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The collision of two Li-2 over Kemerovo

On May 27, 1953, two Li-2s collided in the sky in the Kemerovo region, killing 27 people.

Clash over Kemerovo
Ps-84-nowarra135.jpg
Aeroflot Li-2 , similar to both colliding aircraft
General information
date ofMay 27, 1953
Time03:50 Moscow time
CharacterCollision in the air
CauseCrew errors
A placeUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics 16.5 km west of Barzas , Kemerovo district of the Kemerovo region ( RSFSR , USSR )
Dead27 (20 + 7)
Aircraft
ModelLee 2
AirlineRussian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Aeroflot (East Siberian Territorial Administration of the Civil Air Fleet, 133 ATO)
Departure pointRussian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Irkutsk
StopoverRussian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Severny , Krasnoyarsk
DestinationRussian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Severny , Novosibirsk
Flighteighteen
Board numberUSSR-L4534
Date of issueJune 30, 1948
Passengers16
Crewfour
Dead20 (all)
Second aircraft
ModelLi-2T
AirlineRussian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Aeroflot (West Siberian Territorial Administration of the Civil Air Fleet, 6th AAF)
Departure pointRussian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Severny , Novosibirsk
DestinationRussian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Severny, Novosibirsk
Board numberUSSR-A4031
Date of issueApril 30, 1949
Crew7
Dead7 (all)

Content

  • 1 Aircraft
  • 2 disaster
  • 3 Investigation
    • 3.1 Conclusions of the commission
  • 4 notes

Aircraft

Li-2 with tail number L4534 (serial number 18429005) of the 133rd air transport unit of the East Siberian Territorial Administration of the Civil Air Fleet was released on June 30, 1948 and at the time of the disaster had 3882 flying hours. On this day, he performed passenger flight 18 along the route Irkutsk - Krasnoyarsk - Novosibirsk , and was piloted by his crew, consisting of a commander (PIC)I.D. Stanishevsky , co-pilot V. D. Maksimov , flight attendant Yu. Yu. Chernyshkova and the flight engineer F.I. Perevalova . May 26 at 21:07 Moscow time the airliner took off from the Irkutsk airport and at 00:50 ( May 27 ) landed in Krasnoyarsk. After an hour of parking at 01:50, the plane took off from the Krasnoyarsk airport and after climbing climbed to a tier of 2100 meters. The flight passed along the Krasnoyarsk – Kemerovo – Novosibirsk corridor, and there were 16 passengers on board: 14 adults and 2 children [1] .

Li-2T with flight number A4031 (factory number 18432605) of the 6th airborne squadron of aerial surveys of the West Siberian Territorial Administration of the Civil Air Fleet was released on April 30, 1949 and had 1,268 flight hours at the time of the disaster. On this day, he was supposed to carry out the task of aerial photography in the area of Goose Broad . Piloted his crew, consisting of the commander (FAC) A.N. Lomov , co-pilot M.K. Kisilev , navigator- aerial surveyor M.P. Schur , flightradist N.P. Lyalina , flight engineer E. Ya. Kuznetsova , flight operator Z. P. Volkova and aerial surveyor N.A. Pavlova . At 02:40 Moscow time, the airliner took off from the Novosibirsk airport and after climbing climbed to the prescribed level of 1800 meters, after which it went along the Novosibirsk- Gusiny Brod- Kemerovo route to the aerial photography area, located 45-60 kilometers north-north-east of Kemerovo airport [2 ] .

Holocaust

At this time, the weather was clear, air temperature +10 ° C, and visibility more than 15 kilometers. On the Krasnoyarsk – Kemerovo section, the aircraft commander L4534 cut the route, which is why he deviated from the route by 47 kilometers. Meanwhile, at 03:36, the crew of the A4031 board reported that they had arrived in the aerial photography area at a given level of 1800 meters, and then started to work. The Li-2 A4031 first flew 6 minutes 40 seconds at a 90 ° course , then made a left 180 ° turn in 36 seconds and then flew at a 270 ° course for 6 minutes 40 seconds as well. Then, in 36 seconds, he completed a right turn and lay down on a 90 ° course, now flying strictly against the rising sun [1] .

In less than a minute in the middle of the clear sky at 03:50 Moscow time, flying straight towards each other (L4534 - course 270 °, A4031 - course 90 °), before the eyes of many eyewitnesses, planes crashed into each other 16.5 kilometers west of the village of Barzas ( Kemerovo region Kemerovo region ). A4031 board flying just below with its right propeller chopped off the left wing plane at the junction of the aileron and the flap with the L4534 board, and by hitting the top of its fuselage with the center wing of the second one, it also destroyed its fuselage. At L4534, passengers began to drop out of the cabin, the left plane, tail and parts of the fuselage scattered throughout the forest and meadow in an area of ​​150 by 900 meters, and the center section with motors, a pilot's cabin and the right plane crashed into the forest. The A4031 itself went into a dive and, after 350 meters, crashed into the ground in the forest and exploded, although there was no fire. All 27 people in both aircraft (20 in L4534 and 7 in A4031) died [1] .

Investigation

During the flight, the Li-2 crew aboard the A4031 kept in touch with Novosibirsk ADS and RDS , however, did not contact the Kemerovo ADF. In turn, the Li-2 crew aboard the L4534 kept in touch with the Krasnoyarsk ADS and the RDS and the Kemerovo ADS, but communication with the Novosibirsk RDS was unsatisfactory. At the same time, they did not know the exact location of the aircraft in their RDS zone. Many eyewitnesses were found on the ground who saw two planes rushing towards each other at the same height, while the crews did not take any action to avoid the collision [1] .

It is worth noting that the 6th squadron originally belonged to the Main Directorate of Geodesy and Cartography , and in the West Siberian TU GVF was transferred in March 1953, that is, just two months before the disaster. When joining this squadron, the command of the AP TU GVF did not carry out activities that should clearly explain the organization and safety of flights. Only flight crew training was carried out, and in particular, work during aerial photography did not go into the depths, simply entrusting the training of crews to detachment commander Klykov, who himself began working in this detachment only in March 1953 and also did not know the intricacies of aerial photography. Meanwhile, if the flights of civil and military aviation are echeloned , that is, they take place at echelons - altitudes established by standard pressure, then in the case of aerial photography aviation the situation is different. These aircraft perform flights at an altitude that depends on a given shooting scale , and that in turn is determined by the level of the airfield , adjusted for the terrain of the aerial survey site. Meanwhile, applications for work at the Novosibirsk airport were submitted without indicating the boundaries of the area, and the actual flight altitudes over the area of ​​work did not match the applications submitted. So in the assignment board A4031 was instructed to shoot on a scale of 1: 17000. After a simple calculation, it can be determined that the actual flight altitude relative to the departure aerodrome should be1700+(290-162)=1828 {\ displaystyle 1700+ (290-162) = 1828}   , where 1700 is the true height above the terrain, 290 is the average elevation of the terrain of the survey site above sea level, 162 is the level of Novosibirsk airport. Based on this, according to standard pressure (760 mmHg ), the flight height should have been1828+(760-745,5)∗eleven=1987,5 {\ displaystyle 1828+ (760-745.5) * 11 = 1987.5}   where 745.5 is the pressure of the aerodrome Novosibirsk. Since the pressure at the Kemerovo airfield is higher and amounts to 747.1 mm Hg. Art., then the flight altitude by standard pressure should have been1987,5-17,5=1970 {\ displaystyle 1987.5-17.5 = 1970}   , where 17.5 - correction for increased pressure of the Kemerovo airfield. Based on the above calculations, it is clear that before starting the survey, the A4031 should not have climbed to a height of 1800 meters, but to 1970, that is, an additional gain of 170 meters. But based on the barogram , he actually scored an additional 250 meters. It is worth noting that neither the command of the ZS TU GVF command, nor the Novosibirsk RDS and ADF knew the procedure for determining the shooting height [1] .

As for the L4534, its commander Stanishevsky grossly violated the flight route on the Krasnoyarsk-Novosibirsk highway, when he cut off part of it in the Kemerovo region and did not comply with the established flight level. Earlier in July 1952, Stanishevsky was demoted to co-pilots for indiscipline and loss of orientation, reinstated in February 1953, although he still had serious flaws in piloting, as well as elements of arrogance, stubbornness and misunderstanding [1] .

A direction finder was installed in the Novosibirsk RDS, but for all 35 minutes that the L4534 was in its zone, it did not establish its location, which is why the Novosibirsk dispatcher did not know the air situation in the aerial photography area. The ADF dispatcher in Kemerovo, when he allowed the L4334 to fly over his zone, did not know the real route of the aircraft and did not find out its exact location, although in clear weather he could observe the flight of the aircraft over the Kemerovo airfield. Although it is worth mentioning that there was no flight, since the commander Stanishevsky straightened the route around the airfield. The Novosibirsk RDS did not warn flying crews, as well as the airports of Kemerovo and Krasnoyarsk, that flights were being made in its zone 50 kilometers north of Kemerovo Airport. Finally, the crews of both aircraft, despite the clear weather, did not monitor the air situation and did not take any measures to prevent a collision [1] .

Commission findings

The reasons for the collision of the aircraft were:

  1. A gross violation of the established flight route and a criminally negligent attitude to their duties when piloting an aircraft from the side of PIC Stanishevsky;
  2. Lack of diligence on the part of the PIC Stanishevsky and Lomov when flying;
  3. Poor preparation for flights for aerial photography, poor organization of flights, disregard for the elementary requirements for ensuring flight safety on the part of the command of the ZS TU GVF and the 6th air squad, as well as on the part of the Novosibirsk RDS.

Culprits: both FAC and Fangs, formally related to flight safety.

- [1]

Notes

  1. ↑ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Collision of Li-2 of the East Siberian Technical Command of the Civil Air Fleet and Li-2 of the West Siberian Technical Command of the Civil Air Fleet north of Kemerovo (USSR-L4534) ( unopened ) . airdisaster.ru. Date of treatment May 15, 2013. Archived May 25, 2013.
  2. ↑ Collision of Li-2 East-Siberian Technical University of the Civil Air Fleet and Li-2 of the West-Siberian Technical University of the Civil Air Fleet north of Kemerovo (USSR-A4031) (neopr.) airdisaster.ru. Date of treatment May 15, 2013. Archived May 25, 2013.
Source - https://ru.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Collision_Two_Li-2_on_Kemerovom &oldid = 92905219


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