battle of Borodino

From the beginning of the invasion of the French army on the territory of the Russian Empire in June 1812, Russian troops constantly retreated. The rapid advance and overwhelming numerical superiority of the French deprived the acting general commander-in-chief of the Russian army, General of Infantry Barclay de Tolly, the opportunity to prepare the troops for the battle. The lingering retreat caused public discontent, so Emperor Alexander I dismissed Barclay de Tolly and appointed General of Infantry Kutuzov as commander-in-chief ^[8] . However, the new commander in chief chose the path of retreat. The strategy chosen by Kutuzov was based, on the one hand, on exhausting the enemy, on the other, on waiting for reinforcements sufficient for a decisive battle with Napoleon's army ^[9] .

On August 22 ( September 3 ), the Russian army, retreating from Smolensk , was stationed near the village of Borodino , 125 km from Moscow , where Kutuzov decided to give a general battle; it was impossible to postpone it further, since Emperor Alexander demanded that Kutuzov stop the advance of Napoleon to Moscow ^[9] .

On August 24 ( September 5 ), the Battle of Shevardino Redoubt took place, which delayed the French troops and enabled the Russians to build fortifications on the main positions ^[9] .

The number of troops

The total number of the Russian army is determined by 112-120 thousand people:

• historian Bogdanovich : 103 thousand regular troops (72 thousand infantry, 17 thousand cavalry, 14 thousand artillerymen), 7 thousand Cossacks and 10 thousand militia warriors, 640 guns . Total 120 thousand people ^{[19] [P 2]} .
• from the memoirs of General Tolya : 95 thousand regular troops, 7 thousand Cossacks and 10 thousand militia warriors. A total of 112 thousand people were under the gun, “with this army there are 640 artillery guns” ^[20] .

The number of the French army is estimated at about 138 thousand soldiers and 587 guns ^{[P 3]} :

• According to Marquis Chambray , a roll call, held on August 21 ( September 2 ), showed the presence of 133,815 front rank officers in the French army (their comrades responded "in absentia" to some lagging soldiers, hoping that they would catch up with the army) ^[21] . However, this number does not take into account 1,500 sabers of the cavalry brigade of the divisional general Pajol , who came up later, and 3 thousand front officers of the main apartment ^[16] .

In addition, accounting for the militia in the Russian army implies adding to the regular French army numerous non-combatants (15,000) who were present in the French camp and were in line with the combat capability of the Russian militias. That is, the number of the French army is also increasing. Like the Russian militia, French non-combatants performed auxiliary functions — carrying the wounded, carrying water, and so on.

For military history, it is important to distinguish between the total army on the battlefield and the troops that were brought into battle. However, the ratio of forces that took part in the battle of August 26 ( September 7 ), 1812 , the French army also had a numerical superiority. According to the encyclopedia “The Patriotic War of 1812,” at the end of the battle, Napoleon kept 18 thousand in reserve, and Kutuzov had 8–9 thousand regular troops (in particular, the Guards Preobrazhensky and Semenov regiments) ^[22] . At the same time, Kutuzov said that the Russians had put into battle " everything until the last reserve, even in the evening and the guard ", " all the reserves are already in business " ^[23] .

If one assesses the qualitative composition of the two armies, one can turn to the opinion of the participant in the events of the Marquis Chambre ^[24] , who noted that the French army was superior because its infantry consisted mainly of experienced soldiers, while the Russians had many recruits. In addition, the advantage of the French gave a significant superiority in heavy cavalry ^[25] .

Battle of Shevardin Redoubt

The idea of ​​the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, was to put as many losses as possible to the French forces, change the balance of forces, save the Russian troops for further battles and for the complete defeat of the French army . In accordance with this plan, the battle order of the Russian troops was built ^[26] .

The position chosen by Kutuzov looked like a straight line running from the Shevardino redoubt on the left flank through a large battery on Red Hill, later called Rayevsky's battery, Borodino village in the center, to the village of Maslovo on the right flank.

On the eve of the main battle, in the early morning of August 24 ( September 5 ), the Russian rearguard under the command of Lieutenant-General Konovnitsyn , who was at Kolotsky Monastery 8 km west of the location of the main forces, was attacked by the enemy’s vanguard . A stubborn battle ensued that lasted several hours. After news of the enemy’s roundabout movement was received, Konovnitsyn withdrew troops across the Kolochu River and joined corps in a position in the Shevardino village area ^[26] .

A detachment of Lieutenant-General Gorchakov was stationed near the Shevardino Redoubt. In total, under the command of Gorchakov there were 11 thousand troops and 46 guns. To cover the Old Smolensk road , 6 Cossack regiments of Major General Karpov remained ^[26] .

The great army of Napoleon approached Borodino in three columns. The main forces: 3 cavalry corps of Marshal Murat , infantry corps of marshals Davout , Ney , divisional general Junot and Guards - moved along the New Smolensk road. To the north of them, the infantry corps of the viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, and the cavalry corps of divisional general Grusha were advancing. The corps of the divisional general Poniatovsky was approaching along the Old Smolensk Road . 35 thousand infantry and cavalry, 180 guns were sent against the defenders of the fortifications ^[26] .

The enemy, embracing the Shevardin redoubt from the north and south, tried to surround the troops of Lieutenant General Gorchakov .

The French broke into the redoubt twice, and each time the infantry of Lieutenant General Neverovsky beat them out. Twilight descended to Borodino, when the enemy once again managed to seize the redoubt and rush into the village of Shevardino, the Russian reserves from the 2nd Grenadier and the 2nd combined Grenadier divisions beat off the redoubt ^[27] .

The fight gradually weakened and finally stopped. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, ordered Lieutenant-General Gorchakov to withdraw troops to the main forces beyond the Semyonov ravine ^[26] .

Starting Position

All day August 25 ( September 6 ), the troops of both sides were preparing for the upcoming battle. The Shevardino battle enabled the Russian troops to gain time to complete the defensive work on the Borodino position, allowed to clarify the grouping of French forces and the direction of their main attack ^[26] . Leaving the Shevardino Redoubt, the 2nd Army turned down the left flank of the Kamenka River, and the army’s combat order took the form of an obtuse angle. Both flank of the Russian position occupied 4 km each, but they were unequal. The right flank was formed by the 1st Army of the General of Infantry Barclay de Tolly, consisting of 3 infantry, 3 cavalry corps and reserves (76 thousand people, 480 guns), the front was covered by the river Kolocha . The left flank was formed by a smaller 2nd Army of the Infantry General Bagration (34 thousand people, 156 guns). In addition, the left flank did not have such strong natural obstacles in front of the front as the right.

After losing the Shevardino redoubt on August 24 ( September 5 ), the position of the left flank became even more vulnerable and relied only on 3 unfinished flushes ^{[9] [26]} .

Thus, in the center and on the right wing of the Russian position, Kutuzov placed 4 infantry corps of 7, as well as 3 cavalry corps and the Cossack corps of Platov . According to Kutuzov, such a powerful grouping of troops reliably covered the Moscow area and at the same time allowed, if necessary, to strike the flank and rear of the French troops. The battle formation of the Russian army was deep and allowed for broad maneuvers by forces on the battlefield. The first line of the combat order of the Russian troops were infantry corps, the second line - the cavalry corps, and the third - the reserves. Kutuzov highly appreciated the role of the reserves, pointing out the disposition of the battle: “ Reserves must be protected as long as possible, because the general who will still save the reserve is not defeated ” ^[23] .

Emperor Napoleon , having discovered during the reconnaissance of August 25 ( September 6 ) the weakness of the left flank of the Russian army, decided to inflict the main blow on him. Accordingly, he developed a battle plan. First of all, the task was to seize the left bank of the Kolocha River, for which the village of Borodino in the center of the Russian position should be captured. This maneuver, according to Napoleon, was to divert the attention of the Russians from the direction of the main attack. Then, transfer the main forces of the French army to the right bank of Kolocha and, relying on Borodino, which became the axis of call, push the Kutuzov army into the corner formed by the confluence of the Kolocha river with the Moscow River and destroy ^[9] .

To accomplish the task, Napoleon in the evening of August 25 ( September 6 ) began to concentrate the main forces (up to 95 thousand) in the Shevardino redoubt area. The total number of French troops in front of the 2nd Army reached 115 thousand. For distracting actions during the battle in the center and against the right flank, Napoleon singled out no more than 20 thousand soldiers ^[26] .

Napoleon understood that the coverage of the Russian troops from the flanks was difficult ^{[P 4]} , so he had to resort to a frontal attack in order to break through the defense of the Russian army in a relatively narrow area near Bagration flash , to go to the rear of the Russian troops, press them to the Moscow River , destroy them and open the way to Moscow . In the direction of the main strike in the area from the Raevsky battery to Bagration flash, which had a length of 2.5 kilometers, the bulk of the French troops were concentrated: the corps of marshals Davout , Ney , Murat , divisional general Junot , as well as the guard. In order to divert the attention of the Russian troops, the French planned to carry out auxiliary attacks on Utica and Borodino. The French army had a deep construction of its order of battle, which allowed it to build up striking force from the depths ^[26] .

Sources point to Kutuzov’s special idea, which forced Napoleon to attack precisely the left flank ^{[P 5]} . The task of Kutuzov was to determine for the left flank the necessary number of troops that would prevent a breakthrough in his positions. The historian Tarle quotes the exact words of Kutuzov: “When an enemy ... uses his last reserves on Bagration’s left flank, I will send him a hidden army to the flank and rear” ^[30] .

On the night of August 26 ( September 7 ) of 1812 , based on the data obtained during the Shevardinsky battle, Kutuzov decided to strengthen the left flank of the Russian troops, for which he ordered to transfer from the reserve and hand over to the commander of the 2nd Army Bagration the 3rd Infantry Corps Lieutenant-General Tuchkov I , as well as an artillery reserve of 168 guns, placing it near Psaryov. According to Kutuzov, the 3rd Corps was to be ready to act in the flank and rear of the French troops. However, the head of Kutuzov’s headquarters, General Bennigsen, led the 3rd Corps out of the ambush and placed it in front of the French troops, which did not correspond to Kutuzov’s plan. Bennigsen’s actions are justified by his intention to follow the formal battle plan ^[31] .

The regrouping of part of the Russian forces on the left flank reduced the imbalance of forces and turned the flank attack, leading according to Napoleon’s plan to the rapid defeat of the Russian army, into a bloody frontal battle ^{[32] [33]} .

Start of battle

At five o’clock thirty minutes past morning ^{[P 6]} On August 26 ( September 7 ), 1812, more than 100 French guns began shelling the positions of the left flank. Simultaneously with the beginning of the shelling at the center of the Russian position, the village of Borodino, under the cover of the morning mist, the division of General Delzon from the corps of Italy's viceroy Eugene Beauharnais moved into a distracting attack. The village was defended by the Life Guards Egersky Regiment under the command of Colonel Bystrom . For about an hour, the huntsman fought off a fourfold superior enemy, but under the threat of a detour from the flank, they were forced to retreat across the Kolochu Bridge by bridge. The 106th French linear regiment, emboldened by the occupation of the village of Borodin, followed the rangers across the river. But the guards rangers, receiving reinforcements, repelled all enemy attempts to break through the defenses of the Russians here ^[35] :

“The French, emboldened by Borodin’s occupation, rushed after the rangers and almost with them crossed the river, but the guards rangers, supported by regiments who had arrived with Colonel Manakhtin and the 24th division's chasseurs of the 24th division under the command of Colonel Vuich, suddenly turned to the enemy and joined the newly arrived regiment. they were assaulted at the aid of bayonets, and all the French on our shore were the victims of their bold enterprise. The bridge on the Kolocha river was completely destroyed, despite the strong enemy fire, and the French did not dare to make an attempt at the crossing over the whole day and were content with a firefight with our rangers ” ^{[P 7]} .

Bagration Flash

The flushes on the eve of the battle were occupied by the 2nd Combined Grenadier Division under the command of General Vorontsov . In the sixth hour of the morning, after a brief skirmish, the French began to attack Bagration's flashes. In the first attack, the divisions of Generals Dessa and Kompana from Davout's corps, overcoming the resistance of the rangers, made their way through the Utitsa Forest, but, barely starting to build on the edge opposite the southernmost flush, fell under a karter fire and were overturned ^[37] .

At eight o'clock in the morning Davout repeated the attack and captured the southern flash. Bagration to the aid of the 2nd Combined Grenadier Division sent the 27th Infantry Division of General Neverovsky , as well as the Akhtyrka hussars and Novorossiysk dragoons to strike the flank. The French left the flash, while suffering heavy losses. Both divisional generals Desse and Kompan were injured, the commander of the 1st Corps, Marshal Davout, was wounded when a man fell from a dead horse, almost all brigade commanders were wounded ^[37] .

For the third attack, Napoleon strengthened the attacking forces with three more infantry divisions from the corps of Marshal Ney , three cavalry corps of Marshal Murat and artillery, bringing its strength to 160 guns.

Bagration, determining the direction of the main attack, chosen by Napoleon, ordered General Rajewski , who occupied the central battery, to immediately move the entire second line of troops of his 7th infantry corps to the flushes, and to send General Alexander Konovnitsin to the defenders of the flashes . At the same time, in response to the demand for reinforcements, Kutuzov dispatched the 1st Grenadier Division, seven regiments of the 3rd Cavalry Corps and the 1st Cuirassier Division to Bagration from the reserve of the Life Guards Lithuanian and Izmailovsky regiments. From the far right to the left flank, on the orders of the commander of the 1st army, began the movement of the 2nd infantry corps, Lieutenant General Baggovut ^[38] .

After a strong artillery preparation, the French managed to break into the southern flash and in between flash. In the bayonet battle, divisional commanders, generals Neverovsky (27th Infantry) and Vorontsov (2nd Combat Grenadier) were wounded and carried away from the battlefield ^[39] .

The French were counterattacked by three cuirassier regiments, and Marshal Murat nearly got captured by the Russian cuirassiers, barely having time to hide in the ranks of the Württemberg infantry. Separate parts of the French were forced to withdraw, but cuirassiers, not supported by infantry, were counterattacked by the French cavalry and repulsed. Around 10 o'clock in the morning the flushes remained in the hands of the French.

A counterattack of the arrived 3rd Konovnitsyn 3rd Infantry Division rectified the situation. At the same time, Major-General Tuchkov the 4th died, leading the attack of Revelsky ^[40] and the Murom regiments ^[41] .

At about the same time, the French 8th Westphalian Corps of the divisional general Junot made his way through the Utitsky forest to the rear of the flushes. The situation was saved by the 1st horse battery of Captain Zakharov, which at that time was heading to the area of ​​flushes. Zakharov, seeing the threat to the flash from the rear, hastily deployed the guns and opened fire on the enemy who was building to attack ^[42] . The four infantry regiments of the 2nd Corps of Baggovut, which had come to their rescue, pushed Junot's corps back into the Utitsky forest, inflicting heavy losses on it. Some Russian historians claim that during the repeated offensive, Junot's corps was crushed in hand-to-hand combat, but the Westphalian and French sources completely refute this. According to the recollections of the direct participants, the 8th Corps Junot participated in the battle until the very evening.

By the fourth attack at 11 o'clock in the morning, Napoleon concentrated about 45 thousand infantry and cavalry and almost 400 guns against the flushes. This decisive attack in Russian historiography is sometimes called the eighth, considering the actions of the Junot corps as the sixth and seventh attacks. Bagration, seeing that the flash artillery could not stop the movement of the French columns, led the general counterattack of the left wing (remnants of the 2nd combined grenadier, 27th infantry, 3rd infantry, parts of the right flank of the 4th corps and other isolated parts, including artillery), the total number of troops of which was only about 20 thousand people. The onslaught of the first ranks of the Russians was stopped, and a fierce hand-to-hand fight started, which lasted more than an hour. The preponderance was leaning towards the Russian troops, but during the transition to the counterattack, the wounded shrapnel in the thigh Bagration fell from his horse and was removed from the battlefield. The news of the injury of Bagration instantly swept through the ranks of the Russian troops and had a tremendous impact on the Russian soldiers. Russian troops began to retreat ^[43] .

General Konovnitsyn took command of the 2nd Army and was forced to completely leave the flush for the French. The remnants of the troops, who almost lost control, were assigned to them to a new defensive line beyond the Semyonov ravine, along which the stream of the same name flowed ^[9] . On the same side of the ravine were untouched reserves - the Life Guards Lithuanian and Izmailovsky regiments. Russian batteries of 300 guns kept the whole Semenovskiy stream under fire. The French, seeing the solid wall of the Russians, did not dare to attack on the move ^[44] .

The direction of the main strike of the French shifted from the left flank to the center, on the Rayevsky battery. At the same time, Napoleon did not stop the attack of the left flank of the Russian army. South of the village of Semenovskiy , the Nansuti cavalry corps was advanced , north of Latur-Maubourg , while General Friant’s infantry division rushed from the front to Semenovskoye. At that time, Kutuzov appointed the commander of the 6th Corps, General of Infantry, Dokhturov, as chief of troops of the entire left flank instead of Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn. The Life Guards lined up in a square and for several hours fought off the attacks of Napoleon's Iron Riders (cuirassier from Nansuti’s corps). To the aid of the guards were sent in the south of the cuirassier division of Duki , in the north of the cuirassier brigade of Borozdina and the 4th cavalry corps of Sivers . The bloody battle with the Latour-Maubura cavalry ended with the withdrawal of the French cuirassier, thrown over the ravine of the Semenovsky stream ^[45] .

The Russian troops were never completely dislodged from Semenovskiy until the end of the battle ^[46] .

Fight for Utitsky Kurgan

On the eve of the battle on August 25 ( September 6 ), on the orders of Kutuzov, the 3rd Infantry Corps of General Tuchkov the 1st and up to 10,000 warriors of the Moscow and Smolensk militias were sent to the area of ​​the Old Smolensk Road . On the same day, 2 more Cossack regiments of Karpov joined the troops. For communication with flash games in the Utitsky Forest, the Jaeger Regiments of Major-General Shakhovsky took up the position.

According to Kutuzov, the corps of Tuchkov was suddenly from an ambush to attack the flank and rear of the enemy, leading the battle for Bagration flash. However, in the early morning the chief of staff, Bennigsen, advanced the Tuchkov detachment from an ambush.

On August 26 ( September 7 ), the 5th Corps of the French Army, which consisted of Poles under the command of General Poniatovsky , moved around the left flank of the Russian position. The troops met in front of Utitsa around 8 o'clock in the morning, at the moment when General Tuchkov I, by order of Bagration, had already sent Konovnitsyn's division at his disposal ^[9] . The enemy, coming out of the forest and pushing the Russian rangers from the village of Utica, found himself on the heights. Having installed 24 guns on them, the enemy opened hurricane fire. Tuchkov 1st was forced to move to Utitsky kurgan - a more profitable milestone for himself. Attempts by Poniatowski to advance and capture the mound were not successful ^[47] .

Around 11 am, Poniatowski, having received support from Junot's 8th infantry corps on the left, concentrated fire from 40 guns against the Utitsky kurgan and captured it by storm. This gave him the opportunity to act around the Russian position.

Tuchkov 1 st, seeking to eliminate the danger, took decisive measures to return the mound. He personally organized a counterattack at the head of the Pavlovsk grenadier regiment. The mound was returned, but Lieutenant-General Tuchkov 1 himself received a mortal wound. He was replaced by Lieutenant-General Baggovut, commander of the 2nd Infantry Corps ^[48] .

Baggovut left the Utitsky burial mound only after the defenders of Bagration's flushes retreated beyond the Semyonov ravine, which made his position vulnerable to flank attacks. He retreated to the new line of the 2nd Army ^{[49] [50]} .

Platov Cossacks and Uvarov's Cavalry Raid

At the critical moment of the battle, Kutuzov decided to raid the cavalry of the generals from the cavalry of Uvarov and Platov to the rear and flank of the enemy ^[51] . By noon, the 1st Cavalry Corps of Uvarov (28 squadrons, 12 guns, a total of 2500 horsemen) and Cossacks Platov (8 regiments) had crossed the Kolochu River in the area of ​​the village of Malaya. The avant-garde corps of Uvarov, under the command of General A. M. Vsevolozhsky, was attacked by the French infantry regiment and the Italian cavalry brigade of General Ornano in the region of the crossing of the War River near the village of Bezzubovo . Platov crossed the War River to the north and, going to the rear, forced the enemy to change position.

The simultaneous strike of Uvarov and Platov caused confusion in the enemy’s camp and forced the troops, who stormed the Rajewski battery at Kurgan height, to be pulled to the left flank ^[52] . The Vice-King of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, with the Italian Guard and the body of Pear, were sent by Napoleon against the new threat ^[9] . Uvarov and Platov by 4 o'clock in the afternoon returned to the Russian army.

The raid of Uvarov and Platov may have delayed the decisive attack of the enemy for 2 hours, which allowed the Russian troops to regroup. It was because of this raid, according to a number of researchers, that Napoleon did not dare to send his guard into battle. The cavalry sabotage, although it did not inflict any particular damage on the French, caused Napoleon to feel insecure about the security of his own rears.

“ Those who were in the Battle of Borodino, of course, remember that minute when the persistence of attacks decreased throughout the enemy’s line, and we ... could breathe freely ,” wrote the military historian, General Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky ^[52] .

Raevsky battery

A high mound, located in the center of the Russian position, dominated the surrounding area. A battery was installed on it, with 18 guns at the beginning of the battle. The defense of the battery was assigned to the 7th Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General Rayevsky ^[53] .

Around 9 o'clock in the morning, in the midst of the battle for Bagration's flash, the French launched the first attack on the battery by the forces of the 4th Corps of the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, and also by the divisions of Generals Moran and Gerard from the 1st Corps of Marshal Davout . By influencing the center of the Russian army, Napoleon hoped to impede the transfer of troops from the right wing of the Russian army to Bagration flushes and thus ensure that the main forces quickly defeat the left wing of the Russian army. By the time of the attack, the entire second line of the forces of Lieutenant-General Rayevsky, by order of the general from Infantry Bagration, had been removed to protect the flushes. Despite this, the attack was repelled by artillery fire.

Almost immediately, Italy’s Viceroy Eugene Beauharnais re-attacked the mound. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, at that moment brought into the battle for the Raevsky battery the whole cavalry artillery reserve in the amount of 60 guns and part of the light artillery of the 1st Army. However, despite heavy artillery fire, the French of the 30th Regiment of Brigadier General Bonami managed to break into the redoubt ^[54] .

At that moment, the head of the 1st Army headquarters Yermolov and the head of artillery Kutaisov , who were following Kutuzov’s orders to the left flank, turned out to be near Kurgan height. Having headed the battalion of the Ufa infantry regiment and having attached to it the 18th regiment of the chasseurs , Yermolov and Kutaisov were hit in bayonets right on the redoubt. At the same time, the regiments of major generals Paskevich and Vasilchikov hit the flanks. Redut was repulsed, and Brigadier General Bonami was captured. Of the total French regiment of 4,100 men, under the command of the Bonami, only about 300 soldiers remained in the ranks. In the battle for the battery, Major General Artillery Kutaisov ^[55] died.

Despite the steepness of the sunrise, I ordered the rangers' regiments and the 3rd battalion of the Ufa regiment to attack with bayonets, the favorite weapon of the Russian soldier. The fierce and terrible battle did not last more than half an hour: the resistance was met with desperate, the elevation was taken away, the guns were returned. Brigadier General Bonami, injured by the bayonets, received mercy [captured], there were no prisoners. The damage from our side is very large and far disproportionate to the number of attacking battalions.

- Chief of Staff of the 1st Army Ermolov

Kutuzov, noticing the utter exhaustion of the Raevsky corps, took his troops to the second line. Barclay de Tolly, for the defense of the battery, sent the 24th Infantry Division to Major General Likhachev to the battery ^[56] .

After the fall of Bagration's flushes, Napoleon refused to develop an offensive against the left wing of the Russian army. The original plan to break through the defense on this wing in order to get to the rear of the main forces of the Russian army lost its meaning, since a significant part of these troops failed in the battles for the flushes themselves, while the defense on the left wing, despite the loss of the flushes, remained unbroken . Drawing attention to the fact that the situation in the center of the Russian troops deteriorated, Napoleon decided to redirect his forces to the Rayevsky battery. However, the next attack was delayed for 2 hours, since at that time Russian cavalry and Cossacks appeared in the rear of the French.

Taking advantage of the respite, Kutuzov moved from the right flank to the center of the 4th infantry corps of Lieutenant-General Osterman-Tolstoy and the 2nd cavalry corps of Major General Korf ^[57] . Napoleon ordered more fire on the infantry of the 4th Corps. According to eyewitness recollections, the Russians were moving like cars, closing up the ranks. The path of the 4th Corps could be traced along the trail from the bodies of the dead.

General Miloradovich , the commander of the center of Russian troops, ordered adjutant Bibikov to find Yevgeny Württemberg and tell him to go to Miloradovich. Bibikov sought out Eugene, but because of the roar of the cannonade, words were not heard, and the adjutant gave up, indicating the presence of Miloradovich. At this moment, the flying core tore off his hand. Bibikov, falling from a horse, again pointed with his other hand.

- According to the memoirs of the commander of the 4th Infantry Division,
General Eugene of Württemberg ^[58]

The troops of Lieutenant-General Osterman-Tolstoy joined the left flank to Semenov and Preobrazhensky Guards regiments, located south of the battery. The cavalrymen of the 2nd Corps and the Cavalry Guards and Equestrian Guards regiments ^[57] approached them.

About 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the French opened crossfire from the front and fleshes of 150 guns at the Rajewski battery and launched an attack. To attack against the 24th Division, 34 cavalry regiments were concentrated. The 2nd Cavalry Corps under the command of divisional general Auguste Kolenkur was the first to attack (corps commander divisional general Montbrun was killed by this time). Kolenkur broke through hellfire, walked around the Kurgan height on the left and rushed at the Rajewski battery. Encouraged from the front, flanks and rear by stubborn fire of the defenders, the cuirassiers were thrown back with huge losses (the Raevsky battery for these losses received from the French the nickname “the grave of the French cavalry”). General Auguste Kolenkur, like many of his comrades, found death on the slopes of the mound. Meanwhile, the troops of Italy's Viceroy Eugene Beauharnais, taking advantage of the attack of Kolenkur, which shackled the actions of the 24th division, broke into the battery from the front and flank. On the battery there was a bloody battle. Lieutenant-General Osterman-Tolstoy was wounded in the melee by a bullet in the shoulder, but remained in the ranks. The injured General Likhachev was taken prisoner. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the battery of Rajewski fell ^{[59] [60]} .

Having received news of the fall of the Raevsky battery, Napoleon moved to the center of the Russian army and came to the conclusion that its center, despite the retreat and contrary to the assurances of the retinue, was not shaken. After that, he refused requests to enter into battle guard. The French offensive against the center of the Russian army ceased ^[61] .

As of 6 pm, the Russian army was still firmly located in the Borodino position, and the French troops in none of the directions could not achieve decisive success. Napoleon, who believed that "the general, who will not keep fresh troops by the day following the battle, will almost always be beaten, " never brought his guard into battle. Napoleon, as a rule, introduced the guard into battle at the very last moment, when victory was prepared by his other troops and when it was necessary to strike the enemy with the final decisive blow. However, assessing the situation at the end of the Borodino battle, Napoleon did not see signs of victory, so he did not accept the risk of putting his last reserve into battle ^[62] .

End of battle

After the French troops occupied the Rajewski battery, the battle began to subside. On the left flank of the divisional general Poniatovsky conducted unsuccessful attacks against the 2nd Army under the command of General Dokhturov (the commander of the 2nd Army, General Bagration, was by that time badly wounded). In the center and on the right flank, the case was limited to an artillery exchange of fire until 7 pm Reports to Kutuzov argued that Napoleon retreated, withdrawing troops from the captured positions. Having retreated to Gorki (where one more fortification remained), the Russians began to prepare for a new battle. However, at 12 o'clock at night, Kutuzov’s order arrived, canceling the preparations for the battle scheduled for the next day. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army decided to withdraw the army for Mozhaisk in order to compensate for the casualties and better prepare for new battles. Napoleon, faced with the resilience of the enemy, was in a depressed and anxious mood, as indicated by his adjutant Armand Kolenkur (brother of the deceased General Auguste Kolenkur ):

The emperor repeated many times that he could not understand how the redoubts and positions that were captured with such courage and which we so stubbornly defended, gave us only a small number of prisoners. He asked many times the officers who arrived with reports where the prisoners were to be taken. He even sent to the appropriate points to ascertain whether other prisoners had been taken. These successes without prisoners, without trophies did not satisfy him ...
The enemy took the vast majority of his wounded, and we got only those prisoners about whom I mentioned, 12 guns of the redoubt ... and three or four others taken during the first attacks.

- General Armand Kolenkurk ^[63]

Chronology of the battle

Chronology of the battle. The most significant fights

Designations: † - death or fatal injury, / - captivity,% - injury

There is also an alternative point of view on the chronology of the Borodino battle ^[64] .

Russian loss estimates

The number of casualties of the Russian army has been repeatedly reviewed by historians. Different sources give different numbers:

• according to the 18th Bulletin of the Great Army (September 10, 1812), 12–13 thousand killed, 5 thousand prisoners, 40 generals killed, wounded or captured, 60 captured guns. Total losses are estimated at approximately 40-50 thousand ^[65] ;
• F. Ségur , who was at Napoleon’s headquarters, gives completely different data on trophies: from 700 to 800 prisoners and about 20 guns ^[66] ;
• The document entitled “Description of the Battle of the Village of Borodino, which took place on August 26, 1812” (supposedly compiled by C. F. Tolem ), which in many sources is called the “Kutuzov Report to Alexander I” and dates from August 1812, points to 25,000 people total losses, including 13 dead and wounded generals ^[36] ;
• 38-45 thousand people, including 23 generals. The inscription " 45 thousand " was carved on the Main Monument on the Borodino field , erected in 1839 ^{[P 8]} , also indicated on the 15th wall of the gallery of military glory of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior ^[67] ;
• 58 thousand killed and wounded, up to 1000 prisoners, from 13 to 15 guns ^{[P 9]} . This number was obtained by summing up the data on casualties of the 1st Army (about 38,000), taken on the basis of a summary of the duty officer after the battle, and losses of the 2nd Army, which were estimated by nineteenth-century historians quite arbitrarily at 20,000. These data were no longer regarded as reliable at the end of the 19th century, they were not taken into account in the ESBE , where the number of losses “up to 40 thousand” is indicated. Modern historians have found that the report on the 1st Army also contained information about the losses of the 2nd Army, since there were no officers left in the 2nd Army responsible for the reports;
• 42.5 thousand people - the loss of the Russian army in the book of S. P. Mikheev, published in 1911 ^[71] .

According to preserved statements from the RGVIA archive, the Russian army lost 39,300 people killed, wounded and missing in action ^[72] (21,766 in the 1st Army, 17,445 in the 2nd Army), but given that various reasons are incomplete (do not include the loss of the militia and the Cossacks), historians usually increase this number to 44-45 thousand people. According to Troitsky , data from the Military Accounting Archives of the General Staff give a figure of 45.6 thousand people ^[73] .

French loss estimates

Much of the documentation of the Great Army was lost during the retreat, so the assessment of the losses of the French is extremely difficult. The question of the total losses of the French army remains open.

• According to the 18th Bulletin of the Great Army, the French lost 2,500 dead and about 7,500 wounded, 6 generals killed (2 divisional, 4 brigade) and 7-8 wounded. Total losses are estimated at approximately 10 thousand people ^[65] . In the future, these data have been repeatedly questioned, and now none of the researchers consider them as reliable ^{[74] [75]} .
• “The description of the battle at the village of Borodino”, made on behalf of M.I. Kutuzov (presumably KF Tolem ^[76] ) and dated August 1812, points to more than 40,000 people’s total losses, including 42 killed and the wounded general.
• The most common in French historiography, the number of losses of the Napoleonic army of 30 thousand is based on the calculations of the French officer Denier, who served as inspector at the General Staff of Napoleon, who determined the total losses of the French for 3 days of the battle of Borodino in 49 generals, 37 colonels and 28 thousand lower ranks, there are 6550 killed and 21,450 wounded ^[77] . These figures were classified by order of Marshal Berthier due to inconsistencies with the data of Napoleon’s newsletter on losses of 8-10 thousand and published for the first time in 1842 . The figure of 30 thousand given in the literature was obtained by rounding the Denier data (given that Denier did not take into account 1,176 soldiers of the Great Army who were captured ^[78] ).

Later studies have shown that Denier data are greatly underestimated. So, Denier cites the number of 269 killed officers of the Great Army . However, in 1899, on the basis of the surviving documents , the French historian Martinín found that at least 460 officers, known by surname, were killed ^[79] . Subsequent studies increased this number to 480. Even French historians admit that “ since the information in the statement about generals and colonels who failed at Borodino is inaccurate and understated, it can be assumed that the rest of Denier’s figures are based on incomplete data ” ^{[ 80]} .

• Napoleon’s retired general Ségur defined the losses of the French at Borodino to 40 thousand soldiers and officers. A. Vasiliev considers Segur's assessment tendentiously exaggerated, indicating that the general wrote during the reign of the Bourbons, while not denying her some objectivity ^[81] .
• The Russian literature often cited the number of French casualties of 58,478 . This number is based on the false information of defector Alexander Schmidt, who allegedly served in the office of Marshal Berthier ^{[P 10]} . Later, this figure was picked up by patriotic researchers, indicated on the Main Monument ^{[P 11]} .

For modern French historiography, the traditional estimate of French losses is 30,000 with 9–10,000 killed ^[25] . The Russian historian A. Vasilyev indicates, in particular, that the number of losses of 30 thousand is achieved by the following methods of calculation:

1. comparing the personnel data of the remaining statements for September 2 and 20 (a deduction of one of the other gives a decrease of 45.7 thousand) with a deduction of losses in avant-garde affairs and an approximate number of sick and backward and
2. indirectly - by comparison with the Wagram battle , which is equal in number and approximate number of casualties among the commanders, while the total number of French casualties in it, according to Vasiliev, is precisely known ( 33,854 people, including 42 generals and 1,820 officers; under Borodino according to Vasiliev, the commanding staff’s losses are 1,792, of which 49 are generals ^[74] .

The losses of the generals of the sides killed and wounded amounted to the French - 49 generals, including 8: 2 divisional killed ( Auguste Kolencourt and Montbrun ) and 6 brigade. The Russians lost 26 generals, but it should be noted that only 73 active Russian generals participated in the battle, while in the French army there were 70 generals only in cavalry ^[74] . The French brigadier general was closer to the Russian colonel than to the major general .

However, V. N. Zemtsov showed that Vasiliev’s calculations are unreliable because they are based on inaccurate data. Thus, according to the lists compiled by Zemtsov, “ for September 5–7, 1,928 officers and 49 generals were killed and wounded ,” that is, the total loss of commanders was 1977 people, and not 1792, as Vasiliev believed. The comparison of data on the personnel of the Great Army for September 2 and 20, conducted by Vasilyev, also, according to Zemtsov, gave incorrect results, since the wounded who had returned to service after the battle had not been taken into account. In addition, Vasiliev took into account not all parts of the French army. Zemtsov himself, using a technique similar to that used by Vasiliev, estimated the French casualties for September 5–7 at 38,500 people ^[25] . Also, the figure of the losses of the French troops at Wagram of 33,854 people, used by Vasiliev, is controversial - for example, the English explorer Chandler estimated them at 40,000 people ^[82] .

It should be noted that the death toll from wounds should be added to the several thousand dead, and their number was enormous. In Kolotsky Monastery , where the main military hospital of the French army was located, according to the testimony of the captain of the 30th Linear Regiment of Ch. François, 3/4 of the wounded died during the 10 days following the battle. French encyclopedias believe that among the 30,000 victims of Borodin, 20.5 thousand died and died from wounds ^[83] .

Battle Summary

The battle of Borodino is one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century and the bloodiest of all one-day battles before it. According to the most modest estimates of total losses, about 6,000 people died or were injured on the field every hour, the French army lost about 25% of its composition, and the Russian army lost about 30%. 60 thousand cannon shots were fired from the French, and 50 thousand from the Russian side ^[84] . Napoleon called the battle of Borodino his greatest battle, although his results are more than modest for a great commander accustomed to victories.

The death toll, including those who died from wounds, was much higher than the official number killed on the battlefield; the victims of the battle should include the wounded, and later dead. In the autumn of 1812 - in the spring of 1813, the Russians burned and buried the bodies that remained unburied on the field. According to the military historian General Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky , the total of 58,521 bodies of those killed were buried and burned. Russian historians and, in particular, employees of the museum-reserve on the Borodino field , estimate the number of people buried on the field at 48–50 thousand people ^[85] . According to A. Sukhanov, in the Borodino field and in the surrounding villages (without including French burials in Kolotsky monastery ) 49,887 dead were buried.

Both commanders chalked up the victory. The point of view of Napoleon was expressed by him in his memoirs:

The battle of Moscow is my greatest battle: it is the battle of the giants. The Russians had 170 thousand people under arms; they had all the advantages behind them: numerical superiority in the infantry, cavalry, artillery, excellent position. They were defeated! The intrepid heroes, Ney , Murat , Poniatowski - this was the glory of this battle. How many great, how many beautiful historical acts will be marked in it! She tells how these brave cuirassiers seized redoubts, hacking gunners on their guns; she will tell about the heroic self-sacrifice of Monbren and Kolencourt , who found death in the prime of their glory; She tells about how our gunners, opened on a flat field, fired against more numerous and well-strengthened batteries, and about these fearless infantrymen, who, at the most critical moment, when the commander-in-chief wanted to encourage them, they shouted to him: all your soldiers decided to win today, and they will win! ”

This paragraph was dictated in 1816 . A year later, in 1817 , Napoleon described the Battle of Borodino as follows:

With 80,000 army, I rushed to the Russian, consisting in 250,000, armed to the teeth, and broke them ...

The Russian historian Mikhnevich gave the following comment to the emperor Napoleon about the battle:

Of all my battles, the worst is the one I gave near Moscow. The French in it proved themselves worthy to win, and the Russians gained the right to be invincible ... Of the fifty battles that I have given, the battle of Moscow showed [the French] the most valor and the least success ^{[P 12] [9]} .

According to the memoirs of the French General Pele’s participant in the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon often repeated this phrase: “The battle of Borodino was the most beautiful and the most terrible, the French showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians deserve to be invincible ” ^[86] .

Kutuzov, in his report to the Emperor Alexander I, wrote:

The battle, on the 26th of the former, was the bloodiest of all those known in modern times. The place of the battle we won completely, and the enemy then retired to the position in which he came to attack us.

Emperor Alexander I was not deceived about the real state of affairs, but in order to support the people's hopes for an early end to the war, he announced the battle of Borodino as a victory. Prince Kutuzov was promoted to field marshal with a prize of 100 thousand rubles. Barclay de Tolly received the Order of Saint George of the 2nd degree, Prince Bagration - 50 thousand rubles. Fourteen generals received the Order of St. George 3rd degree. All former low ranks in battle were granted 5 rubles each ^[87] .

Since then, in Russian, and behind it in Soviet historiography (except for the period of 1920–1930s ), the attitude to the Battle of Borodino was established as the actual victory of the Russian army. In our time, Russian historians generally believe that the outcome of the Battle of Borodino was uncertain. According to the encyclopedia "The Patriotic War of 1812", "it seems unproven to be the assertion in Soviet literature that Napoleon was defeated in this battle." During the battle, none of the opponents achieved the desired result. Napoleon did not defeat the Russian army, and Kutuzov did not defend Moscow ^[18] .

Many foreign historians, echoed by some Russian publicists, view Borodino as the undoubted victory of Napoleon ^{[88] [89]} . As a result of the battle, the French took some advanced positions and strengthened the Russian army, while maintaining reserves, pushed the Russians out of the battlefield, and eventually forced them to retreat and leave Moscow . At the same time, no one disputes that the Russian army retained its combat capability and morale, that is, Napoleon never achieved his goal — the rout of the Russian army.

In general, neither side was able to achieve decisive results in this battle. The ambiguity of the outcome of the battle was noted by some of its participants. Thus, the famous military theorist (and a participant in the battle on the side of the Russian army) Karl von Clausewitz attributed Borodino “to those battles that ... did not receive full development” ^[90] .

The main achievement of the general battle at Borodino was that Napoleon failed to defeat the Russian army, and in objective conditions of the entire Russian campaign of 1812, the absence of a decisive victory predetermined the final defeat of Napoleon.

The battle of Borodino marked the crisis of the French strategy of the decisive general battle. The French in the course of the battle failed to destroy the Russian army, force Russia to capitulate and dictate peace terms. The Russian troops inflicted significant damage to the enemy's army and were able to save forces for future battles ^[91] .