Accident Tu-134 near Liepaja

Tu-134A with tail number CCCP-65031 (serial number 48530, serial number 36-07) was released by KHAPP on July 27, 1976 , and two days later it was handed over to the Moscow State Aviation Administration , which sent it to the Riga squadron of LatviaRPO GA . Initially, the aircraft operated passenger flights, but was soon converted into a cargo one, although there were no ballots for this at that time. Alteration of the aircraft was simple - all passenger seats were removed from the cabin, thus obtaining a spacious compartment. By the time of the crash, the airliner had 3894 flight hours ^[1] .

On the night of March 21-22, the aircraft performed a cargo flight during which it was to deliver components from the Omsk to Liepaja for the local radio factory - a branch of the Riga commutator plant (produced communications equipment). Since the aircraft was not equipped with a cargo door during alteration, loading was carried out through the front passenger door. At the same time, the loaders, in order to facilitate their work, began to carry the lightest boxes to the end, and put the heaviest in the front part, closer to the door. At the same time, the load was not weighed, and the centering schedule was not compiled. As a result, the alignment of the aircraft was more than the maximum permissible front. It also later became clear that the total weight of the cargo was 8 tons, which is why the Tu-134 was overloaded by 752 kilograms ^[2] .

At 22:49 Moscow time, the plane took off from Gorky , where it made an intermediate landing ^[3] . It was controlled by a crew consisting of commander Nikolai Dmitriev, co-pilot Valery Kuznetsov, navigator Vladimir Sapunov, flight mechanic Yuri Stepanov and flight attendant-operator Caramello Kaulins ^[2] .

It was already past midnight when the Tu-134 was approaching Liepaja, but the airport was specially extended to receive this flight. At 00:53 the crew received weather data: wet snow 1020 , vertical visibility 100, wind 230 ° 12 with gusts up to 16 , pressure +748 mm Hg . This corresponded to the weather minimum at which the Tu-134 could land, but this did not correspond to the weather minimum of the airport, that is, the dispatcher in this situation had to send the plane to the alternate aerodrome . However, he did not do this and the Tu-134 began to land on a magnetic course of 248 °, while the second pilot piloted it ^{[2] [3]} .

Pilots began to decline immediately after flaps were released. Due to misalignment, the airliner was leveled in horizontal flight only at an altitude of 310 meters and at a speed of 265 km / h, thereby entering the glide path with a delay, and also it constantly rocked from side to side and back and forth. Flying in the clouds, the Tu-134 passed the DPRM at an altitude of 180 meters, after which the crew began to decline again, although the aircraft at this time was to the right and below the glide path. After the passage of the decision-making height (CDL) of 80 meters, the pilots did not immediately go to the second circle , although they did not observe the ground. They also began to direct the airliner to the left, intending to return to the heading line, while the vertical speed reached 8 m / s ^[3] .

The flight altitude was 60 meters, when the crew finally decided to go to the second circle, but the overloaded plane listened to the helm with difficulty. At 1690 meters from the end of the strip and 155 meters to the right of its axis, the Tu-134, being at an altitude of 10-12 meters above the ground, crashed into trees, damaging itself with the left wing. From the impact, the airliner turned to the left, it crossed the axis of the strip and at 00:57 with a left bank of 45 ° crashed into a two-meter railway embankment and, having collapsed, caught fire ^[3] .

In the crash, 4 out of 5 crew members died, only the flight engineer who was injured survived ^[3] .

The immediate cause of the disaster, the commission of inquiry called the crew error in piloting, which carried out landing at a weather minimum below acceptable. It also decreased at a high vertical speed even after the passage of the VLR, while trying to see the ground, which excluded the possibility of a safe departure to the second round. In addition, according to the commission, the disaster was caused by the unsatisfactory loading of the aircraft in Omsk, as well as the unsatisfactory weather supply of the airport, since at 00:55 the weather forecaster did not warn the dispatcher about the weather deterioration, and observation from the BPRM was not carried out, which also required an increase in the weather minimum for the airport and a half times ^[3] .