Military plan "Red"

After the end of the First World War and the self-flooding of the German fleet , the threat from Germany, which dominated the plans of the American military at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, was finally eliminated. From now on, Britain and Japan appeared to be the most likely potential opponents of the United States - the only nations possessing naval power comparable to that of the United States. Although the likelihood of a conflict with Britain was relatively small, the situation could change in the future; in addition, until 1921, Great Britain and Japan were in allied relations, which could be renewed in the future.

In this regard, in 1919-1924, the joint committee of the chiefs of staff of the US Army and Navy prepared plans in case of a possible war with Japan and the British Empire. According to established tradition, plans received “color” code designations. Britain in these plans was designated as "red", Canada - "crimson", India - "ruby", Australia - "scarlet", New Zealand - "pomegranate", and the British colonies - "pink". The general name of the plan was “Red War Plan”.

The main provisions of the plan suggested that:

• War will only be waged between the United States and the British Empire (the Red-Orange plan developed in parallel considered the possibility of a simultaneous war against the British Empire and Japan )
• The entire British Empire will be united in the war against the United States, not a single part of it will try to remain neutral.
• The military potential of both sides will be at the moment of its beginning close to that which existed at the time of drawing up the plan
• The international situation for both sides will not prevent the deployment of their main forces against each other
• A significant part of the US Navy at the time of the outbreak of war (M Day) will be in the Atlantic.

Campaign Goal

The main goal of the campaign was to ensure the security of the United States from invasion by occupying Canadian territory and destroying all British forces in the Western Hemisphere. It was assumed that the fulfillment of these conditions - the elimination of all potential bridgeheads for US invasion of the United States, and the establishment of dominance over the waters of the Western Atlantic, the Caribbean and the eastern part of the Pacific Ocean - would be enough to completely exclude the possibility of effective British action against the American metropolis.

The main theaters of operations, respectively, were to become the territory of Canada and the western Atlantic. Secondary theaters spanned the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama (Panama Canal). Separately, the actions of the navy in the Great Lakes, perceived as a key sector for the entire campaign, were singled out.

Campaign Plan

The campaign plan was based on the task of isolating Canada (indicated in the plan as "Crimson") from the rest of the British Empire (designated as "Red"). American strategists postulated that in itself Canada has neither the military nor the industrial potential to withstand any prolonged war with the United States, and if Canada does not receive military assistance from outside, it will be defeated relatively quickly. Therefore, the main efforts should have been directed at the beginning of the campaign to seize strategic coastal areas and prevent the Canadian forces from attempting to attack US territory.

• Nova Scotia - the main objective of the hostilities in the region was to capture Halifax as quickly as possible through land and sea operations. The widespread use of chemical warfare agents was supposed to break down the defense. The capture of Halifax allowed the Americans to neutralize the largest British naval base in the Western Hemisphere and provide the US Navy with a convenient parking lot to extend the sea blockade on the entire Atlantic coast of Canada.

For this operation, it was supposed to concentrate in advance (before day M, that is, before the mobilization began) the army corps consisting of three divisions, with a total number of up to 25,000 people with ammunition and allowance for 30 days of hostilities. To cover the deployment, the main forces of the American army aviation stood out. The US Navy was supposed to cover the landing in Halifax and disrupt the British efforts to bring troops and equipment to Canada through Atlantic ports.

If the operation to quickly capture Halifax failed, the US forces were to strike at the strategic railway junction in Moncton. The capture of this railway junction would almost completely cut off Nova Scotia from the rest of Canada, isolating the British reinforcements delivered across the ocean on a small bridgehead.

• Quebec and the St. Lawrence River Valley - the seizure of this region would completely cut off the rest of Canada from strategic ports on the Atlantic coast, excluding the possibility of delivering troops and supplies from the British metropolis on the shortest route.
• Ontario and the Great Lakes region - in this region, the main goal was to neutralize Canadian airfields and air bases, in order to avoid the use of British bomber aircraft. Since a number of the largest industrial centers in the United States, including Chicago and Detroit, were located in close proximity to the Great Lakes, military operations in this region were given special importance in terms of protecting the United States from air attacks.

In addition, control of the region made it possible to launch an offensive against the main Canadian industrial centers in Toronto, completely undermining Canada's ability to continue the war without outside help.

• Winnipeg - The attack on Winnipeg was designed to disrupt the railway connection between the eastern and western provinces of Canada. The capture of this region would have made impossible any maneuvers by the Canadian forces over long distances.
• Vancouver and Victoria - Attachment of this region was given great importance. In it was the only Pacific naval base in the Western Hemisphere. The establishment of American control over the region would violate the possibility of supplying Canada through the Pacific Ocean and would impede the operations of the British fleet against the Pacific coast of the United States. The main importance in this operation was given to the navy, which was to organize a landing on the island of Vancouver and subsequently establish a tight blockade of the coast.
• Caribbean Sea - the quick capture by the forces of the Navy and Marine Corps of Bermuda, Jamaica and other strategic sites and military bases of Great Britain was supposed. After which, the army was to form garrison forces to hold these territories against a possible counterattack.
• Outside of the main plan of the campaign, external US territories remained. The defense of Alaska was supposed to be carried out primarily by the army, while the main role in the defense of Panama was to play together both the army and the navy (the garrison of the Panama Canal was supposed to be brought up to 40,000 in advance). At the same time, it was believed that the probability of a concentrated attack against Panama, Hawaii or Alaska is very small, since the British did not have close bases, and the transfer of significant army forces over a distance of tens of thousands of kilometers would require costs that are completely incompatible with real military value of any of these facilities.

Considerable attention was paid to the defense of the Philippines. Since the plan did not include offensive operations outside the Western Hemisphere, the Australian attack on the Philippines, supported by British colonial forces from India, was considered highly likely.

Next Steps

The basic plan did not include any offensive operations outside the Western Hemisphere. The authors of the plan proceeded from the traditional notions of British superiority, and intended to wage a defensive war at sea, concentrating the main forces of the fleet in the northern ports of the United States and nullifying the lines of communication between Britain and Canada. It was assumed that the capture of Canada in itself would force Britain to agree to negotiations on conditions that suit the Americans.

The problem with the plan was the lack of any clear proposals in case Canada declares neutrality and does not fight against the United States. A similar outcome, given the prevailing political sentiment in Canada, seemed quite likely both in London and in Washington. In general, the US military proceeded from the fact that the United States should not agree to Canada’s neutrality if it does not agree to deploy American garrisons to control key ports until the end of the war.

Naval forces

In general, although there was approximate numerical parity in large fleet ships, in practice the British royal fleet was stronger than the American one. The British linear forces possessed, among others, five high-speed battleships of the Queen Elizabeth type, developing up to 25 knots, and three battle cruisers (Hood, Ripals, and Rinaun) developing a speed of up to 28 knots. In the American Navy, there were no battleships with a speed of more than 21 knots, which gave the British a significant tactical advantage. Two of the most powerful British battleships - Rodney and Nelson - belonged to the ships of the latest construction, and at that time were the only battleships in the world built taking into account military experience. British sailors were better trained, and officers had practical combat experience. On the other hand, the American "standard battleships" were slightly better protected and had a high degree of tactical unification.

In the field of aircraft carriers, the British fleet disposed of six (of which three were fleet) against three American (of which there were two fleet). On the other hand, the ratio of decked aircraft was much more even: 192 American versus 200 British (on high-speed aircraft carriers, 140 and 152, respectively), since American aircraft carriers of the Saratoga type were much larger than the British. The American tactics of using aircraft carrier aircraft were better developed and more progressive than the British one: at the Fleet Problem IX exercises in 1929, the Americans first practiced independent strike operations of high-speed aircraft carriers against military bases, while the British still regarded aircraft carriers mainly as part of a linear escort fleet.

The most significant was the superiority of the British fleet in cruisers (both heavy and light). In fact, the British cruising forces outperformed the American in the ratio of 2.5 to 1. As some compensation, the American heavy cruisers were better protected and armed than the British.

With regard to destroyers, the US Navy, in turn, had superiority in numbers. On the other hand, all American destroyers were built between 1914-1922, and are somewhat outdated compared to the new British destroyers. In addition, the torpedo tactics of the American fleet were less perfect. With regard to submarines, there was parity, but about a third of the British submarines were post-war and more technically advanced.

It was assumed that Britain would not be able to concentrate a large naval group in Canadian waters earlier than two weeks after day M, which gave the American Navy some scope for action in the attack of Halifax.

Ground Forces

Reds (Canada and the British Empire)

In their calculations, the Americans proceeded from the fact that the British Empire is significantly superior in ground forces and partially superior in the navy. It was assumed that on Day M the British Empire would have ground forces totaling half a million people, and within 360 days from the start of mobilization this number could be brought up to 2.5 million. The Royal Armored Corps had about 600 tanks and wedges in line with four tank regiments and in reserve, including the relatively modern Vickers Medium Mark II and Mark II ^[4] . The Air Force was calculated as the equivalent of 24 bomber and 12 fighter squadrons.

At the same time, Canada alone could put at the start of the war no more than 60,000 people (of which no more than a quarter were regular) and, according to American estimates, could not mobilize more than 500,000 people within 360 days after M Day. The armored forces consisted of only a few Carden-Loyd Mk VI wedges . The Canadian naval forces consisted of four destroyers and three minesweepers (some of which are in reserve), and could not constitute a serious force without British support. Canadian aviation had about 150 aircraft, mostly training or reconnaissance. There was one squadron of fighters and one squadron of light reconnaissance / bombers with a total number of about 24 aircraft.

Canada was the only bridgehead in the Western Hemisphere where the British Empire could deploy any significant forces to act against the home territory of the United States. Therefore, the focus was on the quick isolation of Canada from the rest of Britain.

Blue (USA)

The United States expected that by Day M their regular army would consist of 102700 soldiers and officers, divided into three fully equipped infantry divisions and one cavalry division and three partially equipped infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions. These forces were supplemented by the forces of the National Guard of 175,000 soldiers and officers, divided into 18 divisions. In addition, there was an organized reserve of nearly 113,000 officers. Military planning assumed (in realistic conditions) a pace of mobilization of up to 25,000 people per day.

The American army did not have modern tanks; its tank forces consisted of approximately 400-500 M1917 light tanks and a certain number (less than 100) of obsolete Mark VIII heavy tanks. Army aviation consisted of three fighter ^[5] squadrons, two bomber and two assault squadrons. There were also six observationally-connected squadrons. National Guard Aviation consisted of 18 observationally-connected squadrons.

The main goal of the plan was to isolate Canada from the rest of Britain and to defeat the main Canadian forces until they were fully mobilized. At the same time, the fleet was supposed to neutralize the remaining British bases in the Western Hemisphere and gain dominance in American waters.

The implementation of this plan, according to American strategists, would eliminate any large-scale British actions against the American metropolis (due to the lack of bridgeheads) and would cause the British Empire sufficient economic damage to force it into peace negotiations without the need to transfer American operations outside Western Hemisphere.

In the event that the British decided to continue the war, the main actions of the Americans would be to protect the external territories (Philippines, Hawaii) and the systematic violation of British trade and communications until the British economy ceases to function. After that, it was supposed to achieve isolation of Britain by the naval forces and force it to surrender.

The British armed forces did not have a specific plan of war against the United States, and attempts to develop such a plan were blocked for political reasons. So, in 1919, the Royal Navy was forbidden to develop plans for war with the United States, since the government was afraid that the very existence of such plans could be used by the American government in order to convince the American population of the need to expand naval programs.

In general, the British fleet was inclined to the idea of ​​confronting America by means of offensive naval operations: concentrated attacks on American naval bases, the destruction of American large ships in battle, and local landing operations against the American metropolis for tactical purposes. The key objective was the defense of Bermuda and other advanced bases from which it was possible to strike against the US Navy and American trade. The transfer of troops to Canada was considered feasible despite US opposition, but the British admirals considered the long-term defense of Canada against the full power of the American army impossible. A major offensive operation was planned at the Asian theater with the aim of occupying the Philippines, and, possibly, the Hawaiian Islands, relying on the resources of Australia and India. The ultimate goal of the British plans was the strategic isolation of America, the disruption of its trade ties and the protection of British communications until the moment that growing American dissatisfaction with the protracted war persuaded Washington to negotiate peace.

In Canada, as early as 1921, a plan of action was developed, called Defensive Scheme No. 1 Developed on the initiative of Lieutenant Colonel James Sutherland Brown, the plan called for the launching of preventive strikes on US territory by “flying troops” of the Canadian army. It was assumed that in the event of undoubted signs of an approaching war, the Canadian units would have to force the border in weakly guarded sectors, advance to the American rear, and inflict blows on the infrastructure: to blow up bridges, spoil the railroad tracks, and disrupt telegraph communication. The goal was to disrupt the deployment of the American army at the borders, and to gain time for the arrival of reinforcements from the UK.

The plan was not adopted by the Canadian government and development was discontinued in 1928.

• Command Decisions . Department of the Army. Edited by Kent Roberts Greenfield. Washington, DC 1960 .
• Bell, Christopher M., “Thinking the Unthinkable: British and American Naval Strategies for an Anglo-American War, 1918-31,” International History Review , (November 1997) 19 No. 4, p. 789-808. (eng.)
• Holt, Thaddeus, “Joint Plan Red,” in MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History , Vol. 1 no. 1. (English)
• Major, John. "War Plan Red: The American Plan for War with Britain," Historian (1998) 58 No. 1 p. 12-15. (eng.)
• Preston, Richard A. The Defense of the Undefended Border: Planning for War in North America 1867-1939 . Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977. (English)
• Rudmin, Floyd W. Bordering on Aggression: Evidence of US Military Preparations Against Canada . (1993). Voyageur Publishing. ISBN 0-921842-09-0 . (eng.)

• Original Plan
• Rudmin, F. A 1935 US Plan for Invasion of Canada February 1995
• Carlson, P. Raiding the Icebox The Washington Post. December 2005
• A Western Front Films Production in association with Brightside Films for Channel 5 America's Planned War On Britain: Revealed