Accident Tu-134 in Amman

Tu-134A with tail number 65668 (serial number 1351306, serial number 13-06) was launched by the Kharkov aircraft factory in 1971 , and by October 1 it was transferred to the Ministry of Civil Aviation , which sent it to the 1st Yerevan Aviation Squad of the Armenian Civil Aviation Administration . At the time of the crash, the airliner had 2822 flight hours ^[1] .

The aircraft was supposed to fly SU-512 on the route Amman - Beirut - Yerevan - Moscow , and was piloted by its crew, consisting of a commander (FAC)K. A. Koshtoyan , inspector (deputy commander of the flight squad) E. M. Grigoryan , co-pilot L. S. Manukyan , navigator F. G. Hambartsumyan , flight engineer G. M. Amirbekyan and the flight attendant G. G. Geghamyan . The stewardess worked in the cabin S. A. Manucharova . In total there were 78 passengers on board: 66 adults and 12 children ^[2] .

The weather was clear in Amman, a moderate west wind was blowing, and visibility was over 10 kilometers. Also in the city at this time there was an incomplete solar eclipse . The pilot piloted the inspector Grigoryan, who was sitting in the left seat, and the commander Koshtoyan was sitting in the right seat. At 13:37, the crew began to take off from runway 24. The airliner reached a speed of V1 = 252 km / h, then Vr = 260 km / h, as reported by the navigator, after which Grigoryan tore off the front landing gear from concrete at a speed of 265 km / h , which was also reported by the navigator. But then Grigoryan, as it seemed to him, saw that the airspeed quickly fell from 265 to 240 km / h, so he cried out: “What is it!” , And after a few seconds: “Engine failure!” , After which he decided to stop takeoff . At 500-550 meters to the end of the runway, reverse was engaged ^[2] .

Racing across the runway, the Tu-134 rolled onto the end safety lane and, after running through it, jumped to the edge of a steep ravine, then fell onto the slope and rushed along it, breaking trees and poles. Then, 290 meters from the end of the runway, he crashed into a reinforced concrete one-story building and stopped. The fuselage of the airliner was torn into three parts, and the navigator’s cockpit collapsed 2/3 of its length. The landing gear collapsed, and the right wing plane bent up broke. The house was completely destroyed. There was a small fire in the underground part of the toilets, but the arrived emergency service managed to eliminate it. In the crash, the navigator and the flight operator, as well as 7 residents of the house, were killed: 3 adults and 4 children ^[2] .

The inspector assured that during the take-off run he observed a drop in speed to 240 km / h, and therefore decided to stop taking off. A decrease in speed to 240 km / h was also observed by the crew commander, although he could not remember exactly when: before or after the engine mode was reduced by the inspector. But according to the flight engineer, all the engines were working properly, the light alarm did not work, and even if one of the two engines failed, the instrument speed could not decrease, only the degree of its increase would decrease. Flight recorders also confirmed the correct operation of the engines, and the stopping distance corresponded to the normal reverse operation of both engines. No failures of other aircraft systems at this moment were also detected. Thus, it was concluded that the inspector was mistaken when he decided that the speed dropped from 265 to 240 km / h, which was not true ^[2] .

According to the commission, when at a speed of 260 km / h the navigator reported on the speed of the front desk lift ( “leg lift” ), Grigoryan, according to his own statement, intended to lift at a speed of 270-275 km / h, so he continued to run in three-point position. When the navigator repeated the “leg lift” , Grigoryan tore the front strut from the concrete. However, he was subconsciously tuned that the front desk should have been raised at a speed of more than 270 km / h, therefore, looking at the speed value and seeing there the value of 265 km / h, he had the false idea in his head that the speed began to fall ( “What is this such a thing! ” ). Since about half a kilometer remained until the end of the runway, Grigoryan decided to stop take-off and removed the engine mode. The speed value of 240 km / h was imprinted in the memory of the inspector, probably due to the fact that he saw this value after the start of the speed reduction. During braking, only the main braking system was used, while emergency braking was not used ^[2] .

According to the research results of the Institute of Biomedical Problems, it was concluded that a solar eclipse could also be a cause of disturbances in the pilots' actions, since a change in the light intensity has a negative effect ^[2] :

1. as an external brake (increases the overall stress of the body, disrupts current activities);
2. as a cause, changes the level of the general tone of the body, in particular the muscular system. A change in light factors accompanies a change in muscle tone, which takes activity to a slightly new level. The learned actions in this case may turn out to be less adequate to the requirements of the situation.