30, during a second interrogation, the former submarine commander issued brief information on the composition and mission of the group, after which he lost consciousness. However, the information provided by the captain and other specialists did not contain information on whether the submarines were equipped with missiles. Восемь человек были переведены в Форт-Хант округа Фэрфакс штата Виргиния вскоре после Дня Победы , где допросы продолжались до тех пор, пока 12 мая капитан не согласился написать отчёт о действиях U-546 ^[24] . Историк пишет, что избиения и пытки экипажа U-546 были оправданы необходимостью оперативно извлечь информацию о потенциальных ракетных атаках ^{[22] [24]} .

24 апреля вторая группа стала медленно двигаться на юго-запад в поисках оставшихся подводных лодок. В ночь на 24 апреля обнаружил ещё одну подводную лодку, но последней удалось скрыться. 2 мая, спустя неделю поисков, группа разделилась. В это время состав второй противолодочной группы был усилен ещё тремя эскортными авианосцами и тридцатью одним эскортным миноносцем ^[25] .

U-881 стала пятой и последней подводной лодкой, уничтоженной в ходе операции. 5 мая незадолго до рассвета лодка была обнаружена эскортным миноносцем при попытке пройти на глубине сквозь патрульную линию. В 06:16 субмарина была уничтожена сброшенными глубинными бомбами, никто не выжил. U-881 стала последней немецкой подводной лодкой, уничтоженной ВМС США в ходе Второй мировой войны ^[26] .

7 мая вторая группа последний раз выстроилась вдоль 60-го меридиана. После безоговорочной капитуляции всех германских сил в тот день корабли группы приняли капитуляцию подводных лодок U-234 , U-805, U-858 и U-1228, прежде чем вернуться на базу на восточном побережье США ^[27] .

После капитуляции Германии ВМС США не прекратили попытки выяснить, несли ли подводные лодки ракеты. Экипажи субмарин U-805 и U-858 были допрошены и подтвердили, что не были оснащены оборудованием для запуска ракет ^[28] . Фриц Штайнхофф, руководивший испытаниями новых ракет на U-511, был захвачен во время капитуляции подводной лодки U-873. Он также был подвергнут тщательному допросу, вскоре после которого покончил с собой в тюрьме Чарльз-стрит в Бостоне. Из-за его самоубийства было проведено официальное расследование ВМС США. Не известно, были ли уверены союзники в его причастности к ракетным испытаниям ^{[26] [29]} .

Тактика, используемая в операции, была впоследствии оценена сотрудниками ВМС США. Палубная авиация эскортных авианосцев была недовольна своими действиями, так как эффективно обнаруживать подводные лодки им помешали сложные погодные условия на протяжении всей операции. Несмотря на это, самолёты вынуждали подводные лодки оставаться на глубине, тем самым значительно снижая их скорость ^[26] . В ряде отчётов подчёркивалась важность совместных действий эскортных миноносцев при атаке подводных лодок, и утверждалось, что эффективность патрульных линий, используемых на протяжении большей части операции, сильно ниже эффективность нескольких кораблей в одном секторе ^[30] . Историк отметил действия разведки, высокую скоординированность и хорошее планирование при проведении операции ^[31] . Информация, полученная разведкой из расшифрованных немецких радиопередач, была задействована, практически, при каждом уничтожении вражеской подводной лодки во время операции ^[32] .

Уже после Второй мировой войны ВМС США провели испытания возможности запуска ракет с подводных лодок. 12 февраля 1947 года американские модификации немецкой крылатой ракеты Фау-1 — Republic JB-2 Loon — в ходе испытаний были запущены с подводных лодок и . Испытания оказались успешными, и привели к развитию вооружения подводных лодок крылатыми ракетами ^[33] . Успех ВМС США с модификацией Фау-1 также показал, что подобные запуски были технически доступны и для немецкого военно-морского флота ^[34] .

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