Number 61 at the stern follows common practice for military transports. The same number entered against the name in the Lloyd's Register
Transport Committee ( eng. Transport Board , less often Board of Transport, Transport Service , or Transport Office ) - a section of the British Admiralty , responsible for the transport of troops and goods in the interests of the fleet and army . It existed until 1756 and from 1794 to 1817 .
History
The predecessor of the Transport Committee was created in 1689 specifically for the transportation of troops to Ireland, the body, which later became known as the Transport Commission, and assumed responsibility for all military transport by sea. The commission lasted until 1724 , after which it was dissolved. [1] Several divisions of the Military Cabinet shared her responsibilities. However, this method proved to be weak, and did not last long.
Under other names, including the Transport Committee, the body remained independent until 1756 . But with the beginning of the Seven Years War, it was dissolved, and duties were again transferred to the Navy Committee.
American Revolutionary War
Understanding the problems encountered during the transportation and supply of troops was made even more difficult by the transfer of certain functions to different committees of the Admiralty, and their separation from each other and from the Whitehall Cabinet . By the start of the American War of Independence, four different committees competed among themselves for the tonnage available. The Treasury hired supply transports for the army; Naval Committee - military transports , as well as freight for the delivery of marine supplies to shipyards and fleets overseas; Arms Committee ( Eng. Ordnance Board ) - for the transport of artillerymen, ammunition and engineering equipment; Supply Committee - fleet supply transports. Only in March 1779 the situation became somewhat more reasonable. The Treasury had neither people nor experience in hiring transports for the army and, partly due to the decisiveness of Charles Middleton , then the fleet controller, these functions were transferred to the Naval Committee. [2]
At first, the British Army in America was expected to be able to partially provide for its needs from local resources, but its inability to capture sufficient coastal territories, especially regarding firewood and fodder for horses, immediately created a crisis. By the beginning of 1778, the Treasury, which was responsible for provisions and supplies, had assembled a fleet of 115 transports with a total tonnage of 30,052 tons . But in 1779, the assuming charge of the Naval Committee discovered that in addition to 38,000 regular troops in America and 7,000 in Canada , it had supplies to 10,500 who were heading to the West Indies , 369 deployed in West Africa , almost 5,000 in Gibraltar, and over 2100 in Minorca .
By December 1781, the Naval Committee had 369 hired transports - 157 military and 212 freight. He surpassed these numbers only in July 1776 , when he hired 416 transports, a total of 128 427 tons, for transporting the 27,000th army to America. Most of these vessels were found by advertisements in London newspapers, after which they were measured, surveyed, evaluated and equipped at the royal shipyards, primarily in Deptford .
Overseas delivered infantry, cavalry, bivouac equipment, army uniforms, horses, Quartermaster supplies, goods for exchange with the Indians, and many other items. Bivouac equipment, for example, included tents with poles and stakes, hammers, barrels, gunpowder caps, axes, sickles, stakes and ropes, buckets, kettles, flasks, satchels and camp flags.
The troops were loaded at the rate of 100 people per 200 tons of gross. The tall man could neither stand in the decks at full height, nor sit right in the bunk. Six people were crammed into a cubicle, designed for four. They could not sleep at the same time, if only they did not fit closely, and then they also had to roll over together. One experienced Hessian mercenary wrote: “The most difficult campaign will not be such a test as a similar transition.” [3] And a certain guard officer spoke out even more strongly.
The problems of communication and coordination between the committees have not been overcome. But even if they were, the most rational organization could not do anything with the physical shortage of ships available for transports. After 1780, the fleet tried several times to raise this issue in the Cabinet, but in vain. [2]
Methods
All this time, the practice of the committee, commission, or departments, regardless of the name, was the same: they acted “on call”. When there was another need for the transportation or supply of troops, a request was made, which Parliament transmitted to the Privy Council of the kingdom. The decrees signed there ( Eng. Orders in Council ) became the legal basis for the hiring or requisition, as well as the conversion of transports. The selection of suitable vessels from the merchant fleet began, their collection at shipyards for inspection and alteration, staffing and organization in detachments or convoys. When there was no need for them, they were returned to the owners or sent to raid service, for sale, for scrap, etc. This was a relatively slow process, and more than once it happened that the lack of ready-to-leave transports forced the expedition to be postponed for the season.
Another drawback of such methods was the lack of readiness, and often the reluctance of merchant captains to obey naval discipline, to comply with warrants, to receive and transmit signals, and so on, which further complicated the use of merchant ships for military purposes. So, in 1782, out of 31 vehicles traveling with the fleet to besieged Gibraltar , only 4 correctly understood the instructions and entered the bay immediately. The rest missed the turn, and the fleet had to collect them for three more days and bring them to the port. [four]
Personally, the secretary of the Admiralty, Charles Middleton , since 1780, advocated the creation of a flotilla of not hired, but constantly assigned transports under the direct control of the fleet. In his opinion, this should have decisively influenced the success of future expeditions, since the time lost in hiring, collecting and preparing transports often meant losing strategic surprise, and poor landing results. [2]
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars
Revived after 1794, the Transport Committee experienced significant growth. In addition to the colonial war overseas, this growth was due to the rapidly changing situation in Europe, with landing expeditions to the continent. So, in 1800, the same expeditionary army received an order to make four landings - in Italy ( Livorno ), in Spain ( Ferrol ), in Malta and in France ( Quiberon ). [five]
In addition, Middleton, later Lord Barham, continued efforts to acquire fleets of transports. When such transports appeared (mainly by reworking from old two-deck ships), the Committee had a permanent ship composition, the organization grew, and it became more and more often called the Transport Service.
The biggest factor in the growth of the fleet of transports was the Iberian War . Then the Parliament made a political decision not to allow the army to "feed from the ground", that is, not to feed on the ground, so as not to repel the population. Instead, they decided to deliver all supplies by sea - the first case in the history of wars. The costs were huge, but it was decided that for the sake of the success of the war, Britain could afford them. Committee Needs
... for the hiring and acquisition of ships and vessels, for the transport of troops and convoys, food, weapons and ammunition, housing, supplies, naval and military supplies of all kinds
Original textthe hiring and appropriating of ship's and vessels for the conveyance of troops and baggage, victualling, ordnance, barrack, commissariat, naval and military stores of all kinds [6]
by 1810, 980 vessels with a total tonnage of 250,000 tons reached one tenth of the total merchant tonnage of Great Britain. The Transport Committee was based in London and consisted of 6 members, or commissioners, usually the full captain , and local agents (usually lieutenants in age) at the ports of Deptford , Deal , Portsmouth , Plymouth , Cork , Dublin , Liverpool and Leith . In Deptford and Portsmouth, field agents were captains, and it was in these two places that the transports were usually inspected and hired, with copper sheathed being preferred. Other officers served as “agents on board,” acting as commododors , each in charge of his own squad of transports.
The hired vessels, usually 350-600 tons, were often specially equipped with horse stalls or cockpits (four soldiers each). An infantry battalion of 600 transported three vehicles. From this it is clear that the army demanded one or two hundred.
Military transports, of which there were 40–50 in those years, were used only for delivering supplies to overseas bases. But the Committee's main concern was supporting the army on the Iberian Peninsula. in 1810, 320 transports went straight to Portugal and Spain , and another 120 to Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Sea . Of the remaining 15, only 15 were engaged in supporting troops in Helgoland and the Baltic , and another 19 in other places, such as Canada , Cape of Good Hope , South America and the West Indies . Troops sent to the East Indies were transported on Company ships. Another 54 vehicles were used offshore and in the Irish Sea . The cost of hiring was 25 shillings per ton for sheathed copper, 21 shillings for sheathed wooden rails, and 20 shillings for simple buildings, where the main board is not covered by anything.
Most of the transports were commanded by the former merchant captains, with a crew of five and one battle ( Jung ) for every 100 tons. However, fleet-equipped, specially redesigned “armed transports” were under the command of superlisted lieutenants, and either served as security for groups of conventional transports, or made transitions on their own. They were either from the "merchants" hired empty, without a team, or former frigates or small two-deckers , armed en flûte , with greatly reduced armaments, in order to make room for troops and cargo. In general, service on them was considered the second grade in the fleet, the lot of unsuccessful or old officers. However, such people as James Bowen , who rose from the master to the admiral, also came out of them.
In 1806 , with the abolition of the Committee on the Sick and Wounded ( English Sick and Hurt Board ), his duties and part of the staff were transferred to the Transport Committee. [7]
Dissolution and followers
The end of the Napoleonic Wars prompted the Admiralty to save. In particular, supporters of the opinion appeared that the collective responsibility of the Committee leads to inefficiency and waste of funds. In 1817, the Committee was abolished, and its functions were divided by the Naval Committee and the Procurement Committee ( Eng. Victualling Board ), while reducing the number of members to 8. [7]
During the Crimean War, the Committee was revived as a mixed service of the navy and the army, and in 1861 , on the recommendation of the Commission of the House of Commons , it was replaced by the Transport Office ( English Transport Office ), subordinate only to the Lords. A year later, he was transformed into the Transport Department of the Admiralty ( Eng. Transport Department of the Admiralty ).
Notes
- ↑ Morriss, Naval Power ... p. 60.
- ↑ 1 2 3 Navies and the American Revolution / R. Gardiner, ed. - P. 102.
- ↑ Navies and the American Revolution / R. Gardiner, ed. - P. 103.
- ↑ Navies and the American Revolution / R. Gardiner, ed. - P. 178−179.
- ↑ Nelson Against Napoleon / R. Gardiner, ed. - P. 134.
- ↑ Reports of the Commissioners Appointed by Parliament to Enquire into the Fees, Gratuities, and Emoluments, ... 1806: 9. Cit. by: The Victory of Seapower / R. Gardiner, ed. - P. 158.
- ↑ 1 2 Morriss, Naval Power ... p. 195.
Literature
- Nelson Against Napoleon: From the Nile to Copenhagen, 1798−1801 / Robert Gardiner, ed. - London: Chatham Publishing, 1997 .-- 192 p. - ISBN 1-86176-026-4 .
- The Victory of Seapower. Winning the Napoleonic War 1806-1814 / Robert Gardiner, ed. - London: Chatham Publishing, 1998 .-- 192 p. - ISBN 1-86176-038-8 .
- Morriss, Roger. Naval power and British culture, 1760-1850: public trust and government ideology. Hants: Ashgate Publishing, 2004. ISBN 0-7546-3031-5