The attempted coup in Spain on February 23, 1981

On November 20, 1975, dictator Francisco Franco died, who reigned supreme in Spain for 36 years. The new head of state - King Juan Carlos I - headed for systemic reforms. During 1976-1977 , especially under the government of liberal leader Adolfo Suarez , Spain as a whole made the transition to parliamentary democracy in the form of a constitutional monarchy. The authorities of the Franco period, the phalangists and ultra-conservatives of the Bunker were eliminated from the authorities.

At the same time, the socio-economic situation of the country remained extremely difficult. Inflation reached 16%, unemployment 20%. Criminality and political terrorism grew (primarily from the Basque separatists ). Premier Suarez was presented with claims ^[1] in the sense that political democratization is carried out at the expense of the economy and social stability.

In army circles, nostalgia for the Francoist order intensified. On April 9, 1977, the legalization of the Communist Party provoked protests from the military command. On November 20, 1978 (the third anniversary of the death of Franco), a group of extreme right-wing officers, led by gendarmerie lieutenant colonel Antonio Tehero, planned a coup — Operation Galaxy . The attempt was prevented, Tehero and his accomplices were sentenced to short terms. This event showed the degree of discontent in the military environment.

In 1980, the crisis worsened. Some influential but unpopular ministers from Suarez’s entourage resigned. In May, the socialist opposition initiated a vote on a vote of no confidence in the government. Although the prime minister managed to maintain his post, his position was weak. On January 29, 1981, Adolfo Suarez announced his intention to resign. The successor was Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo . Political tensions increased, a major new terrorist attack occurred in the Basque Country .

Shortly before the parliamentary meeting, scheduled for February 18, the conservative newspaper ABC published an article by authoritative columnist Emilio Romero Gomez. He severely criticized Suarez and his course and spoke in favor of “changing the form of government”. As head of government, Romero Gomez proposed General Alfonso Armada , known for his far-right views.

On February 20, a vote was held on the candidacy of the new prime minister. Calvo Sotelo did not get the required number of votes. The next meeting was scheduled for February 23.

Voting on Calvo Sotelo's candidacy began at 18:00 Madrid time. At 18:22, a group of gendarmes of the Civil Guard headed by Lieutenant Colonel Tehero, who had long been released from custody and returned to service, appeared in the meeting room of the Palace of Congress. With a gun in his hands, Tehero demanded: "Keep silence for everyone! Everything is on the floor! ” ^[2]

This humiliating order was carried out by almost all those present. Only three people ignored the order - Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, former Minister of Defense General Manuel Gutierrez Mellado and Secretary General of the Communist Party of Spain Santiago Carrillo . 68-year-old General Gutierrez Mellado - a former phalanxist and participant in the civil war on the side of Franco - entered into a physical battle with the coup. What was happening was recorded on a video camera ^[3] by Spanish television operator Pedro Francisco Martin.

Despite the opposition of General Gutierrez Mellado and Prime Minister Suarez, the putschists Tejero took control of the conference room. In their hands were all the legislators and ministers of the country. One of the gendarme officers announced that in the near future a “competent body of military command” would be created, which would take over the full power in Spain.

The units of the army and the Civil Guard that occupied Congress have no other purpose than the good of Spain and its people. We will not allow separatists to turn autonomy into destruction. We will not allow the impunity of terrorist killers. Reject such a situation when the prestige of Spain is declining every day. Armed forces strive for peace, order and security. Long live Spain!
Antonio Tehero ^[4]

Although the coup attempt is associated primarily with the name of Antonio Tehero Molina, the lieutenant colonel of the Civil Guard was not a key figure in the conspiracy. Franco generals Alfonso Armada and Jaime Milans del Bosc stood at the head of the rebellion. Both not only participated in the civil war on the side of Franco, but also served in the Blue Division , fought on the side of the Third Reich against the USSR . Both were seen as potential prime ministers of the future far-right government. It was del Bosco who reported Tehero by telephone from the captured parliament: “My general, everything is in order” ^[5] .

General Milans del Bosque was the commander of the Third Military District ( Valencia ). He had at his disposal the Brunete armored division. After receiving information about the events in Madrid, del Bosque brought tanks to the streets of Valencia, declared a state of emergency ^[6] and banned protests. The administrative buildings of Valencia were taken into the sight of tanks.

The civic part of the far-right putsch was represented by the former head of the Franco trade unions, National Syndicalist Juan Garcia Carres . He took on interregional coordination and information monitoring. Garcia Carres told Tehero that II ( Sevilla ), IV ( Barcelona ) and V ( Zaragoza ), as well as part I ( Madrid ), VII ( Valladolid ) and the garrisons of the Balearic and Canary Islands are ready to join District III. But this information was greatly exaggerated - of the commanders of the districts, only Milans del Bosque participated in the rebellion. The rest either declared their loyalty to the king and the constitution, or they were waiting for the development of events.

The exception was Alfonso Armada ^[7] - deputy chief of the general staff of the ground forces . He hoped to influence Juan Carlos ^[8] , who in his youth was his student at a military school.

Around midnight, General Armada appeared at the Congress Palace. Between him and Tehero a conflict arose regarding the composition of the future government. Tehero insisted on creating a military junta under the leadership of del Bosque. The Armada took a more moderate position: he prepared a list of members of the government - mainly from right-wing politicians, major financiers, representatives of the army and special services. This option created formal associations with the constitutional order. For the sake of breadth of representation, even a representative of the socialists, and possibly the communists, was supposed to be included in the cabinet of Armada.

The general tried to create allusions to the French political crisis of 1958 and present the putsch as a kind of analogue to the "return of General de Gaulle ." This option looked more acceptable than the pronunciamiento of the Latin American type, but it without fail required royal and parliamentary legitimation.

Tehero categorically rejected the Armada project ^[9] and stated that he was not looking for any other options besides military rule. Annoyed Armada left the parliament building.

This man is crazy.
Alfonso Armada about Antonio Tehero

The King of Spain is nominally the commander-in-chief of the country's armed forces. Actions on behalf of the king gave the impression of formally legitimate. This motive was constantly heard in the speeches of the putschists - in particular del Bosque and Armada, but also Tehero.

After receiving information about what is happening, Juan Carlos I demanded an explanation from the Armada. The general said that he was leaving for the royal palace. He intended to offer the monarch "full power", but the king, already orientated in the situation, refused to accept the conspirator. Juan Carlos firmly relied on the suppression of the rebellion. The organizational side was taken over by the secretary of the royal house, General Sabino Fernandez Campo , who became a key figure in the resistance to the coup.

The coup teams continued to be given “in the name of His Majesty,” but information about the refusal of Juan Carlos to support the coup began to spread throughout the army. This confused even the officers of the staff of del Bosque.

The commander of the Brunete armored division, General José Huste , following the order of Milans del Bosque, contacted Sabino Fernandez Campo. Huste tried to clarify the position of the monarch in relation to the coup. The phrase of Fernandez Campo: Ni está ni se le espera ^[10] - “Does not wait and does not hope” - became the final answer.

The High Command, led by General Jose Gaberias Montero ^[11], expressed complete loyalty to the king. Juan Carlos held a series of telephone conversations with the commanders of the military districts and military governors of the provinces. After this, attempts to persuade the rebels to additional army units were doomed to failure. This was followed by a call from the king to General Milans del Bosque, demanding that troops be withdrawn to the barracks of District III and the emergency order was canceled.

On February 23, at 21:00, the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported on the creation of an interim government from deputy ministers and secretaries of ministries. This structure took control during the isolation of ministers. The cabinet was headed by Deputy Minister of the Interior Francisco Laina ^[12] , who oversees the anti-terrorist units. In a brief television speech, he reported on what was happening and made it clear that, even in extreme circumstances, Spain was governed by civilian authorities, not a military junta. Then he held a series of consultations with representatives of parties and trade unions, asking them to remain calm and not provoke military intervention in the situation.

By order of Laina, parts of the Civil Guard and the police, under the command of General Jose Antonio Aramburu and General Jose Antonio Saens de Santa Maria, blocked the seized parliament building. It was decided to refrain from the assault in order to avoid bloodshed. Meanwhile, a telecentre was preparing a speech in front of the nation of Juan Carlos I.

The king, dressed in military uniform, appeared on television ^[13] shortly after 1:00 on February 24th. He strongly condemned the coup attempt and demanded that the putschists immediately surrender.

I appeal to all Spaniards with a short word in the extraordinary circumstances that we are all going through now, and I ask everyone to remain calm and confident. I inform you that I ordered the following to all generals, commander of the districts and troops, fleet and aviation in the regions and provinces:
In the situation created by what happened in the Palace of Congress, and in order to avoid misinterpretation, I confirm that I ordered the civil authorities and the Council of Chiefs of the General Staff to take all necessary measures to maintain the constitutional order within the framework of the existing legality. Any military action must be approved by the Council of the General Staff.
The monarchy, a symbol of the unity and stability of the Motherland, cannot allow any action aimed at interrupting the democratic process defined by the Constitution, which the Spanish people voted for, by endorsing it in a referendum.
Juan Carlos I ^[14]

The coup plan was built in the calculation, if not for support, then for the tacit consent of the king. The unequivocal position of the monarch made hopeless the continuation of the rebellion. By the morning of February 24, 1981, the coup leaders that had seized parliament were mostly demoralized. Tehero tried unsuccessfully to contact del Bosque. At 10:00 o'clock the liberation of the deputies (primarily women) began, at about noon they all left the building. Tehero and his associates surrendered. Over the next day, all the leaders of the rebellion were arrested.

The trial of the military coup 23-F took place in February-May 1982 ^[15] . The convictions were passed against 30 people - 12 army officials, 17 gendarmes and 1 civilian.

The longest sentences - 30 years and 26 years, respectively, 8 months - were received by Lt. Col. Tehero and General Milans del Bosque. General Armada was sentenced to 6 years in prison. The only civil putsch Garcia Carres was convicted for 2 years. The rest received terms from 1 to 6 years.

For some convicts, the punishment was toughened up on the protests of the prosecution in the Supreme Court. So, the 6-year term of the Armada was extended to 30 years. The three accused, an intelligence operative, an artillery captain and a gendarmerie captain, were acquitted as not involved.

Long-term prisoners received pardons in 1988-1990 , after serving 7-9 years. One of the prisoners died in prison. Tehero remained in prison for the longest time - until 1996 .

As usual in such cases, conspiracy theological versions arose. This was facilitated by the confusion of the conflict, bloodless clashes, the rapid retreat of the putschists, their emphasized loyalty to the head of state. The plan of action in case of extremely unlikely success is also incomprehensible - the establishment of a fascist military dictatorship in a Western European country in the early 1980s was absolutely unrealistic. As for the "version of de Gaulle", which Armada was trying to orient, such a model is not compatible with figures like Milans del Bosque.

There are suggestions that the events were organized by the secret services with the approval of the king. The goal is to raise the prestige of the Royal House of Spain, to eliminate the far-right elements from the army, to accelerate the integration of Spain into European structures. These versions have no factual and all the more documentary evidence, remaining at the level of speculation.

At the same time, some points really remain unclear. First of all, this refers to the position of the naval command (with which Armada was negotiating) and the military intelligence CESID ^[16] (whose agent was among the convicts in the gendarmerie).

The US administration, represented by Secretary of State Alexander Haig, originally qualified what was happening as an internal affair of Spain. Only after the king’s speech did the State Department speak in support of the legitimate authorities.

According to Santiago Carrillo, the Vatican was dedicated to the plans for preparing the rebellion.

Governments of Western European countries, above all the states of the European Economic Community (on which accession negotiations were held with Spain), strongly condemned the rebellion from the very beginning. Margaret Thatcher was tougher than the others - the British prime minister described the seizure of parliament as an “act of terrorism."

In the USSR, Spanish events (coinciding with the XXVI CPSU Congress , which summed up the "Brezhnev era" ) were met with great concern. News television and radio programs informed about what was happening in an alarming tone. The views of Tehero were called far-right, del Bosca - fascist. In analytical programs, the figure of Tehero was persistently associated with the grim images of “The Romanesque of the Spanish Gendarmerie” by Federico Garcia Lorca . The armed appearance of the Spanish ultra was seen as part of a global tightening of Western policy, initiated by the US administration of Ronald Reagan .

The events of February 23, 1981 demonstrated that the democratic transformations in Spain became irreversible. The action of the francists did not receive any support in society. Dissatisfaction with socio-economic difficulties did not mean nostalgia for the dictatorial regime.

It is significant that Fernandez Campo, Laina, Gaberias Montero - the figures who played the main role in suppressing the rebellion - themselves came from the phalanx and the Franco army. However, they, like the king, clearly understood that revanchist plans were inadequate and dangerous for the country.

The prestige of the monarchy and of Juan Carlos I personally strengthened. The king clearly positioned himself as a strong national leader and guarantor of democratic legitimacy.

There has been a situational shift of Spanish politics to the left. The Calvo Sotelo government received a vote of confidence, but held out in power for a relatively short time, until the fall of 1982 . In the parliamentary elections, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party won . (Characteristically, the Spanish Solidarity party created by Tehero won 0.14% of the vote.)

The personal popularity of three figures of Spanish politics increased - liberal Adolfo Suarez, European communist Santiago Carrillo and General Manuel Gutierrez Meljado. The latter has generally turned into a national idol and role model.