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Bayazet Defense (1829)

Defense Bayezeta ( June 20 [ July 2 ] - June 21 [ July 3 ] 1829 ) - the defense took place during the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829 . It is one of the heroic episodes of that war. A small Russian garrison, together with local Armenian militias under the general command of Major General P.V. Popov , for 32 hours, almost continuous battles, repelled the attacks on the city of the numerous Turkish corps under the command of the Van Pasha .

Bayazet Defense in 1829
Main conflict: Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829
Doğubeyazıt Mosque and ruined quarter.jpg
Bayazet mosque and the ruined quarter [1]
dateJune 20 ( July 2 ) -
June 21 ( July 3 ) 1829
A placeBayazet Ottoman Empire
Causeattempt to break through the left flank of Russian troops in Anatolia
Totalvictory of the Russian garrison
Opponents

Russian empire

Ottoman Empire

Commanders

Russian empire P.V. Popov
Russian empire F. S. Panyutin

Ottoman Empire van pasha

Forces of the parties

1482 infantry,
339 Cossacks,
500 Armenian police (militias) ,
17 guns (of which 7 are captured) [2]

9000 infantry
5000 cavalry
12 guns
2 mortars [3] [4]

Losses

Regular Russian units [5] : killed: 77 people.
wounded: 332 people
captive: 12 people
Armenian militia :
killed: 90 [6]
wounded and captured: unknown

up to 2000 people killed and wounded [3] [7]

Bayazet

Bayazet was in the western part of historical Armenia , within the Ottoman Empire . The main fortifications of the city at that time were the so-called new ( Iskhak Pasha ) palace and old (Arshakavan) castles. The first was on a rocky ledge in the center of the city, the second - on the same spur east of the first. In terms of fortifications around the city, stone batteries were built from separate towers and walls. A vast plain stretched north of Bayazet [8] .

The Bayazet Sanjak bordered on the Persian Empire and the Armenian region of the Russian Empire. The majority of the population of this sanjak were Armenians (up to 18 thousand inhabitants or up to 3 thousand families). Smaller are the Kurds and Ottoman Turks (up to 600–700 families), but at the same time, the last ones belonged to all government posts. Relatively independent from the Turkish authorities, the self-government had the Armenian clergy, which was subordinate to the Etchmiadzin Catholicos of all Armenians [Comm. 1] . The Echmiadzin monastery itself was located within the Russian Empire [9] .

In strategic terms, Bayazet’s occupation was important for covering the left flank of the Russian army’s operational base. Of particular importance was the fact that the Bayazet Sanjak was rich in grain reserves, and a large caravan road ran through it [10] .

Background

Preparing for War

In anticipation of the war between Russia and Turkey, Bayazet Balyul Pasha in February 1828 , reasonably believing that his sandzhak, bordering the Armenian region , was one of the first to be occupied by Russian troops, made an attempt to negotiate with the Russian commander in chief in the Caucasus Count Paskevich Erivansky . To do this, he sent his official to Paskevich in Tavriz "under the pretext of various courtesies . " Having no particular success in achieving his goals through the envoy, Balyul Pasha in March turned to the Armenian archbishop Nerses Ashtaraketsi with a request to assist him in this matter, but Nerses, who at that time was in some kind of confrontation with Paskevich, hid the pasha from his last desire [11 ] . In mid-June, Balyul Pasha wrote about this request to Generals Pankratiev and Chavchavadze , but Paskevich ignored all appeals of the Bayazet Pasha [12] .

With the outbreak of hostilities, when Russian troops invaded the Ottoman Empire, the military governor of the Armenian region, Major General Prince Chavchavadze was appointed responsible for guarding her border (he had only about 2 thousand infantry and 340 cavalry). The Kurds inhabiting the Bayazet Sanjak, not slowing down to take advantage of the war and the weak protection of the Russian borders, began to raid the borders of Russian Transcaucasia with the aim of robbery. Frequent raids were also carried out within the borders of the Persian Empire, where Russian military units were located in the city of Khoi in anticipation of Iran paying an indemnity due to the past Russo-Persian war of 1826-1828 [11] . Balyul Pasha, seeing that the Russian troops on the border with his sandzhak was not enough even to fully defend his own borders, changed his policy towards Russia. To the letter of Prince Chavchavadze, who suggested that Pasha “seek Russian patronage,” he replied that “if the Russians enter its borders, they will meet with fierce resistance to the last extreme” [13] .

The Armenian population of Bayezet, who showed clear sympathy for Russia, was confiscated by the Turkish authorities all their weapons [14] .

Occupation of Bayezet by Russian troops

After the capture of Akhalkalaki by the Russian troops and the payment of part of the indemnity by Iran, Paskevich decided to take possession of the Bayazet sanjak. From Iran, 2 battalions of the Nasheburg infantry regiment with 4 guns for further offensive operations on Bayazet were sent there to join with the detachment of Prince Chavchavadze, who were there until that time in anticipation of indemnity [15] .

On August 25 (September 6), 1828, Chavchavadze, with a detachment consisting of 1,400 infantry (2 battalions of the Nasheburg and 3 companies of the Sevastopol infantry regiments), 200 Cossacks of the Don Basov regiment and 400 Armenian and Azerbaijani irregular cavalry with 6 guns, left the village of Argadzhi. Having crossed the Khachgeduk ridge (Pambugdag), which shared the Armenian region with the Bayazet sanjak, and without waiting for the lagging train under the cover of the Sevastopol, Chavchavadze on August 27 (September 8) approached Bayazet lightly. Balyul Pasha sent 1300 cavalry against him, part of which - after a short skirmish was overturned by Russian artillery and retreated to the city, while the other part, cut off from the city by Azerbaijani cavalry - retreated into the mountains, and then returned to Bayazet by hidden routes. The actions of the Turks that day were limited to artillery fire from the old castle, which lasted until nightfall [10] [16] .

The next day , August 28 (September 9), in the early morning a convoy with 3 companies of the Sevastopol Regiment approached the camp. Seeing the strengthening of the Russian detachment, Balyul Pasha immediately sent a parliamentarian to the Russian camp with an expression of readiness to surrender Bayazet by noon. In return, Pasha asked for a guarantee of personal freedom and the preservation of all his property, as well as the unhindered exit of the Turkish garrison from the city. Soon, however, Cossack patrols reported approaching Bayazet to 2,000 Kurds. In addition, it was reported that other Turkish units came out of Erzurum to help the Turkish garrison of Bayazet. Fearing an approach to the city of enemy reinforcements, the Russian detachment launched an assault. Two companies of the Nasheburg regiment advanced to the heights located on the south side of the city. Cannon fire was immediately fired at them from the walls of the citadel, however, the Nashi residents, having overthrown the Turkish cavalry, which did not wait for infantry support, quickly climbed to the heights. Following them, 2 unicorns (howitzers) were delivered there, which immediately opened fire on the Muslim part of the city, preceding the attack on it by infantry and cavalry Russian units. In the meantime, Kurdish militias approached the city from the south, but when they saw the critical situation of the Turkish garrison, they moved away from the city. The Turkish garrison, fearing to be cut off from the Makinsky road, the passage on which was deliberately left free by the Russian command, turned on it in an erratic flight [10] [16] .

By one o'clock in the afternoon the city was taken. The Armenians came out to meet the Russian detachment with all the clergy, with icons and church banners. Balyul Pasha, was declared a prisoner of war, but at the same time his movable property (except for food) was preserved behind him [10] [17] .

The trophies of the Russian detachment turned out to be: 12 guns, 3 banners, 2 bunchuk , the Chaush (imperative) sign of the pasha, 180 pounds of gunpowder and significant supplies of provisions and fodder. Losses of the Turks amounted to 50 people killed (not counting the wounded). The losses of the Russian detachment (August 27–28) amounted to: 2 killed; wounded - 7; shell-shocked - 3 people [10] .

Further Subjugation of the Bayazet Sanjak

The fall of Bayazet caused great excitement at the Turkish command. Residents of Erzurum, fearing that the Russians would soon also take Alashkert and go to Erzurum via Hasan-Kale, left the city in a panic [18] .

In Bayazet, many Armenians joined the Russian troops, both from the city itself and its environs. Soon, the elders of Hamur arrived in Bayazet, giving Prince Chavchavadze the keys to the city. On September 8 (20), an Armenian hundred (50 horse-drawn Sardarabad and 50 foot Bayazet horses) took Diadin without firing a shot. On the same day, the envoy of one of the Kurdish ancestors of Gassan-aga arrived in Bayazet. The latter, even when crossing the Russian border, fled with 300 Kurdish families subject to him from the Bayazet Sanjak to Van , and now asked to return to his former place of residence near Hamur. Since Gassan-aga did not take part in the defense of Bayazet against the Russian troops, he was allowed to return [Comm. 2] . In order to earn sincere trust in him, Gassan-aga formed a selected horse-drawn hundred from the Kurds subject to him and personally brought her to the Russian camp. The next day, September 9 (21) , upon receipt of the news by Prince Chavchavadze about the movement of Abdul-Riz-bek (Balyul-pasha’s brother) to Toprah-kala , this hundred joined the Russian units opposing him and took an active part in the battle with the enemy [Comm. 3] . However, many Kurdish tribes, both of the Bayazet and neighboring pashalyks, still did not want to lose their independence and, assisting the Turkish units, repeatedly but vainly tried to oust the Russians from different settlements of the Bayazet Sanjak [21] [22] .

Within a two-week period (from August 25 to September 9), the entire Bayazet Sanjak was conquered by a Russian detachment under the command of Prince Chavchavadze. On November 11 (23), Major General Pankratiev arrived in Bayazet from Khoya and took command of the troops stationed there. Chavchavadze showered with Paskevich “undeserved reproaches” [Comm. 4] , was transferred back to the Armenian region, where he assumed his former post of military governor of the region. At the same time (in early November) additional forces were transferred from Persia to Bayazet (3 infantry battalions and a Cossack regiment) [26] .

During the five-month campaign of 1828, Russian troops conquered the Kara , Akhaltsikh and Bayazet pashalyks. Meanwhile, in Bayazetsky, however, as in other neighboring pashalykas, a plague epidemic broke out, which did not bypass the Russian troops, as a result, they were forced to stop the attack and go to winter apartments [27] [28] .

On the eve of the siege

 
The plan of Bayazet and its environs, taken by the compass during the Turkish War (December 1828 - January 1829) [29]

General Pankratiev, who replaced General Prince Chavchavadze at his post, considered it unacceptable to change the deployment of Russian troops in the Bayazet pashalyk, the last one left, and it was located in the following form:

  • The main forces were located in Kara-Kilis - the Kozlovsky infantry (musketeer) , Nasheburg and Don Cossack Shamshev regiments with 10 guns;
  • In the Toprak-Kalinsky citadel - 2 companies of infantry, 2 guns;
  • In Diadin - a battalion of the Kabardian regiment, 6 guns;
  • In Bayazet - 2 companies of the Sevastopol regiment, 2 guns.

The Cossack Basov regiment was distributed over all the pashalyk garrisons [30] .

In addition to the previously formed militia battalion of local Armenians (500 people), in May, another 500 volunteers were put up by the residents who intend to serve without a salary [31] . Pankratiev also made an attempt to form a cavalry regiment of local Kurds, but the latter in every possible way avoided service, and their ancestors, apparently, tried to sincerely assist the Russian command in gathering people, but they were not successful. One of the Kurdish ancestors wrote to Pankratiev:

I swear to God that I will be very happy when you take them with you on a campaign, because they do not listen to anyone [32] .

On March 25 (April 6), 1829, Pankratiev with Kabardinsky, Sevastopol and Cossack Basov regiments with 10 guns spoke to Kars to strengthen the main operating corps of Paskevich. Major General Popov was appointed commander of the Russian forces in Bayazet Pashalyk. Later Paskevich reported to Nicholas I :

 I knew that the Bayazet detachment was very weak and that I gave the entire left flank to the mercy of fate. In fact, I should have left Gen. M. Pankratiev with 3 battalions, which I took from there, but then at my main point there would be very few troops, and I would not dare to attack the enemy in such strong positions and proceed to Erzurum; I didn’t have other troops, for secures [reinforcements] had not yet arrived.
- From the most comprehensive report c. Paskevich (July 14, 1829 - Erzurum) [3]
 

The Offensive of the Van Pasha on Bayazet

Back in March and August 1829, General Popov received information about the gathering of Turkish forces in the Van Eyale for an attack on the Bayazet Pashalyk, but information from various sources was very contradictory. Popov informed Paskevich about this situation, asking him for permission to carry out reconnaissance in the direction of Van to clarify the situation, in order to continue to act according to circumstances, but was refused [32] .

In the meantime, Van Pasha had really been preparing for an attack on Bayazet since spring, but only at the beginning of June, when Count Paskevich with the main building was already on the outskirts of Erzurum, the seraskir (commander in chief) by Turkish troops ordered Van Pasha to urgently speak on Bayazet. The purpose of this offensive was to divert the main Russian forces from Erzurum. In addition, the occupation of Bayezet by Turkish troops meant a breakthrough of the left flank of the Russian troops in Anatolia and made it possible to first strike the rear of the main corps of Paskevich advancing on Erzurum [33] .

On June 6 (18), up to 3000 Turkish cavalry approached the fortification in the vicinity of Toprah-Kale (120 miles from Bayazet). The insignificant Russian garrison inside it opened artillery fire and made a small sortie, after which the enemy retreated and continued his movement to Bayazet, before looting several houses and taking with them up to 1,500 cattle and 70 Armenian shepherds, two of whom were killed [ 2] .

On June 17 (29) , when the Pasha of Van was in a two-day crossing from Bayazet, Popov received the first information about the movement of Turkish troops on him. By the morning of June 18 (30), the Turkish cavalry detachment (about 2000 people) crossed the Alla-Dag mountain and occupied the village of Kazi-Gol (20 miles from Bayazet), which is located in close proximity to Russian outposts . Going further, the advanced Turkish detachment encountered a Cossack reconnaissance detour and, after a cavalry clash with the loss of 200 people [34] [35], returned to Kazi-Gol. On June 19 (July 1), the Cossack patrol attempted to get as close to the Turkish camp as possible to identify the enemy’s forces, but was immediately met by the numerous Kurdish cavalry sent against it. The Cossack detachment was forced to retreat. Kurdish cavalry, pursuing the Cossacks, occupied the outposts previously occupied by the Russians [2] .

The forces of the parties

Russian garrison

The general Russian forces in the Bayazet sanjak (before the siege) consisted of 3.5 infantry battalions, Cossack regiment Colonel Shamshev (according to Monteit, 2,000 Russians and 1,000 Armenian police) [7] with the following deployment:

  • In Bayazet - Nasheburg regiment, a battalion of the Kozlovsky infantry (musketeer) regiment;
  • In Toprak-Kale - 2 companies of the Kozlovsky regiment;
  • In Diadin - a combined team of infantry companies and Cossacks.

The Armenian police were partly in Bayazet itself (battalion, 500 people), and partly in other points of the sanjak. Of the 12 guns, 10 were in Bayazet (there were also 7 captured ones) [32] .

The number of the Russian garrison in Bayazet (during the siege) [2] :

  • Infantry (13 companies of the Nasheburg and Kozlovsky musketeer regiments) - 1482 people;
  • Cossack Shamshev regiment - 339 people;
  • Armenian police (militia) - 500 people;
  • Field guns - 10;
  • Turkish (captured) guns - 7.
 
"New castle"
(Ishaq Pasha Palace)
 
"Old lock"
(there was a red battery)

Disposition for defense [Comm. 5] [36] :

  • The eastern battery (from the Makinsky road) - the 4th and 5th companies of the Kozlovsky regiment, 1 field and 3 Turkish guns;
    • In front of the eastern battery in a special “armored” building (or tower) - 50 people of the Armenian police;
  • New battery - company of the Nasheburg regiment, 2 field guns;
  • Western battery (from the Erivan road) - battalion of the Nasheburg regiment, 4 field guns;
    • Covering the western battery - 3rd company of the Kozlovsky regiment;
  • The southern line of the city between the new battery and the Erivan road (in small stone rubble) is the company of the Nasheburg regiment and the battalion of Armenian police;
  • In the citadel (new castle) - a company of the Nasheburg regiment, 4 field guns;
  • The red battery (at the old castle) - the company of the Nasheburg regiment, 4 Turkish Turkish guns;
    • At an altitude near the old castle - 200 Armenian police;
  • The general reserve located in the caravanserai is the Cossack Shamshy regiment.

Popov took over the leadership of the defense of the city from the Erivan road, and from the side of the Makinsky road was assigned to Major General Panyutin . Food and powder stocks were located in a new castle, as in a more impregnable [2] .

Turkish Corps

From May 29 ( June 10 ), information began to arrive that Turkish forces intending to launch an attack on Bayazet had gathered up to 15,000 [37] infantry and cavalry with 12 guns. According to scouts from June 17 (29) , when the Van Pasha was already in Kazi-Gol, his forces totaled about 9,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry with 12 guns and 2 mortars [3] .

Having approached Bayazet on June 19 ( July 1 ), the bulk of the Turkish forces numbered about 10,000 infantry and cavalry with 8 guns and 1 mortar [38] . W. Monteith reported that the forces of the Wansk Pasha, attacking Bayezet (we are talking about June 20), totaled 10,000 people and 7 guns [7] . General Turkish forces participating in the battlesOn June 20 ( 2 ) and June 21 ( July 3 ), there were 14,000 people with 14 guns [4] .

Siege

June 20

On June 20 (July 2), at 5 o’clock in the morning, Turkish forces moved from different directions to Bayazet. The outposts of the Russian outposts from the Makinsky road were shot down at once. Popov immediately put forward in that direction the entire Cossack regiment of Shamshev, which was in reserve. For 5 hours, the Cossacks restrained the enemy ’s attacks by “challenging every step” in front of the eastern battery, but were unable to contain the attack of the numerous Turkish cavalry and suffered significant losses, and began to retreat. To help the retreating Cossacks, who were on the verge of extermination, two companies of the Nasheburg regiment were expelled from the citadel. Seeing the approach of the Russian infantry, the Pasha van stopped the attack from the Makinsky road and sent the bulk of his troops to the red battery and to the western part of the city from the Erivan road. It soon became clear that this was a demonstration maneuver to divert Russian forces from the Makinsky road, from which Van Pasha was planning to deliver the main blow. By noon, all Turkish artillery was installed at the heights adjacent to the Muslim part of the city and the Makinsky road. However, Popov initially did not rule out such a turn of affairs and did not weaken the eastern battery, as well as the approaches to the city from the Makinsky road [39] [40] [41] .

 
Bayazet (now Dogubayazit )

By 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the main forces of the Turks again went to the Makinsky road and went on to storm the city. Van Pasha, having opened artillery fire on the eastern battery, sent numerous cavalry at it, followed by 2,000 infantry. “Under the auspices of the horse masses, who carried the whole fire of Russian artillery”, the Turkish infantry secretly crept up to the hill near the Muslim quarter with ravines and slopes and rushed to the eastern battery with shouts. The Armenian militiamen (50 people), who were in the ancient tower in front of the battery, “seized with the greatest horror” , barely managed to take refuge in the city, after which the Turks, taking that tower, immediately opened fire from it on the Russian battery. Another part of the Turkish infantry broke through the Muslim quarter into the city. At the first success of the Turkish troops, the inhabitants of the Muslim quarter opened fire from their homes in the rear of the Russian eastern battery. Major General Panyutin, the defense commander on the Makinsky road, was wounded in the thigh of his right leg and was immediately transferred to the stronghold at the dressing station. Of the commanders, only young artillery officers Opochinin , Radutsky, and Selivanov remained on the battery. Due to the mountainous terrain surrounding the battery, Russian artillery in its location was not able to fire further than 50 fathoms , which allowed attackers to come close. The Turks climbing the battery were met by the bayonets of its defenders [39] [40] [41] .

By the evening, after a 6-hour battle, of the 250 defenders of the eastern battery in the ranks (operational), only 60 remained, who, along with the wounded, began to retreat. However, one officer of the Caucasian Grenadier Artillery Brigade, Second Lieutenant Selivanov, remained on the battery. “Just a young man who participated in the battle for the first time that day,” Selivanov, despite receiving a bullet wound in his leg, leaning on a banner , passed from gun to gun and, personally loading them, continued to fire shots. The second bullet wound with a fragmentation of the shoulder threw Selivanov to the ground. The artillerymen, retreating in the meantime, returned to the battery to take out the wounded second lieutenant, but the latter shouted:

Away! To the guns! You should not have left your place! Protect not me, but the battery! [40] [41]

The gunners again rushed to their guns and joined the attack in hand-to-hand combat, trying in vain to maintain their position. Selivanov died from a third bullet wound in the heart [42] (according to S. A. Markevich, he was chopped off by the Turks at one of his guns [43] ). According to N. I. Ushakov , “the young officer, filled with extraordinary zeal, did not take a step back, and fell with his artillery” [39] . Having captured the battery, the enemy in a rage beheaded not only the wounded, but also the defenders killed [44] .

Meanwhile, the seriously wounded Panyutin, after the end of the dressing, led the 1st Grenadier Company of the Nasheburg Regiment to the battery captured by the Turks. The grenadiers, preceded by a stretcher with a wounded general, walked at an accelerated pace. Passing the retreating artillerymen by themselves, with a bayonet attack they knocked out the enemy from the battery they were occupying, but soon they could not stand the new attack of the Turks, and the battery again fell into the hands of the enemy. Soon, in a hurry to repel the eastern battery from different parts, a combined team of 100 people was assembled under the command of the artillery headquarters captain Trubnikov (2nd). After ¼ hours, this team suddenly attacked the Turks and forced them out of the battery. However, after a short period of time, the Turks again launched an intensified attack on the eastern battery. With its reflection, more than half of the fighters from the combined team were injured or killed. Trubnikov himself was seriously wounded in the chest, but, hastily bandaging the wound, continued to lead the defense of the battery and left it only "when there was no one to protect it" [41] .

At the same time, from 2 in the afternoon, Major General Popov with the main forces held the western line of the city. Turkish forces that broke into the Muslim quarter were supported by the local Turkish and Kurdish population. Colonel Borovsky, the commander of the Nasheburg infantry regiment, was wounded and Colonel Poyarkov took over the command of the regiment, who for quite some time kept the enemy in the Muslim quarter, waging fierce street battles with him, during which he was wounded, but continued to remain at the forefront until the end . Together with the Russian units, Armenian militias took an active part in the battles. According to Popov, the Armenians who retreated under the first onslaught of the Turks now fought fiercely, and their superiors were always ahead and almost all were injured or killed [45] [46] .

By evening, the Turks completely replaced the Russians from the Muslim quarter. Also, the Turks took the heights in front of the red battery, which was defended by Colonel Shamshev. Shamshev himself was seriously wounded in the chest during the fighting. By midnight, the Turks actually captured half of the city, including the eastern battery with 4 guns and other strategically important points [3] [47] .

Military Council (June 20-21)

On the night of On June 20 ( 2 ), on June 21 (July 3), until the morning in the Muslim quarter, the victory was celebrated by the Turkish troops, which was accompanied by gun and gun fire towards the Russian garrison. A depressing impression on the garrison was made by moans and screams brought to him, as it turned out later, of tortured Russian prisoners of war and several Armenian families [45] .

 
Major General F. S. Panyutin

That same night, Generals Popov and Panyutin held a meeting at which the first initially considered it "impossible to renew such a bloody defense again" , proposing to find the best ways to retreat. Panyutin, however, claimed that the retreat would entail even more terrifying losses, but at the same time he proposed not to attempt to regain the lost positions, but, on the contrary, to pull the troops to two castles and strengthen there. Finding no compromise, the generals decided to call Colonels Borovsky and Shamshev and Major Kutlyansky to the council to resolve the issue (the rest of the headquarters officers could not appear due to the most serious injuries). The staff officers who arrived at the council supported the opinion of Panyutin regarding the continuation of the defense. The Military Council came to the decision to occupy both castles, and to position the defensive line evenly at their foots [48] .

All units located on the approaches to the city from the Erivan road, as well as stretched along the western part of the city, were secretly relocated to the designated points that night. The Cossack regiment dismounted and took up defense in the new castle. Empty tents were left in their former places in order to mislead the enemy, who had no idea about the large-scale redeployment of Russian forces. All Russian artillery was sent in advance to the eastern battery, the Muslim quarter and towards the Makinsky road [48] [46] .

June 21

At dawn on June 21 (July 3), Russian artillery suddenly opened intense fire on Turkish positions. The Turks, in turn, launched an attack on the old castle, but were repelled by the two companies of the Nasheburg regiment who were there, who immediately counterattacked the enemy and, with the support of the fire of two weapons of the second lieutenant Opochinin, knocked him out from a height on the eve of the one recaptured from Shamshev. Popov immediately arrived at the dominant height and the wounded Panyutin was delivered on a stretcher, who encouraged the soldiers with his presence. Retreating from the old castle, the Turks launched an attack on the new castle. He was firmly held by infantry, Cossacks and Armenian militias, striking the attacking Turks with "cores, buckshot, rifle defense and strikes against peaks and bayonets" [34] . After several unsuccessful attempts to seize the citadel, the Turks retreated. Following this, 6 Russian guns concentrated their fire on the Muslim quarter, where the main Turkish forces were based. By 11 o’clock in the morning, most of the houses were destroyed and the Turks began to gradually retreat to the blockhouses of the eastern battery to shelter from the fire of Russian artillery [49] .

Without missing a favorable moment, Popov decided to counterattack the enemy and regain the positions previously lost by the Russians. To do this, he sent the Armenian police to the Muslim quarter to completely oust the enemy from there. Nashebourg arrows were sent to the eastern battery under the command of Captain Poltinin and two companies of the Kozlovsky regiment. After a fierce battle, the Turks were driven out with the batteries they occupied, and thanks to the swift throw of the Russian infantry, they did not manage to withdraw a single gun, as a result of which the eastern battery with all its 4 guns remained in the hands of the Russians. Meanwhile, a bloody picture broke out in the Muslim quarter. The Armenians, embittered by the fact that several Armenian families were tortured in it the night before, fought with particular bitterness, not giving mercy to either the enemy or local Muslim residents, not excluding women and children. According to an eyewitness, “more than 1000 corpses testified to the wild reprisal against traitors made here” [45] .

Vansky Pasha ordered the Russians to be driven out of their positions at all costs, and at 12 o’clock in the afternoon, 6,000 Turks with furious shouts rushed to the city from the Makinsky road. However, Popov was expecting an enemy counterattack, and all Russian artillery, which had previously taken aim at a certain area in the immediate vicinity of the eastern battery and waiting for the enemy to line up with the line of sight, simultaneously opened cross-fire from three sides. The Turkish attack was stopped and the enemy began an erratic retreat. A firing volley was fired at the departing Turks, which, in view of the cramped retreats, increased their damage [3] [46] .

Loss of Parties

Russians

Losses of the Russian garrison during battles from among regular units for July 20 ( 2 ) and June 21 (3) were [5] :

List of deceased officers (June 20)

Kozlovsky Infantry Regiment:

  • Captain Valentine
  • Warrant Officer Perekrestov ;

3rd light company of the Caucasian grenadier artillery brigade:

  • Second Lieutenant Selivanov ;

Don Cossack Shamshev Regiment:

  • corral Kirsanov
  • killed:
    • chief officers - 4 people;
  • lower ranks - 73 people;
  • wounded:
    • headquarters officers - 4 people;
    • chief officers - 17 people;
    • lower ranks - 311 people;
  • missing:
    • lower ranks - 12 people.

And of that, the total losses of the Russians amounted to 421 people, which accounted for almost a third of the entire garrison. Also, according to various sources, the total losses of Russians as a result of 2-day battles range from 400 [7] to 475 [46] people.

Of the Armenian police units, 90 people were killed [6] , the number of wounded is unknown. During the fighting on June 20 ( July 2 ), almost all of their commanders were wounded or killed [45] .

For 32 hours, the Russian garrison issued 120 thousand rounds and 1,430 rounds [3] . According to the compilers of the URVK (vol. 4, part 2) , taking into account the small number of garrison, flintlock guns and the number of guns, “the case is almost the only one in the then field battles” [50] .

Turkish

After the Turks retreated on June 21 ( July 3 ), of these, more than 400 bodies of the dead remained on the battlefield. According to the testimony of Turkish prisoners of war, their total losses killed and wounded amounted to 2000 people [3] .

Дальнейшая осада (22—30 июня)

Из донесения Попова Паскевичу:

Пока неприятельский лагерь так близко, мы можем много потерпеть, ибо если пробудем ещё 2—3 недели в таком положении, то жители погибнут от голода… Снарядов ещё достаточно для двух неприятельских штурмов, но патронов едва ли достанет для одного… В Козловском полку офицеров весьма недостаточно: молодые прапорщики командуют ротами, и нет ни одного штаб-офицера; полковой командир ранен, майор Яниковский тоже, подполковник Тршесневский сошёл с ума, Курский ушиблен лошадью без надежды к выздоровлению — и за полком смотреть некому… Чума продолжается; скученность войск усиливает болезнь… Если бы немного подкрепления, то можно бы было прогнать неприятеля и освободиться от этой тяжкой блокады [51] .

В первой половине часа пополудни турецкие войска были отбиты со всех направлений, после чего они вынуждены были отступить к дальним высотам на расстояние около 9 вёрст от Баязета, где расположились в ожидании подкрепления. В самом городе все русские раненые были перенесены в новый замок, а тела погибших (большей частью обезглавленных противником) были похоронены [51] .

Вскоре в городе начался голод. Турецкими войсками был угнан почти весь скот, а остававшийся в городе, падал от бескормицы из-за вытоптанных курдскими конями полей. Жители явились к Попову, прося у него «дневного пропитания» , и последний выдал им продовольствие из казённых запасов. Курдская конница систематически производила незначительные набеги на окрестности города, и казакам по тревоге почти ежедневно приходилось выступать против неприятеля. При одном из наиболее удачных набегов курдской конницы, когда казаки только вернулись из очередного рейда, курды сразу повторили налёт и увели весь остававшийся у жителей скот, а охранявшие его 16 армянских милиционеров были взяты в плен и наследующий день их тела были найдены обезглавленными [51] .

О результатах битвы и дальнейшем тяжёлом положении русского гарнизона и жителей Баязета Попов доносил Паскевичу, прося у него подкрепления. Однако ослабление главного действующего корпуса, который уже долгое время также ожидал подкреплений из Тифлиса , значительно уменьшало бы шансы на успех относительно главной цели кампании — взятие Эрзерума. Паскевич отвечал Попову, что самая деятельная помощь для него будет, если он (Паскевич) разобьёт трехбунчужного ( мушира или генерал-аншефа ) Гакки-пашу и сераскира , а когда, «если Бог благословит» , Эрзерум будет взят, то ванский паша сам оставит Баязет и «будет помышлять о собственном спасении» [3] [52] .

Дальнейшая осада Баязета из рапорта Паскевича Николаю I (от 14 июля 1829 г. — Эрзерум) [3] :

  • 22 июня — конные толпы турецкие подходили к городу с разных сторон, но действием артиллерии нашей были отбиты; им удалось только отогнать в сие время несколько обывательского скота.
  • 23 июня — неприятель занял все высоты вокруг города и оставался без действий. Это было фальшивое выказывание войск для скрытия отступления его, ибо турки в сей день перешли в старый лагерь их при дер. Кази-Гёль.
  • 24 июня — они снова большими толпами показались вокруг города, но небыли допущены артиллериею нашею и отступили.
  • 25 июня — рекруты (300 чел.), шедшие из Грузии в Баязет, прибыли в дер. Кара-Булах, что подле Баязета. Ванский паша послал 5-тысячный конный отряд отрезать им дорогу. Ген.-м. Попов, осведомись о сём, послал навстречу рекрут 3 роты (200 чел.), 3 сотни казаков и одно орудие под начальством полк. Боровского. Турки не поспели перерезать сообщение, и рекруты соединились с нашим отрядом, а неприятель отступил.
  • 26 июня — конные партии турок, вероятно, для грабежа пришли по ту сторону Арарата к Араксу и напали там на армян, переселяющихся к нам из Баязетского санджака.
  • 27, 28, 29 и 30 июня — неприятель каждый день окружал город, стоял до полудня и после отступал в лагерь.

Между тем, пока ванский паша осаждал Баязет, главный русский корпус Паскевича 19 июня (1) июля разгромил сераскира Гаджи-Салеха под Каинлами, 20 июня ( 2 июля ) нанёс сокрушительное поражение Хакки-паше под Милле-Дюзе, а 27 июня ( 9 июля ) русскими войсками был взят Эрзерум. Получив известие о падении последнего, ванский паша тут же снял осаду Баязета и, бросив свой лагерь со множеством имущества, 1 (13) июля двинулся в сторону Вана для защиты своего пашалыка [47] . Через 2 дня Баязетский санджак был полностью покинут неприятелем, а казаки заняли прежние свои пикеты [52] .

Value

Первое известие о 2-дневном «кровавом» сражении в Баязете и о дальнейшем критическом положении русского гарнизона по словам Н. И. Ушакова , заставило Паскевича пережить «несколько крайне тяжёлых минут раздумья и колебаний» . Оно было получено 23 июня (5) июля , когда главный русский корпус находился в Кара-Кургане. От данного пункта до Баязета было около 200 вёрст гористой местности. Русский авангард генерал-майора Ф. А. Бековича-Черкасского , находившийся тогда близ Хорасана , при быстром фланговом движении, пройдя 80 вёрст, мог бы на третьи сутки прибыть только в Топрах-Кале , который находился в 120 верстах от Баязета. Но выдвижение Бековича-Черкасского к последнему ослабляло бы главный действующий корпус Паскевича и, возможно, сводило бы его победы над войсками Гаджи-Салеха и Хакки-паши в Саганлугских горах на нет. По мнению Н. И. Ушакова, ведавшего в то время тайной канцелярией Паскевича, и В. А. Потто , «летописца Кавказских войн», — заслуга Паскевича заключается в том, что он «не допустил частному военному обстоятельству увлечь себя в такую минуту, когда разгром сераскира открывал перед ним ворота Эрзерума» . Паскевич остановился на решении не изменять изначально задуманному плану боевых действий, и данное решение оказалось вполне оправдано последующими событиями [52] [53] .

Удержание же самого Баязета, являвшегося тогда главной опорой левого фланга операционной базы русских войск в Анатолии, исключило возможность выхода турецкого корпуса ванского паши в тыл главному русскому корпусу Паскевича, что в значительной степени повлияло бы на дальнейший ход кампании. По утверждению Н. И. Ушакова:

 Потеря этого пункта без сомнения значительно расстроила бы главные наступательные операции действовавшего Корпуса. Но, к счастью, Ванский паша не имел достаточной предприимчивости, а стойкость гарнизона успела внушить ему весьма выгодное мнение о наших силах [52] . 

Consequences

С уходом ванского паши из Баязетского пашалыка в нём на некоторое время образовалось затишье. Паскевич, придерживаясь тонкой политики по отношению к этому пашалыку, предписывал Попову:

Всех баязетских турок, оказавшихся изменниками, — арестуйте; старшин куртинских не трогайте, чтобы не вооружить против нас народа; армянам не верьте — их преданность может быть признаком страха [53] .

Однако что касается последних, то Попов позволил себе возразить главнокомандующему, написав ему:

Армяне столько показали приверженности к нам в опасное время, что я долгом поставляю себе ходатайствовать перед Вашим Сиятельством — они заслуживают доброго о них мнения [53] .

Также, по донесению Попова: «…армяне ведут себя хорошо; русским преданы и повинуются начальству» . О мусульманском населении Попов писал Паскевичу, что оно также находится пока в спокойствии, но подвергается отрицательному по отношению к русским влиянию со стороны члена областного баязетского правления — курдского аги Сулеймана, назначенного Паскевичем командиром куртинского полка, а также брата последнего, находившегося при ванском паше. В случае вторжения турецких войск в Баязетский пашалык, их преданность ставилась под сомнение [53] .

Вскоре ванский паша, убедившись, что главные силы русских в Эрзеруме и без его участия испытывают крайние затруднения, с новыми силами вновь вторгся в Баязетский пашалык и 24 (12) июля его боковой отряд приблизился к Диадину, а 30 (18) июля главные его силы уже находились в селении Чубухлы, что в 45 верстах или 2-дневном переходе от Баязета [54] . К ванскому паше присоединились три курдских родоначальника «с народом своим» . Одной из значимых причин перехода местных пашей и беков на сторону турецких войск было прибытие в Константинополь английских и французских послов для посредничества о заключении мира. Послы заверяли, что «из завоёванных земель российское правительство не удержит за собою ни одного аршина» . Слухи об этом тут же разнеслись по Баязетскому и другим османским провинциям, находившимся в зоне боевых действий. Управляющие местными администрациями, «зная, что должны опять обратиться к турецкому правительству» , опасались оказывать содействие русским войскам [55] .

Баязету вновь угрожала реальная опасность. Согласно донесению Попова, ванский паша опять приближался к городу и уже сдвинул передовые русские пикеты, среди бойцов гарнизона свирепствовала чума и Попов уже не надеялся удержать город малочисленным гарнизоном, а намерен оборонять только замки. Но оставлять сам город неприятелю тоже было нельзя, так как последний перекрывал бы гарнизону воду. Местные жители бросили свою жатву и принялись спешно покидать город [55] . Несмотря на затруднительное положение главного корпуса, Паскевич всё-таки направил на подкрепление баязетскому гарнизону 6 рот Севастопольского полка, полк черноморских казаков и 4 орудия лёгкой артиллерии [56] под командованием генерала Реутта . Последний вместе с тем по приказу Паскевича сменил на своём посту генерала Попова, которому было приказано вступить в командование своей бригадой [Комм. 6] . С появлением дополнительных русских сил в Баязетском пашалыке, ванский паша распустил курдов по своим кочевьям и поспешил покинуть пашалык [54] .

2 (14) сентября 1829 года был подписан Адрианопольский мирный договор , по результатам которого к России отходили ряд территорий из европейской части османских владений и Закавказья , включая бо́льшую часть восточного побережья Чёрного моря . Баязетский же пашалык, ровно как Карский и Эрзерумский , возвращались Османской империи [57] . В 1829—1830 годах из Баязетского пашалыка в российские пределы переехали 4215 семей [58] , часть из которых поселилась на месте бывшего азербайджанского селения Гавар , где основали город Нор-Баязет (Ново-Баязет) [59] .

Awards and insignia

Коллективные награды

Георгиевские знамёна с надписью «За оборону крѣпости Баязета 20-го и 21-го iюня 1829 года» получили [60] :

  • 1-й и 2-й батальоны Козловского пехотного (мушкетёрского) полка ;
  • Нашебургский пехотный полк ;
  • Донской казачий Шамшева полк .

Individual rewards

Орденами Святого Георгия были награждены [61] :

No.Full NameChinPositionArt.dateЗа №
oneПопов, Павел Васильевичmajor generalкомандир 1-й бригады, 22-й пехотной дивизии3rd17.09.1829№ 415
2Панютин, Фёдор Сергеевичmajor generalкомандир 2-й бригады, 20-й пехотной дивизии3rd19.01.1830№ 421
3Шамшев, Иван КарповичColonelкомандир Донского казачьего полка4th06.08.1830№ 4405
fourБоровский, Александр ФёдоровичColonelкомандир Нашебургского пехотного полка4th06.08.1830№ 4406
3Полтинин, Михаил ПетровичмайорНашебургского пехотного полка4th06.08.1830№ 4408
fourТрубников, Степан ВасильевичкапитанЛёгкой 3-й роты, 22-й артиллерийской бригады4th06.08.1830№ 4410

Comments

  1. ↑ Турецкие власти запрещали колокольный звон и ношение какого бы то ни было головного убора кроме чалмы, но не вмешивались в дела внутреннего самоуправления армянского духовенства [9] .
  2. ↑ Из рапорта Паскевича Николаю I от 23 сентября 1828 года:

    …причиною возвращения как сих куртинцев, так и не участие прочих в защите Баязета должно особенно приписать прокламации, мною ещё при начале кампании распространённой между различными их племенами и в коей ясно представлены были выгоды, которые они получат, прибегнув к покровительству России, и несчастия им предстоящие, если осмелятся вооружаться против войск наших.

    — ЦГВИА [19]
  3. ↑ В армянском селении Чилькан, подвергшегося нападению карапапахов , один из курдов Гассан-аги пикой ранил карапапахского родоначальника Наги-хана [20] .
  4. ↑ По мнению составителей УРВК (т. 4, ч. 2) Б. П. Веселовзорова и В. А. Потто :

    Он [Паскевич] более всего опасался, чтобы успех не был приписан подчинённым генералам, и таким образом, не отнял бы у него военной славы. Так было в Тавризе с князем Эристовым , под Эриванью с Красовским и, наконец, в Баязете с князем Чавчавадзе.

    — Утверждение русского владычества на Кавказе [23] .

    Опале Паскевича, в виду своих военных успехов, во время той войны подвергся и начальник кавалерии действующего корпуса генерал-майор Н. Н. Раевский [24] . В дальнейшем нечто подобное произошло и с руководителем обороны Баязета — Поповым. Одной из причин ухода его в отставку было «неудовольствие с Паскевичем» [25] .

  5. ↑ При описании диспозиции гарнизона Ушаков перечисляет на одно полевое орудие больше (т. е. — 11), чем указывает в общем итоге (т. е. — 10) [2] .
  6. ↑ Что побудило Паскевича в столь опасную минуту сместить с поста командующего Баязетским пашалыком испытанного генерала Попова и заменить его генералом Реуттом оставалось невыясненным, но Попов счёл себя крайне оскорблённым, и по окончании войны вышел в отставку. Известно только, что между ним и Паскевичем произошли некие трения. Несмотря на предложение самого Николая I, желавшего удержать на службе столь «храброго генерала» , заменить отставку длительным отпуском, Попов не пожелал продолжать службу и отбыл в своё имение в Крыму, где посвятил остаток жизни хозяйственным заботам [53] .

Notes

  1. ↑ Reclus, 1876 , p. 259.
  2. ↑ 1 2 3 4 5 6 Ушаков, 1836 , с. 171—173 / Т. 2.
  3. ↑ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 АКАК, 1878 , с. 806—807, № 802 / Т. 7.
  4. ↑ 1 2 ЭВМН, 1883 , с. 381—382 / Т. 1.
  5. ↑ 1 2 Гизетти_, 1901 , с. 150—151.
  6. ↑ 1 2 Прошение баязетских жителей И. Ф. Паскевичу о предоставлении им места для жительства в районе озера Севана на предложенных ими условиях (январь 1830 г.) // ЦГИА Груз. ССР. Ф. 2. Оп. 1. Д. 2254. Л. 37—41. — Присоединение Восточной Армении к России, № 369.
  7. ↑ 1 2 3 4 Monteith, 1856 , p. 273—274.
  8. ↑ ВЭС, 1911 , с. 431.
  9. ↑ 1 2 Потто, 1889 , с. 219—220 / Т. 4.
  10. ↑ 1 2 3 4 5 Рапорт И. Ф. Паскевича Николаю I о взятии крепостей Баязет, Топрак-Кале и укрепления Диадин (23 сентября 1828 г.) // ЦГВИА. Ф. ВУА. Д. 4949. Л. 279—282 об. - ПВА , № 317.
  11. ↑ 1 2 Ушаков, 1836 , с. 352—353 / Т. 1.
  12. ↑ Потто, 1889 , с. 220—221 / Т. 4.
  13. ↑ УРВК, 1908 , с. 108 / Т. 4, Ч. 2.
  14. ↑ Эвоян, 1978 , с. 100.
  15. ↑ Потто, 1889 , с. 2222—223 / Т. 4.
  16. ↑ 1 2 Потто, 1889 , с. 226—228 / Т. 4.
  17. ↑ Ушаков, 1836 , с. 357—358 / Т. 1.
  18. ↑ УРВК, 1908 , с. 112 / Т. 4, Ч. 2.
  19. ↑ ЦГВИА . Ф. ВУА. Д. 4949. Л. 279—282 / об..
  20. ↑ Ушаков, 1836 , с. 361 / Т. 1.
  21. ↑ Ушаков, 1836 , с. 358—361 / Т. 1.
  22. ↑ Потто, 1889 , с. 228—232 / Т. 4.
  23. ↑ УРВК, 1908 , с. 126 / Т. 4, Ч. 2.
  24. ↑ УРВК, 1908 , с. 127 / Т. 4, Ч. 2.
  25. ↑ УРВК, 1908 , с. 384 / Т. 4, Ч. 2.
  26. ↑ Потто, 1889 , с. 240 / Т. 4.
  27. ↑ Monteith, 1856 , p. 221—222.
  28. ↑ Özcan, 2010 , s. 257—271.
  29. ↑ УРВК, 1908 , план. eight.
  30. ↑ УРВК, 1908 , с. 128 / Т. 4, Ч. 2.
  31. ↑ Из журнала командира Отдельного Кавказского корпуса о положении на турецком фронте (13 мая — 3 июня 1829 г.) // ЦГВИА. Ф. ВУА. Д. 4809. Л. 406 и об, 410—411 об. — Присоединение Восточной Армении к России, № 365.
  32. ↑ 1 2 3 Потто, 1889 , с. 484—487 / Т. 4.
  33. ↑ УРВК, 1908 , с. 373—374 / Т. 4, Ч. 2.
  34. ↑ 1 2 Пивоваров, 1892 , с. 165—166 (Из формулярного списка генерала Шамшева) .
  35. ↑ Краснов, 1909 , с. 378—379 / Т. 2.
  36. ↑ Ракович, 1900 , с. 121—124.
  37. ↑ АКАК, 1878 , с. 787, № 788 / Т. 7.
  38. ↑ АКАК, 1878 , с. 803—804, № 798 / Т. 7.
  39. ↑ 1 2 3 Ушаков, 1836 , с. 173—176 / Т. 2.
  40. ↑ 1 2 3 УРВК, 1908 , с. 376—377 / Т. 4, Ч. 2.
  41. ↑ 1 2 3 4 Потто, 1889 , с. 489—492 / Т. 4.
  42. ↑ Тифлисские ведомости // Ред. П. С. Санковский — Тф. , 1829. — № 35.
  43. ↑ Маркевич, 1853 , с. 206 / Т. 2.
  44. ↑ УРВК, 1908 , с. 376—378 / Т. 4, Ч. 2.
  45. ↑ 1 2 3 4 УРВК, 1908 , с. 378—379 / Т. 4, Ч. 2.
  46. ↑ 1 2 3 4 Потто, 1889 , с. 492—494 / Т. 4.
  47. ↑ 1 2 Chesney, 1854 , p. 211—212.
  48. ↑ 1 2 Ушаков, 1836 , с. 176—178 / Т. 2.
  49. ↑ Ушаков, 1836 , с. 178—179 / Т. 2.
  50. ↑ УРВК, 1908 , с. 380—381 / Т. 4, Ч. 2.
  51. ↑ 1 2 3 Потто, 1889 , с. 494—496 / Т. 4.
  52. ↑ 1 2 3 4 Ушаков, 1836 , с. 182—183 / Т. 2.
  53. ↑ 1 2 3 4 5 Потто, 1889 , с. 496—498 / Т. 4.
  54. ↑ 1 2 УРВК, 1908 , с. 385—388 / Т. 4, Ч. 2.
  55. ↑ 1 2 АКАК, 1878 , с. 809—810, № 805 / Т. 7.
  56. ↑ АКАК, 1878 , с. 814—815, № 808 / Т. 7.
  57. ↑ Адрианопольский мирный договор между Россией и Турцией (2 сентября 1829 г.) // Под стягом России (Сборник архивных документов) / Сост., примеч. А. А. Сазонова , Г. Н. Герасимовой , О. А. Глушковой , С. Н. Кистерева . — М. : Русская книга, 1992. — 432 с. — ISBN 5-268-01436-6 .
  58. ↑ ГИА РФ. Ф. 1377. Оп. 1. Д. 41. Л. 49.
  59. ↑ Вердиева, 2003 , с. 42—46, табл. 3.
  60. ↑ Гизетти, 1901 , с. 28, 115 / Ч. 2.
  61. ↑ Гизетти, 1901 , с. 42—44 / Ч. 1.

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Источник — https://ru.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Оборона_Баязета_(1829)&oldid=100438423


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