1962 coup in Burma

Since gaining independence from Britain in 1948, the Union of Burma has faced serious internal problems - primarily with the ongoing civil war and the separatist movements in the national areas. By the early 1960s, all sorts of attempts to find a way out of the military-political and economic impasse did not yield satisfactory results. Summoned to power by Prime Minister U Nu, the military government of General Ne Win (1958-1960) stabilized the situation with emergency measures, but after the general election and U U Nu returned to power, the situation continued to deteriorate. Under these conditions, in early 1962, the command of the Burmese army decided to assume full authority. Among the immediate causes of the March 2, 1962 coup, four groups of problems can be identified:

1. The constitutional crisis associated with centrifugal forces, the intensification of separatist sentiments and the insurgency in the national states,
2. The deterioration of the economic situation;
3. The aggravation of inter-religious contradictions after the declaration of Buddhism as the state religion;
4. The intention of U Nu to resign, which became the catalyst for the fierce struggle between the groups of "traditionalists" (takins) and "modernists" (y-bo) in the ruling Allied Party ^[1] .

Since 1955, the command of the army led by Ne Win drew the attention of the government to the precarious situation in the country, the lack of economic achievements, uncontrollability and corruption ^[2] . However, in practice, Prime Minister U Nu often applied the Buddhist principle of "universal love" (metta), avoided harsh measures ^[1] and did not respond to the appeals of the army. The mistrust between the military and the government of the Union of Burma increased. U Well tried to rely on the forces of the police, but he could not weaken the army during the civil war. After the brigade generals Maun Maun and Aung Shwe, who had influence in the army, were dismissed in 1961, Ne Win and his comrades in the civil war did not meet with opposition in the armed forces. Before them opened the way to power ^[2] . ^[3] .

On February 25, 1962, the National Seminar on Federalism was opened in Rangoon, at which the discussion of the problems of the unity of the country, begun in 1961, was continued. At the seminar, the Shan leaders, led by the first president of Burma, Sao Shwe Teik, enlisting the support of representatives from other national areas, spoke in favor of transforming the Union of Burma into a federation. The question was posed fairly straightforwardly: either the expansion of the autonomy of the principalities, or their armed intervention against the government of Rangoon. Prime Minister U Nu understood that this would be a step towards the disintegration of the country on a national basis, but apart from appeals to solve everything with the world, “family-like”, he could not oppose anything to Shan ultimatum ^[4] . He persuaded the princes not to rush, complaining that the country faces "16,000 problems" and it will take at least 20 years to solve them ^[5] . The persuasions did not give anything - on March 2, 1962, the day the seminar was completed, a proclamation of a federalist declaration was appointed.

On Thursday, March 1, 1962, a government decree on the nationalization of trade in imported goods came into force, which was a blow to the Burmese merchants and sharply increased the opposition of U Nu ^[4] . The attention of observers was taken by the expectations of responses from the cabinet to the federalist speech and the opposition to the nationalization of import trade. The armed forces of Burma did not react to the situation. On the evening of March 1, Army Chief Ne Ne Win arrived at the concert of a ballet troupe from the People’s Republic of China. He calmly watched the performance, went up to the stage to shake hands with the artists, left the theater and the car took him somewhere along the night Rangoon ^[5] .

Around midnight, when the capital of Burma was already asleep, army units with the support of armored vehicles began to quietly occupy strategic objects of the city. No resistance was met: the army was completely subordinate to Not Vin, and the police, whom U Nu had hoped for, pretended that nothing was happening and continued to work in normal mode. From 02:00 am to 04:00 am on Friday, infantry patrols, accompanied by MIS military intelligence officers, arrested Prime Minister U Nu, President Win Maung , Chairman of the Supreme Court, five key ministers of the ruling cabinet and about 30 princes of the states Shan and Kai, participants of the seminar on federalism ^[6] , accused of "conspiracy of the feudal lords". In total, during the night raids, about 50 leaders of the government and the ruling Allied Party were arrested ^{[7] [8]} .

The coup on March 2, 1962 would have passed completely bloodless, if not for the death of Prince Sao Me. It is believed that the cause of this death was the army received false information that a detachment of Shan militants was concentrated in the villa of the former president of Burma and leader of the Shan federalists Prince Sao Shwe Teika and an armory was organized. Closer to 4 am, the military on armored vehicles surrounded the two-story residence of Sao Shwe Teika in Rangoon. The light on the villa was turned off, after which the soldiers opened fire on the windows. The family, awakened by shooting and ringing broken glass, gathered in the living room, after which Sao Shwe Teik, accompanied by his son Sao Tsang, headed for the exit and surrendered to two soldiers. The former president was put in a car and taken away. They didn’t find a separatist detachment or a weapons depot in the villa: Sao Shwe Teik owned only two gift pistols donated by the Czechoslovak government, but they were locked in a canteen in the president’s bedroom. Representatives of the army searched the entire house, seized these pistols, but apart from them and a huge number of Buddhist holy books, to the surprise of representatives of military intelligence, they did not find anything. Meanwhile, Sao Tsang went out into the courtyard of the villa. In the predawn twilight, he saw his younger brother lying on the grass in his pajamas and with a naga spear in his hand. Seventeen Prince Sao Mie Teike died from a fatal wound to the head. Sao Tsang went to the police station in Yankin and said that unidentified uniforms had entered the house and killed his brother. A case was opened under Article 302 of the Criminal Code, the police came to investigate the crime scene, but stated that the army had not given the opportunity to find and interrogate the shooting soldiers. It was found that the automatic rifle was opened 100 feet before the villa, and there were no warning shots in the air.

The Revolutionary Council made an explanation in which it was stated that the troops, fulfilling the assigned tasks, met with armed resistance from the Shan guards and were forced to open fire in order to defend themselves, accidentally killing one of the sons of Sao Shwe Teika. To this day, it remains unclear what actually happened. Relatives of the first president of Burma are inclined to two versions: 1. Perhaps Sao Mie, who suffered from an upset stomach that night and did not have time to sleep, heard the approaching soldiers and, taking a spear just in case, went to see what was happening. The soldiers who were "on edge" saw him, panicked and opened fire. 2. The troops opened fire according to a predetermined plan in order to break the resistance of non-existent militants using the surprise factor , and Sao Mie became a casual victim.

No more detailed investigation was conducted. After the family fled Thailand in 1963, the house burned down, and 9 acres of land on which he stood were confiscated. Generals of Ne Vin's encirclement were built on this land ^[9]

Officially, the coup was considered "bloodless." However, the opposition claimed that Prince Sao Mie was not the only victim - on the same days, Shan’s politician Soa Kua Seng was detained at a checkpoint at Taoundja (the capital of Shan state) and disappeared without a trace ^[10]

At dawn on March 2, 1962, Rangoon, with the exception of the residents of the neighborhoods near the villa Sao Shwe Teika, who were awakened by shooting, continued to sleep. On the morning of 7, the arrested politicians, including 4 ministers, were released ^[7] . At 9 am, it was officially announced that the army and the Revolutionary Council headed by Ne Win control the situation in the country ^[4] , and the France-Presse news agency informed the world that the army had taken power in Burma ^[11] . Ne Win personally spoke on the radio with a statement that “the armed forces assumed the responsibility and the task of ensuring the security of the country due to the extremely deteriorated conditions in the Union” ^[1] and urged everyone to calmly go about their business. The Revolutionary Council that came to power included representatives of the command of the armed forces, the commanders of the districts, and the officers of the General Staff, who mainly began their careers in the 4th rifle battalion, which was once commanded by Ne Win. The composition of the Revolutionary Government, headed by Ne Win, who also occupied the posts of Minister of Defense, Justice and Finance, was announced. The second man in the Revolutionary Council, Brigadier General Aung Ji, became Minister of Industry and Commerce. The remaining ministerial posts were taken by 5 army officers. The only civilian in the office was only Foreign Minister U Ti Khan.

Nevertheless, it was not he, but the Minister of Information and Culture, Colonel So Mute, who made a foreign policy statement that the country's course would not change and would be based on three principles: strict neutrality, respect for the principles of the UN Charter and maintaining friendly relations with all countries ^[7] . On the same day, March 3, the Burma Foreign Ministry sent a note on foreign policy issues to the USSR Foreign Ministry. On March 7, it was reported that the Soviet Union sent a response note in which he expressed his readiness to maintain and develop friendship and cooperation with Burma ^[13] .

On March 4, Ne Win met with representatives of major political organizations and made a statement saying that the Revolutionary Council would restore order, lower prices for goods, build socialism and oppose imperialism. In a March 7 statement, the Revolutionary Council explained the reasons for the coup. The main of them was called the danger of the collapse of Burma. The day of March 2, when the federalists had to make their declaration and the Union of Burma would stand on the brink of collapse, would not leave a serious chance of restoring national unity. Therefore, the army was ahead of events and took power into their own hands, saving the country ^[14] . On the same day, the Revolutionary Council temporarily refused foreign aid, since Burma, in his opinion, "received more than it can use" ^[3] . Now the 1947 constitution was suspended, the parliament was dissolved ^[7] , the law adopted by U Nu in August 1961, declaring Buddhism the state religion, was repealed (and Ne Win began to emphasize his commitment to Buddhism) ^[5] . The Revolutionary Council abolished the State Councils in the autonomies and replaced them with new ones headed by the military. A special system of “management and security committees” was created ^{[1] [3]} . The country's foreign policy activity has sharply decreased, compared with its openness to the times of U Nu ^[5] . I. V. Mozheiko and A. N. Uzyanov noted:

Observers in the West saw in the coup no more than a return to the line of the first government of Ne Win (1958–1960) and the establishment of strong power in Burma. Most political parties inside the country reacted loyally to the new authorities, only the rebel underground and its legal allies perceived the coup as the beginning of an offensive against the left-wing forces ^[3] . In the Soviet Union, they also were in no hurry to draw conclusions about the nature of the new Burmese power: the statements by No Wien about the construction of socialism could be perceived as a continuation of the traditional socialist rhetoric of the times of U Nu.

The changes made by the new government turned out to be much more radical than expected. At the end of April 1962, the Declaration “The Burmese Path to Socialism ” was published, in July the Revolutionary Council established the Party of the Burmese Socialist Program , in 1963 began the broad nationalization of all sectors of the economy. By the end of the 1960s, a one-party system was established in the country, agriculture was cooperative, and large-scale social programs in the field of education and health were launched. It is very likely that his trips to the USSR, which experienced an obvious rise in those years, played a significant role in such a choice of General Ne Win. N. A. Listopadov wrote:

However, Burmese socialism did not produce the results that Ne Win and his entourage were waiting for. Huge investments in industry and the construction of many industrial facilities did not give a serious increase in production ^[15] , rice production in the country fell ^[16] , a shortage of goods arose, accompanied by a rise in prices ^[17] . Entire national groups went abroad, the isolation of the country intensified. Socialist propaganda shifted towards nationalism: the Burmese were proclaimed by the people who made an exceptional contribution to the development of "less developed" neighbors. The Burmese press wrote:

The campaign against foreigners, the “long-nosed” Europeans and the “dark” Indians, whose “immorality” was opposed by the virtues of the Burmese, did not stop: “We are poor — but moral and pure” ^[18] . In the USSR, they preferred to dissociate themselves from the practice of Burmese socialism. It was openly said that such socialism was far from Marxism, and thus left all the economic and political failures of Burma on the conscience of its leaders.

• I. Mozheiko, A. N. Uzyanov. History of Burma (short essay). - M .: USSR Academy of Sciences. Institute of Oriental Studies. Publishing "Science". The main editors of Eastern literature, 1973.
• Gavrilov Yu. N. Program documents of the Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma. Modern theories of socialism "national type". M., 1967.
• Gavrilov Yu. N. The struggle for independence and progressive transformations in Burma. M., 1970.
• Madasami Athimulam. The political attitudes and practical activities of the military regime in Burma from 1962 to the early 1990s. Abstract // Scientific library of dissertations and abstracts . - M. , 1999.
• Purcel V. The Revolution in Southeast Asia. L., 1962.
• Listopadov N.A. Do Ne Win // Questions of history . - M. , 1997. - T. № 11 . - pp . 56-78 .
• Military coup // News . - M. , March 3, 1962.
• Events in Burma // News . - M. , March 4, 1962.
• Friendship, cooperation // News . - M. , March 9, 1962.

• Harn Yawnghwe. A record - 2 March 1962 (English) . Shan Herald (Wednesday, 03 March 2010 11:28). The date of circulation is December 2, 2012. Archived January 16, 2013.