Schulenburg, Werner von der

The representative of an ancient German noble family , originating from the crusader knight Werner von der Schulenburg, who was killed in 1119 . Son of Oberst Lieutenant (Lieutenant Colonel) Bernhard Count von der Schulenburg ( 1839 - 1902 ). He graduated from Wilhelm Grammar School in Braunschweig ( 1894 ). In 1895 he served as a volunteer in the 9th Potsdam Regiment. He studied public law at the universities of Lausanne , Munich and Berlin, in 1900 received a doctorate in public law. In 1908-1910 he was married to Elizabeth von Sobbe (1875-1955). In this marriage, a daughter, Krista-Wernfriedis, was born . Christa-Wernfriedis ^[2] . In the 1930s, von der Schulenburg acquired the Falkenberg fortress ^[3] .

He began his career as a government official in the government of Braunschweig , from 1901 he entered the consular service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since 1903 - Vice Consul at the Consulate General in Barcelona . Then he was at similar posts in Prague and Naples , since 1906 - in Warsaw , which was then part of the Russian Empire. Since 1911 - Consul in Tiflis (now Tbilisi ).

At the beginning of World War I he returned to Germany and entered the military service with the rank of reserve captain in the artillery regiment. After the battle of Marne (1914), he was appointed commander of an artillery battery . In 1915, a German liaison officer in the Turkish army, participated in the organization of the Georgian Legion , which included Georgian volunteers who fought against Russia . Returning to the diplomatic service, he was consul in the Turkish city of Erzurum , headed the German consular service in Beirut and Damascus .

In 1918 he was sent to the Georgian Democratic Republic as part of the German delegation, participated in negotiations with the Social Democratic ("Menshevik") government , and played a significant role in the preparation of the Georgian-German agreement guaranteeing the independence of Georgia. There is information that Schulenburg helped Georgian politicians draw up documents on the independence of their country and the proclamation of the Georgian Democratic Republic.

In 1918, officially represented Germany in the Georgian Democratic Republic. After the war, he was interned by the British occupation authorities on Buyukada Island, in 1919 he returned to his homeland and took the post of adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For military merits during the First World War he was awarded the Iron Cross .

In 1922 - 1931 he was an envoy in Tehran . As an ambassador, he visited the ancient Iranian city ​​of Persepolis three times, about which a memorial plaque has been preserved. In 1931-1934 he was a messenger in Bucharest .

In 1934 he was appointed German Ambassador to Moscow . His initial approval of Hitler's rise to power (expressed, in particular, in Schulenburg's entry into the NSDAP ) was soon replaced by a rejection of Nazi policies. He was one of the initiators of the German-Soviet political rapprochement in 1939 . He was a supporter of the foreign policy of Otto von Bismarck , who believed that the two biggest fronts of German foreign policy could be a war on two fronts and a war with Russia. He advocated cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union . He participated in the conclusion of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, as well as the friendship and border treaty of September 28, 1939.

According to the memoirs of Gustav Hilger, an employee of the embassy at that time: “Inside the embassy, ​​the Third Reich was felt a little. At first, there were no changes in the staff. Fortunately, neither Ambassador Nadolny nor his successor Count Schulenburg were true Nazis, and therefore did not demand from the embassy staff evidence of loyalty to the ruling regime. Schulenburg did not even bother himself to write the speeches that he was supposed to make in official occasions (such as, for example, the "Führer’s birthday"), but instructed the party headman to prepare a suitable text, which he then read out with a bored look " ^[4] .

Activities in 1941

He opposed the war with the Soviet Union, in 1941 he made efforts to prevent it. He reported to Berlin that the Soviet Union had a strong army and huge industrial resources. In May 1941, he met three times with the Soviet plenipotentiary in Berlin Vladimir Dekanozov in Moscow ^[5] . There is a widespread version that during the first meeting on May 5 , Schulenburg directly warned his interlocutor about the impending war and even announced its date. So, in the publication of the historian G. Kumanov “22nd; at dawn ... ”(Pravda, June 22, 1989) the following phrase of Schulenburg is quoted with reference to Anastas Mikoyan, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.):

Mr. Ambassador, maybe this has not happened in the history of diplomacy, because I am going to tell you state secret number one: hand it over to Mr. Molotov , and he, I hope, will inform Mr. Stalin that Hitler decided on June 22 to start a war against the USSR. You ask, why am I doing this? I was raised in the spirit of Bismarck , and he has always been an opponent of war with Russia ...

Mikoyan was not a participant in this meeting, and could get information about it from Stalin, who, according to him, said at a meeting of the Politburo: "We will assume that misinformation has already begun at the level of ambassadors." In the published text of Mikoyan’s memoirs, the presentation of this story looks different: “Schulenburg brought to the attention of Dekanozov that Hitler could attack the USSR in the near future, and asked him to convey this to Stalin.” Thus, the start date of the war (which had not yet been determined at the beginning of May) was not announced.

The surviving meeting report (which also included adviser to the German embassy Hilger and head of the Central European department of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs Pavlov) does not contain information on Schulenburg's extradition of state secrets. However, the ambassador, apparently, really went beyond his responsibilities. In his book The Icebreaker Myth: On the Eve of the War, Professor Gabriel Gorodetsky writes:

... inviting Dekanozov for breakfast on May 5, 1941, in a conversation with him, he raised the question of the critical state of relations between the two countries. Rumors of an upcoming war between them are, according to Schulenburg, “explosive” and they must be stopped, “break their tip”. When asked by Dekanozov where the rumors came from, he replied that the source now does not matter. "Rumors must be reckoned with as a fact." How to do this, he did not think yet. During the conversation, Schulenburg emphasized several times that he was conducting this conversation “privately”. He suggested meeting again to discuss this issue.

In fact, Schulenburg informed his Soviet counterpart about the possibility of the start of hostilities, having done so in the most cautious manner (with reference to some rumors). Thus, he wanted to encourage the Soviet authorities to take positive steps in bilateral relations that could prevent the outbreak of hostilities. At the next two meetings (May 9 and 12), the nature of such steps was discussed - in particular, Dekanozov proposed to publish a joint communique saying that rumors of a conflict brewing between the two countries “are unfounded and spread by elements hostile to the USSR and Germany” . Schulenburg, in turn, said that Stalin could send a letter to Hitler, which would contain a proposal to issue this communiqué. However, this proposal was not accepted ^[6] .

According to the famous Soviet intelligence officer Pavel Sudoplatov , the Soviet leadership believed that Schulenburg was acting on the instructions of influential German political circles who would take further steps to improve bilateral relations. Accustomed to the fact that senior Soviet diplomats did not take independent steps in dealing with foreign colleagues, Stalin could not imagine that Schulenburg was capable of personal initiative in such a matter of principle. In this situation, Stalin was not the first to write a letter to Hitler, although he took a number of actions that, in his opinion, could be positively received in Berlin. So, on May 8, 1941, the USSR officially broke off relations with occupied Belgium , Norway and Yugoslavia . At the same time, by May 1941, Hitler had already made a principled decision to start a war against the USSR. Thus, Schulenburg's personal initiative (supported by another supporter of the development of German-Soviet relations, embassy adviser Hilger) could not lead to the desired results.

In our time, it became known that back in 1941, a few weeks before the war, the German ambassador to the USSR, Count Schulenburg, addressed the Soviet ambassador to Germany, Dekanozov, who was then in Moscow, and invited him for a confidential conversation. Four were present: Schulenburg, adviser to the German embassy Hilger 1) (who later told about all this in his memoirs), Dekanozov and translator Stalin Pavlov. Schulenburg and Hilger proposed to Dekanozov to tell Stalin that Hitler would strike at the USSR in the near future. This, of course, was treason, and which one: the ambassador informs the government at which he is accredited that his country will treacherously attack their country. Schulenburg was threatened with death and indelible disgrace. But how did Dekanozov and Stalin react? “Our efforts,” writes Hilger, “ended in complete failure.” Stalin did not believe Schulenburg, as he did not believe Sorge and Churchill. He considered that the message of the German ambassador was just a tricky move on the part of Hitler to force Stalin to make new concessions to the Germans.

(G. Hilger (1886-1965) - German diplomat. In 1923-1941 - head of the economic department, adviser to the German embassy in the USSR.

Used materials of the book: Torchinov V.A., Leontyuk A.M. Around Stalin. Historical and biographical reference book. St. Petersburg, 2000

“The more I watched the behavior of the Russians,” Hilger writes, “the more I became convinced that Stalin did not realize how close the German attack threatened him ... Apparently, he thought he could negotiate with Hitler and was ready for new concessions to Germany ”(Friendship of Peoples. 1988. No. 3).

I am convinced that such a calm, balanced person with his own political convictions and moral principles, such as Schulenburg, who was also planning to retire, took all these circumstances as personal humiliation, and this also prompted him to make a difficult decision to take his own course, despite his age, a participant in the struggle against Hitler. The Soviet historian Melnikov convincingly proved in his studies that Schulenburg, who was a supporter of a line close to Bismarck's policy of stable, good-neighborly relations with Russia, did not enjoy the sympathies of Gerdeler, who dreamed of an alliance between Germany and the imperialist Western powers, directed against the Soviet Union. Conversely, Schulenburg maintained close contact with the so-called Kreisau circle , which included opponents of the Nazi regime, who sought to pursue a progressive policy, speaking, in particular, for honest and strong friendly relations with the Soviet Union. (see Kegel Gerhard ,, In the Storms of Our Century. Notes of an Antifascist Scout ")

On the night of June 22, 1941, Schulenburg received a telegram from Berlin with the text of a note declaring war on the Soviet Union. At half past five in the morning, two hours after the outbreak of hostilities, he was admitted to the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and handed it to Vyacheslav Molotov (according to V. Molotov himself, Shulenburg appeared earlier, at about half past three, but no later than 3 a.m. ^{[7 ]} ).

Advisor to the German Embassy, ​​Hilger, later wrote: “We said goodbye to Molotov in silence, but with the usual handshake.” The Soviet translator Pavlov wrote that Schulenburg himself added that he considers Hitler’s decision to be insane.

- Prof. Abdulkhan Akhtamzyan ^[8]

After the outbreak of World War II, Schulenburg with the entire embassy staff was interned and then transferred to the German side on the border with Turkey in exchange for Soviet diplomats. He remained in the diplomatic service, although he did not receive a new significant appointment (he headed the so-called "Russian Committee").

He was involved in a conspiracy against Hitler . It was considered by the participants of the anti-Hitler opposition as a possible candidate for the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs (along with Ulrich von Hassel ). He expressed a desire to cross the front line, so that on behalf of the conspirators an agreement with the USSR on ending the war.

[6] Such a principled political position of Schulenburg explains his readiness - and then he was already 68 years old, and his health was shaken - secretly switch to the Soviet side after Stalingrad in order to prepare negotiations with the Soviet Union on the conclusion of peace. The reports of the Gestapo to Bormann and Hitler - the so-called reports of Kaltenbrunner - indicate: the plan of Hitler’s opponents to use Schulenburg for contacts with the Soviet Union arose at the end of December 1942. In the fall of 1943, an attempt was made to secure support for this plan with Herdeler ^[9] , but he refused. In the message of Kaltenbrunner, which cites in his book “The Conspiracy of July 20, 1944 in Germany. Causes and effects ”D. E. Melnikov, it says the following:“ In the fall of 1943, Gerdeler and von Treskov talked about the possibility of transporting the former ambassador Schulenburg through German lines on the Eastern Front. The thoughts that von Treskov developed were about the following. Schulenburg is one of the few Germans who personally know Stalin. Schulenburg must again make contact with him. If Schulenburg comes to an agreement with Stalin, a coup in Germany must be carried out by military action ... Schulenburg always opposed war with the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that this plan of a peace agreement with the Soviet Union was formulated by von Treskov as such. During interrogations in the Gestapo, Schulenburg admitted that he agreed with this plan, which, however, failed due to the indecision of some high-ranking military leaders who did not have the courage to render the previously promised support to a group of Hitler’s German bourgeois opponents.

In addition, Schulenburg agreed to take after the overthrow of Hitler the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new German government.

Hitler and his executioners brutally avenged the man who always opposed the war with the Soviet Union, and then was ready to risk his life for the sake of ending this war and peace negotiations. November 10, 1944 they dealt with him, sending him to the gallows. ^[ten]

• Хавкин Б. Л. Граф Шуленбург: «Сообщите господину Молотову, что я умер… за советско-германское сотрудничество» // Родина. — 2011. — № 1. — С. 121—128
• Ватлин А. Ю. Граф Фридрих Вернер фон дер Шуленбург и эпоха массовых репрессий в СССР // Вопросы истории. — 2012. — № 2. — С. 32—54.

• Биографические данные
• Волков В. К. Призрак и реальность «Барбароссы» в политике Сталина (весна-лето 1941 г.) // Вопросы истории. — 2003. — № 6. С. 31-58 (Ссылка не работает. 4 июля 2012.)
• Городецкий Г. Миф «Ледокола»: Накануне войны
• Мэнвелл Р., Френкель Г. Июльский заговор. — М. , 2007. — ISBN 978-5-9524-3062-4
• Фотография Вернера фон дер Шуленбурга
• Открытие передвижной выставки «Немецкое сопротивление в годы Второй мировой войны. Посол Шуленбург»