The crash of the Tu-134 near Berlin

Tu-134A (registration number of the USSR-65795, serial number 63145, serial 56-06) was produced by the KHAPP factory on March 18, 1980 and was transferred to the Moscow State Academy of Arts , which on March 27 of the same year sent it to 1st Minsk (according to other sources - in the 2nd Minsk) united air squad of the Belarusian UGA. It is equipped with two D-30 turbojet engines of the Perm Motor Plant . On the day of the crash, the airliner completed 8482 take-off and landing cycles and flew 12,658 hours ^[1] .

The crew of flight SU-892 was as follows ^[2] :

• The commander of the aircraft (FAC) is Anatoly Vasilyevich Bogolyubov.
• The co - pilot is N.V. Andrukh.
• Navigator - V.P. Dylenok.
• Bortmekhanik - Alexey Makarovich Zhukov.
• Bortradist - Anatoly Grigoryevich Feoktistov.
• Reviewer -V.A. Kolosov .

Two stewardesses worked in the airplane cabin:

• Irina Ivanovna Belozerova,
• Tatyana Evgenievna Rasskazova.

The Tu-134A aircraft of the USSR-65795 performed flight SU-892 from Minsk to Berlin, but due to bad weather in Berlin (fog), the crew landed in Prague. When the weather in Berlin improved, flight 892 flew out of Prague and after climbing climbed to FL220 (6,700 meters). On board, in addition to 9 crew members, there were 73 passengers; among them were teachers and 27 German schoolchildren from the 10A class of a secondary school in the city of Schwerin , who flew home after an excursion to Minsk ^[3] .

When the liner approached Berlin, the sky was completely covered by cumulus clouds 60 meters high, there was fog and a fresh southeast wind blew. The dispatcher informed the crew that they were the first in the landing line, and also immediately allowed the approach from the direct ILS line to runway No. 25L . The approach was completed without comment, the crew carried out all the necessary pre-landing procedures, after which the liner with the autopilot turned on , being 13.5 kilometers from the runway, entered the glide path . The dispatcher reported that horizontal visibility is 900 meters, and on the runway in position A - 1700 meters, in position B - more than 1000 meters. The crew released the flaps at 38 ° ^[2] .

At first, everything went without deviations, but the dispatcher turned on (for verification) landing lights on runway No. 25R, which at that time was undergoing repairs and was closed. The dispatcher in English warned the crews of the Belarusian and Hungarian Tu-134s (the second approached the first after the landing), although this was not provided for by the rules of radio exchange. But the Belarusian Tu-134 flight attendant who did not speak English well misunderstood the information and took the dispatcher’s message as an instruction to land on runway No. 25R, which he confirmed, and then the PIC gave the command: 25 right, rebuild quickly . Runway No. 25L was 460 meters from runway No. 25R, and its entrance end was 2200 meters closer. The commander turned off the autopilot and began to maneuver manually. Although the dispatcher tried to clarify that the strip No. 25R was closed for repairs and the lights were turned on only for verification, the pilots were talking to each other at that moment and did not hear the dispatcher’s message. Flight 892 quickly turned right and its ILS control signal disappeared for a while ^[2] .

Seeing on the radar screen that flight 892 had significantly deviated to the right, the dispatcher handed over: Aeroflot 892, you should go on 25 left, 25 left . ” The crew confirmed the receipt of information, after which the PIC gave the command: Rearrange , and navigator: Left 230 degrees . The dispatcher also instructed: Turn left, turn left! . The liner at that time was 450 meters to the right of the landing glide path and 60 meters below it. At an altitude of 110 meters, the crew turned on the autopilot, but the engine mode did not increase, and this led to the flight speed falling to 263 km / h, and the vertical speed of descent increased to 7 m / s. The aircraft continued to perform a left turn, when 103 meters from the ground at a vertical speed of 9 m / s, the GPWS system (dangerous speed of approach to the ground) worked, and at 40 meters the VLR alarm went off ^[2] .

At 5:04 p.m. CET (according to other sources at 6:00 p.m. CET), 3 kilometers from the end of runway No. 25L, flight SU-892 in a non-stop position ( landing gear removed, flaps not fully extended) caught the tops of the forest trees and crashed into the ground near Bonsdorf. Jet fuel leaking from the tanks ignited, causing a fire ^[4] .

The fact that the SU-892 flight disappeared from the radar screens was noticed only at 17:15, and already at 17:30 the first rescue services arrived at the crash site. Directly at the crash site, 12 surviving passengers were found; later in hospitals, 2 of them died from their injuries. In total, 72 people died in the crash - all 9 crew members and 63 passengers; Among them were 20 German schoolchildren ^{[3] [2]} .

In 2018, this plane crash (in terms of the number of victims) ranks second in Germany after the Il-62 crash in 1972 (156 dead) and the ninth with the participation of the Tu-134 airliner.

We could not get through; the broken treetops lay everywhere; Christmas trees were like Christmas trees, decorated with airplane seats and debris.

Original text (German)

Wir kamen nicht vorwärts, überall lagen abgerissene Baumwipfel, absurde Weihnachtsbäume, in denen Flugzeugsitze und Wrackteile hingen. ^[3]

The results of the commission's investigation were published in April 1987 ^[3] :

When approaching, the crew was obliged to decide on going to the second round in six cases:

1. After the message, understood as an indication of a change in the runway;
2. With the loss of the signal of the course-glide path system for 38 seconds (during this time, the plane dropped from 420 meters to 200 meters);
3. After the dispatcher’s repeated information that the working lane is left, received at the moment when the aircraft was with unacceptable lateral deviation of 450 meters and 60 meters below the glide path;
4. After turning on the high-altitude and side channels of the autopilot at a height of 110 meters in violation of the restrictions on the operation of the ABSU ;
5. After achieving VLR and lack of visibility of the runway at this altitude;
6. After the operation of the SSOC and the command of the navigator to reduce the rate of decline.

- ^[2]

Conclusions

The causes of AP are:

1. Issuance by the flight manager of the flight at the final stage of the approach to the left lane of untimely and unexpected information, which led to the formation of the wrong decision by the crew.
2. The error of the aircraft's radar operator regarding the imaginary change in the landing permit, which was not detected by other crew members due to:
   • insufficiently coordinated crew actions;
   • lack of mutual control of the actions of individual crew members;
   • difficulties in understanding the English phraseology of flight radio;
   • insufficient knowledge and experience in applying the rules of international flight radio exchange.
3. PIC did not take any of the two necessary decisions in the situation that arose:
   • on the termination of the approach and departure to the second circle, the need for which arose five times before the flight of the VLOOKUP;
   • did not continue the flight at the previously permitted ILS approach rate to the VLOOKUP.

- ^[2]

Berlin residents learned about the plane crash already at 19:30 CET in the Aktuelle Kamera news broadcast, and the message about the plane crash was no more than 30 seconds long, which, after a 6-minute obituary in front of her regarding the death of Paul Ferner, led to many listened to this message ^[3] .

The Soviet newspaper Pravda also limited itself to a short note:

Condolences over the crash.

The Central Committee of the SED , the State Council and the Council of Ministers of the GDR expressed deep condolences to the families and relatives of those killed in the crash that occurred on December 12 near the Schönefeld Airport .

- ^[5]

Nevertheless, such short messages were enough to spread rumors that the Russian crew was allegedly drunk or that the plane was malfunctioning. As a result, anti-Soviet sentiments arose in the city, so on the day of the funeral on December 18, the movement of the Soviet military was limited, and their families were not recommended to go out ^{[3] [5]} .

As a result of the identification of the perpetrators of the disaster, the Chief navigator of the Belarusian CAA Lagun, Leonid Demidovich , was transferred to the first class navigators of the Minsk flight detachment. The head of the BUGA department is Kurilo V.M. reprimanded by the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MGA). The BUGA chief accordingly reprimanded the commander of the aviation detachment and demoted the main navigator Lagun L.D.

In 2010, a memorial sign was installed at the crash site ^[5] .

• Description of the disaster on the Aviation Safety Network