The Battle of Miskel Farm

At noon on March 31, 1863, Major John Mosby and 70 of his rangers marched out in the snow and rain from Rectortown toward Fairfax County. Their goal was Drainsville on the border of Fairfax and Loudon counties. They were planning to attack the federal garrison, which stood in Drainsville and raided the territory controlled by Mosby.

The partisans arrived in Drainsville, but found that the garrison had left the city and went east beyond the Difficult Ran River. In view of the approaching night, the rangers turned west and at 22:00 stopped to rest at the farm of Thomas and Lydia Miskel. On this farm, located on the east bank of the Broad Run River, near its confluence with the Potomac River, a few miles north of Leesburg, the partisans felt safe. The privates were housed in a barn, which was surrounded by a high fence with a single gate, and Mosby and his officers were housed in the main house.

The appearance of the partisans worried local residents who were afraid of revenge on the part of the federal army, so one woman went to the federal units at Union Chech and at midnight told Major Charles Taggart about Mosby's presence on Michel’s farm. Upon receiving this information, Taggart immediately instructed Captain Henry Flint to take five companies of the 1st Vermont Cavalry Regiment to find and destroy the partisans.

At sunrise, a federal detachment approached the Broad Run River along the Lisburg Road and paused briefly to clarify the situation. Here they were noticed by one of the partisans, Dick Morgan, who jumped on his horse and galloped to the camp to warn Mosby.

Approaching the farm, Captain Flint allocated a small detachment of 50 people as a reserve and entrusted it to Captain George Bean. Flint himself led the vanguard. While Fint was preparing for the attack, Dick Morgan arrived at the barn and raised the alarm. At this time, the feds rushed to the barn.

When Captain Flint rushed forward at the head of his squadron, their sabers glistened in the morning sun, and I felt that my last hour had come , ”Mosby recalled later ^[2] .

The cavalry burst into the outer gate, fired a shot at the southerners, and then, despite the presence of carbines, Flint ordered them to attack with sabers. The feds approached the barn and were stopped by another small fence - here they came under heavy pistol fire. Flint himself was killed with the first shots, who received six bullets at once. Among the feds a panic began, they rushed back, back, through those only gates through which they entered the farm. Mosby seized the moment, gathered about 20 rangers and led them into a counterattack. Many northerners were eventually captured, few managed to escape, and the southerners pursued them for several miles.

Southerners lost one man killed (Private Davis) and three wounded. Nine federal cavalrymen were killed in the battle, including Flint and one of the officers. 15 people were injured, and 82 were captured. 95 horses fell into the hands of the partisans.

The battle was lost by the feds despite all the benefits of their position. Their opponent was locked on a farm with one single exit, the farm was surrounded by water on both sides, and in addition, the northerners were twice as numerous as the enemy. Flint made several mistakes: the main order was to attack with sabers, although the Vermontians had cavalry carbines, and the southerners were mostly armed with pistols. If Flint was in a hurry for his people, then the numerical superiority and advantages of weapons would not leave the partisans any chance.

The second mistake was that Flint divided his people and entrusted part of Bin. He did not manage to put things in order and finish the job to the end, although at the time of Flint's death the situation of the northerners was still favorable. For illiterate command and for cowardice, Bean was subsequently dismissed from the army. Major General Steyhl informed the command:

I regret that I have to inform the command that the detachment sent by Major Taggert missed such a good opportunity to capture the rebels. This can only be explained by the illiteracy of the officers and the cowardice of the rank and file. I ordered Colonel Price to conduct a thorough investigation of all circumstances and recommend that all guilty officers be dismissed ^[3] .

In the report, Mosby admitted his mistake: “I admit,” he wrote, “that in this case I did not take appropriate precautions in case of a sudden attack” ^[4] . The battle allowed Mosby to draw several important conclusions: he never again took such a vulnerable position and never again left the camp without a picket chain ^[5] .

One of the Vermont officers was Joshua Grot (1841-1925), the future governor of Vermont.

• Ashdown, Paul and Edward Caudill. The Mosby Myth; A Confederate Hero in Life and Legend. SR Books; Wilmington, Delaware, 2002.
• Wert, Jeffery D. Mosby's Rangers Simon and Schuster Paperbacks; New York, 1990.

• Report of Federal General Steyhl
• Plaque on the battlefield