Fight in the Bay of Biscay

At the end of 1943, the German Navy surface forces based in the ports of Western France, the 8th destroyer flotilla and the 4th destroyer flotilla, carried out operations to secure passage to the German-controlled Atlantic ports of the blockade-breaking transport with strategic materials from Japan. On December 27, for the meeting and escorting of the Alsterufer ship (Operation Trave), destroyers Z-27 (the flag of the commander of the 8th fleet of destroyers captain Tsur See G. Erdmenger), Z-23, Z-24, Z-32 left Bordeaux and Z-37, accompanied by destroyers T-25 and T-27. At sea, they were joined by the destroyers T-23 (the flag of the commander of the 4th flotilla of destroyers Corvette-Captain F. Kolaufa), T-22, T-24 and T-26, which had left the same morning. Thus, the German compound now numbered 5 destroyers and 6 destroyers, in total - 11 ships.

On the same day, the light cruisers Glasgow and Enterprise (with the Canadian team ^[1] ,), the closest of those on duty in the ocean in the area where the vessel was detected, were sent to intercept the Alsterufer, noticed by a British patrol plane. The flagship of the detachment was the commander of the larger Glasgow cruiser Captain C. Clark, the commander of the cruiser Enterprise was the captain of the Royal Navy of Canada G. Grand.

Even before the cruisers arrived, the Alsterufer was sunk by a distant bomber of the British Royal Air Force (from the Czechoslovak squadron). On December 28, at 10.18 a.m., the German destroyers and destroyers reached the designated meeting point with the Alsterufer and, not finding the ship there, lay down on the opposite course to the French coast. At this time, they were spotted by an American patrol plane, transmitting information about the enemy’s ships to British cruisers, which lay on the course of intercepting the German compound. At 12.24, Glasgow and Enterprise were discovered and unsuccessfully attacked by German bombers, but a radio message about the discovery of British ships was sent to German ships at sea only two hours later.

Much earlier, at 12.58, Glasgow and Enterprise approaching from the northwest were spotted from one of the German destroyers. Erdmenger immediately ordered the 4th Flotilla to attack the enemy with torpedoes, but the flotilla commander Kolauf replied that torpedo shooting from destroyers is impossible due to the hurricane wind. The British were only able to visually observe the German compound at 13.32, although before that they had been tracking it with radars. At 13.46, the opponents came close to 105 cable ones, after which almost simultaneously the Glasgow cruiser opened artillery fire, and the Z-23 destroyer shot at the British in a volley of 6 torpedoes.

British squad - 2 ships:

• Light Cruiser Glasgow

It was commissioned in 1937. Displacement 9100/11 350 tons. Speed ​​32 knots. Crew 800 people Armament: twelve 152-mm guns, eight 102-mm guns (anti-aircraft), two 3-pipe torpedo tubes.

• Light cruiser Enterprise

It was commissioned in 1926. Displacement 7580/9500 t Speed ​​33 knots. Crew - 572 hours. Armament: five 152-mm guns ^[2] , three 102-mm guns (anti-aircraft), four 4-pipe torpedo tubes.

German Union - 11 ships:

• Five Narvik-class destroyers

Put into operation in 1940-1941. Displacement 3079/3543 tons. Speed ​​36-37 knots. Crew 332 hours. Armament: five 150-mm guns (except Z-27 - 4 150-mm guns), two 4-pipe torpedo tubes

• Six destroyers of the Elbing type .

Put into operation in 1942-1943. Displacement 1294/1754 tons. Speed ​​33 knots. Crew 206 hours. Armament: four 105-mm guns, two three-pipe torpedo tubes.

At first glance, superior power was on the side of the Germans, who had eleven ships against two of the British. However, the British had a qualitative superiority. Light cruisers were considered higher class warships than destroyers and, especially, destroyers. Glasgow was one of the most advanced Royal Navy cruisers with high speed and very powerful artillery weapons. The Enterprise was significantly inferior to Glasgow, but, nevertheless, despite its considerable age, it could successfully interact with it due to its good driving performance, as well as its strong torpedo weapons.

At the same time, the powerful mine armament of German destroyers and destroyers in principle posed a serious threat to large British ships. Two months earlier in a night battle, five destroyers of the 4th Flotilla torpedoed and sunk the British light cruiser and destroyer.

In addition, German ships, with respect to their small size, had very strong artillery weapons. In total, the German compound was more than double the number of medium-caliber barrels by the British cruisers (twenty-four 150-mm and twenty-four 105-mm guns on German destroyers, against seventeen 152-mm and eleven 102-mm guns on Glasgow and Enterprise ").

However, the superiority of the Germans in artillery armament due to the superiority in the number of guns in practice was illusory. The cruisers, due to their size, presented a more stable platform for artillery fire, which significantly increased the accuracy of their fire in comparison with the unstable destroyers. The British ships also had better fire control systems, as well as more advanced artillery systems. This was especially true for the Glasgow with its four 3-gun turrets with a high degree of automation, while the German guns were manually loaded. It should be remembered that for small German destroyers, enemy shells were much more dangerous than for British cruisers, in addition, protected by armor.

A serious advantage of German ships could be their high speed (which applies only to destroyers, destroyers were not faster than British cruisers). However, larger and higher-class British ships had better seaworthiness, which ultimately played a decisive role, since the battle took place in difficult storm conditions. Small low-breasted German ships were much more affected by strong waves and hurricane winds. They could not develop a full speed, the waves rolled across the decks, knocking down the servants of the openly located destroyer guns, which should have brought 45-kg shells to the guns under the strongest rolling motion. This greatly affected the rate of fire, in addition, the fire from the destroyers was conducted mostly at random, as waves and splashes flooded the glass of the optical rangefinders. As for even smaller German destroyers than destroyers, they were practically unable to conduct artillery fire or shoot torpedoes in a storm, their participation in the battle as part of the formation was limited to putting out smoke screens. Thus, due to the storm, half of the German squadron was completely deprived of combat readiness, and the other half was not able to effectively conduct the battle.

The German compound moved in three columns, heading east. The destroyers marched in the center, the destroyers Z-23 and Z-27 in the right, closest to the enemy, and the Z-32, Z-37 and Z-24 in the left. The German flagship G. Erdmenger did not change course, although he led to a rapprochement with the enemy. Regarding the reasons for this decision, two versions have been put forward in the literature. According to the first, Erdmenger did not change course for evading the battle, since he mistakenly assumed his connection was obviously the strongest and himself sought to impose a battle on the enemy ^[3] . According to the second version, the German commander soberly assessed the combat effectiveness and driving performance of his ships in a storm. Due to increased excitement, as well as malfunctions in the propulsion system on the Z-24, the connection could go only at 27 knots, while the British cruisers freely developed 32 knots. Erdmenger, realizing that in any case he would not be able to tear himself away from the enemy, decided to accept the battle ^[4] ., While continuing to break through the shortest route to the coast of France.

During the first half hour, the battle took place in parallel courses at a distance reduced from 100 to 75 cable. From the German side, only the flagship Z-27 and Z-23 first participated in it. After the first torpedo salvo, to no avail because of the distance limit for torpedoes, two destroyers fired artillery fire from 13.58 on the enemy. At 14.05, the destroyers Z-32 and Z-37 joined in shelling the enemy, stepping forward along the course. At 14.15, a volley of 4 torpedoes was fired from the Z-37, after which the Germans allegedly observed a torpedo hit in one of the British cruisers. In fact, a British detachment at that time attacked a distant German bomber, the explosions of its bombs and were mistaken for a torpedo explosion. The Germans managed to achieve a single hit in Glasgow with a 150-mm shell, which damaged the fan casing over the boiler compartment. The British fire at the first stage of the battle, however, was also not effective, despite pointing at the target with radars (during the battle on the Glasgow the artillery radar failed and the cruiser fired using the search radar) and much better working conditions for the artillery crews, especially on the Glasgow with automatic loading of guns; Canadians at the Enterprise in stormy conditions also experienced problems with manual loading, although much less than the Germans.

At 14.18, Erdmenger ordered the division of his forces into two groups in order to attack the British with torpedoes from two sides, firing crosswise and thereby making it difficult to evade hits. The flagship destroyer Z-27 with Z-23 and destroyers T-22, T-25, T-26 turned north. The remaining ships went south. At 14.23, the destroyer Z-32 from the southern group fired 6 torpedoes, and at 14.28 a 4-torpedo salvo was fired by the head of the northern group Z-27; one torpedo fired from the Z-23. A coordinated torpedo attack failed. None of the German torpedoes hit the target. F. Kolauf subsequently condemned his boss in the battle for the separation of forces, which allowed the British to attack the Germans individually. However, perhaps by his maneuver Erdmenger aimed at giving the opportunity to break through to the coast at least part of his formation. In any case, having fired torpedoes, Erdmenger transmitted by radio the commander of the Z-32 destroyer, Corvette-Captain von Berger, the order to lead the southern group and go east with it. Erdmenger himself with two destroyers and three destroyers turned to the west, carrying along the British cruisers.

Glasgow fire in the second stage of the battle became much more accurate. At 14.30, the flagship German destroyer covered his volley. A 152-mm British shell, falling short of time, went under water, hit the Z-27 below the waterline and exploded in the boiler room, damaging the main turbine of the left turbine. The destroyer lost speed, outboard water flowed into the fuel tanks through the hole. Z-23 covered the damaged Z-27 with a smoke screen, two torpedoes fired into it from the Enterprise passed the target. "Glasgow" at that time transferred fire to three German destroyers of the northern group. At 14.54 an accurate volley of the British cruiser covered the T-25. The destroyer was hit in the stern, the turbine failed, the stern engine room was filled with water. Soon another 152-mm shell blew the front chimney and damaged a turbine in the fore engine room. Covering the losing track T-25, the destroyer T-22 fired a volley of 6 torpedoes at 14.58. At 15.10, three torpedoes were launched from the damaged T-25, all to no avail. “Glasgow”, meanwhile, was fired at skillfully maneuvering under fire the destroyer T-26, which for a long time managed to avoid hits. However, at 15.21 the British shell exploded in the boiler room of the destroyer and caused a big fire. The last remaining intact destroyer T-22 tried to launch a new torpedo attack, but under fire Glasgow was able to only cover the remaining ships without a smoke screen.

To help the northern group, the destroyers Z-32 and Z-37 from the southern group tried to come at 3.30 p.m. (Z-24 with a propulsion system damaged in a storm and three destroyers von Berger ordered to continue the withdrawal to the French coast). Glasgow and Enterprise turned towards the ships of the southern group, but the Z-32 and Z-37 did not dare to accept the battle and began to retreat north-east. Having lost sight of them, Glasgow and Enterprise returned to finish off the damaged German ships. In the short time the British cruisers were absent, the destroyer Z-23 tried to remove the crew from the damaged Z-37, and the destroyer T-22 from the T-25 and T-26 that were idle, however, when the enemy appeared again, Erdmenger ordered the serviceable ships to leave and break through on their own to any port on the coast. At 15.45, the Z-23s and T-22s headed off to the southeast, basking in smoke and darkness with the British ships. Returning to the battlefield, the British cruisers split up. Glasgow took over the pursuit of the German destroyer, and the Enterprise was charged with locating and destroying the enemy destroyers. The Enterprise was the first to discover the T-26 destroyer engulfed in fire and opened fire on it with guns, and at 16.17, approaching a German ship standing in place, fired a torpedo. At 16.20, the T-26 sank. Then the Enterprise was found by the destroyer T-25, where at that moment they were desperately trying to start the stern turbine and set in motion. Having discovered the T-25, the cruiser opened fire on it with guns, to which the Germans could only respond from two small-caliber anti-aircraft guns. At 16.35, the Enterprise approached the T-25 and also launched a torpedo. Torpedo destroyer lasted on the water for another half hour. Glasgow, meanwhile, overtook the Z-27, which increasingly lost track of shells and fuel clogging with seawater through a hole. In 16.41, the Glasgow hit the destroyer in the military cellar. There was a big explosion, and the Z-27 quickly sank with a roll to the port side.

Having sunk the German ships, Glasgow and Enterprise left the scene of the battle. After some time, the destroyers Z-32 and Z-37 from the southern group of von Berger returned again and began to rescue surviving ships. In total, 220 people died in the battle on the destroyer Z-27. (including captain zur See Erdmenger), saved 93; on the destroyer T.-25, 85 people died, 100 were saved; 96 people were killed on the destroyer T-26, 90 were saved. The total casualties of the Germans during the battle amounted to 401 people. Glasgow had 2 killed and 6 wounded in a single German shell hit, Canadians at the Enterprise had no casualties. On December 29, Glasgow and Enterprise arrived in Plymouth. On the way to the base, they were attacked several times by German bombers, but British ships escaped with minor shrapnel damage from nearby explosions. German ships from the defeated Erdmenger compound arrived on December 28 separately at various ports on the Atlantic coast of France: the destroyer Z-24, the destroyers T-23, T-24, T-27 - to Brest; destroyers Z-32 and Z-37 - in Bordeaux; destroyer Z-23 and destroyer T-22 - in Saint-Jean-de-Luc (near the border with Spain). After the battle in the Bay of Biscay, Germany refused to deliver strategic materials from Japan by transport vessels, in the future only submarines were used for this

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